The 2012 Republic of China presidential and legislative elections to be held on January 14th mark the fifth presidential and seventh national legislative direct elections in Taiwan. Incumbent ROC President Ma Ying-jeou of the Kuomintang (KMT) enjoyed a landslide victory in 2008 over Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) candidate Hsieh Chang-ting, winning by over 2.2 million votes.
One of Taiwan's leading political scientists and most widely quoted authorities on Taiwan politics and cross-Strait relations, Professor Chu will address five issues in his talk:
First, how should we interpret the outcome of the January election and the nature and extent of President Ma's renewed mandate?
Second, to what extent has the 2012 election enhanced the overall quality of Taiwan's democracy?
Third, what can we expect in terms of President Ma's domestic agenda for the next four years?
Sociological theorizing and research on the relationship between inequality and corruption is surprisingly rare given the discipline’s long-standing focus on the correlations of inequality with democracy and development, as well as research that demonstrates the associations between corruption, democracy and development. The authors propose that greater income inequality increases corruption and find that its explanatory power is significant relative to conventionally accepted correlates of corruption such as low levels of economic development and democracy. They argue that the rich will
In this paper, Marinov draws on the experience of the European Union (EU) to ask under what conditions economic integration furthers democratization. Scholars agree that incentives at the European level have helped democratic transitions in Southern and Eastern Europe. However, there is no agreement on (i) the exact causal mechanisms involved, (ii) the relative size of the effects, (iii) whether this success can be replicated outside or Europe. He addresses these issues by offering a theory of how integration furthers democratization.
This paper develops a model where there is a trade-off between the enforcement of the property rights of different groups. An "oligarchic" society, where political power is in the hands of major producers, protects their property rights, but also tends to erect significant entry barriers, violating the property rights of future producers. Democracy, where political power is more widely diffused, imposes redistributive taxes on the producers, but tends to avoid entry barriers.
This paper presents an instituion - the COmmunity Responsibility System (CRS) - which constitutes a missing link in our understanding of market development. It highlights the importance of contract enforcement institutions combining reputational and legal mechanisms in the rise of modern markets. Throughout pre-modern Europe, the CRS provided the contract enforcement required for intercommunity impersonal exchange characterized by separation between the quid and the quo over time and space.