Society

FSI researchers work to understand continuity and change in societies as they confront their problems and opportunities. This includes the implications of migration and human trafficking. What happens to a society when young girls exit the sex trade? How do groups moving between locations impact societies, economies, self-identity and citizenship? What are the ethnic challenges faced by an increasingly diverse European Union? From a policy perspective, scholars also work to investigate the consequences of security-related measures for society and its values.

The Europe Center reflects much of FSI’s agenda of investigating societies, serving as a forum for experts to research the cultures, religions and people of Europe. The Center sponsors several seminars and lectures, as well as visiting scholars.

Societal research also addresses issues of demography and aging, such as the social and economic challenges of providing health care for an aging population. How do older adults make decisions, and what societal tools need to be in place to ensure the resulting decisions are well-informed? FSI regularly brings in international scholars to look at these issues. They discuss how adults care for their older parents in rural China as well as the economic aspects of aging populations in China and India.

Authors
Daphne Keller
News Type
Blogs
Date
Paragraphs

I am a huge fan of transparency about platform content moderation. I’ve considered it a top policy priority for years, and written about it in detail (with Paddy Leerssen, who also wrote this great piece about recommendation algorithms and transparency). I sincerely believe that without it, we are unlikely to correctly diagnose current problems or arrive at wise legal solutions.

So it pains me to admit that I don’t really know what “transparency” I’m asking for. I don’t think many other people do, either. Researchers and public interest advocates around the world can agree that more transparency is better. But, aside from people with very particular areas of interest (like political advertising), almost no one has a clear wish list. What information is really important? What information is merely nice to have? What are the trade-offs involved?

That imprecision is about to become a problem, though it’s a good kind of problem to have. A moment of real political opportunity is at hand. Lawmakers in the US, Europe, and elsewhere are ready to make some form of transparency mandatory. Whatever specific legal requirements they create will have huge consequences. The data, content, or explanations they require platforms to produce will shape our future understanding of platform operations, and our ability to respond — as consumers, as advocates, or as democracies. Whatever disclosures the laws don’t require, may never happen.

It’s easy to respond to this by saying “platforms should track all the possible data, we’ll see what’s useful later!” Some version of this approach might be justified for the very biggest “gatekeeper” or “systemically important” platforms. Of course, making Facebook or Google save all that data would be somewhat ironic, given the trouble they’ve landed in by storing similar not-clearly-needed data about their users in the past. (And the more detailed data we store about particular takedowns, the likelier it is to be personally identifiable.)

For any platform, though, we should recognize that the new practices required for transparency reporting comes at a cost. That cost might include driving platforms to adopt simpler, blunter content rules in their Terms of Service. That would reduce their expenses in classifying or explaining decisions, but presumably lead to overly broad or narrow content prohibitions. It might raise the cost of adding “social features” like user comments enough that some online businesses, like retailers or news sites, just give up on them. That would reduce some forms of innovation, and eliminate useful information for Internet users. For small and midsized platforms, transparency obligations (like other expenses related to content moderation) might add yet another reason to give up on competing with today’s giants, and accept an acquisition offer from an incumbent that already has moderation and transparency tools. Highly prescriptive transparency obligations might also drive de facto standardization and homogeneity in platform rules, moderation practices, and features.

None of these costs provides a reason to give up on transparency — or even to greatly reduce our expectations. But all of them are reasons to be thoughtful about what we ask for. It would be helpful if we could better quantify these costs, or get a handle on what transparency reporting is easier and harder to do in practice.

I’ve made a (very in the weeds) list of operational questions about transparency reporting, to illustrate some issues that are likely to arise in practice. I think detailed examples like these are helpful in thinking through both which kinds of data matter most, and how much precision we need within particular categories. For example, I personally want to know with great precision how many government orders a platform received, how it responded, and whether any orders led to later judicial review. But to me it seems OK to allow some margin of error for platforms that don’t have standardized tracking and queuing tools, and that as a result might modestly mis-count TOS takedowns (either by absolute numbers or percent).

I’ll list that and some other recommendations below. But these “recommendations” are very tentative. I don’t know enough to have a really clear set of preferences yet. There are things I wish I could learn from technologists, activists, and researchers first. The venues where those conversations would ordinarily happen — and, importantly, where observers from very different backgrounds and perspectives could have compared the issues they see, and the data they most want — have been sadly reduced for the past year.

