Stanford University

Governance

FSI's research on the origins, character and consequences of government institutions spans continents and academic disciplines. The institute’s senior fellows and their colleagues across Stanford examine the principles of public administration and implementation. Their work focuses on how maternal health care is delivered in rural China, how public action can create wealth and eliminate poverty, and why U.S. immigration reform keeps stalling. 

FSI’s work includes comparative studies of how institutions help resolve policy and societal issues. Scholars aim to clearly define and make sense of the rule of law, examining how it is invoked and applied around the world. 

FSI researchers also investigate government services – trying to understand and measure how they work, whom they serve and how good they are. They assess energy services aimed at helping the poorest people around the world and explore public opinion on torture policies. The Children in Crisis project addresses how child health interventions interact with political reform. Specific research on governance, organizations and security capitalizes on FSI's longstanding interests and looks at how governance and organizational issues affect a nation’s ability to address security and international cooperation.

The Provenance Problem: Research Methods and Ethics in the Age of WikiLeaks

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* Please note all CISAC events are scheduled using the Pacific Time Zone.

 

Register in advance for this webinar: https://stanford.zoom.us/webinar/register/8416226562432/WN_WLYcdRa6T5Cs1MMdmM0Mug

 

About the Event: Is there a place for illegal or nonconsensual evidence in security studies research, such as leaked classified documents? What is at stake, and who bears the responsibility, for determining source legitimacy? Although massive unauthorized disclosures by WikiLeaks and its kindred may excite qualitative scholars with policy revelations, and quantitative researchers with big-data suitability, they are fraught with methodological and ethical dilemmas that the discipline has yet to resolve. I argue that the hazards from this research—from national security harms, to eroding human-subjects protections, to scholarly complicity with rogue actors—generally outweigh the benefits, and that exceptions and justifications need to be articulated much more explicitly and forcefully than is customary in existing work. This paper demonstrates that the use of apparently leaked documents has proliferated over the past decade, and appeared in every leading journal, without being explicitly disclosed and defended in research design and citation practices. The paper critiques incomplete and inconsistent guidance from leading political science and international relations journals and associations; considers how other disciplines from journalism to statistics to paleontology address the origins of their sources; and elaborates a set of normative and evidentiary criteria for researchers and readers to assess documentary source legitimacy and utility. Fundamentally, it contends that the scholarly community (researchers, peer reviewers, editors, thesis advisors, professional associations, and institutions) needs to practice deeper reflection on sources’ provenance, greater humility about whether to access leaked materials and what inferences to draw from them, and more transparency in citation and research strategies.

View Written Draft Paper

 

About the Speaker: Christopher Darnton is a CISAC affiliate and an associate professor of national security affairs at the Naval Postgraduate School. He previously taught at Reed College and the Catholic University of America, and holds a Ph.D. in Politics from Princeton University. He is the author of Rivalry and Alliance Politics in Cold War Latin America (Johns Hopkins, 2014) and of journal articles on US foreign policy, Latin American security, and qualitative research methods. His International Security article, “Archives and Inference: Documentary Evidence in Case Study Research and the Debate over U.S. Entry into World War II,” won the 2019 APSA International History and Politics Section Outstanding Article Award. He is writing a book on the history of US security cooperation in Latin America, based on declassified military documents.

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Christopher Darnton Associate Professor of National Security Affairs Naval Postgraduate School
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The Threat Posed by Deepfakes to Marginalized Communities

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Riana Pfefferkorn
Riana Pfefferkorn
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When we’re faced with a video recording of an event—such as an incident of police brutality—we can generally trust that the event happened as shown in the video. But that may soon change, thanks to the advent of so-called “deepfake” videos that use machine learning technology to show a real person saying and doing things they haven’t.

This technology poses a particular threat to marginalized communities. If deepfakes cause society to move away from the current “seeing is believing” paradigm for video footage, that shift may negatively impact individuals whose stories society is already less likely to believe. The proliferation of video recording technology has fueled a reckoning with police violence in the United States, recorded by bystanders and body-cameras. But in a world of pervasive, compelling deepfakes, the burden of proof to verify authenticity of videos may shift onto the videographer, a development that would further undermine attempts to seek justice for police violence. To counter deepfakes, high-tech tools meant to increase trust in videos are in development, but these technologies, though well-intentioned, could end up being used to discredit already marginalized voices. 

(Content Note: Some of the links in this piece lead to graphic videos of incidents of police violence. Those links are denoted in bold.)

Recent police killings of Black Americans caught on camera have inspired massive protests that have filled U.S. streets in the past year. Those protests endured for months in Minneapolis, where former police officer Derek Chauvin was convicted this week in the murder of George Floyd, a Black man. During Chauvin’s trial, another police officer killed Daunte Wright just outside Minneapolis, prompting additional protests as well as the officer’s resignation and arrest on second-degree manslaughter charges. She supposedly mistook her gun for her Taser—the same mistake alleged in the fatal shooting of Oscar Grant in 2009, by an officer whom a jury later found guilty of involuntary manslaughter (but not guilty of a more serious charge). All three of these tragic deaths—George Floyd, Daunte Wright, Oscar Grant—were documented in videos that were later used (or, in Wright’s case, seem likely to be used) as evidence at the trials of the police officers responsible. Both Floyd’s and Wright’s deaths were captured by the respective officers’ body-worn cameras, and multiple bystanders with cell phones recorded the Floyd and Grant incidents. Some commentators credit a 17-year-old Black girl’s video recording of Floyd’s death for making Chauvin’s trial happen at all.

The growth of the movement for Black lives in the years since Grant’s death in 2009 owes much to the rise in the availability, quality, and virality of bystander videos documenting police violence, but this video evidence hasn’t always been enough to secure convictions. From Rodney King’s assailants in 1992 to Philando Castile’s shooter 25 years later, juries have often declined to convict police officers even in cases where wanton police violence or killings are documented on video. Despite their growing prevalence, police bodycams have had mixed results in deterring excessive force or impelling accountability. That said, bodycam videos do sometimes make a difference, helping to convict officers in the killings of Jordan Edwards in Texas and Laquan McDonald in Chicago. Chauvin’s defense team pitted bodycam footage against the bystander videos employed by the prosecution, and lost.

What makes video so powerful? Why does it spur crowds to take to the streets and lawyers to showcase it in trials? It’s because seeing is believing. Shot at differing angles from officers’ point of view, bystander footage paints a fuller picture of what happened. Two people (on a jury, say, or watching a viral video online) might interpret a video two different ways. But they’ve generally been able to take for granted that the footage is a true, accurate record of something that really happened. 

