Security

FSI scholars produce research aimed at creating a safer world and examing the consequences of security policies on institutions and society. They look at longstanding issues including nuclear nonproliferation and the conflicts between countries like North and South Korea. But their research also examines new and emerging areas that transcend traditional borders – the drug war in Mexico and expanding terrorism networks. FSI researchers look at the changing methods of warfare with a focus on biosecurity and nuclear risk. They tackle cybersecurity with an eye toward privacy concerns and explore the implications of new actors like hackers.

Along with the changing face of conflict, terrorism and crime, FSI researchers study food security. They tackle the global problems of hunger, poverty and environmental degradation by generating knowledge and policy-relevant solutions. 

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This op-ed by Aynne Kokas and Oriana Skylar Mastro was originally published in the Australian Financial Review.


The images of bare-chested, flag-waving MAGA loyalists overtaking the US Capitol flooded US social media and news channels in the days following the January 6 siege against the electoral college count. Memed and amplified, the same images circulated widely on Chinese social media and state-owned news sites without even the need for critical commentary.

The literal destruction of the US Capitol at the hands of President Donald Trump's followers required little imagination to characterize abroad as the downfall of American democracy.

There are many reasons for pessimism. According to one of the most authoritative indexes, Polity, the United States is no longer the world’s oldest continuous democracy, dropping in status to a system that is part democracy, part dictatorship.

Beyond the domestic concerns faced in the aftermath of the breach of one of America's most hallowed buildings, the Capitol siege was a win for China. US soft power, one of its comparative advantages in the great power competition, has taken a huge hit.

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Soft power is “the ability to get what you want through persuasion or attraction in the forms of culture, values, and policies”.⁠ The US has been the primary beneficiary of soft power, with its globally recognized brands, pop culture, fast-food chains, world-renowned universities, and political values.

It is relatively low cost and high impact compared with other forms of power. The United States' relative attractiveness is one of the reasons America prevailed in the Cold War.

The Chinese government is having a propaganda field day. More than ever, the US looks like a country in decline, discouraging to allies and potential partners. Chinese commentators have noted that America's days as the "city on the hill" have come to an end. This is karma, some say, payback for the US supporting opposition groups, as in Hong Kong. As one netizen commented on the popular microblog website Weibo: "So lucky to be born in China."

Beijing has tried to leverage its comparative advantages to build soft power through pathways other than political values.

China has also been trying to increase its soft power through traditional mechanisms such as building its media, education, and tourism sectors. It has enjoyed only moderate success in these areas because of its censorship, pollution, and lack of independent civil society.

But COVID-19 has led to the strengthening of other Chinese public diplomacy efforts, such as its landmark Belt and Road Initiative global trade and investment scheme.

Related initiatives such as the Digital Silk Road, a program to build out global digital infrastructure using Chinese technology, and the Health Silk Road, a plan to export Chinese health expertise through things such as COVID-19 laboratories and vaccine diplomacy, draw on China's comparative advantage in a top-down soft power approach.

Meanwhile, the Trump administration has undermined the historical sources of US soft power. It has shuttered visa lines, investigated international students on campus, and driven the rise of a culture of nationalism. The cancellation of the Fulbright US Student Program and the Peace Corps program in China are prime examples. And the COVID-19 decreased US media production, educational exchange and tourism, which shrank opportunities for promoting its democratic values on the global stage.

A bird’s-eye view of America's relative soft power may seem to offer cause for optimism. Even after four years of Trump's buffoonery and "America First", the US is still far ahead of China, ranking fifth in overall soft power, while China ranks 24th. And isn’t this what matters in competition?

Yes and no. The problem is two-fold. First, the US relies more on its political values as a soft power source than Beijing does. Ironically, this has especially been the case during the Trump administration. National Security Adviser Robert O’Brien has argued that democracies and authoritarian countries such as China “are offering a different approach to the world”. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo has argued to international audiences that democracy is “what we’ve got right”.

Second, Beijing has tried to leverage its comparative advantages to build soft power through pathways other than political values, especially where a top-down government approach is effective. China set up COVID-19 testing labs in Palestine in agreement with Israeli and Palestinian authorities. It extended its hand in Africa by building more than 70 percent of its 4G infrastructure.

