Security

FSI scholars produce research aimed at creating a safer world and examing the consequences of security policies on institutions and society. They look at longstanding issues including nuclear nonproliferation and the conflicts between countries like North and South Korea. But their research also examines new and emerging areas that transcend traditional borders – the drug war in Mexico and expanding terrorism networks. FSI researchers look at the changing methods of warfare with a focus on biosecurity and nuclear risk. They tackle cybersecurity with an eye toward privacy concerns and explore the implications of new actors like hackers.

Along with the changing face of conflict, terrorism and crime, FSI researchers study food security. They tackle the global problems of hunger, poverty and environmental degradation by generating knowledge and policy-relevant solutions. 

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* Please note all CISAC events are scheduled using the Pacific Time Zone.

 

Register in advance for this webinar: https://stanford.zoom.us/webinar/register/8416226562432/WN_WLYcdRa6T5Cs1MMdmM0Mug

 

About the Event: Is there a place for illegal or nonconsensual evidence in security studies research, such as leaked classified documents? What is at stake, and who bears the responsibility, for determining source legitimacy? Although massive unauthorized disclosures by WikiLeaks and its kindred may excite qualitative scholars with policy revelations, and quantitative researchers with big-data suitability, they are fraught with methodological and ethical dilemmas that the discipline has yet to resolve. I argue that the hazards from this research—from national security harms, to eroding human-subjects protections, to scholarly complicity with rogue actors—generally outweigh the benefits, and that exceptions and justifications need to be articulated much more explicitly and forcefully than is customary in existing work. This paper demonstrates that the use of apparently leaked documents has proliferated over the past decade, and appeared in every leading journal, without being explicitly disclosed and defended in research design and citation practices. The paper critiques incomplete and inconsistent guidance from leading political science and international relations journals and associations; considers how other disciplines from journalism to statistics to paleontology address the origins of their sources; and elaborates a set of normative and evidentiary criteria for researchers and readers to assess documentary source legitimacy and utility. Fundamentally, it contends that the scholarly community (researchers, peer reviewers, editors, thesis advisors, professional associations, and institutions) needs to practice deeper reflection on sources’ provenance, greater humility about whether to access leaked materials and what inferences to draw from them, and more transparency in citation and research strategies.

View Written Draft Paper

 

About the Speaker: Christopher Darnton is a CISAC affiliate and an associate professor of national security affairs at the Naval Postgraduate School. He previously taught at Reed College and the Catholic University of America, and holds a Ph.D. in Politics from Princeton University. He is the author of Rivalry and Alliance Politics in Cold War Latin America (Johns Hopkins, 2014) and of journal articles on US foreign policy, Latin American security, and qualitative research methods. His International Security article, “Archives and Inference: Documentary Evidence in Case Study Research and the Debate over U.S. Entry into World War II,” won the 2019 APSA International History and Politics Section Outstanding Article Award. He is writing a book on the history of US security cooperation in Latin America, based on declassified military documents.

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Christopher Darnton Associate Professor of National Security Affairs Naval Postgraduate School
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Daphne Keller
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I am a huge fan of transparency about platform content moderation. I’ve considered it a top policy priority for years, and written about it in detail (with Paddy Leerssen, who also wrote this great piece about recommendation algorithms and transparency). I sincerely believe that without it, we are unlikely to correctly diagnose current problems or arrive at wise legal solutions.

So it pains me to admit that I don’t really know what “transparency” I’m asking for. I don’t think many other people do, either. Researchers and public interest advocates around the world can agree that more transparency is better. But, aside from people with very particular areas of interest (like political advertising), almost no one has a clear wish list. What information is really important? What information is merely nice to have? What are the trade-offs involved?

That imprecision is about to become a problem, though it’s a good kind of problem to have. A moment of real political opportunity is at hand. Lawmakers in the US, Europe, and elsewhere are ready to make some form of transparency mandatory. Whatever specific legal requirements they create will have huge consequences. The data, content, or explanations they require platforms to produce will shape our future understanding of platform operations, and our ability to respond — as consumers, as advocates, or as democracies. Whatever disclosures the laws don’t require, may never happen.

It’s easy to respond to this by saying “platforms should track all the possible data, we’ll see what’s useful later!” Some version of this approach might be justified for the very biggest “gatekeeper” or “systemically important” platforms. Of course, making Facebook or Google save all that data would be somewhat ironic, given the trouble they’ve landed in by storing similar not-clearly-needed data about their users in the past. (And the more detailed data we store about particular takedowns, the likelier it is to be personally identifiable.)

