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* Please note all CISAC events are scheduled using the Pacific Time Zone.

 

Register in advance for this webinar: https://stanford.zoom.us/webinar/register/8416226562432/WN_WLYcdRa6T5Cs1MMdmM0Mug

 

About the Event: Is there a place for illegal or nonconsensual evidence in security studies research, such as leaked classified documents? What is at stake, and who bears the responsibility, for determining source legitimacy? Although massive unauthorized disclosures by WikiLeaks and its kindred may excite qualitative scholars with policy revelations, and quantitative researchers with big-data suitability, they are fraught with methodological and ethical dilemmas that the discipline has yet to resolve. I argue that the hazards from this research—from national security harms, to eroding human-subjects protections, to scholarly complicity with rogue actors—generally outweigh the benefits, and that exceptions and justifications need to be articulated much more explicitly and forcefully than is customary in existing work. This paper demonstrates that the use of apparently leaked documents has proliferated over the past decade, and appeared in every leading journal, without being explicitly disclosed and defended in research design and citation practices. The paper critiques incomplete and inconsistent guidance from leading political science and international relations journals and associations; considers how other disciplines from journalism to statistics to paleontology address the origins of their sources; and elaborates a set of normative and evidentiary criteria for researchers and readers to assess documentary source legitimacy and utility. Fundamentally, it contends that the scholarly community (researchers, peer reviewers, editors, thesis advisors, professional associations, and institutions) needs to practice deeper reflection on sources’ provenance, greater humility about whether to access leaked materials and what inferences to draw from them, and more transparency in citation and research strategies.

View Written Draft Paper

 

About the Speaker: Christopher Darnton is a CISAC affiliate and an associate professor of national security affairs at the Naval Postgraduate School. He previously taught at Reed College and the Catholic University of America, and holds a Ph.D. in Politics from Princeton University. He is the author of Rivalry and Alliance Politics in Cold War Latin America (Johns Hopkins, 2014) and of journal articles on US foreign policy, Latin American security, and qualitative research methods. His International Security article, “Archives and Inference: Documentary Evidence in Case Study Research and the Debate over U.S. Entry into World War II,” won the 2019 APSA International History and Politics Section Outstanding Article Award. He is writing a book on the history of US security cooperation in Latin America, based on declassified military documents.

Virtual Seminar

Christopher Darnton Associate Professor of National Security Affairs Naval Postgraduate School
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Please note: the start time for this event has been moved from 3:00 to 3:15pm.

Join FSI Director Michael McFaul in conversation with Richard Stengel, Under Secretary of State for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs. They will address the role of entrepreneurship in creating stable, prosperous societies around the world.

Richard Stengel Undersecretary of State for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs Special Guest United States Department of State

Encina Hall
616 Jane Stanford Way
Stanford, CA 94305-6055

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Senior Fellow, Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies
Ken Olivier and Angela Nomellini Professor of International Studies, Department of Political Science
Peter and Helen Bing Senior Fellow, Hoover Institution
mcfaul_headshot_2025.jpg PhD

Michael McFaul is the Ken Olivier and Angela Nomellini Professor of International Studies in Political Science, Senior Fellow at the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies, and the Peter and Helen Bing Senior Fellow at the Hoover Institution, all at Stanford University. He joined the Stanford faculty in 1995 and served as FSI Director from 2015 to 2025. He is also an international affairs analyst for MSNOW.

McFaul served for five years in the Obama administration, first as Special Assistant to the President and Senior Director for Russian and Eurasian Affairs at the National Security Council at the White House (2009-2012), and then as U.S. Ambassador to the Russian Federation (2012-2014).

McFaul has authored ten books and edited several others, including, most recently, Autocrats vs. Democrats: China, Russia, America, and the New Global Disorder, as well as From Cold War to Hot Peace: An American Ambassador in Putin’s Russia, (a New York Times bestseller) Advancing Democracy Abroad: Why We Should, How We Can; and Russia’s Unfinished Revolution: Political Change from Gorbachev to Putin.

He is a recipient of numerous awards, including an honorary PhD from Montana State University; the Order for Merits to Lithuania from President Gitanas Nausea of Lithuania; Order of Merit of Third Degree from President Volodymyr Zelenskyy of Ukraine, and the Dean’s Award for Distinguished Teaching at Stanford University. In 2015, he was the Distinguished Mingde Faculty Fellow at the Stanford Center at Peking University.

McFaul was born and raised in Montana. He received his B.A. in International Relations and Slavic Languages and his M.A. in Soviet and East European Studies from Stanford University in 1986. As a Rhodes Scholar, he completed his D. Phil. in International Relations at Oxford University in 1991. 

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Addressing the Bechtel Conference Center, leaders rejected the prospect of territorial concessions, saying that Ukrainians “will not give up” on their country.