Depending on need, useful solutions can be as compelling as political principles.The future of the US as a world leader is at stake. American military base access worldwide depends on perceived political alignment between the US and its allies. In the tech sector, the widespread adoption of US platforms relies on other countries finding that benefits to allowing in foreign platforms outweigh the potential political risks.

Successful multilateral treaty negotiations on issues such as global trade and climate change rely on the perception of a dependable US political system.

Strengthening democracy at home and moving away from "America First" policies will go a long way in reconstructing the trust and relationships central to soft power. But the United States will always be seen as a country in which the election of Donald Trump to the presidency, and now the storming of the Capitol, were possible.

President-elect Joe Biden will soon learn that soft power, once lost, may be difficult to revive.

Read More

President Biden walks past a row of Chinese and American flags.
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APARC Experts on the Outlook for U.S.-Asia Policy Under the Biden Administration

Ahead of President-elect Biden’s inauguration and on the heels of the attack on the U.S. Capitol by a pro-Trump mob that has left America shaken, an APARC-wide expert panel provides a region-by-region analysis of what’s next for U.S. policy towards Asia and recommendations for the new administration.
APARC Experts on the Outlook for U.S.-Asia Policy Under the Biden Administration
U.S. Navy and Indian Navy ships steam in formation in the Indian Ocean.
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How to Mitigate the Risks of Chinese Military Expansion in the Indian Ocean Region

China’s expanding military capacity in the Indian Ocean region poses risks for the United States and its partners, writes South Asia Research Scholar Arzan Tarapore in 'The Washington Quarterly,' offering a framework by which the Quad and others can build strategic leverage to curtail China’s capacity to coerce small states or posture for war.
How to Mitigate the Risks of Chinese Military Expansion in the Indian Ocean Region
President-elect Joe Biden and Chinese President Xi Jinping
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Biden Administration Will Rely On U.S. Allies for Support as Tensions with China Continue to Rise

On the World Class Podcast, international security expert Oriana Skylar Mastro says conflict between China and Taiwan is plausible within the next 15 years, and the U.S. will likely be involved.
Biden Administration Will Rely On U.S. Allies for Support as Tensions with China Continue to Rise
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National Guard at the US Capitol ahead of the inauguration on January 15, 2021 in Washington, DC. After last week's Capitol Riot the FBI has warned of additional threats against the US Capitol and in all 50 states.
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The US depends far more on its soft power than authoritarian China does. Once it is lost, it is hard to get back.

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Social media and digital technologies have come under fire for their contribution to the development of the groups that ultimately stormed the U.S. Capitol on January 6. Following the insurrection attempt, Facebook, Twitter, Google and other major platforms have banned or suspended President Trump’s accounts. Google and Apple removed Parler from their app stores, while Amazon removed the site from its cloud hosting service, putting an indefinite end to Parler’s reach. This panel will discuss the role of social media during the Trump presidency, including the role of platform policies in fomenting or responding to the recent violence, the benefits and risks posed by steps subsequently taken, and what this means for the future of speech online.

Panelists include:

  • Nate Persily, faculty co-director of the Stanford Cyber Policy Center, director of the Center’s Program on Democracy and the Internet, and Professor at Stanford Law School
  • Daphne Keller, Director of the Cyber Policy Center’s Program on Platform Regulation
  • Alex Stamos, Director of the Cyber Policy Center’s Internet Observatory
  • Renee DiResta, Research Manager at the Cyber Policy Center’s Internet Observatory
  • Moderated by Kelly Born, Executive Director of the Cyber Policy Center

 

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Renée DiResta is the former Research Manager at the Stanford Internet Observatory. She investigates the spread of malign narratives across social networks, and assists policymakers in understanding and responding to the problem. She has advised Congress, the State Department, and other academic, civic, and business organizations, and has studied disinformation and computational propaganda in the context of pseudoscience conspiracies, terrorism, and state-sponsored information warfare.

You can see a full list of Renée's writing and speeches on her website: www.reneediresta.com or follow her @noupside.