For any platform, though, we should recognize that the new practices required for transparency reporting comes at a cost. That cost might include driving platforms to adopt simpler, blunter content rules in their Terms of Service. That would reduce their expenses in classifying or explaining decisions, but presumably lead to overly broad or narrow content prohibitions. It might raise the cost of adding “social features” like user comments enough that some online businesses, like retailers or news sites, just give up on them. That would reduce some forms of innovation, and eliminate useful information for Internet users. For small and midsized platforms, transparency obligations (like other expenses related to content moderation) might add yet another reason to give up on competing with today’s giants, and accept an acquisition offer from an incumbent that already has moderation and transparency tools. Highly prescriptive transparency obligations might also drive de facto standardization and homogeneity in platform rules, moderation practices, and features.

None of these costs provides a reason to give up on transparency — or even to greatly reduce our expectations. But all of them are reasons to be thoughtful about what we ask for. It would be helpful if we could better quantify these costs, or get a handle on what transparency reporting is easier and harder to do in practice.

I’ve made a (very in the weeds) list of operational questions about transparency reporting, to illustrate some issues that are likely to arise in practice. I think detailed examples like these are helpful in thinking through both which kinds of data matter most, and how much precision we need within particular categories. For example, I personally want to know with great precision how many government orders a platform received, how it responded, and whether any orders led to later judicial review. But to me it seems OK to allow some margin of error for platforms that don’t have standardized tracking and queuing tools, and that as a result might modestly mis-count TOS takedowns (either by absolute numbers or percent).

I’ll list that and some other recommendations below. But these “recommendations” are very tentative. I don’t know enough to have a really clear set of preferences yet. There are things I wish I could learn from technologists, activists, and researchers first. The venues where those conversations would ordinarily happen — and, importantly, where observers from very different backgrounds and perspectives could have compared the issues they see, and the data they most want — have been sadly reduced for the past year.

So here is my very preliminary list:

  • Transparency mandates should be flexible enough to accommodate widely varying platform practices and policies. Any de facto push toward standardization should be limited to the very most essential data.
  • The most important categories of data are probably the main ones listed in the DSA: number of takedowns, number of appeals, number of successful appeals. But as my list demonstrates, those all can become complicated in practice.
  • It’s worth taking the time to get legal transparency mandates right. That may mean delegating exact transparency rules to regulatory agencies in some countries, or conducting studies prior to lawmaking in others.
  • Once rules are set, lawmakers should be very reluctant to move the goalposts. If a platform (especially a smaller one) invests in rebuilding its content moderation tools to track certain categories of data, it should not have to overhaul those tools soon because of changed legal requirements.
  • We should insist on precise data in some cases, and tolerate more imprecision in others (based on the importance of the issue, platform capacity, etc.). And we should take the time to figure out which is which.
  • Numbers aren’t everything. Aggregate data in transparency reports ultimately just tell us what platforms themselves think is going on. To understand what mistakes they make, or what biases they may exhibit, independent researchers need to see the actual content involved in takedown decisions. (This in turn raises a slough of issues about storing potentially unlawful content, user privacy and data protection, and more.)

It’s time to prioritize. Researchers and civil society should assume we are operating with a limited transparency “budget,” which we must spend wisely — asking for the information we can best put to use, and factoring in the cost. We need better understanding of both research needs and platform capabilities to do this cost-benefit analysis well. I hope that the window of political opportunity does not close before we manage to do that.

Daphne Keller

Daphne Keller

Director of the Program on Platform Regulation
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Q&A with Daphne Keller of the Program on Platform Regulation

Keller explains some of the issues currently surrounding platform regulation
Q&A with Daphne Keller of the Program on Platform Regulation
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In a new blog post, Daphne Keller, Director of the Program on Platform Regulation at the Cyber Policy Center, looks at the need for transparency when it comes to content moderation and asks, what kind of transparency do we really want?

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Three CISAC scientists have joined 26 of the nation’s top nuclear experts to send an open letter to President Obama in support of the Iran deal struck in July.

“The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) the United States and its partners negotiated with Iran will advance the cause of peace and security in the Middle East and can serve as a guidepost for future non-proliferation agreements,” the group of renowned scientists, academics and former government officials wrote in the letter dated August 8, 2015.