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As Ukraine marks four years since Russia’s full-scale invasion, and more than a decade of war that began in 2014, the country is experiencing profound strain — millions are displaced, missile and drone strikes threaten energy infrastructure and cause frequent power outages, and there is a large-scale humanitarian crisis. As the country focuses on survival, defense, and endurance, an equal focus lies on laying the groundwork for long-term democratic recovery and postwar reconstruction.

Many of these efforts are being led by alumni of the Strengthening Ukrainian Democracy and Development Program (SU-DD) at Stanford’s Center on Democracy, Development and the Rule of Law (CDDRL). Launched in 2022 following Russia’s attack on Ukraine on February 24, the program brings mid-career Ukrainian practitioners to Stanford to develop implementation plans for projects focused on governance, recovery, and local capacity building. Participants engage with CDDRL faculty, global peers in the center’s Fisher Family Summer Fellows Program, and Bay Area tech and business experts, politicians, and government officials while refining strategies designed for real-world application under wartime conditions. The SU-DD program builds on the strong foundation of the Ukrainian Emerging Leaders Program (UELP), which was housed at CDDRL from 2017 to 2021. Between the two, the center has hosted 25 Ukrainian fellows across 7 cohorts.

After four years of war, SU-DD alumni say their work has taken on added urgency. Their projects now operate not as future-oriented plans but as active components of Ukraine’s wartime governance and recovery strategy.
 

From the Farm to the Front Lines

For Oleksii Movchan, a member of the Verkhovna Rada (Ukraine’s Parliament) and deputy chair of the parliamentary committee on economic development, his focus is on expanding financing tools for reconstruction. As part of a project he began during his 2025 SU-DD fellowship, he is drafting legislation to reform municipal bond regulations, aimed at increasing the participation of local governments in securities and debt markets and attracting additional resources for rebuilding Ukraine. To accomplish this work, he has relied on the Problem-Solving Framework he learned at Stanford, and shares that his experience in the SU-DD program made him more confident in his values and encouraged him to “stand on [his] principles and values of integrity, openness, and respect to human rights and democracy.” By strengthening municipal access to capital, his work seeks to support infrastructure recovery while reinforcing transparent financial governance.

Oleksii Movchan
Oleksii Movchan while on campus in the summer of 2025. | Rod Searcey

Maria Golub, a senior political and policy advisor working on EU and NATO integration, is developing a national Coalition for Recovery — an inclusive, cross-sectoral platform designed to unify Ukraine’s defense, reconstruction, and reform agendas. With Ukraine balancing the demands of war and reconstruction, Golub’s 2025 SU-DD project aims to ensure that recovery planning connects security, governance, and innovation rather than treating them as separate tracks. Currently in a pilot, her proposals have already informed the government's 2026 recovery and resilience planning process.

Maria Golub
Maria Golub accepts her certificate of completion from Kathryn Stoner and Erik Jensen during the 2025 Fisher Family Summer Fellows Program, which SU-DD fellows participate in concurrently. | Rod Searcey

At the regional level, Mykhailo Pavliuk, vice-chairman of the Chernivtsi Oblast (state) legislature in Ukraine, is actively implementing reforms to advance self-government and deepen Ukraine’s decentralization process. His work, initiated during his time at Stanford in 2023, focuses on strengthening “consolidated, self-sufficient communities” by developing political, financial, infrastructure, and social strategies that can be carried out locally, including cross-border regional initiatives in Chernivtsi. He said the most important element is “supporting the potential of people at the local level through the activities of advisory bodies, consultations, and modeling of joint decisions,” bringing citizens closer to decision-making on community affairs. Pavliuk emphasized that decentralization has been critical to Ukraine’s resilience since 2022, while noting that “there would certainly be a greater outcome in peacetime,” without the constraints imposed by war.

Mykhailo Pavliuk
Mykhailo Pavliuk delivers a "TED"-style talk while on campus in 2023. | Nora Sulots

In the media sector, Alyona Nevmerzhytska, CEO of the independent outlet hromadske, is actively implementing her 2025 SU-DD project to strengthen the organization’s long-term sustainability and resilience. Her work, she says, “addresses two interconnected challenges: financial vulnerability and the rapid emergence of AI in the media landscape.” By developing diversified revenue strategies and integrating responsible AI tools into newsroom workflows, she aims to “improve efficiency, counter disinformation, and expand audience reach.” Despite ongoing security risks, she shares that the newsroom has maintained consistent production, adapted its operations, and prioritized staff safety, demonstrating what she described as “strong institutional resilience.” During her time on campus, Nevmerzhytska met with Stanford journalism and technology experts, whose guidance enhanced her strategic thinking around AI integration and digital modernization, “providing practical insights and [the] confidence to adopt responsible AI tools for efficiency and multilingual production.” She reports that hromadske continues to serve as a platform for accountability and public debate, reinforcing its role within Ukraine’s civil society.