 

Former Research Manager, Stanford Internet Observatory
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Daphne Keller is the Director of Platform Regulation at the Stanford Program in Law, Science, & Technology. Her academic, policy, and popular press writing focuses on platform regulation and Internet users'; rights in the U.S., EU, and around the world. Her recent work has focused on platform transparency, data collection for artificial intelligence, interoperability models, and “must-carry” obligations. She has testified before legislatures, courts, and regulatory bodies around the world on topics ranging from the practical realities of content moderation to copyright and data protection. She was previously Associate General Counsel for Google, where she had responsibility for the company’s web search products. She is a graduate of Yale Law School, Brown University, and Head Start.

SHORT PIECES

 

ACADEMIC PUBLICATIONS

 

POLICY PUBLICATIONS

 

FILINGS

  • U.S. Supreme Court amicus brief on behalf of Francis Fukuyama, NetChoice v. Moody (2024)
  • U.S. Supreme Court amicus brief with ACLU, Gonzalez v. Google (2023)
  • Comment to European Commission on data access under EU Digital Services Act
  • U.S. Senate testimony on platform transparency

 

PUBLICATIONS LIST

Director of Platform Regulation, Stanford Program in Law, Science & Technology (LST)
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James B. McClatchy Professor of Law at Stanford Law School
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Nathaniel Persily is the James B. McClatchy Professor of Law at Stanford Law School, with appointments in the departments of Political Science, Communication, and FSI.  Prior to joining Stanford, Professor Persily taught at Columbia and the University of Pennsylvania Law School, and as a visiting professor at Harvard, NYU, Princeton, the University of Amsterdam, and the University of Melbourne. Professor Persily’s scholarship and legal practice focus on American election law or what is sometimes called the “law of democracy,” which addresses issues such as voting rights, political parties, campaign finance, redistricting, and election administration. He has served as a special master or court-appointed expert to craft congressional or legislative districting plans for Georgia, Maryland, Connecticut, New York, North Carolina, and Pennsylvania.  He also served as the Senior Research Director for the Presidential Commission on Election Administration. In addition to dozens of articles (many of which have been cited by the Supreme Court) on the legal regulation of political parties, issues surrounding the census and redistricting process, voting rights, and campaign finance reform, Professor Persily is coauthor of the leading election law casebook, The Law of Democracy (Foundation Press, 5th ed., 2016), with Samuel Issacharoff, Pamela Karlan, and Richard Pildes. His current work, for which he has been honored as a Guggenheim Fellow, Andrew Carnegie Fellow, and a Fellow at the Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences, examines the impact of changing technology on political communication, campaigns, and election administration.  He is codirector of the Stanford Program on Democracy and the Internet, and Social Science One, a project to make available to the world’s research community privacy-protected Facebook data to study the impact of social media on democracy.  He is also a member of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences, and a commissioner on the Kofi Annan Commission on Elections and Democracy in the Digital Age.  Along with Professor Charles Stewart III, he recently founded HealthyElections.Org (the Stanford-MIT Healthy Elections Project) which aims to support local election officials in taking the necessary steps during the COVID-19 pandemic to provide safe voting options for the 2020 election. He received a B.A. and M.A. in political science from Yale (1992); a J.D. from Stanford (1998) where he was President of the Stanford Law Review, and a Ph.D. in political science from U.C. Berkeley in 2002.   

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As US-China competition intensifies, experts debate the degree to which the current strategic environment resembles that of the Cold War. Those that argue against the analogy often highlight how China is deeply integrated into the US-led world order. They also point out that, while tense, US-China relations have not turned overtly adversarial. But there is another, less optimistic reason the comparison is unhelpful: deterring and defeating Chinese aggression is harder now than it was against the Soviet Union. In this talk, Dr. Mastro analyzes how technology, geography, relative resources and the alliance system complicate U.S. efforts to enhance the credibility of its deterrence posture and, in a crisis, form any sort of coalition.


Photo of Oriana MastroOriana Skylar Mastro is a Center Fellow at Stanford University’s Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies (FSI). Within FSI, she works primarily in the Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center (APARC) and the Center for International Security and Cooperation (CISAC) as well. She is also a fellow in Foreign and Defense Policy Studies at the American Enterprise Institute and an inaugural Wilson Center China Fellow.

Mastro is an international security expert with a focus on Chinese military and security policy issues, Asia-Pacific security issues, war termination, and coercive diplomacy. Her research addresses critical questions at the intersection of interstate conflict, great power relations, and the challenge of rising powers. She has published widely, including in Foreign Affairs, International Security, International Studies Review, Journal of Strategic Studies, The Washington Quarterly, The National Interest, Survival, and Asian Security, and is the author of The Costs of Conversation: Obstacles to Peace Talks in Wartime (Cornell University Press, 2019).