“This is an innovative agreement, with much more stringent constraints than any previously negotiated non-proliferation framework.”

CISAC senior fellow and former Los Alamos National Laboratory director Sig Hecker is a signatory to the letter, along with CISAC co-founder Sid Drell, and cybersecurity expert and CISAC affiliate Martin Hellman.

Six Nobel laureates also signed, including FSI senior fellow by courtesy and former Stanford Linear Accelerator director Burton Richter.

The letter arrives at a crucial time for the Obama administration as it rallies public opinion and lobbies Congress to support the Iran agreement.

You can read the full letter along with analysis from the New York Times at this link.

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Donald Trump has never hidden his admiration for Russia’s imperial dictator, Vladimir Putin. Shortly after taking office for his first term in 2017, President Trump was asked by Fox News host Bill O’Reilly to defend his respect for Putin, whom O’Reilly called a “killer.” Trump replied, “We’ve got a lot of killers. What, you think our country’s so innocent?” The following year, at a press conference in Helsinki during his first summit with Putin, Trump publicly questioned the U.S. intelligence community’s assessment that Russia had interfered in the 2016 presidential election. The Russian leader was standing right by his side.

These expressions of affinity for Putin were shocking at the time, but crucially, they did not produce consequential shifts in U.S. foreign policy. The first Trump administration included many senior national security officials who had a different, more accurate assessment of how Putin’s policies threatened American national interests. Trump’s own 2017 National Security Strategy identified Russia (and China) as revisionist powers that “challenge American power, influence, and interests, attempting to erode American security and prosperity.” Reluctantly, in 2017, Trump also signed a new sanctions law, the Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act, that focused on Russia and other adversaries. His first administration even provided a limited number of anti-tank Javelin missiles to Ukraine. The gap between Trump’s friendly rhetoric toward Putin and actual policy was real.

Continue reading at thedispatch.com.

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The president’s admiration for the Russian dictator erodes American interests and values.

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Michael A. McFaul
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The Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies is pleased to welcome Mykel Kochenderfer as the incoming natural science co-director of the Center for International Security and Cooperation (CISAC), effective January 1, 2027. Kochenderfer will also be appointed as a senior fellow at FSI.

An associate professor of aeronautics and astronautics at Stanford School of Engineering, Kochenderfer is the director of the Stanford Intelligent Systems Laboratory (SISL), where he conducts research on advanced algorithms and analytical methods for decision-making systems. His earlier work on airspace modeling and aircraft collision avoidance led to the creation of the Airborne Collision Avoidance System X (ACAS X), an onboard safety system meant to prevent midair collisions that uses advanced algorithms to detect nearby aircraft and provide maneuver recommendations to pilots.

Kochenderfer is also a senior fellow at the Stanford Institute for Human-Centered AI (HAI), where he is applying the principles that have made flying one of the safest ways to travel toward addressing the safety and governance concerns around artificial intelligence.

“I’m thrilled to welcome Mykel to CISAC and FSI,” says Colin Kahl, director of the Freeman Spogil Institute for International Studies. “Cross disciplinary collaborations like this are what allow our centers and programs to create tremendous amounts of value and impact within Stanford and beyond. The challenges the world is facing today are highly interconnected, and the research we do to solve them has to reflect that.”

Kochenderfer will work alongside James Fearon, CISAC’s social science co-director, to advance the center’s mission to produce rigorous research on pressing security and international cooperation issues and foster intellectual exchanges that help build a safer world.

Fearon, a leading expert on conflict and interstate violence and a senior advisor in the U.S. Department of Defense, welcomes Kochenderfer’s expertise. 

“This is a huge win for CISAC and next-generation research and policy development at the intersection of emerging technologies and international security,” says Fearon. “Mykel is perfect for this role. I am very excited to work with him on the broad range of new problems that the world is throwing at us in this area."

Below, Kochenderfer shares more about his research, what he’s excited to do as part of CISAC, and his advice for staying curious and finding innovative solutions to pressing global issues.



What drew you to accept an appointment at FSI?

I am excited by the opportunity to connect the ideas we have been exploring in the School of Engineering with broader questions of international security. Ever since I took the class “International Security in a Changing World” from Prof. Scott Sagan as an undergraduate, I have greatly admired the scholarship at the Center for International Security and Cooperation (CISAC). The faculty and senior fellows there are truly world class.