So here is my very preliminary list:

  • Transparency mandates should be flexible enough to accommodate widely varying platform practices and policies. Any de facto push toward standardization should be limited to the very most essential data.
  • The most important categories of data are probably the main ones listed in the DSA: number of takedowns, number of appeals, number of successful appeals. But as my list demonstrates, those all can become complicated in practice.
  • It’s worth taking the time to get legal transparency mandates right. That may mean delegating exact transparency rules to regulatory agencies in some countries, or conducting studies prior to lawmaking in others.
  • Once rules are set, lawmakers should be very reluctant to move the goalposts. If a platform (especially a smaller one) invests in rebuilding its content moderation tools to track certain categories of data, it should not have to overhaul those tools soon because of changed legal requirements.
  • We should insist on precise data in some cases, and tolerate more imprecision in others (based on the importance of the issue, platform capacity, etc.). And we should take the time to figure out which is which.
  • Numbers aren’t everything. Aggregate data in transparency reports ultimately just tell us what platforms themselves think is going on. To understand what mistakes they make, or what biases they may exhibit, independent researchers need to see the actual content involved in takedown decisions. (This in turn raises a slough of issues about storing potentially unlawful content, user privacy and data protection, and more.)

It’s time to prioritize. Researchers and civil society should assume we are operating with a limited transparency “budget,” which we must spend wisely — asking for the information we can best put to use, and factoring in the cost. We need better understanding of both research needs and platform capabilities to do this cost-benefit analysis well. I hope that the window of political opportunity does not close before we manage to do that.

Daphne Keller

Daphne Keller

Director of the Program on Platform Regulation
BIO

Read More

Daphne Keller QA
Q&As

Q&A with Daphne Keller of the Program on Platform Regulation

Keller explains some of the issues currently surrounding platform regulation
Q&A with Daphne Keller of the Program on Platform Regulation
Hero Image
getty image of person holding transparent phone
Getty Images
All News button
1
Subtitle

In a new blog post, Daphne Keller, Director of the Program on Platform Regulation at the Cyber Policy Center, looks at the need for transparency when it comes to content moderation and asks, what kind of transparency do we really want?

-
cover image

Israeli electoral politics is a game of arithmetic followed by architecture. The arithmetic that emerged from the October 27 election gave neither bloc a majority. Gadi Eizenkot now holds the mandate and is running out of time to construct a government. Can he do it? If so, what kind of government could emerge from the stalemate? And what happens if he fails? With the clock ticking, Amichai Magen and Yohanan Plesner explore what is happening inside the race to form the next Israeli government. 

ABOUT THE SPEAKER

Yohanan Plesner has served as President of the Israel Democracy Institute (IDI) since 2014. Under his leadership, IDI has undergone a series of transformative changes, including the reorganization of the Institute around five centers of research and policy, the creation of a new communications division, and the expansion of an impact-oriented government relations arm. In the wake of the social and political crisis of 2023, Plesner oversaw IDI’s emergence as a leading public advocate for constitutional reform. Yohanan Plesner grew up in Jerusalem and served in the IDF's elite "Sayeret Matkal" unit, in which he still serves as an active officer in reserve duty. He graduated magna cum laude with a BA in Economics from the Amirim Program for Excellence at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem and went on to obtain an MPA in Political Economy and International Security from Harvard University's Kennedy School of Government. In 2005, after several years in private-industry executive positions, Prime Minister Ariel Sharon appointed Plesner Head of Special Projects in the Prime Minister's Office. In 2006, he was appointed Executive Director of the then governing Kadima Party. In 2007, Plesner was elected to the Knesset, where he served as an MK until 2013. Among other legislative responsibilities, he was a member of the Constitution, Law and Justice Committee, the Defense and Foreign Affairs Committee, Co-chair of the Knesset Lobby for Higher Education, and Chairman of the Knesset's permanent delegation to the Council of Europe. In 2012, Plesner was appointed chair of the special governmental Committee for Equality in the Burden of Service, which produced a blueprint for incorporating the ultra-Orthodox community into military and national service, one of the most complex socio-economic challenges facing the State of Israel.

Virtual Event Only.

Amichai Magen
Amichai Magen

Virtual Only Event.

Yohanan Plesner
Seminars

Tuesday, December 1. Click for details and registration.

Israel Studies
News Feed Image
december_1_event.png
Image
cover image
Date Label
Authors
Nensi Hayotsyan
News Type
News
Date
Paragraphs

At a CDDRL research seminar held on November 12, 2026, Jeanet Sinding Bentzen, a Professor of Economics at the University of Copenhagen, presented joint research on how religiosity shapes economic risk-taking, a question that bridges household finance and the economics of religion.

