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10.15.26Chris_Dann_Seminar

Contrary to expectations following the end of the Cold War, several autocracies have modernized without succumbing to democratizing pressures. This paper argues that a non-trivial number of 21st-century autocrats generate reputations for economic delivery via large-scale infrastructure due to its observability, tangibility, and durability as an asset, providing rulers with a credible commitment device for continued development while retaining authoritarian political institutions. I evaluate a central implication of this argument using geolocated data on 150,000 large-scale construction projects since 2005 and micro-level attitudes from nine harmonized survey datasets, covering 2.5 million respondents across 2,300 subnational districts. Exploiting within-district variation, I find that effective project delivery increases perceived government performance, with effects concentrated among established autocracies and democratic backsliders.

ABOUT THE SPEAKER

Chris Dann is a PhD candidate in Political Science at Stanford University and is a current pre-doctoral fellow with the Center for Democracy, Development and the Rule of Law (CDDRL). Before graduate school he received a BSc from the London School of Economics and an MSc at the University of Oxford. He then returned to LSE for two years as a pre-doctoral fellow, working for economist Professor Sir Tim Besley. His research interests lie in the political economy of large-scale infrastructure investments and how these shape the social contract. 

Hesham Sallam
Hesham Sallam

Virtual to Public. If prompted for a password, use: 123456

Only those with an active Stanford ID with access to Conference Room E-008 in Encina Hall, East, may attend in person.

Encina Hall, E109
616 Jane Stanford Way
Stanford, CA 94305-6055

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CDDRL Predoctoral Fellow, 2026-27
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Chris Dann is a PhD candidate in Political Science at Stanford University and is a current pre-doctoral fellow with the Center for Democracy, Development and the Rule of Law (CDDRL). Before graduate school, he received a BSc from the London School of Economics and an MSc at the University of Oxford. He then returned to LSE for two years as a pre-doctoral fellow, working for economist Professor Sir Tim Besley. His research interests lie in the political economy of large-scale infrastructure investments and how these shape the social contract. 

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Frances Cayton Seminar 10.1.26

Why do some backsliding incumbents co-opt civil society while others fail? This paper introduces a theory of civic consciousness, contending that, as compared to their formal or political counterparts, informal and apolitical civil society groups often fail to recognize their civic resources. I show that government threats to associational freedom help these groups recognize their latent social capital and increase their willingness to mobilize in support of democracy. As evidence, this paper draws on original data comprising the universe of Polish civil society between 2011 and 2025, a prominent period of democratic erosion and partial recovery. I find that Poland's illiberal PiS government financially targeted formal opposition groups but spared informal, apolitical groups. Meanwhile, those groups developed increased agency, leading them to avoid optional government interactions during the backsliding period. An original civil society-level survey experiment confirms that, when facing government threats, informal and apolitical groups are more likely to engage in pro-democratic actions. Altogether, I illustrate how improved civic consciousness facilitates newfound agency and democratic commitment among previously overlooked corners of civic life.   

ABOUT THE SPEAKER

Frances Cayton is the Einstein Moos Postdoctoral Fellow at Stanford's Center on Democracy, Development and the Rule of Law (CDDRL). Her book project, "How Civic Consciousness Shapes Democratic Resilience," examines how, why, and under what conditions civil society encourages individuals to depolarize and resist democratic erosion. Combining extensive organizational and bureaucratic data, elite and mass surveys, experiments, and interview evidence, she demonstrates how informal and apolitical subsets of civic life retain critical latent democratic potential. More broadly, her research probes the drivers and consequences of democratic engagement, primarily in Eastern Europe while also drawing comparison with other eroding democracies globally. Her research is published or forthcoming in numerous outlets, including the American Journal of Political Science and Perspectives on Politics. Her work has been supported by the US Departments of State and Education, as well as the American Political Science Association.

Cayton holds a PhD in Government from Cornell University. She earned her AM from Harvard University's Davis Center for Russian and Eurasian Studies and a BA from the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. 

Hesham Sallam
Hesham Sallam

Virtual to Public. If prompted for a password, use: 123456

Only those with an active Stanford ID with access to Conference Room E-008 in Encina Hall, East, may attend in person.