Alyona Nevmerzhytska
Alyona Nevmerzhytska participates in a discussion during the 2025 Fisher Family Summer Fellows Program. | Rod Searcey

Iaroslav Liubchenko, currently CEO of Ukraine’s national electronic public procurement system Prozorro, focused his 2023 Stanford project on strengthening transparency, efficiency, and institutional integrity in Ukraine’s defense procurement architecture. Today, that vision has become central to his leadership agenda. Prozorro is advancing three core priorities: deepening European integration through the approximation of EU public procurement directives into national legislation — in cooperation with Member of Parliament Oleksii Movchan — and sharing Prozorro’s digital governance model with EU partners; scaling up defense procurement within the system, including drones, unmanned and robotic systems, electronic warfare capabilities, non-lethal equipment for military infrastructure, and strengthened cooperation with the Defence Procurement Agency; and developing the broader Prozorro ecosystem through new coalitions and markets, advanced digital instruments, and AI integration. Prozorro seeks to ensure that Ukraine’s defense and rebuilding efforts are supported by transparent, technology-driven, and institutionally resilient procurement systems — not only fully aligned with EU standards, but capable of serving as a model for public procurement reform across Europe.

Iaroslav Liubchenko
Iaroslav Liubchenko participates in a discussion during the 2024 Fisher Family Summer Fellows Program. | Rod Searcey

Ukraine’s Path Forward


Together, the fellows describe a future shaped not only by physical rebuilding but by the strength of Ukraine’s institutions and civic life. When asked about the country’s priorities for the next several years, their responses aligned in three areas: securing victory and sustaining defense capacity, advancing EU integration, and rebuilding critical infrastructure. Each emphasized that reconstruction must be paired with governance reforms to ensure public trust and long-term resilience.

Amid the political, economic, and human toll of war, our fellows agreed that the “unbreakable spirit and will of Ukrainians” gives them hope. “I am inspired by the endurance of Ukrainian society,” said Nevmerzhytska. “Despite exhaustion and loss, people continue to volunteer, innovate, and support each other. That civic resilience gives me confidence that Ukraine’s democratic spirit remains strong.”

As we look to the beginning of the fifth year of Russia’s war, Ukraine’s future is still uncertain. But the projects these leaders developed during their time at Stanford have carried into their work in parliament, regional government, civil society, media, and the defense sector. What began as ideas for reform are now being tested and adapted under wartime conditions, as they work to keep institutions functioning and prepare for the country’s long-term recovery.

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Hope, Despair, and the Emotional Response to the War in Ukraine

On the World Class podcast, Gabrielius Landsbergis shares what the war in Ukraine has looked and felt like from a European perspective, and what he believes must be done to support Ukraine for the long-term.
Hope, Despair, and the Emotional Response to the War in Ukraine
2025 Strengthening Ukrainian Democracy and Development fellows
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Ukrainian Leaders Advance Postwar Recovery Through Stanford Fellowship

Meet the four fellows participating in CDDRL’s Strengthening Democracy and Development Program and learn how they are forging solutions to help Ukraine rise stronger from the challenges of war.
Ukrainian Leaders Advance Postwar Recovery Through Stanford Fellowship
(Clockwise from left) Oleksandra Matviichuk, Oleksandra Ustinova, Oleksiy Honcharuk, and Serhiy Leshchenko joined FSI Director Michael McFaul to discuss Ukraine's future on the three-year anniversary of Russia's full-scale invasion.
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Through War and Loss, Ukrainians Hold Onto Hope

FSI scholars and civic and political Ukrainian leaders discussed the impact of the largest conflict in Europe since World War II, three years after Russia's invasion of Ukraine.
Through War and Loss, Ukrainians Hold Onto Hope
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People arrive to pay tribute at Maidan Square, where thousands of memorial flags are on display as a reminder of the toll of the war on February 24, 2025, in Kyiv, Ukraine.
People arrive to pay tribute at Maidan Square, where thousands of memorial flags are on display as a reminder of the toll of the war on February 24, 2025, in Kyiv, Ukraine. Paula Bronstein / Stringer / Getty Images
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From parliament to regional government to independent media, alumni of the Center on Democracy, Development and the Rule of Law’s Strengthening Ukrainian Democracy and Development Program are implementing reform initiatives under wartime conditions.

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  • Stanford’s Center on Democracy, Development and the Rule of Law (CDDRL) launched a fellowship in 2022 to support Ukrainian leaders in designing governance and recovery reforms.
  • Alumni of the Strengthening Ukrainian Democracy and Development Program (SU-DD) now implement those plans across parliament, regional government, media, and defense procurement.
  • Stanford-developed reform strategies now support Ukraine’s institutional resilience and transparent recovery during wartime.
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On February 12, Stanford’s Center on Democracy, Development and the Rule of Law (CDDRL), the Europe Center, and the Hoover Institution hosted Lucan Way, Distinguished Professor of Democracy at the University of Toronto, for a seminar titled “Economic Dependence and Authoritarianism: Russia in Comparative Perspective.” The talk, part of the REDS (Rethinking European Development and Security) series, examined the structural relationship between state resource concentration and democratic outcomes, using Russia as a central case while situating it within broader comparative patterns.

