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There’s no shortage of threats facing the globe, from challenges to democracy to emerging capabilities like artificial intelligence and biotechnology, to ongoing conflicts between Russia and Ukraine, the United States and Iran, and the potential for conflict between China and Taiwan.

At Stanford's 2026 Reunion Homecoming weekend, Colin Kahl led a conversation with a panel of scholars from the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies on some of the major challenges currently facing the globe.

Drew Endy highlighted the need to secure the biotechnology frontier, as AI makes it ever more possible for bad actors to bring bioweapons to life. Didi Kuo discussed where democracy is doing well, and what can be done to push back against authoritarianism. Abbas Milani provided personal and scholarly insights into the conflict in Iran and the country's democratic potential. Steven Pifer debunked the idea that Russia is making meaningful progress in its war of aggression against Ukraine, and outlines how the United States can be more effective as a negotiator between the two sides. And Oriana Skylar Mastro shared what people are getting wrong about competition with China, and where more nuance is needed in understanding the U.S.-China relationship. 

While each of these challenges is significant, they are not unsolvable.

“These are not inevitabilities. These are choices," reminds Colin Kahl. "We can choose to engineer a world of abundance and opportunity, or we can create a lot of dangerous things that make life worse. We can choose to defend freedom in the United States and around the world, or we can choose not to. We can choose to wield American power with wisdom and with a degree of restraint, or unwisely with hubris, like an international wrecking ball. We can keep the problems solvable.”

To learn more from these scholars, check out their books:


Watch the full panel discussion in the video above. A podcast version is available in the player below. If you like what you hear, be sure to follow, like and subscribe to World Class on your favorite podcast platform.

TRANSCRIPT:


Kahl: You're listening to World Class from the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies at Stanford University. I'm your host, Colin Kahl, the director of FSI.

Today I'm bringing you a discussion I had with an amazing group of FSI scholars during Stanford's 2026 Reunion Homecoming weekend. We surveyed many trends and threats facing the world today, including the development of bioweapons, challenges to democracy around the world, the war between Russia and Ukraine, Chinese ambitions against Taiwan, and the U.S.-Iran conflict.

These are complicated issues and the challenges to addressing them are real, but so are the opportunities for resolving them. We're going to hear from Drew Endy, a world-recognized expert on bioengineering and biosecurity; Didi Kuo, who specializes in comparative politics, democracy, and the role of political parties; Abbas Milani, a leading voice in Iranian studies and one of the most authoritative contemporary scholars on what's happening to Iranian society; Steven Pifer, a former U.S. ambassador to Ukraine and expert on European defense; and finally, Oriana Skylar Mastro, a scholar of the Chinese military and Indo-Pacific security.

It was a great conversation, and I hope you find it as informative as I did. Here's the panel.

[BEGIN EVENT RECORDING]

Kahl: All right, so I'm going start and we're going to go down the line, and then I'll ask another round and we'll go down the line.

So, Drew, starting with you: what's one thing that the world should understand — maybe something they currently don't understand, or maybe they think they understand, but they're getting wrong — about biosecurity, biotechnology, and how it's poised to change everything.

Endy: So let's start with what we know. Somebody died in Russia of a plague. We have soldiers coming back from the front lines in Ukraine with resistant bacteria. We have Ebola in DRC; it's going to be the worst we've seen in a while, that outbreak. And I had COVID two weeks ago for the fourth or fifth time, I've lost track. It's so last decade, but it's going to kill 50,000 Americans this year, plus or minus. You know that, right? Everybody knows that.

I'm as you mentioned from bioengineering, bioengineering is the youngest engineering department at Stanford. We're twenty some years old. The second youngest is Computer Science. When I moved here to Stanford, research was being done—you know, Karl Deisseroth, who got the Nobel Prize recently—put one gene from a bacteria into neurons to use light to control neurons. That was work he did twenty years ago in bioengineering.

What do you think we've been doing? We've been getting better at bioengineering. One thing that's changing is how we manufacture. If you can encode a way of manufacturing something in the DNA, you can grow what you want where you can operate the biology.

When you leave this room, take a look at a leaf on a tree and think about it from an engineer's perspective. It's a solar panel that makes itself and recycles itself. It's pulling 120 terawatts of net energy on the surface of the earth. We have a capability in front of us to change how we make most of the things we need. We had an internet over the last fifty years that got built for communication resilience. We're going to have a “bio net”: download and grow — download DNA code, grow what you want, you can get it encoded where you are, for manufacturing resilience.

I was flying back from Washington on Wednesday. I was on seat 20A in United, window seat exit row, and I decided to design a genome. And so I opened up Claude on my laptop and I started feeding it PDF files of different genetic sequences and we started dancing. And before I landed at SFO and before my battery went to zero, I had designed a synthetic genome for a bacteria. 

What people are sleeping on a little bit is we're making biology engineerable for good reasons. I don't wake up in the morning thinking about how am I gonna make a WMD? But it's a domain that's becoming engineerable and it's a domain we haven't secured yet. And so it's like, hmm.

In so many different dimensions, we are on this journey of profound, profound change.

Kahl: Speaking of things that are radioactive, Didi, our politics. What's one thing that the folks in this room should understand that maybe they aren't currently tracking?

Kuo: So I actually think Americans and Stanford alum really do understand what's going on. Well over 70 to 80% of Americans are concerned about the state of democracy, both at home and abroad. They're concerned about levels of corruption, about attacks on freedom of speech, on attacks on election integrity, sometimes for very different reasons. But I guess I would yes and that sentiment.

First, this is not an American story. This is happening globally. We are almost entering our twentieth year of what our colleague Larry Diamond calls the global democratic recession, which means a lot of the democratization and optimism of the 1990s has either become stagnant or even been undone.

And that is a problem because even in places that were once thought immune from problems of democracy, we see leaders pursuing the same strategies: going after their opponents, weaponizing the state, repressing civil society. So you know that people are unhappy with their governments, which is often why they elect radical leaders in the first place.

But the second thing that I would say — in addition to understanding that this is global and that that's something we need to kind of drill down and investigate — is that there are actually signs of hope from around the world.

We know that democratic backsliding can be reversed. And we've seen some of those strategies be very successful abroad. And I think we've seen signs of them start to be successful here.

First, we know that massive collective action, civil resistance, and nonviolent protest can really work to bring attention to the things that Americans care about and to stop the worst kinds of violence and repression.

The second thing is institutional defenses, when people who are suddenly finding their jobs politicized or trying to be eradicated or undone, and they try to safeguard their jobs and their roles in various positions, whether they're bureaucrats or judges, tax officers, people who work at universities, law firms, et cetera. That also has a huge effect on stopping democratic erosion. 

But the number one thing is to vote in elections. The number one antidote to democratic backsliding is baked into our very system, and that is democracy itself.

We know that leaders often try to attack elections, but that you can actually create these pro-democracy coalitions across people with very different ideological and policy values and alignments and say, we're actually going to protect this fundamental process of democracy so that we can live to fight another day in the future and try to get all of our policy issues sorted out then.

And I think that we've seen the signs of that here in Minnesota earlier this year, and certainly a lot of mobilization and excitement about the midterm elections and about elections happening in Israel and Brazil and in other places around the world, France, are going to have democracy on the line. But people, when they are threatened, will work to protect democracy.

Kahl: All right. Abbas. Few people, seriously, in the world understand the dynamics inside Iran and Iran's impact on the region in the world better than you. What is one thing we could better understand about the conflict in the Middle East or Iran more generally?

Milani: One thing you can understand is that according to some in the Iranian regime, World War Three has already started. It is between Iran and Israel and the United States, and that Iran is winning. That's their version of the reality.

What I think the world doesn't get about Iran is that it is indeed a very paradoxical society. She talked about democratic backsliding. Iran has been a democratically forward sliding society in the last twenty five years.