Encina Hall, E106
616 Jane Stanford Way
Stanford, CA 94305-6055

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Einstein Moos Postdoctoral Fellow, 2026-27
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Frances Cayton is a scholar of democracy and civil society. For the 2026-27 academic year, she is the Einstein Moos Postdoctoral Fellow at Stanford's Center on Democracy, Development and the Rule of Law (CDDRL). In 2027, she will join the University of South Carolina as an Assistant Professor of Political Science.

Frances' book project, "How Civic Consciousness Shapes Democratic Resilience," examines how, why, and under what conditions civil society encourages individuals to depolarize and resist democratic erosion. Combining extensive organizational and bureaucratic data, elite and mass surveys, experiments, and interview evidence, she demonstrates how informal and apolitical subsets of civic life retain critical latent democratic potential. The project primarily focuses on Poland and Hungary, though it also draws comparisons with cases across East-Central Europe and globally.

More broadly, Frances works on questions about the drivers and consequences of democratic engagement, particularly concerning conspiracy theories, opposition media, and the challenges of post-backsliding redemocratization. Her research is published or forthcoming in numerous outlets, including the American Journal of Political Science and Perspectives on Politics. Her work has been supported by the US Departments of State and Education, as well as the American Political Science Association. She is also the co-founder of EEPGW, a monthly online workshop on East European politics.

Frances holds a Ph.D. in Government from Cornell University. She earned her AM from Harvard University's Davis Center for Russian and Eurasian Studies and a BA from the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill.

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This article considers how higher education in Russia was influenced by the full-scale invasion of Ukraine. The article stems from an understanding of the institutional independence of universities as the main condition for the quality of higher education. In turn, this quality results in international mobility available for students as a source of the universities' future institutional renewal. Consequently, the full-scale war causing the subsequent international isolation of Russia, inner repressions against civil society, and transformations in social and economic spheres, leads to systemic degradation of higher education in this country. This article shows that this systemic degradation consists in the fact that different consequences of the war in the field of higher education (such as forced emigration of scholars and ideologically motivated quotas for entering universities) mutually increase the international isolation of Russian students.

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10.14.26_UkraineEvent

The war in Ukraine is in its 5th year, and casualties continue to mount. How did we get here? And how does this war end? This presentation and discussion will cover the latest military developments, as well as a review of the economic and political factors that will determine how strong Ukraine, Russia, and Europe will be going into negotiations.

ABOUT THE SPEAKERS

Alexandra Vacroux is Vice President for Strategic Engagement at the Kyiv School of Economics (KSE). Her scholarly work has focused on Russia, and heavily on the war against Ukraine. Before moving to Ukraine in 2024, she served as Executive Director at Harvard’s Davis Center for Russian and Eurasian Studies. Alexandra holds a Ph.D. in government from Harvard University. Her dissertation considered informal institutions and corruption in Russia’s pharmaceutical markets and emerged from her experience living in Moscow from 1992 to 2004.

Yevhenii Malik is a former Marine Infantry sergeant in the Armed Forces of Ukraine and a veteran of the Ukraine War. He has extensive frontline experience, including in the 2022 battle for Mariupol. From April 2022 to September 2024, he endured captivity in Russia. Malik is an advocate for Ukraine’s armed forces and veterans and is responsible for undergraduate national security and defense programs at the Kyiv School of Economics (KSE). 

Kathryn Stoner
Kathryn Stoner

Only those with an active Stanford ID and access to the William J. Perry Conference Room in Encina Hall may attend in person. Others may attend virtually, via Zoom.

Registration required.

Alexandra Vacroux
Yevhenii Malik
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Introduction and Contribution


Nearly half of the world (46%) lives in authoritarian regimes that hold regular elections — compared to 28% who live in autocracies without elections and 26% who live under democracy. In these “electoral autocracies,” the ruling party can theoretically lose power, but its ability to repress and co-opt its opponents makes defeat unlikely. Incumbent executives and parties in electoral autocracies have become increasingly sophisticated in their repressive techniques and increasingly connected to other regimes that share similar fears of democracy. “How can electoral authoritarianism be resisted?” is thus a pressing question for domestic opposition parties and civil society organizations (CSOs) as well as international actors seeking to promote democracy, including governments, nonprofits, think tanks, and academics. 