Your research centers on advanced algorithms and decision-making systems. How are you thinking about the opportunities and challenges presented by the use of AI across so many sectors?

AI has tremendous potential in many important areas, ranging from basic science to medicine. AI can now do things that I would not have imagined possible just five years ago. What worries me is premature reliance on these technologies before they have been adequately validated. We need to understand how to ensure their safety, particularly in high-stakes applications, and how to coordinate internationally when AI-related security incidents occur.


What challenges do you see in the world right now that you think can benefit from more collaborative research between the social sciences and natural sciences?

The rapid advance of AI capabilities is forcing us to confront important safety and security issues in areas such as biosecurity and cybersecurity. Addressing these challenges will require not only technical advances but also a deeper understanding of the social and political systems in which these technologies operate. We need to understand how to protect critical infrastructure, how AI is changing the way we consume information, and what policies and institutions will help us navigate these changes.


What are you looking forward to working more closely on with your colleagues at CISAC and the scholarly community at FSI?

I am particularly interested in how we can build international consensus around the responsible development and use of AI. There are important lessons to be learned from other safety-critical industries, including aviation and nuclear technologies, where international cooperation, shared standards, and the exchange of safety information have played important roles. I am excited to explore how those lessons might apply to AI and understand what needs to be done differently.


For students looking to find their niche in the social sciences, natural sciences, or both, what advice do you have for how they can navigate a rapidly changing world and evolving academic landscape?

I would encourage students to develop deep expertise in something they find fascinating while also taking advantage of the many interdisciplinary opportunities available on campus. It is very hard to predict how the world will evolve, and some of the most important challenges will require us to work across traditional disciplinary boundaries. Being able to learn from people who approach problems differently is an incredibly valuable skill.


Where do you find sources of inspiration that help you stay curious and look at the world from new angles?

I have been fortunate to work with Stanford undergraduate and graduate students who bring such diverse backgrounds and interests to our lab. I am constantly inspired by their curiosity, creativity, and insights.

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Amy Zegart on World Class, a podcast by the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies at Stanford University.
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How Frontier Technology Is Rewriting the Rules of Power, Intelligence, and National Security

Amy Zegart joins Colin Kahl on the World Class podcast to discuss what's familiar and what's novel in how nations and other actors are competing politically, militarily, economically, and technologically.
How Frontier Technology Is Rewriting the Rules of Power, Intelligence, and National Security
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Students Take the Lead at 4th Annual Stanford Conference on Technology and National Security

Backed by the Gordian Knot Center for National Security Innovation at the Freeman Spogli Institute, an interdisciplinary student team convened leaders across the military, software and hardware engineering, policymaking, and capital investment for the event, commonly referred to as "StanfordDEFCON."
Students Take the Lead at 4th Annual Stanford Conference on Technology and National Security
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James Fearon to Co-Lead the Center for International Security and Cooperation

Fearon, a senior fellow at the Freeman Spogli Institute, will succeed Scott Sagan, who has served in the role since 2021.
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Kochenderfer will join FSI as the natural science co-director of CISAC beginning in January 2027.

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After the Midterms: What’s Next for America’s Korea Policy?

The November 2026 midterm elections will shape the political landscape for the second half of the Trump presidency, raising important questions about the future direction of U.S. policy toward the Korean Peninsula. What will the future hold for the U.S.-South Korea alliance amid debates over OPCON transfer, burden-sharing, and nuclear submarines? How will Washington balance its security commitments to Seoul with the possibility of renewed diplomacy with Pyongyang? And how might the administration’s trade and economic agenda reshape bilateral relations, particularly with the ROK, and the growing importance of economic security? Experts will examine these interconnected dimensions of U.S. policy toward the two Koreas and assess their implications for regional security and economic relations. 

Co-sponsored by the Consulate General of the Republic of Korea in San Francisco.
 

Speakers:
 

Michael L. Beeman is a Visiting Assistant Professor of Political Science and International Relations at Loyola Marymount University. He also is a Senior Associate (Non-resident), Japan Chair, at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) and a Senior Fellow for Economic Security at The National Bureau of Asian Research.