Economic theory suggests that nearly every household should own at least some stocks, yet many own none, and wealth explains only part of the pattern, since roughly 10 percent of the wealthiest households stay out of the market entirely. Bentzen therefore turns to religiosity as a possible explanation, which she defines as the intensity of a person’s belief rather than the denomination to which they belong. 

Her framework rests on three channels through which religion may influence risk. The first, religious coping, holds that belief in a protective and benevolent God reduces anxiety and strengthens a person’s sense of control, which should encourage risk-taking. The second, religious teachings, pull in the opposite direction, because scripture condemns gambling, drugs, fraud, and violence and should therefore discourage immoral or unlawful risk. The third, the social capital of congregations, can provide informal insurance and useful contacts, although Bentzen expects it to matter little in Denmark, where church attendance is rare. Her research accordingly asks whether religiosity makes people more willing to take morally neutral risks, such as investing in stocks, while making them less willing to take immoral or unlawful ones. 

To test this theory, Bentzen examined the relationship between religiosity and stock-market participation using Danish administrative registers, which cover the full population from 1997 to 2021. Because the registers contain no information on belief, she and her coauthors measured religiosity through first names, building on the idea that religious parents tend to give their children religious names. They scored each name according to how often religious groups use it and checked the scores against the European Values Study, which showed that names track religiosity far more closely than they track other survey responses. 

With this measure, Bentzen found that more religious individuals were more likely to hold stocks, an effect that is sizable even when compared with income and wealth. Religious individuals were also more often self-employed but less often charged with crimes, a contrast that suggests religiosity raises morally neutral risk-taking while lowering immoral risk-taking. To address alternative explanations such as reverse causality and shared family background, she used people’s own first names, which reflect the religious upbringing their parents gave them, and compared siblings. In both tests, the effect shrank by about half but remained significant, which indicates that the relationship is not simply a product of these factors. 

Ultimately, Bentzen’s research identifies religiosity as a persistent source of differences in risk-taking and shows that first names can serve as a measure of culture across an entire population. Looking ahead, Bentzen hopes to explore what drives this pattern, including how childhood surroundings and the sense of protection that faith provides shape risk-taking.

Read More

Marcela Ibáñez presented her research in a CDDRL seminar on November 5, 2026.
News

Chinese-Financed Projects Boost Democratic Support in Latin America

Marcela Ibáñez shows that Chinese-financed projects tend to raise, not lower, citizens’ support for democracy, especially under leaders who rely on small winning coalitions.
Chinese-Financed Projects Boost Democratic Support in Latin America
Benjamin Yoel presented his research in a CDDRL seminar on October 29, 2026.
News

How International Actors Can Shape Support for Opposition to Democratic Backsliding

Research by Benjamin Yoel, based on two survey experiments with more than 4,300 respondents, finds that backing an opposition movement raises public approval more than criticizing the government.
How International Actors Can Shape Support for Opposition to Democratic Backsliding
Milada Anna Vachudova presented her research in a Rethinking European Development and Security (REDS) seminar on October 22, 2026, co-sponsored by the Center on Democracy, Development and the Rule of Law (CDDRL) and The Europe Center (TEC).
News

Can Europe Turn Crisis Into Unity?

Milada Anna Vachudova traces how EU institutions mobilized rapidly after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, and the harder task of converting solidarity into lasting capability.
Can Europe Turn Crisis Into Unity?
Hero Image
Jeanet Sinding Bentzen presented her research in a CDDRL seminar on November 5, 2026.
Jeanet Sinding Bentzen presented her research in a CDDRL seminar on November 5, 2026. | Nora Sulots
All News button
1
Subtitle

University of Copenhagen economist Jeanet Sinding Bentzen finds that more religious Danes are more likely to hold stocks and less likely to be charged with crimes, a pattern that suggests belief encourages morally neutral risks while discouraging unlawful ones.

Date Label
In Brief
  • Jeanet Sinding Bentzen of the University of Copenhagen presented research asking whether religiosity, defined as the intensity of belief rather than denomination, helps explain why many households own no stocks.
  • Using Danish administrative registers covering 1997 to 2021, she and her coauthors measured religiosity through first names and found that more religious individuals were more likely to hold stocks and be self-employed, but less likely to be charged with crimes.
  • The effect shrank by about half but remained significant when tested with individuals’ own first names and sibling comparisons, suggesting religiosity is a persistent source of differences in risk-taking.
Display Hero Image Wide (1320px)
Yes
Authors
Noa Ronkin
News Type
News
Date
Paragraphs

Senior aid worker Kathi Zellweger first visited North Korea in spring 1995 when the country experienced devastating floods and famine. She witnessed a healthcare system on the verge of total collapse.