I would seriously say, and I've written about this several places, that Iran at the societal level is right now arguably the most democratic society in the Muslim Middle East. And every day people are more and more fighting for democracy, from women to minorities to men who are siding with women. Iran has had — in spite of having the most misogynist set of laws on the books — I think arguably has the most active, progressive, prudent women's movement. in the last thirty years.

The Life Women Liberty movement is remarkable. So I think only comparable to the African American movement for civil rights in sixties and seventies in terms of its success.

So you have a paradoxical society, a profoundly despotic society, every day becoming more organized in its despotism. Today we have virtually a military dictatorship in Iran, but at the societal level it is a very dynamic society that wants democracy, women who wants equality.

There are two Irans: the Iran of the Iranian people and the Iran of this regime. And the world policy, U.S. policy doesn't seem to get this very important schism that is at the heart of the Iranian society, the paradox that exists.

Kahl: Steve, unfortunately there's also the largest conflict in Europe since the Second World War. There's been a lot of news on Ukraine. There is always every week, but it seems like the last week has been pretty newsworthy. What should we be understanding more about the current war?

Pifer: Well, I would say Russia is not winning the war on the battlefield in Ukraine, and the campaign now is shifting to target Ukrainian cities and Ukrainian civilians. Ukraine's pretty much stabilized the battlefront.

As they developed over the last two years, drones that can strike more deeply into Russia, they focused on Russian oil refineries. And they've probably . . . I think the IAES estimate was about thirty percent of Russian refining capability now has been taken offline. Now the Russians rebuild it, the Ukrainians attack it again. But that's a legitimate military target.

I mean, those fuels go to power the drones, they go to power the planes, they go to power the Russian tanks. It hasn't yet pushed the Russians to the point where the Russians have begun to negotiate in any more serious way, but it was increasing economic pressure on Russia.

Over the last nine and a half months since January 1st, Russia's gained a net total of about a hundred square kilometers of Ukrainian territory. For perspective, that's less than the size of the city of San Francisco. Ukraine is the size of Texas.

And to do that, the Russians are paying an enormous cost. Thirty to forty thousand Russian soldiers are either killed or severely wounded every single month. And given that failure on the battlefield, what you see is that the Russians are now shifting the campaign to Ukrainian cities. And the hope is that they can weaponize winter, winter's cold against the Ukrainians and break their will. So they target electric power plants, they target large steam facilities that heat the major cities, they target water facilities.

And they do a lot that's simply harassment. So I have on my phone here when I was in Kyiv about two years ago, I downloaded an air raid app. In the last several weeks for Kyiv, they're getting six to ten air raids every single day. And when that goes off at four o'clock in the morning, somebody has to say, do I drag my family down to the bomb shelter for the third time tonight, or do I tell them to sleep and we play the odds?

Now it's going to be a difficult winner for Ukraine. But I think Ukrainians have shown they're resilient. I think the Russian effort's going to fail, and this war unfortunately is going to continue well into 2027.

And the unfortunate thing here is that President Trump has significant leverage that he could use to push the Russians to negotiate a settlement to this war. And he has chosen not to use it. In fact, we've seen even last night by waiving new sanctions on Russia, he's actually gone over to the Russian side. And I think that's going to be a very dark stain on Americans' global reputation.

Kahl: There's conflict of instability in the Middle East, horrible events in Europe. For years, folks in Washington have wanted to pivot to Asia or the Indo-Pacific to focus on the emerging challenges there.

Oriana, what could we better understand about the storm clouds that might be gathering (or not) in the Indo-Pacific, especially across the Taiwan Strait?

Mastro: So I'm gonna cheat a little bit and say everything. I do a lot of research and writing about China, Taiwan, about the Indo-Pacific security, and China is such a complex place. And we have to have nuanced understandings about what is happening there, what is happening across the Taiwan Strait. And in most of the public debate, you either get an extremely dovish view or an extremely hawkish view, and the reality is somewhere in the middle.

For example, it is true that the United States is now distracted with wars in Ukraine and Iran and elsewhere. We have spent 147% of China's full military budget on those conflicts already. So it's very hard to compete with China conventionally in the military sphere when we are being less disciplined about how we're spending our time and effort.

At the same token, it is not the case that because we are distracted today, China has a higher likelihood of taking Taiwan by force. What convinces the Chinese whether to do that or not is not so much whether the United States is distracted in another part of the world, but on their own military competency.

Xi Jinping just did a huge purge of the most senior military leaders there that are currently either missing or at house arrest. So it's not the case that they're waiting for a moment, a window of opportunity.

It's the same thing when you look at China and Russia and what that means for Taiwan. Should we be concerned about China-Russia? Of course we should, but not because these two countries are going to fight a war together. That kind of misses the mark.

Instead, they help each other in peacetime build up their militaries in ways that makes it really hard for us to deter China from using force and if there's a conflict to compel China to stop fighting. I think we see that already in Ukraine; a little bit of Chinese support can go a really long way.

And the last example I will give about this nuanced balance is about the economy. It is true that the Chinese economy is not doing well. But there's no evidence to suggest that that convinces the Communist Party that they have to do some sort of wag-the-dog maneuver to use force in a Taiwan contingency to distract the public. If anything, their strategic culture goes the opposite way; when they have problems at home, they focus inward.

So all of this is to say I'm very vocal about my concerns about the likelihood of conflict over the Taiwan Strait. I think the Chinese have been very clear that they're preparing, they're building their military, they don't want to wait forever to solve this issue. And it's an issue that cannot be solved without force.

But not for all the reasons that potentially we hear in the news for why we should be concerned.

Kahl: Thank you very much. I think one of the things, the common threads across is the urgency around all of these issues. Dynamics in Washington may change a bit, but the reality is whether one loves President Trump or doesn't particularly like what he's doing, he's the president for the next two years. And a lot of really important decisions that impact the world will happen in that two year period.

So, Drew: if you had five minutes with the president on your issue, what would you try to get the president to do that he's maybe not doing enough of, or get him to stop doing what he's doing too much of?

Endy: A couple of things I'd like him to do, but on on this topic today, I'd say, Mr. President, there's never been a better time to secure biology. We could actually know what airborne viruses are in this room right now. We'd need a little machine with a box about the size of that podium and we'd be running it and doing air sampling. Now's the time to secure biology.

I'd pick on his statement from the UNGA over a year ago, where in the middle of a speech he declared that all nations should stand together to end the scourge of bioweapons. I'll take that.

I'd like the president of China and the President of the United States to duet. If I had the magic teleprompter, they should be saying that together, because that by itself will be insufficient. We need to get a duty to notify in place, a hotline for bio threats. If you have the emergence of a pandemic potential outbreak, we talk to each other. Never again do we have the Wuhan ambiguity. And we probably need that biodefense hotline with Moscow as well.

What does that look like operationally? With nuclear security, we've got the NNSA, the National Nuclear Security Agency Administration. $30 billion dollars a year. That, through the weapons lab, gets our nuclear force ready to go.

I'd argue we should have an NBSA: a National Biosecurity Agency. It would be about $10 billion dollars a year. It's not going to run on the high side. We don't put it in the weapons lab, because that'd be really bad. We do it in the public to the greatest extent possible.

So, Mr. President, there's never been a better time to secure biology. We can do it. It can be an enduring legacy. The returns are amazing. I have some other things I need him to do, but like on this topic, we can secure biology.

Kahl: All right. Didi, five minutes with the president.

Kuo: I doubt I would have any impact, but I would make appeals to two things that seem to matter to him. One is money. Okay. So he really likes to make money off of public office. That's called corruption.

But putting that aside, I would probably say something like capitalism is a source of American entrepreneurialism and growth, and that slowing down the rate of democracy, undermining the impartiality and rule of law, and undermining our administrative state, not funding science, stopping immigration of talented PhD students are going to be bad for American capitalism in the long run.

We know that democracy and capitalism flourish and do well when they go together. And I'm not sure that that would have an impact, But I would say that the rise in patrimonialism, transactionalism, and wheeling and dealing that we see around the world is one that's going to make the world inherently less safe. There will be far less inclusive growth and rising inequality is just going to lead to massive instability around the world, as we've already seen.