That might not be the case for much longer. It’s now possible to use artificial intelligence to generate highly realistic “deepfake” videos showing real people saying and doing things they never said or did, such as the recent viral TikTok videos depicting an ersatz Tom Cruise. You can also find realistic headshots of people who don’t exist at all on the creatively-named website thispersondoesnotexist.com. (There’s even a cat version.) 

While using deepfake technology to invent cats or impersonate movie stars might be cute, the technology has more sinister uses as well. In March, the Federal Bureau of Investigation issued a warning that malicious actors are “almost certain” to use “synthetic content” in disinformation campaigns against the American public and in criminal schemes to defraud U.S. businesses. The breakneck pace of deepfake technology’s development has prompted concerns that techniques for detecting such imagery will be unable to keep up. If so, the high-tech cat-and-mouse game between creators and debunkers might end in a stalemate at best. 

If it becomes impossible to reliably prove that a fake video isn’t real, a more feasible alternative might be to focus instead on proving that a real video isn’t fake. So-called “verified at capture” or “controlled-capture” technologies attach additional metadata to imagery at the moment it’s taken, to verify when and where the footage was recorded and reveal any attempt to tamper with the data. The goal of these technologies, which are still in their infancy, is to ensure that an image’s integrity will stand up to scrutiny. 

Photo and video verification technology holds promise for confirming what’s real in the age of “fake news.” But it’s also cause for concern. In a society where guilty verdicts for police officers remain elusive despite ample video evidence, is even more technology the answer? Or will it simply reinforce existing inequities? 

The “ambitious goal” of adding verification technology to smartphone chipsets necessarily entails increasing the cost of production. Once such phones start to come onto the market, they will be more expensive than lower-end devices that lack this functionality. And not everyone will be able to afford them. Black Americans and poor Americans have lower rates of smartphone ownership than whites and high earners, and are more likely to own a “dumb” cell phone. (The same pattern holds true with regard to educational attainment and urban versus rural residence.) Unless and until verification technology is baked into even the most affordable phones, it risks replicating existing disparities in digital access. 

That has implications for police accountability, and, by extension, for Black lives. Primed by societal concerns about deepfakes and “fake news,” juries may start expecting high-tech proof that a video is real. That might lead them to doubt the veracity of bystander videos of police brutality if they were captured on lower-end phones that lack verification technology. Extrapolating from current trends in phone ownership, such bystanders are more likely to be members of marginalized racial and socioeconomic groups. Those are the very people who, as witnesses in court, face an uphill battle in being afforded credibility by juries. That bias, which reared its ugly head again in the Chauvin trial, has long outlived the 19th-century rules that explicitly barred Black (and other non-white) people from testifying for or against white people on the grounds that their race rendered them inherently unreliable witnesses. 

In short, skepticism of “unverified” phone videos may compound existing prejudices against the owners of those phones. That may matter less in situations where a diverse group of numerous eyewitnesses record a police brutality incident on a range of devices. But if there is only a single bystander witness to the scene, the kind of phone they own could prove significant.

The advent of mobile devices empowered Black Americans to force a national reckoning with police brutality. Ubiquitous, pocket-sized video recorders allow average bystanders to document the pandemic of police violence. And because seeing is believing, those videos make it harder for others to continue denying the problem exists. Even with the evidence thrust under their noses, juries keep acquitting police officers who kill Black people. Chauvin’s conviction this week represents an exception to recent history: Between 2005 and 2019, of the 104 law enforcement officers charged with murder or manslaughter in connection with a shooting while on duty, 35 were convicted. 

The fight against fake videos will complicate the fight for Black lives. Unless it is equally available to everyone, video verification technology may not help the movement for police accountability, and could even set it back. Technological guarantees of videos’ trustworthiness will make little difference if they are accessible only to the privileged, whose stories society already tends to believe. We might be able to tech our way out of the deepfakes threat, but we can’t tech our way out of America’s systemic racism. 

Riana Pfefferkorn is a research scholar at the Stanford Internet Observatory

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Q&A with Riana Pfefferkorn, Stanford Internet Observatory Research Scholar

Riana Pfefferkorn joined the Stanford Internet Observatory as a research scholar in December. She comes from Stanford’s Center for Internet and Society, where she was the Associate Director of Surveillance and Cybersecurity.
Q&A with Riana Pfefferkorn, Stanford Internet Observatory Research Scholar
A member of the All India Student Federation teaches farmers about social media and how to use such tools as part of ongoing protests against the government. (Pradeep Gaur / SOPA Images / Sipa via Reuters Connect)
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New Intermediary Rules Jeopardize the Security of Indian Internet Users

New Intermediary Rules Jeopardize the Security of Indian Internet Users
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Some Humility About Transparency

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Daphne Keller
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I am a huge fan of transparency about platform content moderation. I’ve considered it a top policy priority for years, and written about it in detail (with Paddy Leerssen, who also wrote this great piece about recommendation algorithms and transparency). I sincerely believe that without it, we are unlikely to correctly diagnose current problems or arrive at wise legal solutions.

So it pains me to admit that I don’t really know what “transparency” I’m asking for. I don’t think many other people do, either. Researchers and public interest advocates around the world can agree that more transparency is better. But, aside from people with very particular areas of interest (like political advertising), almost no one has a clear wish list. What information is really important? What information is merely nice to have? What are the trade-offs involved?

That imprecision is about to become a problem, though it’s a good kind of problem to have. A moment of real political opportunity is at hand. Lawmakers in the US, Europe, and elsewhere are ready to make some form of transparency mandatory. Whatever specific legal requirements they create will have huge consequences. The data, content, or explanations they require platforms to produce will shape our future understanding of platform operations, and our ability to respond — as consumers, as advocates, or as democracies. Whatever disclosures the laws don’t require, may never happen.

It’s easy to respond to this by saying “platforms should track all the possible data, we’ll see what’s useful later!” Some version of this approach might be justified for the very biggest “gatekeeper” or “systemically important” platforms. Of course, making Facebook or Google save all that data would be somewhat ironic, given the trouble they’ve landed in by storing similar not-clearly-needed data about their users in the past. (And the more detailed data we store about particular takedowns, the likelier it is to be personally identifiable.)

For any platform, though, we should recognize that the new practices required for transparency reporting comes at a cost. That cost might include driving platforms to adopt simpler, blunter content rules in their Terms of Service. That would reduce their expenses in classifying or explaining decisions, but presumably lead to overly broad or narrow content prohibitions. It might raise the cost of adding “social features” like user comments enough that some online businesses, like retailers or news sites, just give up on them. That would reduce some forms of innovation, and eliminate useful information for Internet users. For small and midsized platforms, transparency obligations (like other expenses related to content moderation) might add yet another reason to give up on competing with today’s giants, and accept an acquisition offer from an incumbent that already has moderation and transparency tools. Highly prescriptive transparency obligations might also drive de facto standardization and homogeneity in platform rules, moderation practices, and features.