"I would see children on a drip, and the drip was an old beer bottle," Zellweger recalls. "Hardly any medicine around. Medical staff sent to the woods to find edible food. Hospitals were often empty, because if electricity doesn't work, water supply is questionable, and family members have to bring in food, so you might as well stay at home."

Over the next three decades, Zellweger made 75 trips to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK), lived in Pyongyang for five years (2006-2011) while serving as country director for the Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation, and founded KorAid Limited, a nonprofit focused on serving North Korean children in institutions and people with disabilities – the subject of a working paper she published while in residence at APARC as a 2011-13 Pantech Fellow with the center’s Korea Program.  

In a recent interview hosted by Karen Eggleston, director of APARC’s Asia Health Policy Program, Zellweger reflects on her life’s journey of engagement with the DPRK and discusses her recently published memoir, Miss Kathi: Saving Lives in North Korea (Post Hill Press, co-authored with Mike Chinoy). In this conversation, Zellweger also assesses North Korea’s changing healthcare system, the unintended consequences of global sanctions, and the urgent need for renewed humanitarian engagement with the country.


Sign up for APARC newsletters to receive analysis and commentary by our experts and guest speakers >



A Health System in a Shortage-Based, Centrally-Planned Economy


North Korea officially maintains a state-run healthcare model inherited from the Soviet era, but in reality, that guarantee has eroded.

"There is no longer universal free healthcare," Zellweger explains. “The infrastructure is there, but is not being fed properly.”

The North Korean health system spans central hospitals in Pyongyang, provincial and county facilities, and village-level clinics. Yet outside the capital’s showcase institutions, facilities remain hollowed out, with severe shortages of equipment, medical supplies, and staff training.

"You can have very updated, modern facilities, but you need to know how to use them," Zellweger says. “There have been some improvements, but there is still a long way to go.”

She noted that “even Kim Jong Un described countryside living as century-old backwardness.” In 2024, Kim launched the Regional Development 20×10 Policy, which aims to modernize infrastructure across 20 counties each year over the next 10 years. Yet, with the country's borders sealed since late 2019, independent observers must rely on satellite imagery and state broadcasts to gauge progress.

Sanctions have hindered humanitarian aid but failed to make North Korea shift away from nuclear development.
Kathi Zellweger

A Chokehold on Humanitarian Aid and a Call for Reengagement


North Korea is subject to strict international sanctions, which, although designed to deter the DPRK’s nuclear and ballistic missile programs, have paralyzed humanitarian delivery mechanisms.

"Sanctions of course hinder aid going in," Zellweger points out. "For example, everything containing metal needs approval from the UN. That’s a huge bureaucratic process which a small NGO simply cannot afford – you need a lawyer for that."

The result has been a chilling effect on standard medical shipments, from basic diagnostic devices to surgical instruments and water sanitation hardware. Meanwhile, the population’s nutritional baseline remains precarious. More than 40 percent of the DPRK’s population – almost 11 million people – remains undernourished, subsisting on carbohydrate-heavy diets devoid of vital proteins, fats, and micronutrients, according to UN data.

“I do wish the UN agencies would be back to help, especially the WHO and UNICEF in the health care sector and also NGOs who worked in the medical field or with people with disabilities,” says Zellweger.

With North Korean troops deployed alongside Russian forces in Ukraine and Pyongyang leaning into tighter alliances with Moscow and Beijing, Western political appetite for North Korean engagement has plummeted. Yet Zellweger argues that turning away from the civilian population is both a humanitarian tragedy and a strategic mistake.

"For me, engage, engage, engage is what is important, especially at this time when North Korea is focusing on Russia and China," Zellweger emphasizes. "We should never forget the people in the countryside who still need our support."

Read More

Cover of the book 'Being in North Korea' by Andray Abrahamian on a blurred background of a road, a cropped scene from the cover image
Books

Being in North Korea

Being in North Korea
A teenager is given blood test during a physical examination in Seoul, South Korea.
News

Income-Based Health Inequalities Persist in the US and South Korea, Though Universal Coverage Helps Reduce Disparities

South Korea achieves comparable clinical outcomes at lower per-capita spending than the United States, according to a new study. The co-authors, including Stanford health economist Karen Eggleston, find systemic income-based inequalities in health care access and utilization in both countries, albeit they are less pronounced under South Korea's universal health care system.
Income-Based Health Inequalities Persist in the US and South Korea, Though Universal Coverage Helps Reduce Disparities
Portrait of Pei-Chia Lan.
News

Studying Taiwan as a Window into Social Divides in a Changing World

Pei-Chia Lan, who recently joined Stanford as the Wang and Chen Senior Fellow in Taiwan Studies, illuminates how globalization, migration, and geopolitics shape social inequalities in the most personal aspects of people’s lives, from parenting and eldercare to identity formation, and what Taiwan reveals about these dynamics.
Studying Taiwan as a Window into Social Divides in a Changing World
Hero Image
All News button
1
Subtitle

Veteran Swiss aid official and former APARC fellow Kathi Zellweger shares insights from a life dedicated to saving lives in North Korea and urges the West to reengage with Pyongyang.