From 2023-24, he was a Visiting Scholar at Stanford University’s Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center and university Lecturer and, during 2025, he was a Lecturer at UC San Diego. Prior to this, he served for over two decades in the federal government beginning at the Department of Commerce and then, for over 16 years, as a senior trade official and negotiator at the Office of the US Trade Representative (Executive Office of the President). As the Assistant US Trade Representative for Japan, Korea, and APEC, he led negotiations with Korea for the renegotiated U.S.-Korea Free Trade Agreement (2018) and negotiations with Japan for the U.S.-Japan Trade Agreement (2019).

He is the author of Walking Out: America’s New Trade Policy in the Asia Pacific and Beyond (2024, Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center) and Public Policy and Economic Competition in Japan (2001, Routledge). He received his DPhil (PhD) in Politics from the University of Oxford, an MA in International Relations from Johns Hopkins University, and a BA from Southern Methodist University. Dr. Beeman also was a Fulbright and Monbusho Scholar in Japan and an Advanced Research Fellow at Harvard University.
 

Mark Lambert joins the Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center (APARC) as Visiting Scholar, China Program Fellow, for the 2026-2027 academic year, following a career in government with the U.S. Department of State. He served as China Coordinator and Deputy Assistant Secretary in the Bureau of East Asia and Pacific Affairs. He oversaw the Office of China Coordination and the Office of Taiwan Coordination. Mark has extensive experience in China, cross-Strait, and Asia Pacific affairs. He served as Deputy Assistant Secretary with responsibility for Japan, Korea, Mongolia, Australia, New Zealand, and the Pacific Islands. Earlier he established the International Organizations Bureau’s office aimed at protecting UN integrity from authoritarianism and served as Special Envoy for North Korean Affairs.  Previously, he was named the State Department’s human rights officer of the year for devising a strategy to release Chinese political prisoners and promote religious freedom.
 

Sydney Seiler was the national intelligence officer for North Korea at the National Intelligence Council from 2020 to 2023 and is one of the nation’s top experts on North Korea. Previously, he was the U.S. Forces Korea (USFK) senior analyst and senior defense intelligence expert for North Korea from 2016 to 2020, serving as the principal adviser and senior expert on Korean Peninsula security issues to the USFK commander and the U.S. Defense Intelligence Enterprise. Mr. Seiler also served as the U.S. special envoy for Six Party Talks (2014–2015), where he coordinated U.S. diplomacy and policy on the DPRK and led negotiations with North Korea. Prior to that, Mr. Seiler served as the director for Korea on the National Security Council (2011–2014). A member of the Senior National Intelligence Service, Mr. Seiler has over 40 years of experience focusing on Korean Peninsula affairs in a range of executive management, intelligence, and policy positions within the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) Directorate of Analysis, the CIA’s Directorate of Operations, the CIA’s Open Source Center, and the National Security Agency. He has four decades of experience watching North Korea and 17 years of serving in South Korea. He received his MA degree in Korean studies from Yonsei University and is a graduate of the Korean language programs of the Defense Language Institute and Yonsei University.
 

Directions and Parking > 

Philippines Conference Room (C330)
Encina Hall, 3rd Floor
616 Jane Stanford Way, Stanford, CA 94305

Michael L. Beeman, Visiting Assistant Professor, Loyola Marymount University
Mark Lambert, China Policy Fellow, APARC, Stanford University
Sydney Seiler, Senior Adviser (Non-resident), Korea Chair, Center for Strategic and International Studies
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LeonidGozmanSeminar11.18.26

Neither Vladimir Putin nor the war in Ukraine will last forever. What political order is likely to follow, and what would it mean for Russia, Ukraine and the West?

Leonid Gozman, a longtime Russian opposition politician and political psychologist, will examine the scenarios that may unfold. A Ukrainian defeat, he argues, would likely produce a new war almost immediately. The end of Putin’s rule poses its own risks, and the transition could prove more dangerous than the present. Yet Gozman contends that a post-Putin Russia would probably be better for its citizens and the international community, even if members of Putin’s circle remain in power.

That transition, he suggests, may open a narrow window for Russia to resume a path of normal political and economic development. This discussion will consider what such a path would require, what forces could close it, and what role domestic actors and Western governments might play in shaping the outcome.

The event will be moderated by Kathryn Stoner, Mosbacher Director of the Center on Democracy, Development and the Rule of Law and Satre Family Senior Fellow at the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies. Stanford affiliates are invited to attend in person, and all others may join online via Zoom; registration is required.

