As U.S. President Donald Trump prepares to visit Beijing on May 14-15, 2026, for a highly anticipated summit with President Xi Jinping, the world is watching to see if the two leaders can stabilize a U.S.-China relationship strained by disputes over trade, technological race, the future of Taiwan, and the rippling effects of the conflict with Iran.

Trump’s trip to Beijing – already rescheduled once due to the conflict in the Middle East – has been described as having tremendous symbolic significance. Yet, expectations for a breakthrough on specific deliverables should remain low, according to Susan Thornton, a China expert and former U.S. diplomat. Thornton joined APARC Director Kiyoteru Tsutsui on the latest episode of the APARC Briefing video series to analyze the potential outcomes of the Trump-Xi summit and the high-stakes dynamics shaping U.S.-China relations.
 

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Trade and Tech: A Call for a Paradigm Shift

On the economic front, Thornton drew on her deep experience in trade negotiations to critique the lack of focus in U.S. policy.

"The biggest problem for U.S. negotiators is deciding what it is that we want from China," she said. "We tend to give them a long list of revolving priorities, which [makes it easy for the] other side of the negotiating table to just fob them off and not actually commit to anything over years of negotiations.”

On the technology rivalry between the two powers, Thornton urged a shift in strategy. Rather than pursuing sweeping export controls that are often unilateral and incomplete, she advocated for a narrower, multilateral approach focused on the most sensitive technologies, combined with a greater emphasis on American innovation. AI governance is one of the areas Thornton believes could be a common ground for Washington and Beijing to align their policies.

“It's going to be very hard for the United States to contain China's technological ambitions and growth,” she said. “I don't think that we're exactly competing on the same metrics. I question how it is that we're going to be able to keep China from getting technologies that are dual-use but might be useful in some military application when these things are basically economy-wide products.”

When it comes to technological competition, "We need to try to run faster than China, not be constantly trying to trip China up and looking in the rearview mirror," Thornton urged. "I don't think that's going to bode well for the long-term development of the U.S. tech sector."

The Taiwan Flashpoint: A Longer-Term Challenge

While Taiwan remains the most dangerous flashpoint that could trigger a kinetic warfare between the United States and China, Thornton believes that the immediate risk of conflict has receded, in accordance with recent U.S. threat assessments that no longer see 2027 as a likely target date for a potential Chinese takeover of the island.

Beijing, she argued, is closely watching the domestic political situation in Taiwan and how the leadership in Taipei views U.S. reliability and support. “I think the Chinese have determined, based on both of those things they've been watching, that they can afford to wait a bit longer, see what happens.”

Thornton cautioned, however, that, even as a conflict over Taiwan may no longer pose an immediate-term threat, “it is a problem that is going to develop over the coming decade.”

Diplomacy in a Multipolar World Order 

When asked about the future of the global order, Thornton described a trend toward fragmentation. If the United States steps back from its global leadership role, it is difficult to see who else would be willing or able to shoulder the cost of providing global public goods, she said. A “thinner world order,” with the United Nations at its center, may eventually find favor with countries that can afford to pay for some of those goods, she reflected.

In a closing advice for aspiring foreign service officers, Thornton argued that the emergence of a multipolar world reinforces the need for skilled diplomacy. “As the global order changes and more countries come into the mix of the councils of politics in the world, the United States will have to lean back toward diplomacy more,” she predicted.

“We're going to need very good diplomats,” she concluded, because it will be significantly harder to be an American diplomat in a fragmented world order in which the United States is no longer the single overwhelmingly dominant power.

The event was moderated by FSI director Colin Kahl, and featured FSI scholars with a cross-section of expertise: Drew Endy, FSI senior fellow (by courtesy) and associate professor in bioengineering at Stanford’s School of Engineering; Andrew Grotto, a research scholar at FSI’s Center for International Security and Cooperation (CISAC) and director of the Program on Geopolitics, Technology, and Governance (GTG); Jeff Hancock, senior fellow and director of FSI’s Tech Impact and Policy Center; and Jennifer Pan, FSI senior fellow and the Sir Robert Ho Tung Professor of Chinese Studies.