Date Label
Display Hero Image Wide (1320px)
Yes
Authors
News Type
News
Date
Paragraphs

Introduction and Contribution


The significant amount of democratic backsliding currently underway in the United States is in no small part fueled by racial animus. These sentiments underlie indiscriminate deportations as well as the cutting of federal funding to institutions that make use of DEI programs or that are suspected of “wokeness.” More generally, racial resentment is known to intensify political polarization, which itself fuels backsliding. In other words, supporters of the Trump administration may be more willing to accept anti-democratic transgressions because their opponents have been racialized, criminalized, and portrayed as existential threats rather than legitimate opponents. 

It stands to reason that reducing racial animus can help reverse the US’s backsliding. How might this be accomplished? In “Close Race,” Jasmine English presents findings from a survey experiment in which white Irish Americans were randomly given information about the proportion of African Americans with Irish ancestry. This number (38%) is much higher than is often assumed. Among recipients of this information, those who identified more strongly with both their Irish American ancestry and the Republican Party were more likely to exhibit decreased racial animus. Open-ended survey questions reveal that just under a third of respondents inferred from the information about African Americans’ Irish ancestry that racial categories are not so mutually exclusive and that differences between racial groups are not so large. 

English’s findings are especially pertinent as multiracial Americans have grown at a faster rate (about 25% in the last decade) than any monoracial group in the US. Around one in ten Americans (over 33 million) identify as multiracial. Social scientists have notably added to our knowledge about the political attitudes of multiracials, the choices they make in identifying with this or that racial group, and the ways that voters evaluate multiracial politicians. 

Less is known, however, about how the growth in multiracials has affected the attitudes of monoracials. As English discusses, this trend could provoke opposite reactions: On the one hand, monoracials might perceive multiracial growth as a threat to their identity, status, or privileges, leading them to double down on racial prejudice. On the other hand, a greater awareness of shared ancestry could challenge monoracials’ assumptions that racial groups are mutually exclusive, leading to reduced racial animus.

The experiment suggests that merely learning a new fact about ancestry can meaningfully alter racial attitudes.

The experiment suggests that merely learning a new fact about ancestry can meaningfully alter racial attitudes. In addition, the experiment utilizes a contrasting approach to “perspective-taking” methods, whereby individuals are encouraged to imagine the experiences of distinct racial outgroups. Yet it may be preferable to challenge the basis or continuity of racial categories rather than encourage people to take these as given. Finally, by studying Irish Americans as a subgroup of white Americans, English shows how disaggregating racial categories can undercut simplistic binary framings. In other words, white Americans who identify with their various ethnic groups may be less inclined to perceive an existential threat from non-whites.

Learning about Shared Ancestry Through a Survey Experiment


English focuses on Irish Americans because they are the US’s third largest white ethnic group, and on African Americans because the black-white divide has been most consequential in American history. If white prejudice toward African Americans can be reduced, then it should be possible (and perhaps simpler) for other racial minorities such as Latinos or Asian Americans. 

Over 2,500 white Irish Americans were surveyed in late 2024. English measured the strength of their Irish American identity using three components: (1) linked fate, or the perception that one’s social standing or life chances are connected with the reputation or treatment of other Irish Americans, (2) the importance of one’s Irish American identity, and (3) the closeness that one feels, in terms of values and ideas, to other Irish Americans. Then, racial attitudes were measured using the canonical racial resentment scale as well as various questions about racial prejudice. These assess respondents’ beliefs about the persistence of systemic racism, African Americans’ purported special treatment, and the extent to which African Americans differ from white Americans in terms of trustworthiness, propensity to violence, work ethic, and intelligence. English shows that respondents with stronger Irish American identities also exhibited higher levels of racial animus.
 


 

Table 3 Irish American Identity and Racial Resentment

 

Table 4 Irish American Identity and Explicit Racial Prejudice

 



The survey proceeded as follows: First, all respondents were asked to estimate the proportion of African Americans with Irish ancestry. Second, the randomly assigned treatment group received the information that “38% is the correct answer,” while the control group moved on to the next portion. Third, all respondents answered questions about racial resentment and prejudice. 