In “Opposition strategies and electoral challenges under autocracy,” Oren Samet analyzes five strategies opposition parties use to fight electoral authoritarianism during campaigns, on election day, and after polls have closed. These are: joining multiparty coalitions, strengthening their party organization, mobilizing mass protests, boycotting elections, and seeking international assistance. Samet shows that each strategy entails tradeoffs, increasing opposition competitiveness while making authoritarian repression more likely or efficient. For example, joining a multiparty coalition can both increase the incumbent’s likelihood of defeat and increase his propensity to repress — insofar as he perceives the opposition as popular and threatening.

Samet shows that each strategy entails tradeoffs, increasing opposition competitiveness while making authoritarian repression more likely or efficient.

Samet offers several prescriptions for international democracy promoters. First, they must collaborate with domestic opposition parties, because only they — and not CSOs — can win elections. Yet many international actors avoid this approach; for instance, some opposition parties may care more about power than democracy, or collaborating with them may invite criticism that democracy promotion is partisan. While these risks cannot be ignored, neither can political parties.

A second prescription follows from the fact that oppositions have at least five tools at their disposal: there can be no single “best practice” in democracy promotion; it requires flexibility, adaptability, and an integrated approach. Finally, because autocrats continue to become more sophisticated, democracy promoters must take steps to prepare for the repression of their partners. 

Five Approaches and Their Pitfalls


Otherwise effective strategies for winning democratic elections — such as running savvy campaigns on primetime television that are informed by public opinion polling — will not work for opposition parties under electoral autocracy. This is because the system is structurally biased toward incumbents. As such, one common approach has been for individual opposition parties to join together in a coalition: sharing policy platforms, endorsing joint candidates, and merging their party organizations. And indeed, multiparty coalitions are statistically associated with higher vote shares and a higher likelihood that autocrats are defeated. At the same time, however, such coalitions are difficult to form and sustain due to ideological differences and polarization. In especially repressive electoral autocracies, such as Ethiopia or Cambodia, incumbent parties are often able to neutralize or eliminate coalitions. Finally, when coalitions pose a serious challenge on election day but without winning, autocrats may repress even harder.

A second strategy involves strengthening party organization, for example, by improving its geographic reach or recruiting more professional candidates. These efforts can increase competitiveness and popular appeal, but they risk providing the incumbent with a large amount of information that he can use to more efficiently target his opponents. This includes formal lists of members, candidates, and party branch locations. Meanwhile, more organized opposition parties may inadvertently legitimize the system by affording it some semblance of democracy.

Encouraging mass protests is a third strategy available to opposition parties. As the number of protesters grows, authoritarian repression becomes more costly and more likely to backfire, while the incumbent’s allies become more likely to defect and join the opposition. Parties help with this process by translating protester demands into coherent party platforms. However, and especially after the 2010-12 Arab Uprisings, electoral authoritarian regimes have become highly sensitive to and ready to combat protests. This may be accomplished via surveillance or assistance from powerful third parties such as China or Russia.

A fourth, common strategy has been for parties to boycott the autocrat’s electoral facade. Doing so signals to the international community that the playing field is skewed and the system illegitimate. Yet boycotts can lead to missed opportunities for the opposition to build electoral strength, influence policy change as legislative minorities, or monitor the autocrat from inside government. In addition, they rob oppositions of the chance to take advantage of the autocrat’s miscalculations, which may even lead to his defeat. 

Finally, opposition parties can reach out to international actors for support. This may involve requesting that they sanction the regime or intervene in the name of democracy. International pressure can indeed encourage political openings and is especially useful for oppositions with low visibility. However, autocrats are adept at demonizing those who use this strategy as agents of malign foreign influence. These appeals can strengthen the autocrat’s domestic support base among those who see him as protecting the nation. In all, these tradeoffs suggest that effective democracy promotion requires a deep understanding of the political context in which oppositions operate.