The scholars discussed four key areas to consider when it comes to the benefits, risks, and political implications of emerging technologies.

The Resurgence of Biotechnology

Humans have a long history with biotechnology, from fermentation to stem cell research. Now, after the past few decades in which industries were reshaped by digital technology, we’re seeing a potential biotech resurgence, explained Drew Endy, in which synthetic DNA chemistry allows scientists to build new DNA without using pre-existing molecules.

“I’m hopelessly biased,” said Endy. “But it's impossible for me to overstate the significance of being able to manufacture DNA from scratch.”

If the technology continues on its current trajectory, it could allow for a more accessible, affordable way to make useful items like computer chips or better enzymes, but it also carries the risk of offering a bad actor an easier path toward the creation of harmful toxins or pathogens.

Reflecting on the contrast between biotechnology and artificial intelligence, Colin Kahl observed, “We're reaching this moment where we're increasingly turning living organisms into zeros and ones, and we're turning zeros and ones into living organisms.”

Screens and Mental Health

Amid concerns about the amount of time children and teens are spending on screens and its impact on mental health, Australia recently passed the Social Media Minimum Age Act, which forbids social media companies to allow those under 16 from accessing their platforms.

According to Jeff Hancock, whose Tech Impact and Policy Center has been working alongside the Australian government to assess the ban’s effect, approximately 35% of young Australians have stopped using social media. But they’re not suddenly playing cricket with their friends. Many are simply swapping it out for ChatGPT or some other screen-based platform.

In California, legislation on a social media ban is being considered, which could influence other states. Issues involving social media and AI as they relate to children is one of today’s rare bipartisan issues.  

Of course, large language models can be persuasive and dangerous for adults, too. Hancock believes we should be “very concerned” about how AI will shape our perceptions of life, especially given the tendency of users to spend more time on social media when the algorithm feeds them negative content, and the economic incentives for platforms to keep users engaged.

The U.S.-China Decathalon

When it comes to the so-called AI “race” between the United States and China, Andrew Grotto prefers to compare it to a decathlon, since “AI competition is a multi-dimensional contest,” he explained. At the moment, both countries are vying to be the first to unlock artificial general intelligence (AGI), namely AI that matches or exceeds human intellectual capabilities.

When it comes to the adoption of America’s AI stack, “China is not only a formidable competitor on price, but increasingly quality,” Grotto stated. The U.S. is banking on other countries to view its values as an advantage. However, he said, we’re at a divisive moment in American foreign policy where it’s not a given that other countries will be keen to align with the U.S..

There are key differences between the U.S. and China in how they approach AI. While U.S. companies with massive market caps such as Google, Microsoft, and Amazon are focused mostly on serving wealthy countries with large populations, China is more willing to strategically invest in regions that don’t meet such criteria, like the Global South. It remains to be seen how the U.S. will address this gap, and how much it will attempt to reign in private businesses.

China does not share U.S. concerns on privacy and security risks. According to Jennifer Pan, the Chinese view on generative AI is “overwhelmingly positive. It's about the possibilities of this new technology in improving people's lives and the economy,” she said. Pan notes that “the goal of the Chinese Communist Party is to survive in power,” and so their regulations revolve mostly around political control.

Pan does note that, with the spread of digital technologies, propaganda has become more challenging for the Chinese Communist Party, as they now must compete with independent voices such as influencers for attention.  

The Bioweapons Risk

At the UN General Assembly in 2025, President Donald Trump called upon all nations to “end the development of bioweapons once and for all.”

Endy adds that nation states should also agree to a duty to notify each other in the event of an outbreak that could contribute to a pandemic. The risk of AI contributing to biological risk should not be taken lightly. Computational methods could potentially be used by bad actors to design novel toxins and pathogens that are undetectable and for which we don't have medical countermeasures or vaccines.