English’s results show that the treatment did not make a statistically significant difference for the full sample, but instead for those with a strong sense of Irish American “linked fate.” Reductions in racial animus were especially concentrated among Republicans with high Irish American identification, which likely stems from the fact that Republicans exhibit higher levels of racial resentment than Democrats or independents. 

Finally, respondents within the treatment group were asked to describe their reactions to learning about the proportion of African Americans with Irish ancestry. English provides select responses to these open-ended questions, which illustrate how much of a difference the new information made. For example, “I honestly had no idea and just thought, like me, Irish is basically white,” “It goes to show how much ancestry we all share,” and “[it] makes me think that we are all more alike than people try to make out.” In other words, the informational treatment led respondents to view racial groups as less mutually exclusive and the distance between racial groups as smaller. How might these effects generalize beyond Irish Americans?
 


 

Table 7 Reduced Racial Essentialism

 

Table 8 Reduced Perceived Distance

 



*Brief prepared by Adam Fefer.

Hero Image
People of diverse skin tones fist-bumping in a circle.
Kamil Kalkan
All News button
1
Subtitle

CDDRL Research-in-Brief [4-minute read]

Date Label
Display Hero Image Wide (1320px)
No
Authors
News Type
News
Date
Paragraphs

Introduction and Contribution


Large parts of the Arab world were convulsed by mass protests between 2010 and 2012. The protests were fueled by decades of authoritarian rule and economic mismanagement by corrupt political parties and entrenched bureaucrats. Many of the region’s autocrats saw this as evidence that prior ways of “managing” politics — such as through unfree elections or parliamentary debate among relatively loyal politicians — were no longer reliable. Indeed, elections could serve as spaces to mobilize collective opposition while debate could quickly turn chaotic, stalemated, or critical of the autocrat. 

Accordingly, Arab autocrats became ever more reliant on two broad strategies. The first is repression: brutalizing, surveilling, jailing, and exiling their opponents, both real and suspected. The second is a more tightly controlled kind of management: creating parallel political institutions to produce a façade of genuine political engagement. This second strategy has been especially clear under Egyptian President Abdel Fattah El-Sisi (2014-) in his embrace of youth-led propaganda initiatives.

In “Youth and the Reinvention of State-managed Politics in Sisi’s Egypt,” Hesham Sallam shows how what he terms the “New Youth Project” has helped Sisi bypass elections and parliaments, groom a new class of pro-military civilian leaders, and portray his regime as modern and inclusive. These projects include highly choreographed youth forums and conferences, organizations to build support for his regime within political parties, and publications by purportedly independent national security experts. As a consequence, Sisi has effectively co-opted key segments of Egyptian youth in hopes of avoiding the fate of his predecessors. Sallam carefully unpacks the New Youth Project’s history, varied functions, and embeddedness within Sisi’s domestic and foreign policy agenda. 

Background to the New Youth Project


At the time of the Arab Uprisings, Egypt was ruled by President Hosni Mubarak (1981-2011). His National Democratic Party and cadre of corrupt bureaucrats played a key role in igniting the public outrage that led to his downfall. Mubarak was succeeded by the civilian President Mohamed Morsi, who then-General Sisi ousted in a military coup after just over a year in power. For Sallam, these years were formative for Sisi, convincing him that ruling parties and entrenched “political classes” were serious impediments to regime survival, as was cooperation between civilian and military authorities. As such, Sisi did not build a party of his own. Yet he understood the need to groom new cadres and deepen his administration’s legitimacy.

Sallam dates the New Youth Project to 2014, when the Nasser Military Academy began organizing programs to socialize young civilian leaders in military propaganda. The following year, Sisi founded a Presidential Youth Leadership Program that holds regular forums. Meanwhile, the regime tacitly supported the youth-led Nation’s Future Party until it was internally overtaken by Mubarak-era elites. Sisi responded by creating a Coordination Committee of Parties’ Youth Leaders and Politicians, helping the regime build its influence within various parties while giving it the appearance of cross-partisan support.

Functions of the New Youth Project


Sisi’s efforts to build parallel institutions, groom pro-military civilian leaders, and construct a façade of participation can be helpfully illustrated via Sallam’s examination of the National Youth Conference (NYC). NYC is a regime-led forum where young Sisi supporters gather to discuss public policy and make recommendations to the president. 