The second thing I would appeal to, like Drew, is legacy. I would actually say go focus on the arch and on the ballroom because liberal democracy is the single greatest achievement of this American project over the past 250 years. Liberal democracy is historically very hard won and rare. Most people have lived and died under something like empires.

Second of all, it's the result of massive decades, if not centuries, of popular mobilization of the kind we are now seeing in Iran.

And third, it has provided tremendous hope and inspiration to people around the world who want to live in freedom and try to secure it. That is what makes America great.

We have adapted and been flexible about what our democratic values are over time to expand to become a truly multiracial democracy. And he is messing it up a little bit.

And so I would say, sir, please go golf, go enjoy your life. And your legacy can be a positive one if you just stop attacking the thing that makes us the best country in the world.

Kahl: Play more golf and it makes America great again. Abbas, five minutes with the president on Iran.

Milani: I would say that you might think you can solve other problems instinctively with the instincts of a gambler. With Iran you can't. It is an old, complicated problem. Every administration has tried to solve this problem for the last forty-five years and it is not that simple. You can't bomb your way out of Iran's nuclear problem. You cannot bomb your way into a democracy in Iran. Iranian democracy has to be made by the people of Iran.

Don't threaten to destroy the civilization of Iran, which is one of the greatest civilizations in the world. If you destroy Iranian civilization, you are destroying part of the greatest legacy that we have, which is wisdom, which is prudence, which is philosophy. So these kinds of threats work against the people of Iran ridding themselves of this regime.

The only way we are going to have peace in the Middle East is if we understand how powerful that desire for democracy, the desire for amity with the United States is amongst the people of Iran. These kinds of politics, these kind of rhetorics, placing the decisions about this into hands that know nothing about this area, who are financially involved in this area. And they are dealing with people who know all too well how to use financial weaknesses of leaders to get what they want.

Look at what that kind of money has done to soccer.

That same thing is happening to American foreign policy. That is a dead end, Mr. President. Allow the processes that have made this country what this country is, work. Otherwise, that legacy is going to be that you'd fought a regime, you brought a lot of destruction, but you left a regime that is weaker domestically, but regionally has much more power

It controls two of the choke points of the world economy: Bob al-Mandab and the Strait of Hormuz. You went in there without thinking that they would close the Strait of Hormuz. Every indication was that they would do that if you attacked them. And particularly attack killing the top leadership. They were on record that they were going to close the Strait of Hormuz.

I would have told them, read what other administrations have done. Read what Colin Kahl probably told the president when somebody suggested to Biden that they should attack. I wouldn't be surprised if Colin was in the room and said, “Don't do it.”

I would say that you can truly leave a historic legacy if you can bring about the Abrahamic Accord. But to bring about the Abrahamic Accord, you need to convince the Israelis that Palestinians also have a right to a state. Without that, the Abrahamic Accord won't happen. With Abrahamic Accord, I think you will move the needle historically in the Middle East.

Kahl: I will just say: Abbas and I have talked about this a lot. We as Americans, we are a very powerful country and we are also problem solvers and we like to believe that we can solve world problems. We often cannot. It's also the case that some problems are not solvable in the near term. You have to muddle through and manage, which is super unsatisfying. The historical record is that pretty much everything that has happened was not only predictable, it was predicted, which is I think the most unfortunate aspect around a lot of this stuff.

Steve, two years ago, Trump said if he's elected he would solve the Ukraine war in twenty four hours. So we're twenty four months since the last election. If you had five minutes with the president on the Russia Ukraine conflict, what would your advice be?

Pifer: Well, I've written a lot over the last eighteen months about the Trump policy towards Russia-Ukraine. Polls show like eighty-five percent of Americans do not trust, do not like, do not respect Putin. Polls show that Americans support Ukraine. And I think if you actually took a poll in Congress, you would find most in Congress share those views. And I would tell the president, Mr. President, your policy in terms of buying diesel from Russia, not putting more pressure on Russia, and now turning it against Ukraine by cutting off some of the intelligence sharing: it’s wrong.

It's wrong morally. It's wrong strategically. And it's wrong in terms of your effort, your proclaimed desire to try to mediate it into this war. It's wrong morally because Russia is clearly the aggressor. It was Russia that seized Crimea with military force in 2014 and then went on to get involved in fighting in Donbas. It was Russia that launched the invasion in 2022. Ukraine is the victim.

It's wrong strategically, because if Russia prevails in this war, either they win on the battlefield, or perhaps they benefit from a bad peace deal. That's going to embolden Vladimir Putin. And that means a greater Russian threat to Europe and to vital American national security interests. I don't think Mr. Trump understands that at all.

But it's also wrong in terms of his effort to try to mediate a solution. But if you look over the past year, the Ukrainians have indicated readiness to make some pretty painful concessions to achieve peace, including perhaps accepting the de facto loss of a lot of territory. The Russian position has not budged.

Recently Russian officials have said there's been no change in the Russian position since 2024. And part of the problem is Mr. Trump's failure to use his leverage to push the Russians to negotiate. And this is why the decision to start buying diesel fuel from Russia is so bad. We're now basically sending American dollars that are going to feed part of that Russian military machine by releasing some of the financial pressure on Russia that might force them otherwise to adopt a different course.

And what I worry about that is: of course it's bad implications for Russia-Ukraine, but in other places where they look at this, not only in Moscow, but in Beijing, other capitals where they see us as the adversary, they're looking at this as not a sign of American strength. They're seeing it as a sign of American weakness and they're looking at saying, “Gee, look how well people like Putin can play Trump.” That's not good for our foreign policy.

Kahl: So twice this year already, President Trump has met with Xi Jinping. Once in China, once here in the United States, they're likely to meet again at some point this year. Despite all the competition and rhetoric, there does appear to be an effort between the two leaders to have a detente or a pause, a timeout on some of the rougher edges of the relationship. If you had five minutes with the president on China issues or Taiwan issues or China Taiwan issues, what would your recommendations be?

Mastro: This is one area where I think we oversimplify. We think that China's policies are because of Xi Jinping. And that if we had a different leader in China, everything would just be rosy again. But Xi Jinping is a product of the system. So for me, it's not the case that if Xi Jinping left, the next leader would be like, you know what? I think it's better for China to just do everything the United States demands of it and be number two in the world.

I would tell the president that U.S.-China competition is not about the United States or about China. But that power is actually bestowed upon either country by the rest of the world. Whether or not the United States is a great power, whether or not China is a great power, largely depends on how the rest of the world sees these two countries and sees the benefit, or the costs, of one of them having more power than the other.

Now, the United States as a global superpower, this is largely beneficial for many countries in the system. But first, we have to be honest that it's not the best system for everybody. To Didi's point, there's a lot of autocracies out there that would prefer that it wasn't the United States that is in charge.

But secondly, there's a whole part of the world—the majority of the world, the developing world—that the United States has ignored for decades and decades and decades. And that Trump has gone even a step farther by reducing what I would say the little amount of development aid, soft power that we had in this part of the world.

Now, I can tell you one thing for sure: this is a number one priority in China. Xi Jinping wants to be the leader of the developing world. So, are the Chinese wrong or are the Americans wrong to basically decide the value? But I can say in terms of a business sense, this is the area where you're gonna have the most returns.

Now, from my own biases, I am—not here on this stage—but still in the military. I've been in the military for seventeen years. I believe in the effectiveness of the use of force at international politics. Otherwise, I wouldn't dedicate so much of my life to serving uniform.

But that being said, diplomacy, soft power, developmental assistance, all these other things that the United States used to do more of . . . having a U.S. information service . . . these make a huge difference.

And so I would tell him to invest so much more in the other tools of power. China lists twelve types of tools of power, which military power is only one of them. And they're just as serious about the other ones.

And as much as the allies and partners periodically can be annoying about stuff, they are the source of U.S. power. In many respects, the U.S. military cannot project power without them. And so this isn't a favor that the rest of the world is doing for us that over a hundred countries allow U.S. access, bases, and overflight. This is something that the United States needs to maintain its position and to protect its interests abroad.