ABOUT THE SPEAKER

Leonid Gozman was the former president of the Union of Right Forces and former co-chairman of the Right Cause Party (2008–2011). From 2008 to 2013, he served as director of humanitarian projects at RUSNANO, a state-owned enterprise that commercializes innovations in nanotechnology, and from 1999 to 2008, he was executive board member and representative for governmental and NGO relations at Unified Energy System of Russia (RAO UES). An active participant in Russia’s democratic movement who has served as political advisor to Anatoly Chubais and Yegor Gaidar, he is also the author of eight books and is a lecturer at Moscow State University. He was previously a fellow at the Woodrow Wilson Center, and professor of psychology and Russian area studies at Dickinson College in Carlisle, Pennsylvania, and was a visiting fellow at the National Endowment for Democracy in Washington, DC.

Kathryn Stoner
Kathryn Stoner

Only those with an active Stanford ID and access to the William J. Perry Conference Room in Encina Hall may attend in person. Others may attend virtually, via Zoom.

Registration required.

Leonid Gozman
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Special Seminar with Leonid Gozman

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About the event: Emerging technologies developed since the end of the Cold War—and their proliferation to new actors—call into question the prospects for strategic stability in the twenty-first century. Strategic stability exists when rivals are mutually deterred and lack any rational incentive to escalate to nuclear use during conflict. Yet emerging technologies—with their new knowledge and tools with the potential for enhancing military capabilities—are impacting stability in such ways that the assumptions of rationality and deterrence no longer hold. First, these emerging technologies may be able to achieve effects once reserved to nuclear weapons, creating incentives for preemption. Second, these technologies are proliferating horizontally across more states, complicating mutual deterrence. Third, such technologies affect the psychology of decision-makers during crises, undermining rationality. Just as these phenomena may undermine stability, however, adversaries may yet be able to use the very same technologies to restore the strategic balance, although how is not yet fully apparent. In this panel, Herb Lin, Rose McDermott, Jackie Schneider and Harold Trinkunas will discuss their recent contributions to a special issue of the Texas National Security Review on the subject of emerging technologies and strategic stability.

William J. Perry Conference Room

CISAC
Stanford University
Encina Hall, E205
Stanford, CA 94305-6165

(650) 725-8035
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Senior Research Scholar
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Harold Trinkunas is the Deputy Director and a Senior Research Scholar at the Center for International Security and Cooperation at the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies at Stanford University. Prior to arriving at Stanford, Dr. Trinkunas served as the Charles W. Robinson Chair and senior fellow and director of the Latin America Initiative in the Foreign Policy program at the Brookings Institution. His research focuses on issues related to foreign policy, governance, and security, particularly in Latin America. Trinkunas has written on emerging powers and the international order, ungoverned spaces, terrorism financing, borders, and information operations. 

Trinkunas has co-authored Militants, Criminals and Warlords: The Challenge of Local Governance in an Age of Disorder (Brookings Institution Press, 2017), Aspirational Power: Brazil’s Long Road to Global Influence (Brookings Institution Press, 2016) and authored Crafting Civilian Control of the Military in Venezuela (University of North Carolina Press, 2005). He co-edited and contributed to Oxford Handbook of Peaceful Change in International Relations (Oxford University Press, 2021), Three Tweets to Midnight: The Effect of the Global Information Ecosystem on the Risk of Nuclear Conflict  (Hoover Institution Press, 2020), American Crossings: Border Politics in the Western Hemisphere (Johns Hopkins University Press, 2015), Ungoverned Spaces: Alternatives to State Authority in an Era of Softened Sovereignty (Stanford University Press, 2010), Global Politics of Defense Reform (Palgrave MacMillan, 2008), and Terrorism Financing and State Responses (Stanford University Press, 2007).

Dr. Trinkunas also previously served as an associate professor and chair of the Department of National Security Affairs at the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, California. He received his doctorate in political science from Stanford University in 1999. He was born in Maracaibo, Venezuela. 