She also continues to serve in the United States Air Force Reserve, for which she works as a Strategic Planner at INDOPACOM. Prior to her appointment at Stanford in August 2020, Mastro was an assistant professor of security studies at the Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University. She holds a B.A. in East Asian Studies from Stanford University and an M.A. and Ph.D. in Politics from Princeton University.

 


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This event is part of the 2021 Winter/Spring Colloquia series, Biden’s America, Xi’s China: What’s Now & What’s Next?, sponsored by APARC's China Program.

 

Via Zoom Webinar. Register at: bit.ly/2MYJAdw

Oriana Skylar Mastro Center Fellow at the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies
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* Please note all CISAC events are scheduled using the Pacific Time Zone.

 

Seminar Recording: https://youtu.be/JqN4Ga4DVss

 

About the Event: 

Much of the imagery and remote sensing analysis in the Open Source Community pertains to North Korea’s nuclear weapons pathway and military capability. However, many questions remain regarding economic and agricultural health in a nation known for denial of access to outside observation. But by applying emerging analytical and processing technology of satellite imagery and data, we can address the challenge of examining economic and environmental patterns in the North.

Machine Learning technology has been used to analyze rudimentary objects like roads or buildings on satellite imagery for years, but has yet to be successfully employed to better understand nuanced patterns of life. In our partnership with the analytics company Orbital Insight, we have undertaken a project of counting thousands of objects in satellite images taken over the past five years to uncover North Korea’s trade relationship with China.

This project includes counting number of trucks at each side of the Sino-Korean Friendship Bridge as a measure of trade activity between North Korea and China. By applying artificial intelligence to more than 300 satellite images, we observed fluctuations of truck counts, which peak during the month of November. A significant drop in the truck counts during the year of 2020 is noticed as a result of restricted traffic from the global pandemic, although as much as 30 trucks were observed in the month of June on both sides of the border. The project demonstrates the utilities of machine learning in analyzing emerging datasets. Careful monitoring of trade between the two states can aid in better understanding the China-North Korea economic relationship and how it evolves over time.

CISAC is also partnering with international organizations and geospatial systems specialists to apply data derived from public space mapping systems to better understand macro-environmental, agricultural, and water security trends over the past twenty years in North Korea. For decades, scientists of every discipline have been analyzing remotely-sensed images and data sets to extract otherwise-imperceptible insight pertaining to broad aspects of environmental health including coastal erosion, deforestation, land subsidence, and global thermal changes. But because of a post-war technology vacuum and broadly-applied sanctions against space-derived information, North Korea has never had access to this data or the advanced software and data storage architecture necessary to support it. The potential for direct collaboration with the North on environmental analysis may enhance North Korea’s ability to mitigate its own agricultural risk and potentially facilitate informal international collaboration.

 

 

About the Speaker: Allison Puccioni has been an imagery analyst for over 25 years, working within the military, tech, media, and academic communities. After honorably serving in the US Army as an Imagery Analyst from 1991 - 1997, Allison continued the tradecraft as a civilian augmentee to US and NATO operations in the Kosovo airstrike campaign, and as a Senior Analyst and Mission Planner for Naval Special Warfare Group One. After earning her Master’s Degree in International Policy, Allison established the commercial satellite imagery analysis capability for the British publication company Jane's. In 2015, Allison joined Google to assist with the establishment of applications for its commercial small-satellites. Today, Allison is the Principal and Founder of Armillary Services, providing insight on commercial imaging satellites and associated analytics to the governments, nongovernmental organizations, and the commercial sector. Concurrently, Allison manages the multi-sensor imagery analysis team at Stanford University's Center for International Security and Cooperation.