So don't only meet with Xi Jinping and shake hands and roll out the red carpet and say, “Okay, since I met with him and we have now a comfortably tense relationship, everything is going well.”

Take a look at the rest of the world and figure out how to maintain what has historically been U.S. dominance of the international system, a U.S. led liberal order. How do we go back to being sure that that is something that my kids are going to enjoy afterwards?

Kahl: I want to ask our last lightning questions. Everybody in this room is super committed to Stanford in all sorts of ways. What do you think Stanford could be doing more of, maybe could be doing better to help the world understand or address these issues? Abbas?

Milani: I think we are in one of the most remarkable moments in history. We are in the process of not just gradual incremental change or historic change. We're in the process of what can only be called epochal change. The changes we are about to witness and are witnessing are only, in my view, comparable to Renaissance, where everything about everything changed. We are in the process of experiencing that.

In that first phase of modernity, America, I think, is the most successful example of a democratic secular society. Going into this new phase, that model needs to be saved. American democracy needs to be saved. American democracy can only be saved if it has a more global view, a more inclusive view, and a more tolerant view. We need to begin this at Stanford. We need to teach the culture of tolerance in classes.

It is increasingly difficult to discuss difficult topics in class. I'm not talking about bioengineering. You can get away with anything in bioengineering. But try to have that level of discussion about the Arab Israeli problem, the Iranian problem, American democracy problem, race problem, gender problem. You get into serious difficulties. We need to defend that. Democracy requires defending.

I come from a place that went from an authoritarian regime to a pseudo-totalitarian regime. I came from Iran in 1986, a country that was literally at war with the United States. And twenty-two years, ago I became head of the Iranian studies program at Stanford. That would not be possible anywhere else in the world. I know the value of democracy, and I don't think at Stanford we're doing enough to defend this most valuable cherished gift that we have.

We need to cultivate, strengthen that culture.

Kahl: Didi.

Kuo: Every morning when you wake up and read the news, it can be a bummer. And I will say coming to work makes me feel better. And that's because FSI is a really special place where the approach to these topics is scholarly.

Therefore, we understand, you know, this is a kind of unique historical time, but it's one that we can really try to understand with an interdisciplinary lens and an understanding that our goal is to take academic knowledge and get it out into the world: use it to try to improve outcomes, provide policy recommendations, engage with the media or with thought leaders and people who can actually shape the public understanding of these issues.

And that is something I see creating a lot of purpose among my colleagues and creating special places outside of academic disciplines for those of us who care about engaging with the world to really unite academic knowledge with public understanding.

But the second thing is also focused on students. In California, we are super far from Washington, D.C. So if you go to Georgetown, for example, you have a lot of students who know what government is, they're going to get an internship. Over here, sometimes all the students know is Silicon Valley's over there. They're going to solve the world's problems through the private sector. I don't know, man. We have governments for a reason. AI, climate change, all of these issues are going to need to be tackled through regulation, not just through the moral binds or whatever that the president thinks that we can regulate AI with.

So I think that any way of encouraging public service and engagement with government—whether that's local, national, or international, going to other countries—is super important. And once students get a taste and a flavor of that public service, they get really into it. It's just that it's far for us, geographically, to engage. And I therefore think it's really important to encourage those kinds of opportunities.

Kahl: Amen. Steve?

Pifer: Yeah, well let me start with I some things I think that Stanford does and FSI do well. I think we do a good job on Russia-Ukraine of explaining to students what's going on, why it matters. And it's not just Stanford speakers, but we bring a lot of people in.

So on Wednesday, we had an American and a Ukrainian who are based in Kyiv. They came to talk for an hour and a half on Ukraine's innovative defense culture, where under the pressure of war they're just doing incredible changes in terms of how fast they react to things and get new weapons into the field.

There's a lot of . . . I won't list everybody, but a lot [of us] write, speak, do media on this to try to educate the broader public. We have a law school professor who organized a group of his students to track down and identify American law firms that are helping Russian oligarchs hide their wealth in the United States. And that was part of a broader effort that Stanford was running with the International Working Group on Sanctions, where we did about twenty-six papers advising on how sanctions on Russians could be tightened. So I think there's a lot of things that are being done that are good.

The more difficult challenge I think we have is how do we talk to the U.S. government? When people like Colin were in during the Biden administration, I think we had a lot of access. The administration didn't agree with everything we asked them to do, but there was a dialogue there.

I'm not sure anybody FSI has on the Russia Ukraine thing any kind of contact with people who matter in the Trump administration. So it's difficult to have the kind of conversation where you might suggest here are some ways to move forward. But I think that's going to be one of the real challenges is how can we affect government policy directly?

Kahl: And I think this is a really important point because I think this can be interpreted as basically saying, well, okay, when Democrats are in, people can have access. But it's not actually about partisan politics. It's about this particular administration's approach to outside expertise and which voices they tend to listen to. One can agree with it or disagree with it. It's it just is a thing, which is traditionally places like universities and think tanks and other sources of analysis outside of government are just not prioritized in this

Pifer: After I left the government in 2004, we had lots of access as outsiders to the Bush administration. They welcomed that dialogue. I don't think this administration does.

Kahl: Oriana.

Mastro: That's a perfect segue to what I wanted to say about policy impact about how do we talk to the U.S. government? It's not only the U.S. government. As someone who works on China, the amount of which professors and students are engaging with China is less and less over time because all of these things have become politically difficult.

And to me, Stanford is an environment in which you should be able to take those risks. This is a place where you can have dialogues with the Chinese. This is a place where policy, political officials should feel like they can come and talk and engage with these issues.

And so to try to have that kind of interconnectivity in May, I launched this policy lab on the Indo-Pacific. I call it “policy-guided.” What that means is instead of sort of doing all this research and then writing an op-ed and hoping someone reads it and then maybe it has some impact, I identify the decision makers that have influence on that research area early on in the process, and I engage with them throughout the whole process so that they have a stake in making sure that they're getting the information they need when they need it.

And part of that is educating students not only on the substance on Indo-Pacific, but also skill sets. So part of that is we just launched something called the Commander Series, where I bring combatant commanders—so these are four-star generals who are in charge of every region of the world—to campus every quarter. They give a big public talk, which again, given the political environment, given everything, did come with some convincing. We now have three lined up for this year. But it's possible. It's possible to continue to engage. And then in addition to the public talks, ask them to do private master classes with the students.

Like having that exposure to students to do kind of the real world work and to have that direct policy impact, is it harder? Yes. Is it still possible at a place like Stanford? Absolutely.

Kahl: I want to really foot stomp something because at the intersection of what Oriana and Steve just said: yes, there's a degree to which we're not as plugged into Washington as maybe in previous administrations. But the flip side of that is, actually, Stanford is a safer space for conversations among those parts of Washington that want to have conversations outside of Washington because we are further away.

We are seen as less ideological. We're not seen as particularly partisan. We're seen as a font of technical knowledge because Silicon Valley plays its own role in the current ecosystem for better or worse. So that's also an opportunity, not just a constraint.

Endy: I love this question. We heard that we're in a moment of epochal change not seen since the Renaissance. That's stunning. I'm going to carry that for a long time.

I wonder what Mr. and Mrs. Stanford think of us. If they appeared today and saw what we are now, how would they react? One of the things I go back and read is the purpose they wrote in the charter of the university. And there's a sentence, this really interesting sentence. It says: “to have an influence in behalf of humanity.”

And the first time I read it, I thought it was a typo. I thought it was supposed to be “on” behalf of humanity. But it says “in behalf of,” which really means out there doing stuff. And I think we could do a lot better in that regard.

I think we're pretty good at being Stanford. I think we could do a lot better in behalf of humanity. And FSI and CISAC is very much about that. But what does that look like? And and so I'll check some things out that may seem adjacent, but I think they're important. Number one.

I used to be chair of undergraduate admissions and financial aid for the university. We're not need-blind for international applicants. We are for domestic, but not for international. We could do it, but we always manage to not do it. This would be a good year to do it.

