This op-ed originally appeared in Nikkei Asia 

If his recent diplomatic contacts are any indication, Prime Minister Yoshihide Suga is off to an auspicious start in managing Japan's two most important relationships: the U.S. and China.

Last month, Suga got a pleasant surprise when he spoke to Joe Biden, with the President-elect explicitly stating that the Senkaku Islands, which China claims as the Diaoyu, fall under the protection of Article 5 of the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty. A few weeks later, Suga received China's foreign minister Wang Yi, who was there largely to consolidate the warm economic relationships between the two countries -- except for a prickly comment about the Senkakus at the end. Clearly, the U.S. and China both see Japan as a critically important player in their competition for Asia-Pacific hegemony.

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This is a far cry from the precarious position Japan found itself in at the beginning of Shinzo Abe's first and second terms. In 2007, the young Prime Minister Abe elevated a spontaneous joint response by the U.S., Japan, Australia, and India to the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami into a quadrilateral working-level group involving regular meetings and maritime exercises. Dubbed the Quad, Abe sought to make the group a counter to China's increasingly expansionist threats in the Indo-Pacific region.

When Abe's first term was cut short, he was succeeded by the more China-friendly Yasuo Fukuda, who prioritized relations with China and stepped back from the Quad. Combined with a leadership change in Australia that saw the pro-China Kevin Rudd become Prime Minister, the Quad fizzled out.

After Abe returned to the prime ministership in 2012, lingering suspicion over his hawkish nationalism and anti-China sentiment was exacerbated by his 2013 visit to the controversial Yasukuni Shrine. That provoked rebuke not only from Japan's East Asian neighbors but from then U.S. Vice President Biden.

With U.S. policymakers still hoping that China's surging middle-class wealth would transform the country into a peace-loving democracy, the Quad seemed like a misguided attempt by Japan's China-hawks best left forgotten. Some in Tokyo were even starting to worry about a "grand bargain" between the U.S. and China that would relegate Japan to a small supporting role in the Asia-Pacific.

How times have changed. Few in Washington believe China will ever metamorphose into a moderate democracy, while in 2017, Abe harnessed Donald Trump's anti-China agenda to revive the Quad, as all four countries realized the need for a viable strategy to contain China. The new Quad has quickly gathered momentum, with India allowing Australia to join the Malabar naval exercises in November for the first time in 13 years so that all Quad members could participate.

As the Quad's main architect, Abe played a central role in bringing the group to this point, pairing it with the Free and Open Indo-Pacific vision, another influential framework for the region for which he can claim authorship. By Abe's side throughout these developments, and now in charge of Japan's foreign policy, how will Suga handle the Quad, and what are its pros and cons?

The highest aspiration for the Quad is that it becomes an Asian version of NATO that can contain China. The combined military capabilities of the four countries are formidable, with the U.S. obviously leading the way and India possibly needing some catching up. The geostrategic impact of a formal alliance to pressure China would be tremendous.

Such an alliance would be even more effective if it included other countries in the region. Some, such as South Korea, New Zealand, the Philippines, Indonesia, and Vietnam, have begun to participate in multilateral forums headlined by the Quad, possibly foreshadowing the development of a Quad Plus grouping that could exert significant pressure on China to moderate its expansionist approaches.

While Suga will likely tread carefully in expanding the Quad's activities to avoid damaging important economic relations with China, he has a clear understanding that China will only respond to power, and the game-changing power of the Quad alliance would surely appeal to him.

For all its potential, the Quad is not there yet. Fundamentally, it remains a coalition of like-minded countries discussing their concerns about China. At their most recent meeting in Tokyo in October, the four countries could not even muster a joint statement -- instead releasing separate readouts in each country's capital. Becoming an alliance with reciprocal obligations is clearly much further down the line.

Unless greater institutionalization becomes reality, China's divide and conquer approach will remain a threat, as it will try to target one or another country to break the Quad. China has already successfully done so before, pushing Australia to break from the Quad in 2008.

Today, the Quad's greatest utility for Suga is the threat it poses to China. The potential for this loose coalition to coalesce into a formidable alliance would increase if China continues to engage in provocative actions and further alienate the four countries. This threat could be effective in deterring China's aggressive behavior in the Indo-Pacific.

At this point, Suga will likely use the Quad as a card, gradually deepening its engagements but also preparing to develop it into a stronger alliance if China keeps poking at the Senkakus. The fact that Suga has that leverage today speaks to Japan's improved position relative to the early days of the first Abe administration.

STANFORD, CA, December 3, 2020 — The Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center (APARC), Stanford University’s hub for interdisciplinary research, education, and engagement on contemporary Asia, invites nominations for the 2021 Shorenstein Journalism Award. The award recognizes outstanding journalists who have spent their careers helping audiences around the world understand the complexities of the Asia-Pacific region. The 2021 award will honor a journalist whose work has mostly been conveyed through Asian news media. The deadline for nomination submissions is Monday, February 15, 2021.

An annual tradition since 2002, the Shorenstein Journalism Award is sponsored by APARC and carries a cash prize of US $10,000. It honors the legacy of APARC benefactor, Mr. Walter H. Shorenstein, and his twin passions for promoting excellence in journalism and understanding of Asia. Over the course of its history, the award has recognized world-class journalists who push the boundaries of coverage of the Asia-Pacific region and help advance mutual understanding between audiences in the United States and their Asian counterparts. Recent honorees include Tom Wright, Maria Ressa, Anna Fifield, Siddharth Varadarajan, Ian Johnson, and Caixin Media.