Way’s core argument centered on a simple but powerful proposition: when economic resources are concentrated in the hands of the state, autocracy becomes more likely; when resources are dispersed outside the state, democracy becomes more feasible. The key mechanism linking economic structure to regime type is the strength — or weakness — of countervailing societal power. Resource concentration generates societal dependence on political leaders. Citizens dependent on public-sector employment or state benefits face high personal costs for political opposition, including loss of income or access to essential services. Similarly, business elites reliant on state licenses, contracts, or regulatory goodwill incur substantial risks if they challenge incumbents. The result is weak opposition, limited activist networks, minimal independent funding, and fragile civil society organizations.

Way situated this framework within three major literatures on authoritarianism. First, underdevelopment (Lipset 1959; Przeworski et al. 2000) remains strongly associated with autocracy: roughly 70 percent of poor countries were autocratic between 2000 and 2021. Second, oil wealth (Ross 2001; Bellin 2004) produces an even starker pattern: about 90 percent of petrostates were authoritarian in the same period. Third, statist or weak private-sector economies (Fish 2005; Greene 2007; Arriola 2013; Rosenfeld 2021) show similar tendencies, with roughly 80 percent of the most statist countries classified as autocratic. Despite their differences — very poor African states, wealthy Middle Eastern petrostates, and middle-income statist regimes — the underlying mechanism is the same: resource concentration fosters weak countervailing power.

Russia exemplifies this structural dynamic. While the 1990s appeared to feature strong countervailing forces, including powerful oligarchs credited with supporting Boris Yeltsin’s reelection, Way argued that these actors were in fact institutionally weak. Russia’s private sector relied heavily on state connections in a system with weak courts and manipulable regulatory frameworks. The imprisonment of Mikhail Khodorkovsky after he challenged Vladimir Putin underscored the vulnerability of even the wealthiest economic actors. The broader business community remained largely passive, reflecting structural dependence rather than autonomous strength.

Statism further entrenched authoritarian control. A state-dependent middle class and political parties reliant on Kremlin financing limited the development of robust opposition. In oil-rich systems, public-sector employment and distributive benefits deepen citizens' dependence, while governments remain fiscally insulated from private-sector pressures. In underdeveloped postcolonial contexts, even modestly financed states wield disproportionate leverage over fragile economies, facilitating cooptation and repression.
Preliminary statistical evidence using V-Dem measures of “resource concentration” supports these claims. State ownership or control over key sectors correlates strongly with authoritarianism, high pro-incumbent mobilization, low opposition mobilization, media control, and weak civil society. Way acknowledged complications, including endogeneity: autocrats often increase resource concentration through nationalization or expansion of public employment. Nevertheless, certain structural conditions — such as large oil reserves, extreme underdevelopment, or historically weak private sectors — make concentration more feasible ex ante.

In conclusion, Way emphasized that autocracy is not inevitable in such contexts. However, where countervailing societal power is weak, imposing authoritarian rule becomes far easier. Across diverse regimes, economic dependence constitutes a common mechanism of authoritarian control — whether through business capture of the state or state capture of business.

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Natalie Letsa presented her research in a CDDRL seminar on February 5, 2026.
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Zehra F. Kabasakal Arat presented her research in a CDDRL seminar on January 29, 2026.
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Andrew Michta presented his research in a REDS Seminar co-hosted by CDDRL and TEC on January 22, 2026.
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Will Deterrence Hold in Europe?

At a REDS seminar co-hosted by CDDRL and TEC, Andrew Michta assesses whether Europe’s security institutions are prepared for renewed great power competition.
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Lucan Way presented his research in a REDS Seminar on February 12, 2026.
Lucan Way presented his research in a REDS Seminar on February 12, 2026.
Nora Sulots
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Lucan Way examines the structural relationship between state resource concentration and democratic outcomes, using Russia as a central case while situating it within broader comparative patterns.

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  • In a REDS (Rethinking European Development and Security) Seminar co-hosted by the Center on Democracy, Development and the Rule of Law, The Europe Center, and the Hoover Institution, Lucan Way examined how state resource concentration shapes authoritarian and democratic trajectories.
  • He argued that economic dependence weakens opposition, civil society, and independent business, limiting countervailing societal power.
  • The discussion situated Russia within comparative research on statism, oil wealth, and the links between underdevelopment and the durability of authoritarianism.
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Aerial Drone Flyby Shot in Kyiv - Biggest National flag of Ukraine. Aerial view. Spivoche Pole, Kiev
Aerial shot of the Motherland Monument and the Biggest National Flag of Ukraine in Kyiv, Ukraine, photographed prior to February 24, 2022. | Oleksandr Tkachenko, Getty Images

February 24 marks the fourth anniversary of Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022. Though Ukraine has won many battles, the war for Ukraine’s right to exist as an independent, democratic nation rages on at a very steep human cost.