The second thing I think we need to do is we need to bring Stanford out into the United States. I used to teach a version of Introduction to Bioengineering to five hundred high school students in Title I high schools. And they were registered as Stanford students as high school students in low income high schools throughout the country.

I think we could have a service requirement for undergraduates where they're teaching fellows in high schools as upperclassmen helping with this. We could have five thousand extra students a year as high school students. So I think there's some macro moves the university could make that would amplify what FSI and other places are doing, and we need to get on with it.

Kahl: This is such a great place to end because the panel today was global threats and essentially what we can do about them. And I think what you heard, and frankly, where I think FSI is unique, not only at Stanford, but in the world in many respects, is that so many of the things that we read about or that we watch on YouTube are at the cross currents of these huge geopolitical changes, these world changing technological developments, and contentious domestic politics in the future of democracy here and around the world. Like these are the things that all of us care about.

Just as people as Americans, we are deeply invested at FSI. And I think what you've heard is like we can choose to engineer a world of abundance and opportunity, or we can create a lot of dangerous things that make life worse. We can choose to defend freedom in the United States and around the world, or we can choose not to. We can choose to wield American power with wisdom and with a degree of restraint, or unwisely with hubris, like an international wrecking ball. 

These are choices. These are not inevitabilities. These are choices. And I think at FSI, we believe we can help empower the right choices, especially by empowering our students. The thing that keeps me most optimistic when we have conversations like this — I think everybody up here would agree — is how awesome our students are, and how much more incredible they are at, you know, as twenty-year-olds than we were as twenty year olds.

And what I often say is smart and incredible as all these people on stage and all the other people you encounter, all the people in this room are, we're not going to solve the world's problems.

The best we can do is keep the problems solvable and empower our students to solve our problems. And the good news is our students are completely capable of doing that.

So thank you very much, and thanks again to our panelists.

[END EVENT RECORDING]

Kahl: You've been listening to World Class from the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies at Stanford University. If you like what you're hearing, please leave us a review and be sure to subscribe on Apple, Spotify, or wherever you get your podcasts to stay up to date on what's happening in the world, and why.

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Fmr Congressman and Ambassador Jeff Flake sits on stage with Professor Kathryn Stoner.
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Does the Path to Bipartisanship Run Through Foreign Policy?

During his visit to the Freeman Spogli Institute, former Senator and Ambassador to Türkiye Jeff Flake reflected on domestic political divisions and issues where parties can come together.
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Amy Zegart on World Class, a podcast by the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies at Stanford University.
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How Frontier Technology Is Rewriting the Rules of Power, Intelligence, and National Security

Amy Zegart joins Colin Kahl on the World Class podcast to discuss what's familiar and what's novel in how nations and other actors are competing politically, militarily, economically, and technologically.
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Vladimir Putin and Donald Trump in conversation on the tarmac of the Joint Base Elmendorf-Richardson on August 15, 2025 in Anchorage, Alaska.
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At Stanford's 2026 Reunion Homecoming, a panel of scholars from the Freeman Spogli Institute discussed challenges to democracy, the potential and dangers of biotechnology, the Russia-Ukraine and U.S.-Iran conflicts, and the U.S.-China relationship.

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Nonpartisan citizen election observation plays an important role in promoting the credibility of electoral processes around the world. This article assesses whether nonpartisan observation can shape attitudes among the US public, randomizing information about nonpartisan domestic observers in a series of survey experiments fielded to nearly 10,000 respondents. These included both hypothetical vignettes and information about a real-world nonpartisan domestic observation mission undertaken by The Carter Center during the 2022 midterm elections in Fulton County, Georgia. The results show that information about positive assessments by nonpartisan observers of the hypothetical and Fulton County elections increased respondents' confidence in electoral results and processes, and also made respondents more likely to identify the officially announced winner over the candidate they favored as the candidate who won. Alternative ways of framing observers were largely inconsequential.

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Oren Samet
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Introduction and Contribution


The ongoing wars in Iran and Gaza have led to a marked increase in global attention to Israel’s military power, and in particular to the nuclear weapons that it is widely believed to possess. This is especially notable given Israel’s longstanding concern over Iran’s nuclear program as well as its refusal to join the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and place safeguards on its Dimona reactor.

Israeli nuclear policy cannot be understood apart from (1) its decades-long strategy of “deliberate ambiguity,” (2) its diplomatic emphasis on the NPT’s definition of nuclear-weapons states as those that have overtly tested a nuclear weapon, and (3) continued American support for Israel’s position. In “Israel and the NPT: new insights into old questions,” Or Rabinowitz examines the origins and consequences of this status quo, which began with a 1969 agreement between President Richard Nixon and Prime Minister Golda Meir. What Rabinowitz calls the “Nixon-Meir understanding” — whereby Israel would not test, declare, or openly advertise its nuclear weapons and the US would not press Israel to accede to the NPT — has persisted ever since. Rabinowitz’s article draws on American, Israeli, British, and Canadian archival research, as well as secondary literature and media reports.

The Nixon-Meir understanding has delivered significant strategic benefits for Israel, but it has also imposed costs, particularly by limiting Israel’s ability to acquire civilian nuclear infrastructure from other Western countries. It remains to be seen whether this status quo will persist in light of the nuclear ambitions of Israel’s neighbors, the possibility of wider regional proliferation, and Israel’s growing international isolation. 

Origins, Development, and Challenges of Israel’s Nuclear Policy


Israel began constructing its French-supplied Dimona reactor in the late 1950s. The Eisenhower administration largely pursued what Rabinowitz terms a “policy of benign neglect” (p. 3). This approach was partly upended by the Kennedy administration, which pressured Israel to halt its nuclear development and submit its Dimona reactor to periodic inspections. In response, Israel adopted a range of tactics to conceal its nuclear program, including hiding its plutonium production plant in what appeared to be an ordinary administrative building. Kennedy’s death led to a more sympathetic Johnson administration, during which time Israel’s clandestine program grew.

For Rabinowitz, the late 1960s marked a watershed in Israeli nuclear policy. By the 1967 Six-Day War, Israel had likely crossed the nuclear threshold for the first time. In 1968, the Non-Proliferation Treaty was finalized; critical to the treaty was Article IX, which stated that nuclear-weapon states were those that had “manufactured and exploded [i.e., tested] a nuclear weapon.” The test criterion became foundational to Israel’s policy of deliberate ambiguity, and Israeli officials invoked it quite consciously in their international relations. In 1969, Nixon and Meir agreed to the aforementioned bilateral understanding, which was kept secret from many American allies. For example, British officials remained uncertain about whether Israel possessed nuclear weapons until the early 1980s. 

Israel’s nuclear ambiguity faced several challenges in the 1970s. During the 1973 Yom Kippur War, Israel allegedly placed its nuclear forces on alert twice. Then, during the 1979 “Vela incident,” a US satellite detected a signal consistent with a nuclear test, and Israel was widely suspected of being involved. However, the Carter administration avoided formally attributing the incident to Israel, in part because doing so could have jeopardized US-Israeli relations and the Egypt-Israel peace process, not to mention the prospects of Carter’s reelection. The Reagan administration likewise maintained the status quo, despite renewed international pressure following Israel’s 1981 strike on an Iraqi reactor.

With the end of the Cold War, Israel feared that the first George Bush administration would pressure it into joining the NPT. Although Bush Sr.’s cooperation with Egypt on nuclear safeguarding initiatives represented the clearest challenge to the Nixon-Meir understanding, the administration ultimately did not depart from the arrangement. Thereafter, the Bill Clinton administration adopted a more lenient approach to Israel’s NPT status and reportedly assured Israel that the US would help preserve its strategic position.

While Israel’s policy of deliberate ambiguity has delivered substantial benefits, it has also generated trade-offs. In particular, the Nixon-Meir understanding has hindered Israel in importing civilian nuclear reactors. Western nuclear suppliers have all made nuclear cooperation conditional on Israel’s accession to the NPT or equivalent safeguards. Israel’s refusal to do so was deemed too politically costly, as these countries were wary of generating political backlash from Arab countries.