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Allison Puccioni has been an imagery analyst for over 25 years, working within the military, tech, defense, media, and academic communities. After honorably serving in the US Army as an Imagery Analyst from 1991 - 1997, Allison continued the tradecraft within the Defense Industry: augmenting US and NATO operations in the Kosovo airstrike campaign, and as a Senior Analyst and Mission Planner for Naval Special Warfare Group One. After earning her Masters Degree in International Policy, Allison established the commercial satellite imagery analysis capability for the British publication Jane's, publishing Open Source imagery analysis for six years. In 2015, Allison joined Google to assist with the establishment of applications for its commercial small-satellites. Today, Allison is the Principal and Founder of Armillary Services, providing insight on commercial imaging satellites and associated analytics to the governments, nongovernmental organizations, and the commercial sector. Concurrently, Allison manages the multi-sensor imagery analysis team at Stanford University's Center for International Security and Cooperation.

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Allison Puccioni Principal and Founder Armillary Services
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* Please note all CISAC events are scheduled using the Pacific Time Zone.

 

Seminar Recording: https://youtu.be/TV8ye_OVdzY

 

About the Event: Proof that France had become the world’s fourth nuclear power exploded above the Algerian Sahara in February 1960, during the Algerian War for Independence (1954–62). Sixteen more blasts would take place before France abandoned its Saharan test sites in 1966, which had continued to host French explosions underground during the first years of Algerian Independence. Well before the first airborne detonation, and even after French testing went below ground, the likelihood that radioactive debris (known as fallout) would contaminate the desert environment and its human inhabitants animated an international controversy. Saharan fallout loomed at once as a new threat to Algerian and African sovereignty and to Cold War negotiations that promised to limit weapons testing, revealing historical intersections between African decolonization and the nuclear arms race.

 

About the Speaker: Austin Cooper is a Predoctoral Researcher at Stanford University’s Center for International Security and Cooperation and a PhD Candidate in History and Sociology of Science at the University of Pennsylvania.

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Austin R. Cooper is a Stanton Nuclear Security Fellow in the Security Studies Program at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. He completed his PhD in History and Sociology of Science at the University of Pennsylvania. He has held fellowships at Stanford University’s Center for International Security and Cooperation and SciencesPo’s Nuclear Knowledges Program.

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Austin Cooper Predoctoral Researcher Stanford University
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* Please note all CISAC events are scheduled using the Pacific Time Zone.

 

Seminar Recording:  https://youtu.be/trpJJ0-nJzE

 

About the Event: In the middle of the twentieth century, geophysical science and new technologies pried open three of Earth's most remote and inhospitable regions: Antarctica, the ocean floor, and the exosphere—that is, outer space. As human activity in these frigid zones increased, so too did their status as “global commons,” domains belonging to all, and therefore none. This presentation examines how one issue in particular, nuclear weapons, galvanized the politics of the global commons from the 1950s to the 1970s and sheds light on how the United States navigated the new spaces as part of its Cold War foreign policy.

 

 

About the Speakers: 

Stephen Buono is a postdoctoral fellow at CISAC. He earned his PhD in History from Indiana University. At Stanford, he is at work on his first book, The Province of All Mankind, a history of how outer space became a realm of American foreign policy and international law in 1950s and 1960s. Before arriving at CISAC, Stephen was an editor for the journal Diplomatic History and an Aerospace History Fellow with the American Historical Association and the National Aeronautical and Space Administration.

 

Ryan A. Musto is a MacArthur Nuclear Security Fellow at CISAC. He holds a PhD in history from The George Washington University and master’s degrees in international and world history from Columbia University and the London School of Economics. Prior to joining CISAC, Ryan served as a Stanton Nuclear Security Fellow at MIT. His work has been published in Diplomatic HistoryDiplomacy & StatecraftPolar RecordBulletin of the Atomic Scientists, and Americas Quarterly, amongst other outlets. Ryan is currently writing a book manuscript on the international history of regional denuclearization.

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Stephen Buono and Ryan Musto Stanford University
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* Please note all CISAC events are scheduled using the Pacific Time Zone.

 

Seminar Recording:  https://youtu.be/zrDq0xRWnhk

 

About the Event: Determination and verification of the nuclear activities of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) are critical to ongoing disarmament and nonproliferation efforts. This study assesses the complete nuclear fuel cycle of the DPRK, from its capacity to produce fissile material precursors at mining and milling facilities in Pyongsan, to activity at the main Nuclear Scientific Research Center in Yongbyon. An interdisciplinary approach is used to analyze the different stages of the DRPK’s nuclear fuel cycle. In investigating the uranium ore grade and ore production capacity at the mining and milling facilities, we combine analysis of archival geological maps, geological field survey reports, and first-hand collection and geochemical analysis of comparable rock samples from the Korean Peninsula. In analyzing the ongoing activities at fissile material production facilities, we integrate satellite imagery analysis with machine learning algorithms, allowing for automated analysis of large image sets.