None of these costs provides a reason to give up on transparency — or even to greatly reduce our expectations. But all of them are reasons to be thoughtful about what we ask for. It would be helpful if we could better quantify these costs, or get a handle on what transparency reporting is easier and harder to do in practice.

I’ve made a (very in the weeds) list of operational questions about transparency reporting, to illustrate some issues that are likely to arise in practice. I think detailed examples like these are helpful in thinking through both which kinds of data matter most, and how much precision we need within particular categories. For example, I personally want to know with great precision how many government orders a platform received, how it responded, and whether any orders led to later judicial review. But to me it seems OK to allow some margin of error for platforms that don’t have standardized tracking and queuing tools, and that as a result might modestly mis-count TOS takedowns (either by absolute numbers or percent).

I’ll list that and some other recommendations below. But these “recommendations” are very tentative. I don’t know enough to have a really clear set of preferences yet. There are things I wish I could learn from technologists, activists, and researchers first. The venues where those conversations would ordinarily happen — and, importantly, where observers from very different backgrounds and perspectives could have compared the issues they see, and the data they most want — have been sadly reduced for the past year.

So here is my very preliminary list:

  • Transparency mandates should be flexible enough to accommodate widely varying platform practices and policies. Any de facto push toward standardization should be limited to the very most essential data.
  • The most important categories of data are probably the main ones listed in the DSA: number of takedowns, number of appeals, number of successful appeals. But as my list demonstrates, those all can become complicated in practice.
  • It’s worth taking the time to get legal transparency mandates right. That may mean delegating exact transparency rules to regulatory agencies in some countries, or conducting studies prior to lawmaking in others.
  • Once rules are set, lawmakers should be very reluctant to move the goalposts. If a platform (especially a smaller one) invests in rebuilding its content moderation tools to track certain categories of data, it should not have to overhaul those tools soon because of changed legal requirements.
  • We should insist on precise data in some cases, and tolerate more imprecision in others (based on the importance of the issue, platform capacity, etc.). And we should take the time to figure out which is which.
  • Numbers aren’t everything. Aggregate data in transparency reports ultimately just tell us what platforms themselves think is going on. To understand what mistakes they make, or what biases they may exhibit, independent researchers need to see the actual content involved in takedown decisions. (This in turn raises a slough of issues about storing potentially unlawful content, user privacy and data protection, and more.)

It’s time to prioritize. Researchers and civil society should assume we are operating with a limited transparency “budget,” which we must spend wisely — asking for the information we can best put to use, and factoring in the cost. We need better understanding of both research needs and platform capabilities to do this cost-benefit analysis well. I hope that the window of political opportunity does not close before we manage to do that.

Daphne Keller

Daphne Keller

Director of the Program on Platform Regulation
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Cover of the EIP report "The Long Fuse: Misinformation and the 2020 Election"
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Election Integrity Partnership Releases Final Report on Mis- and Disinformation in 2020 U.S. Election

Researchers from Stanford University, the University of Washington, Graphika and Atlantic Council’s DFRLab released their findings in ‘The Long Fuse: Misinformation and the 2020 Election.’
Election Integrity Partnership Releases Final Report on Mis- and Disinformation in 2020 U.S. Election
Daphne Keller QA
Q&As

Q&A with Daphne Keller of the Program on Platform Regulation

Keller explains some of the issues currently surrounding platform regulation
Q&A with Daphne Keller of the Program on Platform Regulation
twitter takedown headliner
Blogs

Analysis of February 2021 Twitter Takedowns

In this post and in the attached reports we investigate a Twitter network attributed to actors in Armenia, Iran, and Russia.
Analysis of February 2021 Twitter Takedowns
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In a new blog post, Daphne Keller, Director of the Program on Platform Regulation at the Cyber Policy Center, looks at the need for transparency when it comes to content moderation and asks, what kind of transparency do we really want?

Former senator to teach, lecture at Stanford

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Russ Feingold, the former U.S. senator perhaps best known for pushing campaign finance reform, will spend the spring quarter at Stanford lecturing and teaching.

Feingold will be the Payne Distinguished Lecturer and will be in residence at the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies while teaching and mentoring graduate students in the Ford Dorsey Program in International Policy Studies and the Stanford Law School.

Feingold was recently the State Department’s  special envoy to the Great Lakes Region of Africa and the Democratic Republic of Congo. He will bring his knowledge and longstanding interest in one of the most challenging, yet promising, places in Africa to campus with the cross-listed IPS and Law School course, “The Great Lakes Region of Africa and American Foreign Relations: Policy and Legal Implications of the Post-1994 Era.”

Feingold, a Wisconsin Democrat who served three terms in the Senate between 1993 and 2011, co-sponsored the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002. Better known as the McCain-Feingold Act, the legislation regulated the roles of soft money contributions and issue ads in national elections.

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Module 3 of CDDRL’s “Solving Public Policy Problems” Online Course Out Now

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Nora Sulots
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The Center on Democracy, Development and the Rule of Law is pleased to announce the release of the third module of mini-lectures in our Solving Public Policy Problems massive open online course (MOOC).

Case studies like this are instrumental to the curriculum for both CDDRL’s Leadership Academy for Development (LAD) and the Masters’ in International Policy (MIP). They address a wide range of issues in developing countries and are designed to encourage you to think critically about key decisions that have led to policy reforms. This video refers to the implementation segment of the Problem-Solving Framework (module 1.3).

Case Study: Gifford Pinchot and Sustainable Forest Management


The year was 1909, and Gifford Pinchot, Chief Forester of the United States, faced a terrible personal dilemma. He had discovered a pattern of corruption in the sale of public lands to developers and other private interests. But the new president, William Howard Taft, depended on support from western Republicans and had placed a gag order on the whole affair. Pinchot was outraged at this evidence of corruption reaching the White House, but he wanted to give Taft a fair hearing. The new president had, after all, vowed to support conservation and strong control over federal lands. Taft invited Pinchot to the White House, where he alternately implored Pinchot not to go public with the matter and threatened him with dismissal if he violated the gag order. Pinchot had in his pocket a letter that could expose the scandal. This case explores the dilemma of Pinchot, a mid-level bureaucrat dependent on a president’s good will, and the strategies available to him. It shows the power of a single leader and the similarities the United States once had with many developing nations struggling with widespread corruption.

Through this case, students will gain a better understanding of how good communication is important for persuading stakeholders that a reform objective is both achievable and beneficial.