Rabinowitz’s conclusion is that whether Israel maintains its nuclear policy status quo will likely depend on the actions of its neighbors, several of whom have nuclear ambitions. If Iran or Saudi Arabia cross the nuclear threshold, a more aggressive and overt policy may prove beneficial as an Israeli deterrent. Ultimately, the article unpacks a very murky yet consequential dynamic in world politics. It shows how Israeli policy has relied not only on covert possession of nuclear weapons, but on a diplomatic strategy of ambiguity, leveraging the NPT’s “test” criterion and American commitments not to force Israel’s hand.

*Brief prepared by Adam Fefer.

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Israeli Prime Minister Golda Meir standing with President Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger, outside the White House, Nov. 1973.
Israeli Prime Minister Golda Meir standing with President Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger, outside the White House, Nov. 1973. | Marion S. Trikosko / Library of Congress
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CDDRL Research-in-Brief [4-minute read]

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After the Midterms: What’s Next for America’s Korea Policy?

The November 2026 midterm elections will shape the political landscape for the second half of the Trump presidency, raising important questions about the future direction of U.S. policy toward the Korean Peninsula. What will the future hold for the U.S.-South Korea alliance amid debates over OPCON transfer, burden-sharing, and nuclear submarines? How will Washington balance its security commitments to Seoul with the possibility of renewed diplomacy with Pyongyang? And how might the administration’s trade and economic agenda reshape bilateral relations, particularly with the ROK, and the growing importance of economic security? Experts will examine these interconnected dimensions of U.S. policy toward the two Koreas and assess their implications for regional security and economic relations. 

Co-sponsored by the Consulate General of the Republic of Korea in San Francisco.
 

Speakers:
 

Michael L. Beeman is a Visiting Assistant Professor of Political Science and International Relations at Loyola Marymount University. He also is a Senior Associate (Non-resident), Japan Chair, at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) and a Senior Fellow for Economic Security at The National Bureau of Asian Research.

From 2023-24, he was a Visiting Scholar at Stanford University’s Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center and university Lecturer and, during 2025, he was a Lecturer at UC San Diego. Prior to this, he served for over two decades in the federal government beginning at the Department of Commerce and then, for over 16 years, as a senior trade official and negotiator at the Office of the US Trade Representative (Executive Office of the President). As the Assistant US Trade Representative for Japan, Korea, and APEC, he led negotiations with Korea for the renegotiated U.S.-Korea Free Trade Agreement (2018) and negotiations with Japan for the U.S.-Japan Trade Agreement (2019).

He is the author of Walking Out: America’s New Trade Policy in the Asia Pacific and Beyond (2024, Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center) and Public Policy and Economic Competition in Japan (2001, Routledge). He received his DPhil (PhD) in Politics from the University of Oxford, an MA in International Relations from Johns Hopkins University, and a BA from Southern Methodist University. Dr. Beeman also was a Fulbright and Monbusho Scholar in Japan and an Advanced Research Fellow at Harvard University.
 

Mark Lambert joins the Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center (APARC) as Visiting Scholar, China Program Fellow, for the 2026-2027 academic year, following a career in government with the U.S. Department of State. He served as China Coordinator and Deputy Assistant Secretary in the Bureau of East Asia and Pacific Affairs. He oversaw the Office of China Coordination and the Office of Taiwan Coordination. Mark has extensive experience in China, cross-Strait, and Asia Pacific affairs. He served as Deputy Assistant Secretary with responsibility for Japan, Korea, Mongolia, Australia, New Zealand, and the Pacific Islands. Earlier he established the International Organizations Bureau’s office aimed at protecting UN integrity from authoritarianism and served as Special Envoy for North Korean Affairs.  Previously, he was named the State Department’s human rights officer of the year for devising a strategy to release Chinese political prisoners and promote religious freedom.
 

Sydney Seiler was the national intelligence officer for North Korea at the National Intelligence Council from 2020 to 2023 and is one of the nation’s top experts on North Korea. Previously, he was the U.S. Forces Korea (USFK) senior analyst and senior defense intelligence expert for North Korea from 2016 to 2020, serving as the principal adviser and senior expert on Korean Peninsula security issues to the USFK commander and the U.S. Defense Intelligence Enterprise. Mr. Seiler also served as the U.S. special envoy for Six Party Talks (2014–2015), where he coordinated U.S. diplomacy and policy on the DPRK and led negotiations with North Korea. Prior to that, Mr. Seiler served as the director for Korea on the National Security Council (2011–2014). A member of the Senior National Intelligence Service, Mr. Seiler has over 40 years of experience focusing on Korean Peninsula affairs in a range of executive management, intelligence, and policy positions within the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) Directorate of Analysis, the CIA’s Directorate of Operations, the CIA’s Open Source Center, and the National Security Agency. He has four decades of experience watching North Korea and 17 years of serving in South Korea. He received his MA degree in Korean studies from Yonsei University and is a graduate of the Korean language programs of the Defense Language Institute and Yonsei University.
 

Directions and Parking > 

Philippines Conference Room (C330)
Encina Hall, 3rd Floor
616 Jane Stanford Way, Stanford, CA 94305

Michael L. Beeman, Visiting Assistant Professor, Loyola Marymount University
Mark Lambert, China Policy Fellow, APARC, Stanford University
Sydney Seiler, Senior Adviser (Non-resident), Korea Chair, Center for Strategic and International Studies
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Tuesday took us from Anthropic to the RAND Corporation to the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, and it turned out to be the day that most challenged my assumptions. I walked in expecting conversations about policy. What I got instead was a series of honest reckonings with uncertainty.

The morning began at Hoover Institution's DC office, where we met with Tarun Chhabra, Head of National Security at Anthropic. Our visit came just days after Anthropic's CEO published a landmark essay calling for a global slowdown in AI development. The timing made the conversation feel urgent in a way that none of us had quite anticipated. What struck me most was how candidly the discussion addressed the question of who should be making decisions about these technologies. The answer, surprisingly, was not the companies building them. The insistence that regulation needs to be democratic, that Congress has a role to play, and that the people at the frontier of AI development should not be the ones setting the rules for everyone else was not what I expected to hear from inside the industry. It reframed the way I think about the relationship between innovation and governance.

At RAND, we sat down with Salman Ahmed, Distinguished Chair in Strategy and Diplomacy, who brought decades of experience from the UN and the White House to a conversation about the forces reshaping the international order. He described the current moment as defined by two colliding realities: the unraveling of the post-Cold War era and the rise of AI. One observation that stuck with me was the idea that the Bay Area tends to focus on change while the rest of the world focuses on continuity, and that nobody agrees on what belongs in which category. In a week full of conversations about defending democracy, RAND offered something rarer: a genuine admission that the story is still unfolding and that even the most experienced strategists are improvising.

Our final stop was Carnegie, where we met with Frances Z. Brown, Vice President for Studies. The conversation shifted from technology to the parts of the world that risk being forgotten. Africa is experiencing both the most democratic transitions and the most democratic reversals of any region right now, and yet it has been pushed off the strategic agenda by the focus on Ukraine, China, and AI. That observation was a useful corrective. The discussion also touched on the elimination of USAID and what it means for American influence abroad, reinforcing a pattern I noticed across the entire week: the institutions that support democracy are stretched thinner than ever.

For me, the thread connecting all three meetings was a question I brought with me from my own research. My thesis examines Russia's looting and destruction of Ukrainian cultural heritage, and I have been wrestling with whether cultural heritage recovery ever makes it onto the agenda when institutions plan for what comes after conflict, or whether it is always an afterthought. Tuesday confirmed my sense that it remains largely invisible in the policy conversation, which only sharpened my conviction that the work of making it visible matters.

If I could share one takeaway with an incoming honors student, it would be this: the people shaping policy in Washington are not working with settled frameworks. They are navigating enormous uncertainty in real time. And the chance to sit across from them and ask questions is the kind of experience that changes how you read everything after it.