“People who wanted to cause harm in the past would see how difficult it is to utilize biology and be put off and pick up an automatic weapon instead,” Endy said. “But now if something like Claude makes it easier for them to use biotechnology, they could misuse biology.”

But Endy’s bigger concern is nation state bioweapons. The rhetoric around AI could be destabilizing, leading to one country deciding that if another country has a bioweapons program, they should follow suit.

“This is the historical pattern that played out 100 years ago that led to the militarization of biology leading into World War II,” Endy noted. “Nothing good came of that.”

Ideally, suggested Kahl, biology and AI would be used together for positive purposes, to create new vaccines and identify patient zeros earlier. Such positive uses of technology could help uplift humanity and propel us toward a brighter future.

What to Expect Next

“The World Changing Technology in 2026” panel discussion was the second event in FSI’s new quarterly series examining the state of the world. (Read a summary of the first event here.) The next discussion will take place in November 2026 and will examine the national and geopolitical ramifications of the U.S. mid-term elections. To join FSI at upcoming events on the latest developments in international affairs, register for invitations on the institute’s website.

The Japanese public is largely opposed to dispatching the Japan Self-Defense Forces (JSDF) to the Strait of Hormuz, but framing the issue in terms of Japan’s energy dependence substantially raises support for military involvement in Iran. By contrast, arguments invoking the Japan-U.S. alliance and legal legitimacy for military action have no such effect. These are the findings from a vignette experiment fielded by the Stanford Japan Barometer (SJB) in March, one month after Japan’s February 2026 general election.

The results also reveal that mentioning energy dependence moves opinion in favor of military deployment even among respondents who are told that diplomacy, not deployment, is the right response, suggesting that energy-dependence messaging changes minds regardless of policy recommendation. Alliance- and legal-focused messaging, by contrast, have no measurable effect.

SJB is a large-scale, multi-wave public opinion survey on political, economic, and social issues in Japan. A project of the Japan Program at Stanford University’s Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center (APARC), SJB is led by Stanford sociologist Kiyoteru Tsutsui, the director of APARC and the Japan Program, and political scientist Charles Crabtree. The vignette experiment on the Japanese public's attitude toward military deployment in Iran was part of the final, three-wave panel survey SJB fielded around Japan’s February 2026 snap election, which focused on identifying public attitudes toward immigration.

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A Public Wary of War

The SJB experiment finds that, without any contextual framing, Japanese respondents lean against JSDF dispatch to the Strait of Hormuz, averaging a score of 2.00 on a four-point scale, where 1 represents "strongly oppose" and 4 represents "strongly support." 

This baseline skepticism reflects the Japanese public’s reluctance to deploy military forces abroad, rooted in Article 9 of the postwar constitution, and a broader wariness of entanglement in the Iran conflict. But the crisis in the Middle East has fueled deep economic fears in Japan, which relies on the region for over 90% of its crude oil imports, making it highly dependent on the Strait of Hormuz for energy security.

The SJB team wanted to know: Could this energy security argument shift the public’s baseline opposition to military deployment, and if so, how, compared with other justifications?

The Energy Argument Works Both Directions

The experiment randomly assigned respondents to read one of several short policy statements before answering whether they supported JSDF dispatch to the Strait of Hormuz. Some arguments favored deployment; others opposed it. Each invoked a different rationale: energy security, the Japan-U.S. alliance, and constitutional legitimacy.

The most striking change in attitude came from the energy-dependence framing.

Respondents who read a pro-dispatch energy argument – emphasizing that a blockade of the Strait of Hormuz would devastate Japan's economy and living standards, making military involvement necessary – showed a statistically significant increase in support for JSDF deployment, rising approximately 0.12 points above the control group.

Notably, respondents who read a con-dispatch energy argument – which presented the same energy-dependence facts but concluded that Japan should pursue diplomacy through its own channels with Iran rather than deploy forces – showed an even larger increase in support, rising approximately 0.28 points above the control group.