 

Deputy Director, Center for International Security and Cooperation
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Harold Trinkunas

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Stanford University
Encina Hall, C236
Stanford, CA 94305-6165

650-497-8600
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Senior Research Scholar at the Center for International Security and Cooperation
Hank J. Holland Fellow in Cyber Policy and Security, Hoover Institution
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Dr. Herb Lin is senior research scholar at the Center for International Security and Cooperation and Research Fellow at the Hoover Institution, both at Stanford University.  His research interests relate broadly to the impact of emerging technologies on national security, especially in the digital domain (cyber, artificial intelligence, information warfare and operations), and has written extensively on the role of offensive operations in cyberspace as instruments of national policy.  In addition to his positions at Stanford University, he is Chief Scientist, Emeritus for the Computer Science and Telecommunications Board, National Research Council (NRC) of the National Academies, where he served from 1990 through 2014 as study director of major projects on public policy and information technology.  From 2016 to 2025, he was a member of the Science and Security Board of the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists. In 2016, he served on President Obama’s Commission on Enhancing National Cybersecurity and in  2021 on the Aspen Commission on Information Disorder.  Prior to his NRC service, he was a professional staff member and staff scientist for the House Armed Services Committee (1986-1990), where his portfolio included defense policy and arms control issues. He received his doctorate in physics from MIT.

Avocationally, he is a longtime folk and swing dancer and a lousy magician. Apart from his work on cyberspace and cybersecurity, he is published in cognitive science, science education, biophysics, and arms control and defense policy. He also consults on K-12 math and science education.

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Jacquelyn Schneider

Jacquelyn Schneider is a Hoover Fellow at the Hoover Institution.  Her research focuses on the intersection of technology, national security, and political psychology with a special interest in cybersecurity, unmanned technologies, and Northeast Asia.

Her work has appeared in Security Studies, Journal of Conflict Resolution, Strategic Studies Quarterly, and Journal of Strategic Studies and is featured in Cross Domain Deterrence: Strategy in an Era of Complexity (Oxford University Press, 2019).  Her current manuscript project is The Rise of Unmanned Technologies with Julia Macdonald (upcoming, Oxford University Press). In addition to her scholarly publications, she is a frequent contributor to policy outlets,  including Foreign Affairs, CFR, Cipher Brief, Lawfare, War on the Rocks, Washington Post, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, National Interest, H-Diplo, and the Center for a New American Security.  

In 2018, Schneider was included in CyberScoop’s Leet List of influential cyber experts.  She is also the recipient of a Minerva grant on autonomy (with co-PIs Michael Horowitz, Julia Macdonald, and Allen Dafoe) and a University of Denver grant to study public responses to the use of drones (with Macdonald).  She was awarded best graduate paper for the International Security and Arms Control section of the International Studies Association, the Foreign Policy Analysis section of the International Studies Association, and the Southwest Social Science Association. 

She is an active member of the defense policy community with previous positions at the Center for a New American Security and the RAND Corporation. Before beginning her academic career, she spent six years as an Air Force officer in South Korea and Japan and is currently a reservist assigned to US Cyber Command. She has a BA from Columbia University, MA from Arizona State University, and PhD from George Washington University.

Hoover Fellow at the Hoover Institution
Jacquelyn Schneider
Rose McDermott
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Amid the fifth year of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, two leaders from the Kyiv School of Economics (KSE) brought a view from the ground to Stanford on October 14. Dr. Alexandra Vacroux and Yevhenii Malik spoke in a discussion moderated by Kathryn Stoner, the Mosbacher Director of the Center on Democracy, Development and the Rule of Law (CDDRL) and the Satre Family Senior Fellow at the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies (FSI).

Dr. Vacroux is KSE’s vice president for strategic engagement and a longtime scholar of Russia. Malik, a former Marine infantry sergeant, fought in the 2022 battle for Mariupol and spent nearly two and a half years as a prisoner of war in Russian captivity before being released in a prisoner exchange in 2024. He now leads undergraduate national security and defense programs at KSE.

The talk came days after the U.S. president announced plans to buy Russian diesel. The speakers also reworked their presentation following that morning’s news, which Vacroux described as a cutoff of Starlink and Starshield service for Ukrainian forces.

Running through the conversation was a larger point: Ukraine is fighting a different kind of war, one in which inexpensive drones and robots do work that once took soldiers and costly weapons, and the lessons reach well beyond Ukraine.

A Campaign to Make Kyiv Unlivable


Vacroux said Russia has spent the months since August trying to make Kyiv unlivable, hoping residents will leave and Ukraine will surrender. Drones struck the city’s northern and southern bridges within four days of each other earlier this month. The day before the event, 39 ballistic missiles and 120 drones hit the capital, and most of the missiles were aimed at power stations and substations. Since August, she said, air alerts have been almost constant, to the degree that Ukrainians ignore them, and many KSE classes now meet in the basement. Vacroux pointed to the London Blitz and said research on how wars end gives little reason to expect this approach to work.