You can read the case study here, access the full series on our YouTube page, and watch Module 3 below:

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Grant Miller and Francis Fukuyma discuss the Case of World Health Partners-Sky
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Module 2 of CDDRL’s “Solving Public Policy Problems” Online Course Out Now

Using the Problem-Solving Framework from Module 1, our second set of mini-lectures examines the case study of child health outcomes in Bihar, India, and includes an interview with Grant Miller, the Henry J. Kaiser, Jr. Professor of Health Policy at the Stanford School of Medicine.
Module 2 of CDDRL’s “Solving Public Policy Problems” Online Course Out Now
Solving Public Policy Problems
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Reimagining Public Policy Education at Stanford and Beyond

The Center on Democracy, Development and the Rule of Law is proud to announce the launch of a new free massive open online course aimed at providing participants with a foundational knowledge of the best means for enacting effective policy change in their home countries.
Reimagining Public Policy Education at Stanford and Beyond
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This single-video module examines the case of Gifford Pinchot and Sustainable Forest Management. Through this case study, students will gain a better understanding of how good communication is important for persuading stakeholders that a reform objective is both achievable and beneficial.

The New Global Equilibrium: Talk by Rahul Gandhi

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The New Global Equilibrium, talk by Rahul Gandhi

Please join us on Wednesday, May 31, for a talk by Indian politician Rahul Gandhi.


Mr. Gandhi will offer his unique perspective on the changing world order and India's crucial role within it. Following his talk, Mr. Gandhi will engage in a conversation with CDDRL Affiliated Scholar Dinsha Mistree.

Registration is required. Please note that large bags will not be permitted into the venue, and all bags are subject to search.

SPEAKERS

Rahul Gandhi

Rahul Gandhi

Former President, Indian National Congress

Rahul Gandhi was a Member of Parliament from 2004 until earlier this year. In March 2023, he was disqualified from Parliament pursuant to a court verdict that is currently under challenge in a higher court. He last represented the constituency of Wayanad in Kerala in the Lok Sabha and, prior to that, served three terms as MP from Amethi in Uttar Pradesh. In 2007, he was named General Secretary of the Indian National Congress in charge of the youth and student organizations of the Party. In January 2013, he assumed office as Vice President of the Indian National Congress. He was the President of the Indian National Congress from December 2017 to July 2019.

Rahul was born on June 19, 1970, to Rajiv and Sonia Gandhi. He has attended St. Stephen’s College, Delhi, Harvard College, and Rollins College, Florida, from which he graduated with a Bachelor of Arts. He went on to receive an M. Phil. in Development Studies from Trinity College, Cambridge University. Thereafter, he joined the Monitor Group, a strategy consulting group in London, where he worked for three years.

In the past, Rahul was a member of the Parliamentary Standing Committees on Home Affairs, Human Resource Development, External Affairs, Finance and Defence and the Consultative Committees for the Ministry of Civil Aviation, the Ministry of Rural Development, the Ministry of Finance & Corporate Affairs and the Ministry of External Affairs.

Rahul has championed the development of a self-help group movement and a non-profit eye care provider in North India.  He also serves as a trustee of the Rajiv Gandhi Foundation.

Dinsha Mistree

Dinsha Mistree

Affiliated Scholar (CDDRL), Research Fellow (Hoover Institution), Research Fellow (Rule of Law Program, Stanford Law School)
Moderator

Dinsha Mistree is a research fellow at the Hoover Institution, where he manages the Program on Strengthening US-Indian Relations. He is also a research fellow in the Rule of Law Program at Stanford Law School and an affiliated scholar at the Center on Democracy, Development and the Rule of Law. Dr. Mistree studies the relationship between governance and economic growth in developing countries. His scholarship concentrates on the political economy of legal systems, public administration, and education policy, with a regional focus on India. He holds a Ph.D. and an M.A. in Politics from Princeton University, with an S.M. and an S.B. from MIT. He previously held a postdoctoral fellowship at CDDRL and was a visiting scholar at IIM-Ahmedabad.

Dinsha Mistree

CEMEX Auditorium (Stanford Graduate School of Business)
655 Knight Way, Stanford, CA 94305

In-person only. No streaming link.

Rahul Gandhi
Lectures

Coca-Cola Curses: Hate Speech in a Post-Colonial Context

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Hate speech is a contextual phenomenon. What offends or inflames in one context may differ from what incites violence in a different time, place, and cultural landscape. Theories of hate speech, especially Susan Benesch’s concept of “dangerous speech” (hateful speech that incites violence), have focused on the factors that cut across these paradigms. However, the existing scholarship is narrowly focused on situations of mass violence or societal unrest in America or Europe.

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Gray Skies Ahead

Authors
Gi-Wook Shin
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This essay originally appeared in Korean on March 4 in Sindonga (New East Asia), Korea’s oldest monthly magazine (established 1931), as part of a monthly column, "Shin’s Reflections on Korea." Translated by Raymond Ha. A PDF version of this essay is also available to download. 

In early January, I spoke with my colleague Francis Fukuyama about a range of global issues in an exclusive interview for the Munhwa Ilbo, a major Korean newspaper. Looking back on 2022, he said it was “a very good year.”1 I was rather surprised by this assessment, given the ongoing political turmoil at home and abroad.

Elaborating on his answer, Fukuyama explained that “the Russians got completely bogged down” in Ukraine. Moreover, “China experienced mass protests, and there were protests also in Iran.” In the United States, “pro-Trump forces failed to make gains” in the November midterms. Fukuyama concluded that we may “look back on 2022 as the year when this democratic recession that has been going on for over 15 years finally bottomed out.”2

Though I agree that the democratic recession has bottomed out, it is too early to tell whether we will see a recovery. History tells us that we could remain stalled in the status quo for a while. Even after Hitler, Stalin, and Mao disappeared from the scene, Nazism, Stalinism, and Maoism remained. Juan Perón (Little Hitler), Nicolae Ceaușescu (Little Stalin), and Pol Pot (Little Mao) emerged in different parts of the world. Trumpism could remain a potent political force despite Trump’s loss in 2020. Politicians may continue to model themselves after Trump. A democratic recovery will be a long and arduous process, requiring a great deal of attention and effort.

Yoon Suk-Yeol’s election halted Korea’s democratic decline. . . [However,] anti-pluralism pervades Korean politics, and polarization only continues to worsen.
Gi-Wook Shin

Whither Korea’s Democracy?

Just as the United States turned the tide on democratic backsliding with Biden’s victory, Yoon Suk-Yeol’s election halted Korea’s democratic decline. The Yoon administration entered office trumpeting liberal democratic values and calling for a politics of common sense and fairness. However, it failed to live up to its rhetoric during its first year. Anti-pluralism pervades Korean politics, and polarization only continues to worsen. The ruling and opposition parties are locked in a vicious cycle of mutual hostility. This begs the question of whether Korea’s democracy can set itself on a path to recovery.