That is, simply mentioning Japan's vulnerability to an oil supply disruption raised support for JSDF involvement, even when the message explicitly argued against military action. “This pattern suggests that the energy-dependence information itself, rather than the normative conclusion drawn from it, is what moves opinion,” the researchers write on the SJB website.

Alliance and Legal Arguments Fall Flat

In contrast, two other commonly invoked arguments – obligations related to the Japan-U.S. alliance and constitutional authority – had virtually no effect on the Japanese public’s support of JSDF deployment.

The alliance framing emphasized that contributing to U.S. operations in the Strait of Hormuz is essential, given the centrality of the U.S.-Japan security partnership to Japan's defense. A counter-argument noted that many international observers view U.S. strikes on Iran as violations of international law and that most European allies are declining to participate.

Neither version significantly moved opinion on JSDF dispatch.

Similarly, arguments about whether the conflict legally qualifies for the exercise of collective self-defense – with one version arguing that new legislation could authorize dispatch and another arguing that no existing legal basis permits it – produced near-zero effects.

These null results are particularly striking given how frequently alliance obligations and constitutional legitimacy dominate elite debates over JSDF deployment in Japan. The data suggest that, at least in this scenario, these arguments resonate far more in policy circles than with the general public.

The findings carry important lessons for Japanese policymakers, who are walking a tightrope between the United States and Iran: “Concrete economic stakes are more resonant than foreign-policy abstractions,” note the SJB researchers. Still, the Japanese public’s default position is opposition to JSDF deployment in Iran. “The framing experiments shift opinion at the margins, but do not reverse the underlying skepticism toward JSDF dispatch.”

Headlines about foreign companies establishing a foothold in China only to fail years later no longer surprise anyone. But why does this keep happening? Kenneth Wilcox, former CEO of Silicon Valley Bank (SVB) from 2001 to 2010 and author of The China Business Conundrum: Ensure that Win-Win Doesn't Mean Western Companies Lose Twice, argues that the answer comes down to mental models and preparation.

In a recent lecture hosted by the Stanford Center on China's Economy and Institutions, Wilcox explained that we all develop mental models — internal frameworks that help us interpret and navigate the world around us. We carry these models with us wherever we go, applying them instinctively to new situations and environments. The trouble, Wilcox argues, is that a mental model only holds up if the new environment resembles the one it was built for. And American mental models, more often than not, simply don't hold up in China.

Wilcox knows this firsthand. After a decade leading SVB, he and his wife moved to China in 2011 to open a Chinese branch of the bank. Things started smoothly enough — he secured a partnership with Shanghai Pudong Development Bank and obtained the necessary license — but it quickly became clear that the rules he'd spent his career following no longer applied. The license, for instance, permitted him to open the bank but barred him from conducting any business in renminbi, China's national currency, for the first three years. For a bank, this created an obvious problem: how do you pay staff, let alone operate, without access to local currency? The government's solution was a subsidy to cover operating costs during that period, along with an invitation to meet regularly with other banks and business leaders to share SVB's model and approach. After many such meetings, Wilcox's Chinese partners told him they had been so impressed with what they'd learned that they planned to open their own bank modeled on SVB's approach.

This, Wilcox explained, is a pattern that plays out with striking regularity in China. Foreign companies are lured in with the promise of a vast new market and eager local partners. They are then entangled in regulations and bureaucracy, kept afloat with subsidies while they wait for permission to operate more freely — all while their technology and intellectual property are quietly absorbed. Eventually, the foreign company is left with little choice but to close up and leave. Some companies see it happening but look the other way. Others don't recognize it until it's too late. Many never fully understand why they failed at all.

Wilcox traced all of this back to the limitations of mental models. American businesses tend to arrive in China assuming the environment will function more or less like home: keep your head down, stay out of politics, focus on the business, and you'll be fine. But that assumption doesn't hold in China, where the government and the Communist Party exert control over virtually every aspect of commercial life. The most powerful players routinely hold simultaneous roles — party member, bank executive, government official — all at once. It is precisely these unexamined assumptions, Wilcox concluded, that set so many Western ventures up to fail before they've even begun.