~ Amalia Abecassis

Amalia (center right) engages with a speaker during a site visit.
Amalia (center right) engages with a speaker during a site visit. | Stacey Clifton

For our first meeting of the day, we visited the Hoover Institution's outpost in DC. We met with Tarun Chhabra, a visiting Hoover Fellow and Anthropic's current head of national security policy. We learned valuable insights into how frontier model labs assess the risks of powerful AI development and how they think about aligning AI's public benefit with national security and innovation. It was amazing to hear directly about how Anthropic sees the AI landscape today and the challenges it sees going forward. We also discussed AI’s implications for democracy and how this technological wave may be an opportunity for developing countries to build infrastructure and expand social access. While I candidly felt that we as humans are only at the first step of AI safety and still haven’t identified all the potential dangers of AI development, I was comforted by the thought that frontier model labs are asking the right questions about safety and innovation. 

Next, we made our way to the Pentagon City area to speak with Salman Ahmed of RAND. He spoke broadly about his view of the state of the world and the main forces he identified as most influential today. Unsurprisingly, he spoke a bit about the risks of AI and especially about AI’s effect on the global information space. Notably, however, we heard a lot about how most people — outside of Silicon Valley, at least — are concerned about the continued transition away from the Post-Cold-War world order and how there is, internationally, little to no agreement on what comes next. It was refreshing to hear his thoughts on the other forces in the world shaping our future that are not AI. I particularly enjoyed his attention to the idea of a local political economy and how near-term effects of policy for communities can drive larger change. Salman’s thoughts prompted me to think more deeply about my own frameworks for viewing the world, especially how I identify mechanisms for change. 

In the afternoon, we had our last meeting of the day with Frances Brown and Andrew O’Donohue of the Carnegie Endowment for Peace. We received a great breakdown of current democracy policy in the US and how the meaning of democracy can shift across partisan lines depending on each’s priorities and values.

Additionally, responding to my question about the relationship between think tanks and government positions, Frances shed light on how people move back and forth and how priorities look different on each side. In particular, she talked about how work in government can raise questions for her that she then has time to return to and study in depth at a think tank. This highly permeable cross-industry relationship was not something I was previously aware of, and I really enjoyed hearing about it. After two days of meetings, I felt I was starting to pick up on aspects of the broader policy ecosystem in Washington, D.C. We heard from a variety of think tanks and government-adjacent organizations, and I could better see how these groups interacted. While each organization had its own characteristics, I was surprised by the consistent academic feel across them all. 

Overall, I was struck by how each speaker had breadth and depth of knowledge across a spectrum of topics, and by how articulate and thoughtful they were in thinking through the forces that shape our world. While I think everything is connected in some way, I felt the speakers we heard from identified the most relevant factors and defended their choices well. 

Lastly, we finished the day with a thoughtful visit to the Lincoln Memorial and reflected on the relevance of the Gettysburg Address and Second Inaugural today.

~ John Churchill

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Fisher Family Honors Class of 2027 poses in the lobby of the National Endowment for Democracy.
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Honors College 2026 Day 1: Sharpening Our Research in the Nation’s Capital

This is the first story in a series of blog posts written by the Fisher Family Honors Program class of 2027 detailing their experiences in Washington, D.C., for CDDRL's annual Honors College.
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Fisher Family Honors Class of 2027
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CDDRL Welcomes Eleven Juniors to its Fisher Family Honors Program

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The Fisher Family Honors Program Class of 2026 poses at the Lincoln Memorial with faculty director Stephen Stedman.
The Fisher Family Honors Program Class of 2026 poses at the Lincoln Memorial with faculty director Stephen Stedman. | Stacey Clifton
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This is the second story in a series of blog posts written by the Fisher Family Honors Program class of 2027 detailing their experiences in Washington, D.C., for CDDRL's annual Honors College.

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Introduction and Contribution


American bureaucracies are frequently criticized for impeding the delivery of both public infrastructure and private development projects, wrapping them in the “red tape” of regulatory procedures. Of course, bureaucratic oversight is necessary to ensure public accountability, enable stakeholder input, and respond to market failures. It is hard to imagine how, for example, the natural environment could be protected from exploitation without regulation. Yet disagreement persists about whether the current regulatory landscape strikes the right balance between oversight and efficiency.

The National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) of 1970 is one of the most significant federal administrative laws and is foundational to American environmental law. Per its objective of protecting the environment, NEPA requires agencies to assess the environmental impacts of major federal projects. These include construction, energy, water, and public lands projects. 

NEPA’s highest level of review is the Environmental Impact Statement (EIS), which requires substantial time and scientific expertise to complete. Accordingly, the EIS process has been criticized for causing project delays. This critique is plausible at first glance: average EIS reviews now take over four years to complete and often produce documents over 600 pages long (over 1,000 pages including appendices). 

Despite criticism over NEPA procedures, little is known about why some EISs take longer to be approved than others. Answering this question is important for assessing whether American bureaucracies can adequately balance the oversight-efficiency tradeoff.

In “A hazard analysis of federal permitting under the National Environmental Policy Act of 1970,” Michael Bennon, Daniel De La Hormaza, and R. Richard Geddes present findings on the correlates of EIS permitting. Using a dataset of nearly 1,300 EISs, the authors show that major construction projects and those occurring in states with more restrictive environmental laws are associated with longer permitting times. By contrast, privately financed projects are permitted more quickly. These findings will likely cohere with readers’ intuitions, namely that (a) more demanding regulations increase approval times and (b) private economic interests have the resources to navigate regulatory environments.

Using a dataset of nearly 1,300 EISs, the authors show that major construction projects and those occurring in states with more restrictive environmental laws are associated with longer permitting times.

The authors’ findings are relevant not only for those interacting directly with NEPA. Indeed, as illustrated in their analysis of the 2009 American Recovery and Reinvestment Act, lengthy environmental reviews can make it difficult to quickly undertake new infrastructure projects when they are needed — as was the case following the Great Recession.

Data, Methods, and Hypotheses


The authors’ dataset includes 1,269 EIS reviews. Of these, 1,161 reached a Record of Decision (ROD), the federal agency’s final decision. The average duration of time from a Notice of Intent (NOI — i.e., the intent to undertake an EIS) to ROD was 4.5 years, and the median was 3.6 years. This underscores the time required for projects to complete environmental review under NEPA.

The authors include variables for (1) major construction and infrastructure projects, which comprise about half of the data set; (2) projects backed by private investors; (3) states with restrictive environmental laws, defined, for example, in terms of whether uninjured parties can challenge projects in court or whether private actions require environmental review; and (4) inclusion in the “federal permitting dashboard,” which was created in 2015 with the goal of improving the efficiency of large projects.

To measure the correlates of EIS permitting, the authors use a “Cox proportional hazards model,” a statistical method for estimating how different variables affect the time until an event happens. For example, hazard models are often used to measure how different medical treatments affect patient mortality. For the authors’ purposes, a lower hazard rate indicates a longer permitting duration. 

The authors first hypothesize that larger projects will take longer to approve. This may be the case because such projects tend to attract greater stakeholder engagement, opposition, and litigation. Projects in states with more restrictive environmental laws, as well as those requiring supplemental EISs, are also hypothesized to take longer to approve. In addition, private financing ought to lead to faster approvals because private funders have the incentives and resources to expedite permitting. So too should the permitting dashboard decrease permitting times, consistent with its efficiency-maximizing objectives. 

Findings


As mentioned, the authors find that major construction and infrastructure projects have significantly longer permitting times, averaging 5.2 years.
 


 

Table 3 Average permit duration by phase and covariates

 

Table 4 Cox regression results for permit characteristics


Conversely, privately financed projects are indeed found to be approved more quickly, taking an average of just 3.7 years. Meanwhile, projects in states with restrictive environmental laws, such as California, New York, and Washington, are found to take longer. Contrary to the authors’ expectations, however, projects included in the federal permitting dashboard face longer permitting times. This may reflect selection bias, or the fact that projects placed on the dashboard tend to be especially large or complex. In terms of page count, longer EISs are associated with longer permitting times and longer delays. 

