Russ Feingold, the former U.S. senator perhaps best known for pushing campaign finance reform, will spend the spring quarter at Stanford lecturing and teaching.

Feingold will be the Payne Distinguished Lecturer and will be in residence at the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies while teaching and mentoring graduate students in the Ford Dorsey Program in International Policy Studies and the Stanford Law School.

Feingold was recently the State Department’s  special envoy to the Great Lakes Region of Africa and the Democratic Republic of Congo. He will bring his knowledge and longstanding interest in one of the most challenging, yet promising, places in Africa to campus with the cross-listed IPS and Law School course, “The Great Lakes Region of Africa and American Foreign Relations: Policy and Legal Implications of the Post-1994 Era.”

Feingold, a Wisconsin Democrat who served three terms in the Senate between 1993 and 2011, co-sponsored the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002. Better known as the McCain-Feingold Act, the legislation regulated the roles of soft money contributions and issue ads in national elections.

Stanford Report: The First Lady of the United States, Michelle Obama, spoke at SCPKU today and said study abroad allows students to realize that countries all have a stake in each other's success.  Following her remarks, she held a conversation with students on the Stanford campu via SCPKU's Highly Immersive Classroom. Read more.

Introduction and Contribution

The ongoing wars in Iran and Gaza have led to a marked increase in global attention to Israel’s military power, and in particular to the nuclear weapons that it is widely believed to possess. This is especially notable given Israel’s longstanding concern over Iran’s nuclear program as well as its refusal to join the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and place safeguards on its Dimona reactor.

Israeli nuclear policy cannot be understood apart from (1) its decades-long strategy of “deliberate ambiguity,” (2) its diplomatic emphasis on the NPT’s definition of nuclear-weapons states as those that have overtly tested a nuclear weapon, and (3) continued American support for Israel’s position. In “Israel and the NPT: new insights into old questions,” Or Rabinowitz examines the origins and consequences of this status quo, which began with a 1969 agreement between President Richard Nixon and Prime Minister Golda Meir. What Rabinowitz calls the “Nixon-Meir understanding” — whereby Israel would not test, declare, or openly advertise its nuclear weapons and the US would not press Israel to accede to the NPT — has persisted ever since. Rabinowitz’s article draws on American, Israeli, British, and Canadian archival research, as well as secondary literature and media reports.

The Nixon-Meir understanding has delivered significant strategic benefits for Israel, but it has also imposed costs, particularly by limiting Israel’s ability to acquire civilian nuclear infrastructure from other Western countries. It remains to be seen whether this status quo will persist in light of the nuclear ambitions of Israel’s neighbors, the possibility of wider regional proliferation, and Israel’s growing international isolation. 

Origins, Development, and Challenges of Israel’s Nuclear Policy

Israel began constructing its French-supplied Dimona reactor in the late 1950s. The Eisenhower administration largely pursued what Rabinowitz terms a “policy of benign neglect” (p. 3). This approach was partly upended by the Kennedy administration, which pressured Israel to halt its nuclear development and submit its Dimona reactor to periodic inspections. In response, Israel adopted a range of tactics to conceal its nuclear program, including hiding its plutonium production plant in what appeared to be an ordinary administrative building. Kennedy’s death led to a more sympathetic Johnson administration, during which time Israel’s clandestine program grew.

For Rabinowitz, the late 1960s marked a watershed in Israeli nuclear policy. By the 1967 Six-Day War, Israel had likely crossed the nuclear threshold for the first time. In 1968, the Non-Proliferation Treaty was finalized; critical to the treaty was Article IX, which stated that nuclear-weapon states were those that had “manufactured and exploded [i.e., tested] a nuclear weapon.” The test criterion became foundational to Israel’s policy of deliberate ambiguity, and Israeli officials invoked it quite consciously in their international relations. In 1969, Nixon and Meir agreed to the aforementioned bilateral understanding, which was kept secret from many American allies. For example, British officials remained uncertain about whether Israel possessed nuclear weapons until the early 1980s. 

Israel’s nuclear ambiguity faced several challenges in the 1970s. During the 1973 Yom Kippur War, Israel allegedly placed its nuclear forces on alert twice. Then, during the 1979 “Vela incident,” a US satellite detected a signal consistent with a nuclear test, and Israel was widely suspected of being involved. However, the Carter administration avoided formally attributing the incident to Israel, in part because doing so could have jeopardized US-Israeli relations and the Egypt-Israel peace process, not to mention the prospects of Carter’s reelection. The Reagan administration likewise maintained the status quo, despite renewed international pressure following Israel’s 1981 strike on an Iraqi reactor.

With the end of the Cold War, Israel feared that the first George Bush administration would pressure it into joining the NPT. Although Bush Sr.’s cooperation with Egypt on nuclear safeguarding initiatives represented the clearest challenge to the Nixon-Meir understanding, the administration ultimately did not depart from the arrangement. Thereafter, the Bill Clinton administration adopted a more lenient approach to Israel’s NPT status and reportedly assured Israel that the US would help preserve its strategic position.

While Israel’s policy of deliberate ambiguity has delivered substantial benefits, it has also generated trade-offs. In particular, the Nixon-Meir understanding has hindered Israel in importing civilian nuclear reactors. Western nuclear suppliers have all made nuclear cooperation conditional on Israel’s accession to the NPT or equivalent safeguards. Israel’s refusal to do so was deemed too politically costly, as these countries were wary of generating political backlash from Arab countries.

Rabinowitz’s conclusion is that whether Israel maintains its nuclear policy status quo will likely depend on the actions of its neighbors, several of whom have nuclear ambitions. If Iran or Saudi Arabia cross the nuclear threshold, a more aggressive and overt policy may prove beneficial as an Israeli deterrent. Ultimately, the article unpacks a very murky yet consequential dynamic in world politics. It shows how Israeli policy has relied not only on covert possession of nuclear weapons, but on a diplomatic strategy of ambiguity, leveraging the NPT’s “test” criterion and American commitments not to force Israel’s hand.

*Brief prepared by Adam Fefer.