I first raised concerns about Korea’s democratic decline in an essay in the May 2020 edition of Sindonga magazine, entitled “Korean Democracy is Sinking under the Guise of the Rule of Law.”3 The Moon Jae-In administration was in its third year at the time.

In that essay, I noted that the Moon administration, intoxicated by a sense of moral superiority, regarded the opposition as a great evil with which there could be no compromise. It showed no qualms about deploying populist tactics, regarding itself as the champion of the ordinary citizen in a pitched battle against the establishment elite. Moreover, it politicized the courts and undermined the separation of powers. It was weakening Korea’s democracy “under the guise of the rule of law.” If political actors recklessly violated democratic norms and ideals, no amount of procedural legitimacy would be enough to sustain Korea’s liberal democracy. I warned that Korea’s democracy could gradually erode, just as one could “become soaked by a drizzle without noticing.”4 The essay was an earnest plea to prevent an unsettling tragedy—that a generation of politicians could dismantle the democracy that they had passionately fought for as pro-democracy activists in their youth.

This diagnosis formed the basis for South Korea’s Democracy in Crisis (2022), which I co-edited with Ho-Ki Kim, a professor of sociology at Yonsei University.5 This edited volume includes essays by progressive and conservative academics from Korea and the United States. It explains how and why Korea’s hard-won democracy entered a state of crisis, and it points to illiberalism, populism, and polarization as the main reasons. As we approach the first anniversary of President Yoon’s inauguration and look toward the future, it is timely to reassess the current state of Korea’s democracy along those three dimensions.

President Yoon repeatedly stressed the importance of freedom. However, he has failed to move beyond rhetorical gestures. Korea’s citizens are still waiting to see what an emphasis on liberal democratic values looks like in practice.
Gi-Wook Shin

Let us begin with illiberalism. The Moon administration, which wielded a Manichean logic of good and evil and stoked chauvinistic anti-Japanese nationalism, is no longer in power. As if in reaction to these trends, President Yoon repeatedly stressed the importance of freedom. In his inaugural address, he put forth a vision of value-based diplomacy centered on solidarity between liberal democracies.6 However, he has failed to move beyond rhetorical gestures. Korea’s citizens are still waiting to see what an emphasis on liberal democratic values looks like in practice.

Moreover, the logic of political tribalism continues to overwhelm liberalism. Article 46(2) of Korea’s constitution declares that “members of the National Assembly . . . shall perform their duties in accordance with conscience.”7 However, many members are afraid to speak their minds for fear of angering their own side. Government officials are still indicted for “abuse of authority” over decisions they made while implementing policy measures. The core democratic norm of forbearance remains a distant prospect. There are serious concerns that wide-ranging prosecutorial investigations against Moon administration officials are descending into yet another campaign to “eradicate deep-rooted evils,” which was one of the Moon administration’s political priorities.8

Next is populism. In its 21st-century form, populism does not simply appeal to popular sentiment. It has two defining characteristics: anti-elitism and anti-pluralism. The former takes aim at the elite establishment, while the latter rejects coexistence with different groups. Anti-elitism manifests itself as hostility toward party politics, and anti-pluralism provokes a hatred of opposing political forces. Furthermore, technological advances and the dissemination of social media platforms enable populist leaders to communicate directly with their supporters. This form of direct interaction is another key characteristic of contemporary populism. In Korea, there are populist forces on both the left (Moon-ppa, gae-ddal) and the right (Taegukgi brigade).9

Ideological attacks against the elite have subsided since Yoon entered office. However, the administration’s policy against the so-called “new” establishment, including labor unions, runs the risk of veering toward populism. It is necessary to address corruption in labor unions and correct imprudent practices, such as the emergence of a “labor aristocracy.” While doing so, the Yoon administration should refrain from taking a politically motivated approach that appeals to conservative voters.

Populist leadership is also a problem. In the weeks leading up to the People Power Party’s (PPP) national convention in March, where the ruling party elected its new leader, President Yoon and his office showed a heavy-handed approach by openly throwing their weight behind Kim Gi-Hyeon. On the other side of the aisle, Lee Jae-Myung, the leader of the opposition Democratic Party of Korea (DPK), is currently the subject of ongoing prosecutorial investigations. Lee’s response to these investigations has not been befitting of a political leader in a pluralist democracy. Both Yoon and Lee hew closer to a “strongman” style of leadership that values boldness and the ability to achieve results, even at the cost of democratic norms such as compromise and mutual understanding through communication. Though they represent opposing political parties, Yoon and Lee share a similar political style that, in turn, reinforces mutual hostility between the two sides.

Korean politics has degenerated into a raw struggle for power between warring tribes. It no longer fulfills its most basic function—to gather a wide range of differing opinions and to seek compromise.
Gi-Wook Shin

Last is political polarization. After the impeachment of President Park Geun-Hye and the election of Moon Jae-In, political polarization in Korea has further deteriorated due to the economic repercussions of the COVID-19 pandemic and widening socioeconomic inequalities. Even outside the political sphere, there is growing mutual distrust between individuals and between communities. There is no space for moderation or nuance. Instead of agreeing to disagree, as would be the norm in a pluralist society, everyone is compelled to choose a side. As political fandoms come to the fore and politicians amplify gender issues to “divide and conquer” the electorate, Korean politics has degenerated into a raw struggle for power between warring tribes. It no longer fulfills its most basic function—to gather a wide range of differing opinions and to seek compromise.

Mutual toleration, coexistence, and compromise are becoming increasingly rare in Korean politics, which is defined by a winner-take-all electoral system and a powerful presidency. The extremely narrow margin of victory for Yoon Suk-Yeol over Lee Jae-Myung—a mere 0.73 percentage points—is a sobering portrait of just how polarized Korea has become. Since the DPK still holds a legislative majority in the National Assembly, cooperation across the aisle is a lost cause. The Yoon administration and the PPP are pressuring the opposition with prosecutorial investigations. In response, the DPK has called for the appointment of a special, independent prosecutor to investigate allegations surrounding not only Lee, but also Yoon and First Lady Kim Keon-Hee. The DPK appears to be opposing only for the sake of opposing.

The National Assembly has abdicated its most basic responsibility of passing laws to improve the lives of Korea’s citizens. According to the National Assembly’s Secretariat, 13,198 pieces of legislation were pending review across 17 standing committees at the end of 2022. This is an average of approximately 776 per committee. This figure is significantly higher than 8,957 (527 per committee) in 2021, and only 4,023 (237 per committee) at the end of 2020. Political polarization has worsened since the transfer of power to the PPP last year. Unfortunately, the future of Korea’s democracy is anything but bright.