 

About the Speaker: Sulgiye Park is a Stanton Nuclear Security Fellow at CISAC, Stanford University, where she focuses primarily on investigating the front-end of uranium pathway in North Korea. She looks at the uranium mining and milling processes for disarmament and nonproliferation efforts. Prior to joining CISAC, Sulgiye was a postdoctoral scholar at Stanford Geological Sciences and Stanford Institute for Materials and Energy Sciences, where Sulgiye studied materials' behaviors at extreme environments.

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Sulgiye Park Stanton Postdoctoral Fellow Stanford University
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While U.S. policymakers and military planners have been heavily focused on China’s maritime expansion in the western rim of the Pacific Ocean and the South China Sea, Beijing has been steadily growing its capacity in the Indian Ocean region. The United States and its partners should take realistic and effective steps that address the strategic risks they face in the region and realize their vision of a “free and open Indo-Pacific,” writes APARC’s South Asia Research Scholar Arzan Tarapore in the latest issue of The Washington Quarterly.

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The United States’ strategic competition with China now extends to the Indian Ocean region, albeit it takes a different form compared with the heavily militarized territorial disputes of the western rim of the Pacific Ocean and the South China Sea. The People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) fleet is increasingly designed for oceanic deployments beyond China’s near seas and is rapidly expanding its amphibious capability. The PLAN conducts frequent oceanographic survey and submarine deployments, maintaining a constant presence of at least seven or eight navy ships in the Indian Ocean at any time. Having established its first-ever overseas military base on the western edge of the ocean, in Djibouti in 2017, China continues to develop other ports from Tanzania to Indonesia under the banner of the Belt and Road Initiative. It is also expanding security cooperation with regional states.

“This military expansion poses strategic risks for the United States and its allies and partners,” argues Tarapore. “It gives China rapidly increasing capacity to use military coercion in the Indian Ocean region, both directly, through military intervention, and indirectly, by compelling changes in regional states’ security policies.” It also gives China advantages in case of a potential war in the region.

Despite the dangers, the United States and its likeminded partners have not arrested this increase in China’s regional military power. Their response to date has been based, in some cases, on flawed strategic logic and, in other cases, on unrealistic assumptions.
Arzan Tarapore

The United States and its partners have proclaimed their commitment to the “free and open Indo-Pacific” vision. However, the four powers with the greatest interest and capacity to push back on China’s inroads —namely, the United States, India, Japan, and Australia, which banded together as the “Quad” — have failed to mitigate Beijing’s challenge. Their haphazard response “does little to curtail China’s capacity to coerce small states or posture for war,” says Tarapore.

He then offers a strategic assessment and a conceptual framework by which the United States and its partners can more effectively mitigate the risks of Chinese military expansion. Their most urgent task, he claims, is to build “strategic leverage,” that is, develop their political relationships and military capabilities in ways that consolidate their advantages. By doing so, they would ideally convince Beijing that coercive policies are unworkable or prohibitively costly, which would then impede China’s capacity to coerce regional states or posture for wartime. Tarapore is convinced that India has a key role to play within this framework if the latter also accounts for India’s particular resource and policy constraints.

Read Tarapore's paper

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A loaded shipping liner sails out of port.
Commentary

Let's Keep it the 'Free and Open' Indo-Pacific

Both Japan's Suga and the incoming Biden administration should maintain the language of the "free and open Indo-Pacific" for consistency and to signal their ongoing commitment to maintaining a firm policy stance on China's ambitions.
Let's Keep it the 'Free and Open' Indo-Pacific
A warship sailing in the South China Sea and a photo of three soldiers standing guard in front of a Chinese traditional building
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China’s South China Sea Strategy Prioritizes Deterrence Against the US, Says Stanford Expert

Analysis by FSI Center Fellow Oriana Skylar Mastro reveals that the Chinese military has taken a more active role in China’s South China Sea strategy, but not necessarily a more aggressive one.
China’s South China Sea Strategy Prioritizes Deterrence Against the US, Says Stanford Expert
Battleships patrolling in the open ocean.
Commentary