[T]he protocol is within 7 minutes of the air raid, everyone is down, the PowerPoint slides are up, and the lecture is continuing. But of course, when you have a continual air raid, you just hold all of your classes in the basement.
Dr. Alexandra Vacroux
Vice President for Strategic Engagement, Kyiv School of Economics

A Front Line Frozen by Drones


Malik said the front line has barely moved in nearly five years. Drones have extended the “kill zone” to as much as 50 miles, and Ukraine is turning to unmanned ground vehicles (UGVs) that commanders believe could replace up to 60% of frontline infantry. By his estimate, Ukraine needs about 500,000 a year and currently produces roughly 20,000. Each of Ukraine’s more than 100 combat brigades now has an unmanned battalion, he said, and those units account for about 80% of Russian casualties.

No one will cry because a UGV was destroyed.
Yevhenii Malik
Head of National Defence and Security Educational Programs, Kyiv School of Economics

Cheaper Weapons, Changing Math


Cost is central to that shift. Malik said a Shahed-type attack drone costs between $50,000 and $150,000, while a fighter jet starts around $15 million and a Patriot missile can cost up to $4 million, which makes conventional air defense unsustainable against mass drone attacks. Ukraine answered with its own interceptor drones, he said, and builds a drone-missile hybrid called Flamingo at an unofficial cost of about $600,000, compared with $1.5 million or more for a Tomahawk. A high-intensity war, he argued, is won with cheap systems that can be made in large numbers, not with a few hundred advanced aircraft, and Ukraine’s private defense firms are finding new battlefield uses for the technology nearly every month.

The constraint, both speakers said, is money more than ingenuity. Ukraine spends about 40% of its GDP on defense, compared with roughly 10% in Russia, and 3.5% in the U.S. Vacroux urged Europe to disburse a promised €90 billion loan faster and to resolve the impasse over frozen Russian assets.

A War the World Is Watching


The speakers noted that Ukraine’s rivals are studying the war more closely than its partners. Malik said North Korea has supplied ballistic missiles and soldiers to Russia, and Vacroux said the country is bringing that experience home for a possible fight with South Korea. China, she said, is doing the same as it thinks about Taiwan. The Americans and Europeans, by contrast, are mostly not gaining firsthand experience, and cutting off Ukrainian partnerships cuts off the chance to learn without sending their own troops into that kind of war. Malik predicted that U.S. forces will soon face jet-powered Shaheds in the Middle East, and said neither the United States nor Europe has an affordable way to stop them at scale.

Pressure on Russia, and on Europe


Vacroux said sanctions and Ukrainian strikes on refineries are straining Russia’s economy, though economic pressure alone is “necessary but not sufficient” to end the war. She also described a rise in Russian sub-threshold attacks on Europe, including cyberattacks, arson and drone incursions, which she said test the credibility of NATO’s Article 5.

Peace Talks, Nuclear Threats, and the Will to Keep Fighting


When asked about negotiations, Malik was blunt. “Negotiations are one very big myth,” he said. Vacroux noted that some channels still produce prisoner exchanges. Both viewed Russian nuclear threats as deterrence more than intent. Vacroux said about three-quarters of Ukrainians want elections to wait until the war ends, and 62% say they will keep fighting “as long as it takes.” Malik expected another wave of residents to leave Kyiv this winter.

Vacroux closed by sharing her belief that Ukraine’s only dependable security guarantee is the one it builds itself. “It cannot rely on the United States. It cannot rely on companies like Starlink. It cannot rely on the Europeans.”

View a full recording of the conversation:

*This article was supported by research using Claude. All outputs were reviewed by humans, and the final expression was produced by the author.

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Alexandra Vacroux and Yevhenii Malik of the Kyiv School of Economics said Russia’s strikes on Kyiv are escalating while cheap drones and robots hold the front line in place, a shift in warfare that Ukraine’s rivals are studying closely.

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In Brief
  • Ukraine is pioneering a new kind of warfare in which cheap drones and unmanned ground vehicles hold the front line in place and replace soldiers, Malik said, though funding limits how fast Ukraine can scale them.
  • Vacroux said Ukraine’s rivals, including North Korea and China, are learning from the war while the U.S. and Europe are not.
  • Russia has intensified strikes on Kyiv since August to make the city unlivable, and Vacroux said Ukraine can rely only on the security guarantee it builds itself.
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