Based on the three metrics of illiberalism, populism, and polarization, Korea’s democracy is unlikely to return to a path of recovery for the foreseeable future. The transfer of power to the conservatives may have prevented a further decline, but Korea’s democracy is stuck in a quagmire with no exit in sight. There is also a growing mistrust in politics among the Korean people.

In my column in the May 2022 edition of Sindonga, I reviewed the five years of the Moon administration and outlined my hopes and expectations for the incoming Yoon administration. I noted that Korea’s democracy had been “drenched in a heavy downpour over the course of this year’s presidential election.” I was one of many who resolved to “keep a close eye to see whether Yoon Suk-Yeol will be able to save South Korea’s democracy from the impending thunderstorm.”10 As the Yoon administration approaches the end of its first year, it is time for a clear-headed assessment of where Korea’s democracy stands. The downpour has stopped, but the skies are still overcast. There is no telling when we might see sunshine again.

The End of Strongmen—or Not

I have argued that Korea’s democratic decline must be understood as part of a global phenomenon. Democratic backsliding remains a topic of great concern among Western intellectuals. According to Freedom House, the proportion of democracies in the world surpassed 50% in the mid-1990s as a result of the “third wave” of democratization that began in the 1970s. After reaching a peak of 62% in 2006, this figure has declined for 15 consecutive years. It has now fallen below 50%. This trend is reminiscent of the 1930s and 40s. Back then, the United States and the United Kingdom defended democracy from fascism and communism in World War II and the Cold War. During the past decade, however, even these two countries have experienced a crisis of democracy.

As noted above in Fukuyama’s assessment, there are signs that the global decline in democracy has indeed bottomed out. Putin is mired in a crisis, and Xi is also facing an uphill battle. Because the two leading authoritarian powers are facing difficulties, the political landscape has become more favorable for democracies. At the outset of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, many anticipated that Putin would win an easy victory. However, the war has become a global proxy war between democracies and authoritarian powers. Russia’s military is floundering, and some analysts even argue that this war could lead to Putin’s downfall. Xi has consolidated power to secure a third term as president, but public discontent is building over COVID-19 policies and economic stagnation. Researchers at Cambridge University have reported that, in general, the power of authoritarian leaders has weakened over the course of the pandemic.

Most of the political leaders highlighted in Gideon Rachman’s The Age of the Strongman—Donald Trump, Boris Johnson, Rodrigo Duterte, and Jair Bolsonaro—have exited center stage in their respective countries. Erdoğan’s leadership in Turkey has also taken a hit due to the recent earthquake. In his book, Rachman warns that the emergence of strongmen since the 2000s posed a threat to democracy across the world. It is thus an encouraging sign that their political influence appears to be largely waning. One of the reasons why pro-Trump forces failed to gain ground in last November’s midterms is that American voters chose to defend and restore democracy.11

Even so, it is unclear whether we are in the midst of a “fourth wave” of democratization. Illiberalism and populism continue to cast a shadow in many parts of the world. The underlying socioeconomic conditions that gave rise to illiberalism and populism have not improved, with inflation and income inequality creating serious difficulties. Moreover, political polarization shows no sign of improvement. According to the Economist Intelligence Unit’s democracy index, the global average barely changed from 2021 (5.28) to 2022 (5.29).12 In the United States, while Trump’s political clout has shrunk, he is still a major contender for the 2024 presidential race. Trumpism is alive and well. Many pro-Trump politicians who claim that the 2020 election was stolen have been elected to Congress.

Steven Levitsky and Daniel Ziblatt observe in How Democracies Die that democratic decline in the 21st century has often occurred as a result of elected leaders gradually dismantling democratic institutions. Military dictators or communist revolutionaries forcibly toppled democracies in the past, but democracies are now under attack from politicians who entered office through free and fair elections. Since the democratic recession is a global phenomenon, a democratic recovery will also require international cooperation.

How Korea’s Democracy Can Recover

Korea is not immune to global trends. While these trends will determine the prevailing winds, there are steps that Korea can take on its own. To set itself on the path to a robust recovery, Korea’s democracy must undergo major surgery in multiple areas. It is necessary to reform institutions and establish a different political culture. There must be a new style of political leadership, and there must be a concerted effort to address underlying socioeconomic conditions.

Institutional reform can wait no longer. There is broad agreement that the institutions created by the 1987 constitution, referred to as the “1987 regime,” have outlived their historical purpose. Political calculations, however, continue to stymie efforts to overhaul these institutions. The 1987 constitution created an extremely powerful presidency with a one-term limit, giving rise to a host of negative repercussions. All but 47 of the 300 seats in the National Assembly are filled through winner-take-all elections in single-member districts. Constitutional reform is required to address the former, and electoral reform is needed to fix the latter.13 Anonymous voting should be eliminated to protect the autonomy of each legislator, while also holding them accountable for their decisions. Although the details must be negotiated between the ruling and opposition parties, the overall objective should be to facilitate compromise and alleviate political polarization.

Korea’s political culture also needs to change. Politicians must learn to tolerate different opinions, and political parties should openly communicate with one another to find solutions. Demonizing the other side is unacceptable. It is only natural for there to be a wide variety of opinions in a pluralistic, democratic society. Those who hold different views should be able to respectfully engage in dialogue with one another, as long as these views align with the fundamental values outlined in Korea’s constitution. Divisive identity politics and insular political fandoms have no place in a healthy democracy.

Political parties must also change their internal culture. During the recent race to elect its new leader, the PPP was overtaken by a controversy about who truly qualified as a “pro-Yoon” politician. This show of allegiance is more reminiscent of an authoritarian regime than a democracy. There are also problems on the other side of the aisle. In late February, the National Assembly narrowly rejected a motion to allow the arrest of Lee Jae-Myung over corruption charges.14 Because the votes were cast anonymously, some DPK supporters vowed to hunt down “traitors” who did not vote against the motion. Once again, such actions have no place in a healthy democracy.

It is vital to work toward an economic recovery and to rebuild a robust middle class. . . . [Inflation and economic turmoil have] worsened economic inequality, fueling the fire of political polarization.
Gi-Wook Shin

Moreover, it is impossible to reduce political polarization without addressing the underlying socioeconomic factors. It is vital to work toward economic recovery and to rebuild a robust middle class. The pandemic, Sino-U.S. tensions, and Russia’s invasion of Ukraine have brought about inflation and economic turmoil. This has worsened economic inequality, thereby fueling the fire of political polarization. Political reforms alone will not solve the problem. In this vein, the Yoon administration should address labor unions from the perspective of labor policy, not as an ideological issue.