NYC is an extravagant endeavor, involving fireside chats and Q&As between Sisi and Egyptian youths, TED-style talks by young entrepreneurs, screenings of documentaries touting the regime’s initiatives, and mock simulations of official dialogue. NYC moderators raise (likely prepared) proposals to Sisi, which he promises to take into consideration. These activities give authoritarian Egypt an air of democratic accountability: the president is responsive, public policy is effective, and the state is open and transparent. Importantly, the regime also uses NYC to respond to episodes of mass dissatisfaction. For example, during an economic downturn in 2017, NYC featured presentations justifying Sisi’s monetary policies and efforts to counter price hikes. 

NYC also serves as a reliable forum for the grooming of pro-military civilian leaders. This complements existing military training programs for bureaucrats, journalists, and university employees, which have become de facto prerequisites for government employment. The conferences consistently uphold the military’s view of national security. In 2019, for example, the regime faced protests sparked by a former contractor who accused Sisi and his inner circle of corruption; accordingly, the year’s NYC centered on how terrorists use misinformation and fake news to undermine Egypt. Such narratives and propaganda would likely be less persuasive in an electoral or parliamentary forum than in the carefully managed NYC.

During the conference, young speakers tell the audience about their self-improvement or entrepreneurial success — the implication being that anyone can be successful in Sisi’s Egypt. Meanwhile, presentations filled with data and statistics provide a sense of scientific credibility. One presentation sought to convey that NYC had been a resounding democratic success because it was attended by Egyptians across gender, age, and geography; yet no mention was made of the exclusion of opposition perspectives or those regularly victimized by state repression. 

Finally, the Egyptian Center for Strategic Studies has extended the regime’s efforts. Led by former security officials, the self-proclaimed independent think tank provides ostensibly expert analyses linking regime opponents, particularly the Muslim Brotherhood, to terrorism. Ultimately, Sallam shows that Sisi’s youth project is less about empowering young Egyptians than about creating new channels through which the regime can exercise authoritarian control.

*Brief prepared by Adam Fefer.

Hero Image
People watching someone on a stage.
Terren Hurst
All News button
1
Subtitle

CDDRL Research-in-Brief [4-minute read]

Aria Label
Read More of Facades of Youth Engagement in Sisi’s Egypt
Date Label
Display Hero Image Wide (1320px)
No
-
Industrial Islamism: How Authoritarian Movements Mobilize Workers

The more a Muslim-majority country industrializes, the more Islamized its politics becomes. Utku Balaban makes this provocative case in his award-winning Industrial Islamism. The book centers on Turkey, the most industrialized Muslim-majority country and home to the most successful Islamist movement. Drawing on historical and ethnographic research in sweatshops and working-class neighborhoods, Balaban follows a new class of industrial entrepreneurs who drove Turkey’s post–Cold War boom. Their alliance with the Islamist movement let them control workers on the shop floor and reshape national politics.

ABOUT THE SPEAKER

Utku Balaban is Associate Professor of Sociology in the Department of Race, Intersectionality, Gender, and Sociology at Xavier University. He is also the author of Industrial Islamism: How Authoritarian Movements Mobilize Workers (University of California Press, 2025), A Conveyor Belt of Flesh (Friedrich Ebert Foundation, 2010), and Social Inclusion Policies in Turkey (Ankara University, 2014). 

This event is co-sponsored by CDDRL's Program on Turkey and the Abbasi Program in Islamic Studies.

In-person: Encina Commons 123 (615 Crothers Way, Stanford)
Online: Via Zoom

This event is open to the public. Registration is required.

Utku Balaban Xavier University
Seminars
Image
Industrial Islamism: How Authoritarian Movements Mobilize Workers
Date Label
-
Are the Streets Still Talking? Protests and Evolving Repression in the Middle East

Although the Middle East/SWANA region encompasses a diverse range of authoritarian regimes, protests are surprisingly common across much of it. Mass mobilizations such as the Arab uprisings and Iran’s Woman, Life, Freedom movement attract international attention, yet less is known about the thousands of smaller protests that precede and follow them. This talk will examine patterns of protest across the region and explore how repression is changing in the age of mass surveillance and artificial intelligence.

This event is co-sponsored by CDDRL's Program on Arab Reform and Development and the Middle Eastern Studies Forum.

ABOUT THE SPEAKER

Jillian Schwedler is Distinguished Professor of Political Science at the City University of New York’s Hunter College and the Graduate Center and Nonresident Senior Fellow at the Crown Center for the Middle East at Brandeis University. She has served in elected leadership positions for the American Political Science Association and the Middle East Studies Association. She has been a member of the Editorial Committee of the International Journal of Middle East Studies and is currently Chair of the Editorial Committee for the Middle East Research and Information Project (MERIP), publishers of Middle East Report.