Beijing’s Line on the South China Sea: “Nothing to See Here”

China’s official denials of growing military capability in the region look a lot like gaslighting.
Beijing’s Line on the South China Sea: “Nothing to See Here”
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U.S. Navy and Indian Navy ships steam in formation in the Indian Ocean.
INDIAN OCEAN (July 20, 2020) The Nimitz Carrier Strike Group, consisting of flagship USS Nimitz (CVN 68), Ticonderoga-class guided missile cruiser USS Princeton (CG 59), and Arleigh Burke-class guided missile destroyers USS Sterett (DDG 104) and USS Ralph Johnson (DDG 114), along with Indian Navy ships Rana, Sahyadri, Shivalik and Kamorta, steam in formation during a cooperative deployment in the Indian Ocean.
U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication 2nd Class Donald R. White Jr.
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China’s expanding military capacity in the Indian Ocean region poses risks for the United States and its partners, writes South Asia Research Scholar Arzan Tarapore in 'The Washington Quarterly,' offering a framework by which the Quad and others can build strategic leverage to curtail China’s capacity to coerce small states or posture for war.

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This op-ed by Kiyoteru Tsutsui and Charles Crabtree was originally published in The Hill.


Any power transition produces policy casualties. In the United States, this might be particularly true as an incoming administration often differentiates itself from the incumbent by quickly announcing new policies and the abandonment of old ones. This is easier to do regarding domestic policy than foreign policy, where some continuity must be secured, even if serious disagreements exist between the incoming and outgoing administrations. Despite the tendency for administrations to make smaller changes in the realm of foreign policy, it seems that one casualty of the Biden administration will be the concept of a “Free and Open Indo-Pacific.” The administration should learn more about the genealogy of this policy and reassert its commitment to the “free and open” part of the idea.

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The phrase “Free and Open Indo-Pacific” (FOIP) originates from the administration of Japan’s former prime minister, Shinzo Abe. In response to China’s Belt and Road Initiative, a global infrastructure development strategy that reflects China’s expansionist ambitions, Abe and his government weaved together some ideas from prior Liberal Democratic Party governments and labeled them the Free and Open Indo-Pacific strategy in 2016.

With an emphasis on coalition-building to check and balance China’s influence, this strategy had strong security undertones, which made Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) countries nervous. Fully aware of the need to get ASEAN countries on board, the Abe government softened the edges of the strategy by renaming it a “vision,” shifting away from the emphasis on security components and offering a more friendly tone to the Belt and Road Initiative. Backed up by Japan’s supportive engagement with Belt and Road activities, this softer version became a hit in Southeast Asia, with various countries claiming authorship for it — and even China did not register a strong objection to it.

The 2018 FOIP vision has three pillars: promotion of rule of law, freedom of navigation, and free trade; economic prosperity, and peace and stability. The first pillar is particularly important, as it distinguishes FOIP from China’s competing strategy.

Abe promoted FOIP not only in Asia but also in the U.S. Leveraging the warm personal relationship with his American counterpart, Abe tried to sell the strategy to the Trump administration as an effective way to moderate if not fully counter Belt and Road. Trump’s foreign policy team adopted this concept, using it to slow China’s expansion in the Pacific, Asia  and even East Africa. Eventually, the U.S. government began using the FOIP language frequently and placed it at the center of its anti-China foreign policy.

As the Biden administration takes over, it is understandable that its experienced foreign policy team, with a focus on returning to multilateral engagements and moderating anti-China rhetoric, would hesitate to quickly adopt FOIP, which may have acquired strong anti-China connotations in American foreign policy circles. In line with this, President-elect Biden so far has preferred the phrase “a secure and prosperous Indo-Pacific region” instead. This has deepened existing concerns in Asia, particularly in Japan, that Biden will be soft on China.

Correspondingly, Japan’s Suga administration, which came to power in mid-September, has faced criticism that it is softer on China than the Abe administration. This concern came to the fore in November, as the Suga administration routinely started using the language “secure and prosperous Indo-Pacific.” Another precipitating event was a recent press conference in which Foreign Minister Toshimitsu Motegi did not immediately counter Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi’s prickly comments about the Senkaku islands.