To commemorate this important day for Ukraine and the world, the Center on Democracy, Development and the Rule of Law (CDDRL) is honored to host a panel of high-profile Ukrainian leaders currently based in Kyiv and Washington, D.C. for a discussion of the impact of the war on daily life, the global democratic order, and Ukraine's future. This important discussion will feature Ukrainian policymakers offering analysis of the war’s political and economic dimensions, democratic governance under wartime conditions, and Ukraine’s engagement with international partners. 

The panel will be introduced by Kathryn Stoner, Mosbacher Director of CDDRL and the Satre Family Senior Fellow at the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies (FSI), and moderated by Michael McFaul, the Ken Olivier and Angela Nomellini Professor of International Studies in the Department of Political Science, Senior Fellow at the Hoover Institution, FSI, and the Woods Institute for the Environment, and former U.S. ambassador to Russia.

Lunch will be available for in-person attendees. For those unable to join us in person, a livestream of the panel will be available via Zoom. Please register for more information.

Meet the Panelists

Oleksiy

Oleksii Movchan

Member of the Verkhovna Rada (Ukraine's Parliament); Deputy Chairman of the Verkhovna Rada Committee on Economic Development
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Oleksii Movchan is a Member of the Ukrainian Parliament and Deputy Chairman of the Verkhovna Rada Committee on Economic Development, representing the “Servant of the People” faction. He chairs the subcommittee on public procurements and state property management, and is active in inter-parliamentary groups with the USA, UK, Japan, and others. Before parliament, he led projects at Prozorro.Sale. Oleksii holds degrees from Kyiv-Mohyla Academy, Ukrainian Catholic University, and Kyiv School of Economics. He has advanced key reforms in procurements, state-owned companies, and privatization to support Ukraine’s European Union integration. He was a 2025 Fisher Family Summer Fellow and participated in the Strengthening Democracy and Development Program (SUDD) at the Center on Democracy, Development and the Rule of Law.

andriy_v_shevchenko

Andriy Shevchenko

Former Ukrainian Ambassador to Canada; Head of the Ukrainian World Congress Mission to Ukraine, Reagan-Fascell Democracy Fellow at the National Endowment for Democracy
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Andriy Shevchenko serves as the Head of Mission in Ukraine for the Ukrainian World Congress, where he leads efforts to strengthen cooperation between the global Ukrainian community, Ukrainian authorities, the Armed Forces of Ukraine, international partners, and the broader Ukrainian diaspora. In this role, he focuses on political advocacy, coalition-building with governments worldwide, and supporting initiatives such as Unite with Ukraine and EnergizeUkraine, designed to assist Ukrainian defenders and citizens during the ongoing conflict. In Ukraine, Shevchenko is widely recognized for his experience as a journalist, community advocate, politician, and diplomat. For his contributions during the Orange Revolution, he was honored with the Press Freedom Award by Reporters Without Borders (Vienna, 2005). Until September 2023, he served as Deputy Minister of Defense, overseeing military diplomacy, NATO and EU cooperation, and international military assistance. He has also served as Ukraine’s Ambassador to Canada and ICAO (2015-2021), and as a member of the Ukrainian Parliament (2006-2014), contributing significantly to Ukraine’s international relations and policy initiatives. He was a Yale University World Fellow in 2008 and a Draper Hills Summer Fellow at the Center on Democracy, Development and the Rule of Law in 2009.  Currently, Shevchenko is a Reagan-Fascell Democracy Fellow at the National Endowment for Democracy in Washington, D.C.

Oleksandra Ustinova

Oleksandra Ustinova

Member of the Verkhovna Rada (Ukraine's Parliament), Chair of the Parliamentary Special Commission on the Arms Control; Advisor to the Minister of Defense of Ukraine
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Oleksandra Ustinova is a member of the Verkhovna Rada, Ukraine's parliament. Since the beginning of Russia's invasion in 2022, she has met repeatedly with lawmakers in the United States to advocate on behalf of Ukraine, including an address before the U.S. House of Representatives on February 28, 2022. Prior to her government service, Ustinova was the head of communications and anti-corruption in healthcare projects at the Anti-Corruption Action Center (ANTAC), one of the leading organizations on anti-corruption reform in Ukraine. She was a visiting scholar with the Ukrainian Emerging Leaders Program at the Center on Democracy, Development and the Rule of Law from 2018-2019.

Anastasiia Malenko

Anastasiia Malenko

Journalist
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Anastasiia Malenko is a Kyiv-based reporter covering the war in Ukraine. Previously a breaking news correspondent for Reuters, she reported on key political and economic developments related to the war. In her feature reporting, Anastasiia focuses on how the war reshapes Ukrainian society. She also examines military strategy through battlefield analysis. Anastasiia is a graduate of Stanford University and CDDRL's 2022-23 Fisher Family Honors Program.