Above all, it is necessary to establish a style of political leadership befitting of a liberal democracy. Authoritarian leadership is built on charisma, patriarchal authority, a strict vertical hierarchy, unity of purpose, and efficiency. In contrast, leadership in a liberal democracy consists of open communication, horizontal relationships, respect for diversity, and forbearance. Korea’s democracy will move one step forward when it moves beyond strongmen to embrace a style of leadership that shows respect for democratic norms and values.

Joseph Nye was an early advocate of the importance of soft power in international politics. “Soft power” refers to the ability to persuade through attraction instead of force or coercion. In The Powers to Lead, Nye argues that successful leaders require two “hard power” skills and three soft power skills. The former refers to managerial skills and political acumen, while the latter includes communication, vision, and emotional intelligence.

By this standard, President Yoon took positive steps in terms of his leadership style upon entering office. He put forth a clear and timely vision that stressed fairness, common sense, and the restoration of liberal democratic values. By moving the presidential office to Yongsan and directly engaging with reporters every morning, he showed a desire to improve communication and respond to public sentiment. Mistakes were made, but he was initially headed in the right direction. Credit should be given where it is due.

Freedom, Fairness, and Common Sense

Since then, however, Yoon appears to have returned to a strongman style of leadership. There are fewer efforts to communicate with the opposition and empathize with public sentiment. Instead of relying on political acumen, his administration is wielding the law as a political tool. It bears repeating that the rule of law is not sufficient to guarantee a liberal democracy. We witnessed all too clearly how the Moon administration eroded Korea’s democracy while ostensibly appealing to the rule of law. A liberal democracy ultimately rests on respect for democratic norms and values. It cannot be sustained without a vigilant effort to safeguard these norms and values. To protect freedom, which President Yoon repeatedly mentioned in his inaugural address, it is crucial to tolerate the other side and demonstrate forbearance. Prosecutorial authority must be exercised with great caution, and his administration must show patience in persuading the opposition and the people.

Yoon vowed to restore fairness and common sense in the face of injustice . . . . The Korean people elected him to the highest office in the land, and he has a responsibility to uphold democratic norms and values.
Gi-Wook Shin

The failures of the Moon administration stemmed from its heavy reliance on a tight-knit network of former pro-democracy activists. It did not keep its eyes and ears open to public sentiment. There were no checks and balances to detect and correct mistakes. Similarly, there are now serious concerns that the Yoon administration could follow the same path by exclusively relying on a super-network of prosecutors. Consider, for example, the failure to appropriately vet Chung Sun-Sin, a former prosecutor, before he was appointed as the head of the National Office of Investigation in February. Chung, who previously worked under Yoon at the Prosecutor’s Office, resigned after reports emerged that his son had bullied a high school roommate. When he resigned from his role as prosecutor general to enter politics, Yoon vowed to restore fairness and common sense in the face of injustice. He should remain true to that vow. The Korean people elected him to the highest office in the land, and he has a responsibility to uphold democratic norms and values.

International cooperation is also vital on the path to a global democratic recovery. Recall how the free world, led by the United States and the United Kingdom, joined forces in the struggle against Nazism and communism. Recognizing the importance of multilateral cooperation, the Biden administration has organized the Summit for Democracy. The second summit, held in late March, was co-hosted in Korea, Costa Rica, the Netherlands, the United States, and Zambia. In effect, Korea represented Asia. At this summit, it was announced that Korea would host the third summit.15 These events are opportunities for the Yoon administration to present a detailed strategy for how Korea can play a leading role in the resurgence of democracy across the world.

One possibility would be to create and support an international forum to discuss relevant issues. In the United States, the National Endowment for Democracy, funded primarily by Congress, supports a wide range of activities across the world to promote democracy. Shorenstein APARC is currently in discussions with the Korea Foundation for Advanced Studies to host an annual dialogue, called the “Sustainable Democracy Roundtable,” for Korean and American experts and practitioners to explore the topic of democratic recovery. This dialogue will also involve young scholars and students, with the aim of nurturing future democratic leaders. Through convening similar international forums, Korea could play a leading role in promoting international solidarity among liberal democracies by fostering connections between private citizens as well as governments. 

Next Korea: Beyond a Zero-Sum Society

As I thought about how to conclude this series of essays, I was reminded of The Zero-Sum Society (1980) by Lester Thurow, which I read during my time in graduate school. In a zero-sum society, one person’s gain is another’s loss. The overall sum of gains and losses adds up to zero. Thurow used this concept to explain why it was difficult for American society to address environmental and energy issues in the 1970s as it faced economic stagnation. The clashing interests of different groups in society impeded problem-solving.

The most serious problem of a zero-sum society is that any kind of reform or change will meet heavy resistance. Close-knit interest groups will fiercely protect their own interests. This helps explain why social conflict is intensifying in Korea today, and why it is so difficult to bring about change. Political leadership is needed to transform a zero-sum society into a positive-sum society, in which the sum of gains and losses is greater than zero.

Consider the two predominant forces in Korean politics: those who achieved economic development through industrialization, and those who fought for democratization. These two groups must cease their zero-sum struggle. They must resist the temptation to demonize each other as “descendants of dictators” or a “pro-North Korean fifth column” respectively. It is time to honestly reflect upon each side’s successes and shortcomings, so that they can work together toward a positive-sum future for Korea. There is no time to lose. Inter-Korean relations are in dire straits, and Sino-U.S. tensions are intensifying by the day. Korea’s aging society presents formidable obstacles to economic growth. As the late Professor Park Se-Il of Seoul National University argued, Korea must move beyond industrialization and democratization to become a global leader.

Over the past year, I explored “Next Korea”—Korea’s vision for the future—and sought to outline a roadmap for how it might be achieved. This series of essays, which addressed politics, economics, society, culture, and foreign policy, was intended to convey my thoughts and reflections on how Korea could advance to the next stage of its development. I felt that having an outside perspective allowed me to see the “forest” of Korea’s path toward the future, even if I cannot see the trees in great detail.

By any measure, Korea has made remarkable achievements in a short period of time. It has overcome war, division, and authoritarian rule to become a country with the 10th largest economy in the world in only seven decades. Its soft power is sweeping across the globe, and Korea has world-class talent in every field. This is truly a miracle, and Koreans have every reason to be proud. The challenge now is to take the next step. Korea stands at a critical crossroads. Will it settle for the status quo, or could it leap into the top five?

Steve Jobs closed his famous 2005 commencement address at Stanford with two words: “Stay hungry.” This was at once a call to action for the ambitious Stanford graduates in the audience and a reminder to himself to keep moving forward. Korea must also “stay hungry” if it is to move higher and leap toward the future. I will be watching with great hope and anticipation to see how Korea will flourish in the years to come.

