Miriam Golden’s presentation in CDDRL’s Research Seminar on April 23, 2026, addressed a central puzzle in democratic politics: why are incumbent reelection rates systematically higher in richer democracies? Drawing on cross-national data, she demonstrates a strong positive relationship between national income and reelection rates, a pattern that is both statistically robust and theoretically unexpected. This empirical finding motivates a reassessment of two dominant frameworks — accountability theory, associated with John Ferejohn, and selection theory, associated with James Fearon. Accountability models suggest that voters reward good performance and punish poor performance, but they do not explain cross-national variation in reelection rates. Selection models argue that elections filter out low-quality politicians, implying that poorer countries with lower reelection rates must have dishonest or incompetent politicians, yet empirical evidence does not align well with these inferences.

Golden proposes an alternative framework centered on “capacity gaps,” introducing the resources that politicians have available and voters' ability to discern political performance as key missing parameters. In poorer countries, both state capacity and voter interpretive capacity are constrained. Governments face fiscal and administrative limitations that restrict policy delivery, while voters struggle to distinguish whether poor outcomes result from incompetence, corruption, or structural constraints. As a result, the informational conditions necessary for effective accountability break down. Golden further argues that informational signals are asymmetric: markers of “bad” types, such as corruption scandals, criminal convictions, or dynastic ties, are visible and salient, whereas markers of “good” types, such as competence or honesty, are diffuse and easily mimicked. In these settings, even honest, competent, and well-intentioned politicians are likely to lose office because they are indistinguishable to voters from the malfeasant and incompetent. Even high-performing politicians may not be rewarded electorally, and good types gain no consistent advantage in reelection. 

To evaluate this framework, Golden presents multiple empirical investigations. First, she examines whether voters reward economic performance using within-country variation in GDP growth. The results show that higher growth increases reelection rates, but only in countries with high literacy levels. Since literacy roughly proxies voter discernment capacity, this suggests that performance matters electorally only when voters can interpret it. Second, she analyzes survey data from legislators in Italy and Pakistan to assess whether elections filter out low-quality politicians. She finds that politicians with “bad-type” markers, such as dynastic backgrounds or long tenure, exhibit higher tolerance for corruption yet continue to survive electorally, contradicting selection theory. Third, she tests whether poorer democracies have lower-quality politicians by examining education levels and relative salaries. She finds no meaningful differences in legislator quality across income levels and no relationship between salaries and reelection rates, further weakening selection-based explanations.

Overall, Golden’s approach reconciles several empirical anomalies: the income–reelection relationship, the conditional effect of economic performance, and the persistence of low-quality politicians. At the same time, important questions remain regarding causal identification and measurement, as proxies like literacy may capture broader development effects. Nonetheless, the framework offers a compelling shift in focus from politicians to voters, highlighting how limits in information processing can undermine both accountability and selection in democratic systems.

On Thursday, April 16, Daniel Kelemen (UC Merced) and CDDRL predoctoral fellow Hanna Folsz discussed the consequential outcome of the April 2026 Hungarian election: the victory of Peter Magyar’s Tisza Party over Viktor Orbán’s Fidesz Party in a Rethinking European Development and Security (REDS) seminar co-hosted by the Center on Democracy, Development and the Rule of Law and The Europe Center.

Daniel Kelemen opened the talk, first offering an overview of Viktor Orbán's rise to power. In 2010, Orbán won Hungary’s nationwide election with over two-thirds majority, a majority large enough to allow him to amend the constitution. Having suffered an electoral defeat in the past, Orbán worked to centralize his power. He captured referees — courts and independent bodies — seized control of the media, and demonized and undermined the opposition. Orbán effectively changed the rules of the game, tilting the electoral playing field. 