Kathryn Stoner
Kathryn Stoner
Michael A. McFaul
Michael McFaul

In-person event for Stanford affiliates only: Bechtel Conference Center (Encina Hall, 1st floor, 616 Jane Stanford Way, Stanford)

Livestream available to the public: via Zoom, if prompted for a password, use: 123456

Members of the media interested in attending this event should contact cddrl_communications@stanford.edu.

Oleksii Movchan Member of Verkhovna Rada, Ukrainian parliament Panelist Ukraine
Andriy Shevchenko Former Ukrainian Ambassador to Canada, Ukrainian journalist and civil activist Panelist
Oleksandra Ustinova Member of Verkhovna Rada
Anastasiia Malenko Ukrainian Journalist Panelist
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Does the outbreak of a major international war change political discourse? Drawing on theories of political communication and elite cueing, identity salience, and threat perception, we hypothesize that the outbreak of a war of aggression by a major power increases the use of nationalist rhetoric by heads of government in other, non-belligerent, states.

To test this hypothesis, we analyse over 10,000 tweets by heads of government from 130 countries before and after the Russian invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. Using word embeddings, we map politicians' tweets along a nationalist–cosmopolitan spectrum and show a significant shift toward nationalist political discourse on the online platform.

Subgroup analysis reveals that this effect was stronger among leaders of member states of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Yet, leaders from countries that are members of the pro-Russia Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) and those with past experiences of irredentism or territorial armed conflicts — thus resembling the Russia–Ukraine war — did not increase their resort to nationalist rhetoric.

These findings offer new insights into how — in the digital age — conflict in one place can diffuse into politics elsewhere.

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Introduction and Motivation:


Social scientists and philosophers have shown increased interest in the concept of descriptive representation. Indeed, the identities and life experiences of those doing the representing may be critical for enacting the preferences of those being represented. This is especially the case for historically marginalized groups — upper-class, educated men may simply fail to adequately represent lower-class, uneducated, or women voters. In addition to considerations of fairness, there is growing recognition that descriptive representation can improve policy outcomes, such as service delivery or trust in government.

However, the study of descriptive representation has been hampered by data availability. Identifying simple correlations across the world’s democracies — for example, between proportions of working-class legislators and levels of social welfare provision — has hitherto been impossible.

In “The Global Legislators Database,” Nicholas Carnes, Joshua Ferrer, Miriam Golden, Esme Lillywhite, Noam Lupu, and Eugenia Nazrullaeva introduce the largest dataset of biographic and demographic information on national legislators ever assembled. GLD will enable scholars to assess just how much voters elect those with life experiences resembling their own. The authors compile information on five descriptive variables across 97 democracies: legislators’ party affiliation, gender, age, highest level of education, and previous occupation (to assess their social class). By contrast, prior datasets have focused only on heads of state or cabinet members, or on only a selection of more developed democracies.

Some questions around descriptive representation would seem to have intuitive answers: Wouldn’t developed countries have more women representatives, or wouldn’t women legislators feature less prominently in right-wing parties? Scholars can now hope to do more than merely gesture at answers.

The authors introduce the largest dataset of biographic and demographic information on national legislators ever assembled. GLD will enable scholars to assess just how much voters elect those with life experiences resembling their own.

Characteristics, Validity Checks, and Applications:


GLD comprises countries that (a) have a population of over 300,000 and (b) meet the standard for what Freedom House calls “Electoral Democracy” — having some minimum of political rights and civil liberties. Excluding six cases of data availability constraints, this yields 97 countries, including India, the United States, Brazil, Mexico, Nigeria, and the Philippines. Scholars of Pakistan, Bangladesh, or Turkey — who would likely characterize these countries as authoritarian during the 2015-17 time period — will be pleased that the authors chose a more forgiving measure of democracy.

Biographic data is drawn from the national legislature in unicameral countries and the lower chamber in bicameral countries. (By contrast, upper chambers are sometimes indirectly appointed or hereditary, which sheds less light on whether voters choose descriptively similar representatives.) This yields over 19,000 individuals who held office during at least one legislative session in 2015, 2016, and 2017. GLD has remarkably complete data for the five variables mentioned above: age and education data are presented for over 90% of legislators in the dataset, for over 93% as regards occupation, and nearly 100% for gender.

In order to assess GLD’s validity, the authors compare select variables to those in comparable datasets. For example, the gender variable is compared with gender data from the Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) project, which shows that the two measures are nearly identical. So too is the age data nearly identical to an index from 15 affluent democracies.
 


 

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Figure 1. Shares of women legislators in the GLD and V-Dem. Note: Bahamas, Belize, Fiji, and Kosovo are omitted because of missing data in the V-Dem.

 

Figure 1. Shares of women legislators in the GLD and V-Dem. Note: Bahamas, Belize, Fiji, and Kosovo are omitted because of missing data in the V-Dem.
 