Foreign policy experts, led by Yuichi Hosoya at Keio University, have argued vigorously that this language change signals a weaker commitment to the core principles of FOIP. If “free and open” is replaced by “secure and prosperous,” they contend, the whole vision becomes meaningless — and this shift will be remembered as a moment when Japan abandoned its commitment to the international order, undergirded by democracy and freedom, in favor of China’s vision of a “secure and prosperous” region that prioritizes development and stability.

Realizing the potential impact of this shift, the Suga administration quickly backtracked and resumed using “Free and Open Indo-Pacific.” FOIP is back in Japan, which signals Japan’s continuing resolve to promote the international liberal order.

The Biden administration also should consider readopting “Free and Open Indo-Pacific.” It’s understandable that Biden would want to move away from a strategic frame used by the Trump administration. There are certainly many of President Trump’s phrases that the Biden administration should drop, such as “America First” and “China virus.” But FOIP was not a vision created by anyone in the Trump administration. It was launched by Japan’s Abe administration and, after some modification, accepted by many Asian countries, arguably even by China.

Biden’s foreign policy likely will place greater emphasis on human rights and democracy than did Trump’s. Vis-à-vis China, this would mean that the U.S. will more vocally criticize human rights violations in Hong Kong, Xinjiang and elsewhere, and that trade negotiations will proceed with more civility. Given this, it would be inconsistent for the Biden administration to replace “free and open” with “secure and prosperous” in talking about the Indo-Pacific region. 

While there is some ambiguity about the concrete policies that accompany the admittedly underspecified FOIP vision, the Biden foreign policy team would be wise to readopt FOIP, bearing in mind an important fact: It was not Trump’s idea. If the next U.S. administration drops “free and open,” it will send the wrong message to the world, placing undue weight on Japan’s shoulders as the only major torch-bearer for liberal values in the region, and potentially straining the U.S.-Japan security relationship that must be in lockstep to moderate China’s ambitions.

Kiyoteru Tsutsui 120820 crop 4X4

Kiyoteru Tsutsui

Kiyoteru Tsutsui is the Henri H. and Tomoye Takahashi Professor and Senior Fellow in Japanese Studies at Shorenstein APARC, the director of APARC's Japan Program, a senior fellow at FSI, and professor of sociology, all at Stanford.
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Tsutsui and Crabtree argue that maintaining FOIP is crucial for the long term success of the Indo-Pacific.
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Both Japan's Suga and the incoming Biden administration should maintain the language of the "free and open Indo-Pacific" for consistency and to signal their ongoing commitment to maintaining a firm policy stance on China's ambitions.

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* Please note all CISAC events are scheduled using the Pacific Time Zone.

 

Seminar Recording:  https://youtu.be/ISsBNJEKP70

 

About the Event: This chapter builds on my earlier writing during the West African Ebola outbreak, in which I argue that health security paradigms and militarized health interventions engender “defensiveness” in landscapes of care, while they also intensify already securitized landscapes and relationships of development and humanitarian aid. In this chapter, I include insights about the US-authored Global Health Security Agenda (GHSA), to suggest that the Government of Sierra Leone’s 2014 adoption of the agenda has helped to strengthen containment and control paradigms at the expense of care, and to prioritize the collection and management of disease event data over other pressing concerns related to health care delivery (cf. Benton 2015). Specifically, I analyze global health security policy discourse and practice outlined in the GHSA and militarized health interventions as they travel and settle in four disparate sites: a rural clinic in eastern Sierra Leone (see Kardas-Nelson and Frankfurter 2018); abandoned and repurposed treatment centers; the Imperial War Museum’s temporary exhibit “Fighting Extremes: From Ebola to Isis;” and US and Sierra Leonean political rhetoric explicitly linking Ebola virus disease and terrorism (whether by metaphor, analogy, or literal means). Reading across these sites, I show how projects of counter-terrorism and humanitarianism subtend global health policy, and become institutionalized in and through the everyday management of public health provision.

 

About the Speaker: Adia Benton is an associate professor of Anthropology and African Studies at Northwestern University, where she is affiliated with the Science in Human Culture Program. She is the author of the award-winning book, HIV Exceptionalism: Development through Disease in Sierra Leone, and is currently writing a book about the West African Ebola outbreak.

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Adia Benton Associate Professor of Anthropology Northwestern University
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