Kelemen states that there are cases in which smaller authoritarian groups within a larger system are tolerated or protected by national parties because they deliver votes. Orbán operated with the support of Angela Merkel, the former Chancellor of Germany, who largely stopped the EU from taking action against Orbán. Orbán’s party, the Fidesz Party, was a part of Merkel’s EU-wide party, the European People’s Party (EPP), a center-right, Christian party. This support, along with the emigration of dissatisfied voters and continued funding from the EU, helped Orbán stay in power. 

However, Orbán’s Fidesz Party was kicked out of the EPP in 2021. Merkel, who was a strong supporter of Orbán, left office in 2022. Orbán’s policy also became more extreme, raising more concern from European member states. In 2022, the EU Commission cut funding to Hungary, suspending 32 billion euros. Kelemen identifies this suspension of funds as an effective step against Hungary’s regime. 

Kelemen then outlined the implications of Orbán’s fall for Hungary, the EU, and international actors, including Russia and the United States. For Hungary, it means full regime change, as the Tisza Party will likely take efforts to undo Orbán’s autocratic policy changes. For the EU, it means that policy on Ukraine and Russia will be different, because Orbán was using his veto to prevent support for Ukraine and sanctions on Russia. For the US and Russia, Russia lost its supporter and ear in the EU, and the Trump administration lost its closest ally in Europe. On a global note, Orbán was a key figure in trying to bring together far-right populists. After he was kicked out of the EPP, he formed a more autocratic-focused party called MEGA (Make Europe Great Again). 

On April 2, FSI Center Fellow Didi Kuo opened CDDRL’s Spring Research Seminar Series with a presentation titled “Beyond Policy: The Rise of Non-Programmatic Party Competition in Advanced Democracies.” The seminar examined whether policy continues to serve as the primary basis of political competition and voter-party linkage in advanced democratic systems.

Kuo began by outlining the traditional “programmatic” model of party competition, which assumes that political parties compete by offering distinct policy platforms and that voters make choices based on these policy differences. In this framework, democratic responsiveness emerges from the alignment between public preferences and party positions. Historically, such programmatic competition has been closely associated with democratic consolidation, strong institutions, and effective governance.

However, Kuo challenged this assumption by asking whether policy still plays a central role in contemporary politics. She presented evidence suggesting that political discourse, particularly in the United States, has shifted away from policy-focused communication. For example, recent political speeches were shown to contain fewer policy references and more grievance-based and retrospective language. This shift raised concerns that parties may increasingly rely on alternative strategies to mobilize voters.

The seminar then explored several non-programmatic forms of political competition. These included identity-based appeals, grievance politics, populism, and affective polarization. Kuo explained that these strategies emphasize emotional resonance, group identity, and symbolic representation rather than concrete policy proposals. In such contexts, voters may be motivated less by policy preferences and more by partisan identity or perceived cultural alignment. Importantly, these dynamics do not fully replace programmatic competition but instead reduce its relative importance.

Kuo also discussed theoretical and empirical research showing that many voters possess limited policy knowledge and often hold unstable or weakly structured policy preferences. As a result, factors such as party identification, emotion, and social identity can play a more significant role in shaping political behavior. This complicates the traditional view that democratic accountability operates primarily through policy evaluation.

To assess whether programmatic competition is declining, Kuo introduced new measurement strategies. These included expert surveys evaluating party cohesion and policy salience, as well as analyses of voter responses over time to determine whether individuals reference policy when expressing political preferences. The findings suggested a gradual decline in policy-based reasoning among voters, even in countries like the United States that have historically been highly programmatic.

Kuo concluded by considering the broader implications of this shift. A decline in programmatic competition may weaken democratic accountability, as voters become less likely to evaluate governments based on policy performance. It may also contribute to increased polarization and reduced willingness to compromise, as identity-driven politics tends to be more zero-sum. Ultimately, the seminar suggested that if policy is no longer the dominant mode of political competition, scholars may need to rethink core assumptions about how democracy functions.

In sum, Kuo’s presentation highlighted a significant transformation in advanced democracies: the growing importance of non-programmatic strategies in party competition and the potential consequences this shift holds for democratic governance.