*Brief prepared by Adam Fefer.

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This memo examines securitization within the public political discussion of both Russia and the United States. We have selected keywords pertaining to the country itself in general and to the country’s intelligence services in order to identify whether the overall sentiment towards the country is similar to the sentiment given to one of the most securitized topics. For the dataset, we selected recent content from the 10 most-cited political bloggers, with the platforms being Substack for the US and Telegram for Russia. Further on, we analyzed some of the relevant post texts qualitatively. Policy recommendations are provided based on the results. 

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This paper examines the evolution of Vladimir Putin’s social contract and its transformation from a performance-based arrangement into an identity- and mobilization-based model that supports Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine. The paper brings together several dimensions of the social contract — economic performance, political passivity, elite interests, and ideological legitimacy — to demonstrate how they evolved alongside one another rather than independently. It argues that the origins of this arrangement can be traced to the crises of the 1990s, when economic collapse and political instability left many Russians looking for stability more than political participation. Against this backdrop, the Kremlin gradually built an informal understanding with society: the state would provide order, improving living standards and relative freedom in private life, while citizens would largely stay out of politics. As this model became established, tighter control over the media, increasingly managed elections, pressure on independent political actors, and the growing acceptance of political disengagement all helped reinforce it. As economic growth slowed and the regime’s performance-based legitimacy weakened, the contract adapted by increasingly relying on militarized identity, patriotic mobilization, and narratives of external threat. The annexation of Crimea and the full-scale invasion of Ukraine are interpreted as key moments in this transformation, enabling the regime to replace material incentives with identity-based legitimacy and the “rally-around-the-flag” effect. The article concludes that Putin’s social contract is not a static agreement but a flexible, state-imposed mechanism capable of adapting to changing political conditions. However, this flexibility also creates new vulnerabilities, as the regime becomes increasingly dependent on continuous ideological mobilization and public acceptance of militarized governance to sustain its legitimacy.

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This memo examines how pro-war Russian-language Telegram channels framed the war in Ukraine and Western actors during peace negotiations over six months after the Anchorage summit of August 2025. Drawing on a corpus of over 500,000 posts from 117 channels, the study moves beyond treating pro-war Telegram as a single propagandistic bloc and instead examines how framing varies across distinct categories of channels. We find that the Telegram ecosystem is stratified along multiple dimensions that do not always align. The channels that produced the strongest political framing of Western actors were not the channels that reached the largest audiences, and different categories favored different rhetoric. Mass-audience news outlets frequently engaged in consistent delegitimization of the West, while independent commentators advanced moral and conspiratorial framing, and military bloggers often used enemy-based language. Across the corpus, the United States and President Trump emerged as central objects of attention, invoked more frequently than either Russian or Ukrainian leadership. The study adds an account of how pro-Western hostility is distributed across forms and categories of propagandistic Telegram messages. We argue that this internal structure has direct implications for how Western governments might contest the Russian information space.

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This paper asks whether the United States and the European Union, despite divergent economic exposure and institutional design, can sustain a coherent sanctions strategy toward Russia, and how that divergence shapes the regime's effectiveness. It proceeds through a structured comparison across three policy domains — energy, finance, and immobilized sovereign assets — drawing on the literatures on economic statecraft, energy security, and financial-network theory, and on transaction-level, macroeconomic, and legal evidence from 2022 to early 2026. The analysis finds, first, that the United States' position as a net energy exporter enabled rapid embargoes, whereas the EU's import dependence produced a slower, phased decoupling. Second, US financial measures operated extraterritorially through dollar centrality and centralized OFAC enforcement, while the EU relied on regulatory jurisdiction over SWIFT but enforced through fragmented national authorities; a Gazprombank carve-out preserved the energy-export inflows that offset the intended balance-of-payments shock. Third, in the dispute over frozen assets, EU custodial institutions bear the legal and retaliatory exposure that the United States advocates from a position of relative insulation. The findings indicate that the regime's effectiveness is constrained less by the design of individual measures than by uneven enforcement and an asymmetric distribution of risk; absent institutionalized burden-sharing, its durability and credibility are likely to weaken.

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