For categories like education and prior occupation — where comparable data are unavailable — the authors conduct “face validity” tests: these draw on our intuitions that legislators are, for example, mostly educated and not working class. And indeed, these intuitions are borne out in the distributions of GLD data. In terms of total coverage, GLD includes information on more legislators than the comparable Global Leadership Project database for all but two countries, and in many cases, the differences are large.
 


 

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Figure 3. Distributions of legislator traits in the GLD.

 

Figure 3. Distributions of legislator traits in the GLD. Note: Age is calculated at the time of election. Higher education includes levels beyond primary and secondary education (Bachelors, Masters, PhD, LLB, LLM, JD, MD, and short-cycle tertiary). Data on educational attainments for legislators is unavailable for Côte d’Ivoire.
 



The authors then use GLD in application to a number of questions for which scholars have lacked global data. First, some have hypothesized that in legislatures with more (a) uneducated, (b) female, and (c) working-class representatives, incumbency rates will be lower. This is because individuals from these three groups might have a harder time overcoming challenges relating to expertise, sexism, and fundraising, respectively. Correlating GLD data with a global reelection database, the authors find only evidence for (b), suggesting that women may face higher barriers to remaining in office. These are only correlations, but they point to fruitful areas for exploration: why might women face unique barriers, and what distinguishes countries with lower versus higher barriers?
 



 

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Figure 5. Re-election rates by years of education, gender, and occupational background.

 

Figure 5. Re-election rates by years of education, gender, and occupational background. Note: The share of working-class legislators is zero for six countries that are dropped from the figure: Albania, Botswana, Cyprus, Estonia, Guatemala, and Mongolia.
 



A second application involves public financing of elections, which is thought to favor more working-class legislators who would have a harder time fundraising. Correlating V-Dem data on public financing with the GLD variable on prior occupation, however, the authors find limited evidence for this conjecture. Finally, some have proposed that countries with a stronger rule of law would favor a higher proportion of lawyers in the national legislature. Looking again at GLD prior occupation data alongside V-Dem rule of law data, the authors find limited evidence for this hypothesis.

These varied applications point to how the Global Legislators Database can serve as a valuable resource for scholars interested in the causes and consequences of descriptive representation. Although the GLD covers only a single point in time, it can serve as a bedrock for additional data-collection efforts. In addition to expanding its temporal coverage, scholars may also wish to gather data on upper chambers. Especially in ethnically diverse countries like Bosnia and Herzegovina, upper chambers are intended to mirror the descriptive composition of specific regions. However, it may be the case that ethnic representatives are still vastly more wealthy or educated than their constituents, thus impeding their ability to represent.

*Brief prepared by Adam Fefer.

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Flyer for the 2026 Oksenberg Conference, titled "Coping with a Less Predictable United States," including an image of President Trump board Air Force One.

The content, consistency, and predictability of U.S. policy shaped the global order for eight decades, but these lodestars of geopolitics and geoeconomics can no longer be taken for granted. What comes next will be determined by the ambitions and actions of major powers and other international actors.

Some have predicted that China can and will reshape the global order. But does it want to? If so, what will it seek to preserve, reform, or replace? Choices made by China and other regional states will hinge on their perceptions of future U.S. behavior — whether they deem it more prudent to retain key attributes of the U.S.-built order, with America playing a different role, than to move toward an untested and likely contested alternative — and how they prioritize their own interests.

This year’s Oksenberg Conference will examine how China and other Indo-Pacific actors read the geopolitical landscape, set priorities, and devise strategies to shape the regional order amid uncertainty about U.S. policy and the future of global governance.
 

PANEL 1 

China’s Perceptions and Possible Responses 


Moderator 

Thomas Fingar 
Shorenstein APARC Fellow, Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies, Stanford University 

Panelists 

Da Wei 
Professor and Director, Center for International Security and Strategy, Tsinghua University 

Mark Lambert 
Retired U.S. Department of State Official, Formerly China Coordinator and Deputy Assistant Secretary 

Susan Shirk 
Research Professor, School of Global Policy and Strategy, University of California San Diego 


PANEL 2 
Other Asia-Pacific Regional Actors’ Perceptions and Policy Calculations 


Moderator 

Laura Stone 
Retired U.S. Ambassador and Career Foreign Service Officer; Inaugural China Policy Fellow at APARC, Stanford University 

Panelists

Victor Cha 
Distinguished University Professor, D.S. Song-KF Chair, and Professor of Government, Georgetown University 

Katherine Monahan 
Visiting Scholar and Japan Program Fellow 2025-2026, APARC, Stanford University 

Kathryn Stoner 
Satre Family Senior Fellow, Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies, Stanford University 

Emily Tallo 
Postdoctoral Fellow, Center for International Security and Cooperation, Stanford University 