Prof. Schwedler’s books include the award-winning Faith in Moderation: Islamist Parties in Jordan and Yemen (2006), Policing and Prisons in the Middle East (with Laleh Khalili, 2010), and The Political Science of the Middle East (with Marc Lynch and Sean Yom, 2022).  Her articles have appeared in numerous journals, including World Politics, Comparative Politics, Contention, and Social Movement Studies.  Her most recent book, Protesting Jordan: Geographies of Power and Dissent (2022) was recipient of best book awards from the National Endowment for Democracy and the Middle East Institute.

Hesham Sallam
Hesham Sallam

Virtual to Public. If prompted for a password, use: 123456

Only those with an active Stanford ID with access to William J. Perry Conference Room in Encina Hall may attend in person.

Jillian Schwedler Distinguished Professor of Political Science at the City University of New York’s Hunter College Presenter City University of New York’s Hunter College
Seminars

Monday, November 16, 4:00-5:15 pm. Click here to register.

News Feed Image
ARD - Jillian Schwedler - 11.16.26 (2).jpg
Date Label
-
LeonidGozmanSeminar11.18.26

Neither Vladimir Putin nor the war in Ukraine will last forever. What political order is likely to follow, and what would it mean for Russia, Ukraine and the West?

Leonid Gozman, a longtime Russian opposition politician and political psychologist, will examine the scenarios that may unfold. A Ukrainian defeat, he argues, would likely produce a new war almost immediately. The end of Putin’s rule poses its own risks, and the transition could prove more dangerous than the present. Yet Gozman contends that a post-Putin Russia would probably be better for its citizens and the international community, even if members of Putin’s circle remain in power.

That transition, he suggests, may open a narrow window for Russia to resume a path of normal political and economic development. This discussion will consider what such a path would require, what forces could close it, and what role domestic actors and Western governments might play in shaping the outcome.

The event will be moderated by Kathryn Stoner, Mosbacher Director of the Center on Democracy, Development and the Rule of Law and Satre Family Senior Fellow at the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies. Stanford affiliates are invited to attend in person, and all others may join online via Zoom; registration is required.

ABOUT THE SPEAKER

Leonid Gozman was the former president of the Union of Right Forces and former co-chairman of the Right Cause Party (2008–2011). From 2008 to 2013, he served as director of humanitarian projects at RUSNANO, a state-owned enterprise that commercializes innovations in nanotechnology, and from 1999 to 2008, he was executive board member and representative for governmental and NGO relations at Unified Energy System of Russia (RAO UES). An active participant in Russia’s democratic movement who has served as political advisor to Anatoly Chubais and Yegor Gaidar, he is also the author of eight books and is a lecturer at Moscow State University. He was previously a fellow at the Woodrow Wilson Center, and professor of psychology and Russian area studies at Dickinson College in Carlisle, Pennsylvania, and was a visiting fellow at the National Endowment for Democracy in Washington, DC.

Kathryn Stoner
Kathryn Stoner

Only those with an active Stanford ID and access to the William J. Perry Conference Room in Encina Hall may attend in person. Others may attend virtually, via Zoom.

Registration required.

Leonid Gozman
Seminars

Special Seminar with Leonid Gozman

News Feed Image
cddrl_special_event_leonid_gozman_11.18.26.png
Date Label
Paragraphs

What makes someone Black in American society today? From Donald Trump questioning Kamala Harris’s racial identity to Joe Biden’s claim that hesitant Black voters “ain’t Black,” American politics frequently brings questions of racial authenticity and belonging to the surface. Yet political science often approaches race as a fixed attribute, rather than a social construction. Here, we seek to understand how Americans define blackness in social and political life. Using a conjoint experiment with a racially diverse sample that includes Black, White, and mixed-race Black-White respondents, we evaluate how ascribed and acquired traits influence perceptions of blackness. The results show that inherited characteristics—particularly parentage and skin tone, which are the strongest determinants of racial classification—play a central role, yet sociopolitical cues such as partisanship, neighborhood context, and spousal race also influence racial classification. Using a continuous measure, we also show that respondents make graded assessments of blackness rather than purely binary classifications, with some individuals perceived as more Black than others. Black respondents are more likely than White respondents to classify a broader set of profiles as Black, consistent with a more inclusive understanding of racial membership; however, they also place greater emphasis on shared political identity. These findings clarify how racial categories are socially constructed and why that construction carries real political and social consequences.

All Publications button
1
Publication Type
Journal Articles
Publication Date
Journal Publisher
Perspectives on Politics
Authors
Hakeem Jefferson
Number
Published online 2026:1-21
Subscribe to Society