1 Kim Namseok, “A Resurgence of Democracy? A Conversation with Francis Fukuyama on the Challenges of a Changing Global Order,” Freeman Spogli Institute, January 12, 2023.↩

2 Namseok, “Resurgence of Democracy?”↩

3 Gi-Wook Shin, “Korean Democracy is Sinking under the Guise of the Rule of Law,” Shorenstein APARC, April 1, 2020.↩

4 Shin, “Korean Democracy is Sinking.”↩

5 For more details about the book, see “South Korea’s Democracy in Crisis,” Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center.↩

6“Inaugural Address by President Yoon Suk Yeol,” Korea.net, May 10, 2022. ↩

7 Ministry of Government Legislation, “Constitution of the Republic of Korea.”↩

8 Shin, “Korean Democracy is Sinking.”↩

9 For a more detailed discussion of these political groups, see Gi-Wook Shin, “In Troubled Waters: South Korea’s Democracy in Crisis,” Shorenstein APARC, May 3, 2022.

↩

10 Shin, “In Troubled Waters: South Korea’s Democracy in Crisis.”↩

11 For example, see Josh Boak and Hannah Fingerhut, “VoteCast: Inflation Top Concern, but Democracy a Worry Too,” Associated Press, November 8, 2022, and Zack Beauchamp, “The Midterms Showed American Democracy Won’t Go Down Without a Fight,” Vox, November 9, 2022.↩

12 Economist Intelligence Unit, “Democracy Index 2022,” accessed April 17, 2023.↩

13 One proposed solution is to create multi-member districts. It will also be necessary to prohibit “satellite” parties that defeat the purpose of the mixed-member proportional system that was created during the Moon administration. For a more detailed discussion, see Shin, “Korean Democracy is Sinking.”↩

14 Sitting National Assembly members cannot be arrested without a consenting vote of the National Assembly.↩

15“South Korea to Host Third ‘Summit for Democracy’ – Joint Statement,” Reuters, March 29, 2023.↩

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Asia in 2030, APARC@40 Anniversary Conference and Celebration

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Flyer for Asia in 2030, APARC@40 Conference and Celebration with an image of Encina Hall facade

The culmination of a special event series celebrating Shorenstein APARC's 40th Anniversary, "Asia in 2030, APARC@40"

Join us in celebrating APARC's 40 years of research, education, and engagement. Recognizing the accomplishments of the past four decades and looking forward to the future, the two-day program will highlight multiple aspects of APARC’s core areas of expertise and examine key forces affecting Asia’s present and shaping its future.

1-1:30 p.m.

Opening Session

Opening Remarks

Gi-Wook Shin
Director of Shorenstein APARC and the Korea Program
William J. Perry Professor of Contemporary Korea
Professor of Sociology
Senior Fellow at the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies
Stanford University

Congratulatory Remarks

Kathryn Ann “Kam” Moler
Vice Provost and Dean of Research
Marvin Chodorow Professor
Professor of Applied Physics, Physics, and Energy Science Engineering
Stanford University

Condoleezza Rice
Tad and Dianne Taube Director of the Hoover Institution
Senior Fellow on Public Policy at the Hoover Institution
Denning Professor of Global Business and the Economy at the Stanford Graduate School of Business
Professor of Political Science
Senior Fellow at Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies
Stanford University

Scott D. Sagan
Co-Director and Senior Fellow at the Center for International Security and Cooperation
Caroline S.G. Munro Professor of Political Science
Mimi and Peter Haas University Fellow in Undergraduate Education
Senior Fellow at the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies
Stanford University

1:30-2:45 p.m. 

The Future of Diplomacy

John Everard
Former Ambassador to Belarus, Uruguay, and North Korea for the United Kingdom
Coordinator of the UN Security Council’s Panel of Experts on North Korea
Former Pantech Fellow at Shorenstein APARC

Laura Stone
Former U.S. Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for India, Nepal, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, Bhutan, and Maldives
Former Acting Deputy Assistant Secretary for China and Mongolia;
Former Director of the Office of Chinese and Mongolian Affairs
Former Director of Economic Policy Office in the Bureau of East Asia and Pacific Affairs
Visiting Scholar and Inaugural China Policy Fellow at Shorenstein APARC at Stanford University

Moderator

Michael Beeman
Former Assistant U.S. Trade Representative for Japan, Korea, and APEC at the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative
Visiting Scholar at Shorenstein APARC
Stanford University

2:45-3 p.m. ~ Coffee and Tea Break

3-4:15 p.m.

The Future of Asian Studies

Panelists

Donald K. Emmerson
Director of the Southeast Asia Program at Shorenstein APARC
Affiliated Faculty with the Center on Democracy, Development, and the Rule of Law
Affiliated Scholar with the Abbasi Program in Islamic Studies
Senior Fellow Emeritus at the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies
Stanford University

Thomas B. Gold
Professor of Sociology
University of California, Berkeley

Jisoo Kim
Korea Foundation Associate Professor of History, International Affairs, and East Asian Languages and Literatures
Director of the Institute for Korean Studies
Co-Director of the East Asia National Resource Center
The George Washington University

Moderator

Kiyoteru Tsutsui
Deputy Director of Shorenstein APARC
Director of the Japan Program
Henri H. and Tomoye Takahashi Professor and Senior Fellow in Japanese Studies
Professor of Sociology
Senior Fellow at the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies
Stanford University

4:15-4:30 p.m. ~ Coffee and Tea Break

4:30-6 p.m.

Oksenberg Panel: The Future of U.S.-China Relations

Introduction

Jean C. Oi
Director of the China Program at Shorenstein APARC
Lee Shau Kee Director of the Stanford Center at Peking University
William Haas Professor of Chinese Politics
Senior Fellow at the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies
Stanford University

Panelists

M. Taylor Fravel
Arthur and Ruth Sloan Professor of Political Science and Director, Security Studies Program
Massachusetts Institute of Technology

David Michael Lampton
Professor Emeritus and former Hyman Professor and Director of SAIS-China and China Studies, School of Advanced International Studies at John Hopkins University
Former Oksenberg-Rohlen Fellow at Shorenstein APARC

Oriana Skylar Mastro
Center Fellow at the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies
Stanford University

Moderator

Thomas Fingar
Former U.S. Department of State Assistant Secretary of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Analysis, Director of the Office of Analysis for East Asia and the Pacific, and Chief of the China Division
Former Deputy Director of National Intelligence for Analysis and Chairman of the National Intelligence Council
Fellow at Shorenstein APARC
Stanford University
 

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