Finally, the authors examine permit completion rates by federal agencies, finding an average of 3 RODs per week. This rate is generally stable over time, though it spiked during Donald Trump’s election in 2016 and his inauguration in early 2017. Ultimately, the findings suggest that permitting duration is shaped not only by technical regulations but also by differences in economic resources, political conflict over projects, and federalism.

*Brief prepared by Adam Fefer.

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Turlock Irrigation District (Turlock, CA). | American Public Power Association
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CDDRL Research-in-Brief [4-minute read]

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Caption Turlock Irrigation District (Turlock, CA). | Photo credit American Public Power Association
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Milada Anna Vachudova of the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill presented on “Europe in the Face of War and America’s Authoritarian Turn” during a Rethinking European Development and Security (REDS) seminar, co-sponsored by the Center on Democracy, Development and the Rule of Law (CDDRL) and The Europe Center (TEC). Drawing on research coauthored with Nadiia Koval of the European Policy Institute in Kyiv, Vachudova examined how Russia’s war in Ukraine, democratic backsliding within the European Union, and changing U.S. foreign policy are reshaping Europe’s geopolitical role.

Vachudova began by arguing that Ukraine’s resistance to Russia’s full-scale invasion is also a defense of European democracy, national sovereignty, and the security of EU and NATO members. She situated this claim within a broader account of the EU’s power. Historically, the EU has exerted influence through its democratic norms, economic integration, market access, and enlargement rather than military force. Yet she rejected the idea that Europe must choose between defending liberal values and pursuing geopolitical interests. Military capabilities, she suggested, can complement the EU’s normative and economic strengths.

The EU’s potential as a geopolitical power has long been undermined by political expediency. Vachudova pointed to Europe’s pre-2022 dependence on Russian energy and continued economic engagement with Moscow, as well as the challenge posed by authoritarian-minded political parties within the EU. These vulnerabilities illustrated the costs of prioritizing short-term economic interests over democratic commitments and long-term security.

Russia’s February 2022 invasion nevertheless prompted an unusually rapid European response. EU institutions, particularly the European Commission, moved to assist Ukrainian refugees, expand market access, impose sanctions, provide financial and military assistance, and revive enlargement. Vachudova emphasized that this early institutional leadership occurred amid an absence of traditional French-German leadership. It also coincided with the emergence of ad hoc coalitions and a shift in influence toward northern and eastern EU member states, whose governments have often taken a more urgent view of the Russian threat.

However, translating this initial momentum into sustained military capacity has proven difficult. Increased defense spending, including in Germany and Poland, has not eliminated obstacles to coordination, implementation, and collective action. The EU must contend with powerful veto players even as uncertainty about the United States raises questions about Europe's ability to help defend Ukraine and eventually defend itself.
Vachudova characterized the current U.S. trajectory as an “authoritarian turn,” arguing that the Trump administration’s approach to Russia and Ukraine has eroded transatlantic trust. In her assessment, perceived American unreliability carries significant security, reputational, and economic costs, including growing doubts among allies about dependence on U.S.-made weapons systems.

Despite these challenges, Vachudova identified reasons for cautious optimism. Europeans will not stop mobilizing against authoritarian rule even as these forces continue to fight for power with the help of the Kremlin. External threats and shocks can catalyze European integration. Vachudova also described a pattern of “democratic bandwagoning,” exemplified by Canada moving closer to the EU. Ultimately, she suggested that Ukraine’s determination could help sustain enlargement and strengthen Europe’s identity as both a democratic community and a geopolitical actor. The central question is whether Europe can convert crisis-driven solidarity into lasting political unity and defense capabilities.

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Milada Anna Vachudova presented her research in a Rethinking European Development and Security (REDS) seminar on October 22, 2026, co-sponsored by the Center on Democracy, Development and the Rule of Law (CDDRL) and The Europe Center (TEC).
Milada Anna Vachudova presented her research in a Rethinking European Development and Security (REDS) seminar on October 22, 2026, co-sponsored by the Center on Democracy, Development and the Rule of Law (CDDRL) and The Europe Center (TEC). | Nora Sulots
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Milada Anna Vachudova traces how EU institutions mobilized rapidly after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, and the harder task of converting solidarity into lasting capability.

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  • Milada Anna Vachudova examines whether Europe can convert crisis-driven solidarity into lasting political unity and defense capability.
  • EU institutions mobilized rapidly after Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, but various veto players have since limited the EU’s support for Ukraine.
  • A perceived “authoritarian turn” in U.S. policy has eroded transatlantic trust and boosted Russia’s power. It has also raised questions about Europe’s ability to help defend Ukraine and eventually itself, despite rises in defense spending in many European states.
  • Europeans will not stop mobilizing against authoritarian rule even as these forces continue to fight for power in EU states with the help of the Kremlin.
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This article was written by Dr. Nancy Sato, former Japan Project Associate at SPICE, from 1982 to 1991. In its early years, SPICE comprised several separate area-focused projects. This is the ninth of several articles—focusing on the 50-year history of SPICE—that will be posted this year.

My standout memory of SPICE from 1982–1991 is that our colleagues were the most expert, dedicated, community-minded, and heartwarming educators, devoted to international and cross-cultural education and understanding. Their most laudable and effective approach was amplifying teachers’ voices in developing and implementing curricula to best teach, learn from, and reach the rich diversity of students in their classrooms.

The unique combination of the top university experts in each geographic and content area, working together with experienced educators with exquisite teacher professional development and curriculum development skills, while also bringing teachers, students and families into the process, created the most meaningful ways to expand all of our perspectives of the world and global understanding.

I feel so fortunate to have been a part of this marvelous group of colleagues and mentors who transformed my personal and professional life, even gaining my “big brother” Steve Thorpe, fellow Social Studies educator. My early career at the Boston Children’s Museum, first as their school desegregation coordinator and then as their multicultural education specialist, set the stage. The museum’s reputation as a leader in advancing experiential education and hands-on learning was a natural match for highlighting the importance of engaging, interactive learning that characterizes SPICE materials.

My SPICE journey had a serendipitous beginning—since the Boston Children’s Museum housed Harvard’s Outreach program, a sister Outreach program to Stanford’s SPICE, David Grossman became a frequent, annual visitor. His consummate knowledge of teaching, working in the schools, and making learning authentic, comprehensive and enjoyable, was apparent. I knew that working in SPICE as I pursued a PhD in education would be a perfect match, so when David introduced me to that idea, and to Kay Sandberg Abe, the Japan Project director, I was blessed to enter the wondrous world of SPICE, with their excellent mentorship. The Discovery Box unit, about how to use artifacts to enhance classroom learning, was a highlight, along with Wendy Wong’s fabulous curriculum unit cover designs.

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David’s leadership and engaging personality brought together an amazing group of educators, whose spirit, camaraderie, laughter, and expertise created a global, multicultural family that not only provided mutual support while working together, but spans generations, as we still keep in touch, share ideas, and gather at reunions. And all this was enabled through the strength, compassion, and wisdom of Ron Herring, Director of CISP (California International Studies Project), our umbrella organization at that time.

I’ll always remember the key features of our message for international education, that serve us all even more today: multiple perspectives, interdependence, context, change, authenticity, empathy, and genuine caring for people all over the world—with special attention to those voices and perspectives not typically represented. And those key principles mirror our SPICE family, the most caring, curious, close-knit family and community of scholars who continue to expand global understanding by promoting empathy, hope, and activism to improve the world around us. The SPICE family inspires us to continue our friendship and collective lifelong learning and action.

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Fenlyn Wong, SPICE Founding Director Dr. David Grossman, Dr. Nancy Sato, and Ken Yasuda | Photo courtesy of Nancy Sato
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Stanford alum and former SPICE Japan Project Associate Dr. Nancy Sato shares memories of her years with SPICE.

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