Thomas Fingar, Laura Stone
Victor Cha, Da Wei, Mark Lambert, Katherine Monahan, Susan Shirk, Kathryn Stoner, Emily Tallo
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On January 15, 2026, Emil Kamalov, CDDRL’s 2025-26 Stanford U.S.-Russia Forum (SURF) Postdoctoral Fellow, presented his team’s research on whether autocracies can draw citizens who have emigrated back to their country of origin. Historically, episodes of autocratization create huge migration waves. In recent times, countries such as Chile, Venezuela, Iran, Belarus, and Russia have experienced waves of emigration as a result of authoritarian leadership. When skilled professionals who are crucial to their country’s functioning leave, a phenomenon known as “brain drain,” a central question arises: if and how these individuals will return. This raises two key questions: can autocracies reverse such a brain drain and bring their citizens back, or can only democracies do so?

Kamalov turns to the case of Russian migration to explore these questions more directly. For many Russians, the 2022 war with Ukraine was an initial trigger for leaving the country. Kamalov explains that autocrats use emigration as a safety valve to manage dissent at home. In doing so, autocrats rely on several tools to maintain control. These include selective “valving,” which allows some citizens to emigrate while retaining enough workers critical to industry, as well as imprisonment to punish those who attempt to leave. For those who have already emigrated, autocrats may introduce special policies, such as financial or tax benefits for critical professions, in an attempt to attract them back to the country. 

Kamalov then discussed what motivates citizens to move into and out of countries. He outlines a list of push and pull factors, including economic conditions, integration and discrimination, and satisfaction with amenities and services. He identifies a gap in the literature, noting that there is relatively little focus on politics — specifically regime change, autocracy, and democracy. From this gap, Kamalov poses several questions: can autocrats lure emigrants back with incentives, will people return if democratization occurs, and does democratic backsliding in host countries push emigrants back home? For political emigrants in particular, political liberties are non-tradable in their decisions about return.

Turning fully to the case of Russian emigration, Kamalov notes that about one million Russians have left the country since the February 24, 2022, invasion of Ukraine. This represents the largest brain drain since the collapse of the USSR. Forty-one percent work in the IT sector, and the majority of emigrants are highly skilled and educated, with many working in science, media, and the arts. This emigration represents a significant share of opposition-minded Russian citizens: most of those who left had experience with protest and civic engagement in Russia, and roughly 80 percent cite political reasons for their departure. In response, the Kremlin introduced several policies aimed at discouraging professional emigration or attracting emigrants back. These include mobilization exemptions for highly skilled workers in critical industries such as math, architecture, and engineering, as well as economic support for IT workers, including subsidized mortgages. Because of these policies, Russia serves as a useful case study for understanding whether the strategies autocracies use to entice citizens back or prevent them from leaving are actually effective.

In March 2022, Kamalov and his team launched a panel survey of Russian migrants consisting of five waves. Approximately 21,000 post-2022 Russian emigrants across around 100 countries participated. As part of the survey, respondents were asked to imagine hypothetical political scenarios in Russia and indicate whether they would return if those scenarios became reality. These scenarios ranged from highly realistic but undesirable to unrealistic but highly desirable. They included continued war with Putin in power, continued war with family mobilization exemptions, an end to the war without regime change, an end to the war with political amnesty but no regime change, and full regime change with pro-democratic forces coming to power. The team also analyzed respondents’ host countries, focusing on economic conditions, citizenship opportunities, and political environments.

The results show that having a good job or a path to citizenship in the host country reduces the likelihood of returning to Russia, while democratic backsliding in the host country increases it. Draft exemptions do not increase return at all. Ending the war alone would attract only about 5 percent of emigrants, ending the war combined with political amnesty would attract about 15 percent, while democratization is by far the most attractive scenario, drawing around 40 percent back. When looking at subgroups, all professional categories studied — culture, IT, media, science, and education — were similarly unlikely to return under non-democratic conditions. During democratization, around half would return, though those working in culture, such as artists and musicians, were somewhat less likely to do so. Younger emigrants were more likely to return than older ones.

When asked why they would not return, respondents cited high migration costs, regime volatility, and distrust of Russian society. Some believed that even with political change, Russian society would take much longer to become progressive. Those who said they would return pointed to home, family, opportunities, quality of life, migration fatigue, and, in some cases, disillusionment with democracy in host countries.

The findings of Kamalov’s team demonstrate that even removing the initial trigger for emigration cannot attract many emigrants back. Job opportunities can draw certain subgroups, even during wartime, but broader political conditions matter far more. Autocratic spillovers and cooperation also matter, as democratic backsliding in host countries can motivate return. Importantly, even those who currently cannot envision retu

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Emil Kamalov presented his research in a CDDRL seminar on January 15, 2026.
Emil Kamalov presented his research in a CDDRL seminar on January 15, 2026.
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SURF postdoctoral fellow Emil Kamalov explains why political freedoms outweigh material benefits for many Russian emigrants considering return.

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