The award alternates between recipients whose work has mostly been published through Asian news media and those whose work has mostly been conveyed through American news media. The 2021 award will recognize a recipient from the former category. “Media freedom has increasingly been under attack throughout Asia, and many countries in the region are becoming dangerous places for journalists to work in,” said APARC Director Gi-Wook Shin. “It is now more crucial than ever to stand against these assaults on press freedom and support independent journalism without fear or favor.”

For the award, the Asia-Pacific region is defined broadly to include Northeast, Southeast, South, and Central Asia and Australasia. Both individual journalists with a considerable body of work and journalism organizations are eligible for the award. Nominees’ work may be in traditional forms of print or broadcast journalism and/or in new forms of multimedia journalism. The Award Selection Committee, whose members are experts in journalism and Asia research and policy, presides over the judging of nominees and is responsible for the selection of honorees.

APARC is inviting 2021 award nomination submissions from news editors, publishers, scholars, journalism associations, and entities focused on researching and interpreting the Asia-Pacific region. The Center will announce the winner by April 2021 and present the award at a public ceremony at Stanford in the autumn quarter of 2021.

Nominations are accepted electronically through Monday, February 15, 2021, at 11:59 PM PST. For information about the nomination procedures and to submit nominations please visit the award nomination entry page.

Please direct all inquiries to aparc-communications@stanford.edu.

While much of the world has been occupied with the COVID-19 pandemic, the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) has been active in promoting China’s claims in the South China Sea. Is it justified to argue that China is taking advantage of the global pandemic to make military gains?

In a new essay published in the Winter 2020 issue of the China Leadership Monitor, FSI Center Fellow at APARC Oriana Skylar Mastro sheds light on this question. Leveraging Chinese-language sources in addition to her own operational knowledge from over a decade of military experience, Mastro evaluates the PLA activities in the South China Sea over the eight-month period since March 2020. She includes in her analysis PLA statements, military exercises and operations, and deployment of relevant platforms and weapons in the region. Her conclusion is that the PLA has not significantly increased its operational role in the South China Sea but rather its signaling role. “Specifically, the Chinese military seems to be purposefully using, and perhaps even exaggerating, its capabilities and activities to enhance deterrence against the United States,” she argues.

Deployments of Weapons Systems and Military Exercises

After compiling a comprehensive picture of Chinese military activities in the South China Sea that includes both deployments of systems to the Paracels and Spratlys Islands and military exercises in the area, Mastro examines what these activities reveal about the PLA’s role in China’s South China Sea strategy.

PLA deployments in the area suggest it is trying to discourage the United States from countering its attempts to increase control over the South China Sea, she says. “China has been linking its deployments to U.S. activities for signaling purposes […] With new basing on the South China Sea islands and longer-range and more capable aircraft, China now has the option to move these platforms as a way to demonstrate to the United States its capability and resolve.” Over the past eight months, China has also conducted more robust military exercises to prepare for South China Sea contingencies. “But military readiness and preparedness are not the only reasons the PLA conducts exercises, notes Mastro. Instead, she argues that the PLA role has evolved beyond the operational to become a leader in a signaling strategy to bolster Chinese deterrence vis-à-vis the United States.

Chinese Discourse  

One of the strongest indicators that the Chinese military is attempting to leverage its role to signal capability to the United States is how the Chinese official media are capturing the ongoing competition. Having reviewed approximately 80 publications on the South China Sea, Mastro finds that the Chinese media are being used to amplify how capable the PLA has become in conducting complex operations in the South China Sea and to highlight that it is blameless for the current tensions in the region.

Mastro concludes that the PLA has taken a more active role in China’s South China Sea strategy, but not necessarily a more aggressive one. It is the need to enhance deterrence vis-à-vis the United States that has become a priority. “The PLA has become the main vehicle through which China is attempting to convince the United States to moderate its own South China Sea approach.” This sensitivity, and in some cases paranoia, about U.S. strategy, she claims, “suggests we are likely to hear tough talk and ostentatious military activity for some months to come.”

This op-ed by Kiyoteru Tsutsui and Charles Crabtree
was originally published in The Hill.

President-elect Joe Biden had a pleasant surprise for Japanese Prime Minister Yoshihide Suga during their first phone conversation after the U.S. presidential election. In what was expected to be a cordial congratulatory call without policy discussion, Biden explicitly stated America’s commitment to protect the Senkaku Islands, citing Article 5 of the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty.

At the time, Americans were preoccupied with the political aftermath of the still-contested election, but Japanese observers paid close attention to the first contact between the two new leaders, especially since the first encounter between their predecessors shaped U.S.-Japan relations for the past several years.

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Four years ago, Prime Minister Shinzō Abe became the first foreign leader to meet with President Trump, soon after his election victory in November 2016. This fact was never lost on Trump; throughout his presidential administration, the relationship between the two men was strong, which benefited the alliance as the two countries worked to create a united front against China’s increasing international aggression.

In 2016, policymakers on the Japanese side were concerned about the U.S. conceding much of its interest in the Pacific to China, as part of “a grand bargain” that would diminish U.S. commitment to Japan and other allies in the region. Trump’s successful campaign made this scenario less likely, but the Japanese understood that their country relies more on American support in constraining China’s expansive regional ambitions than vice versa. 

Fast-forward to 2020, and we see a new political reality in the bilateral relationship — the U.S. needs Japan as much as Japan needs the U.S. in facing the challenges of China’s rise to a global superpower. The fact that Biden mentioned his commitment to Senkakus — largely unsolicited, although the Japanese side allegedly dropped some hints — suggests an American desire to shore up support from Japan.

With China now viewed as a shared rival — if not outright enemy — how will the two leaders shape regional dynamics in coming years? On security, tensions around the Senkakus almost certainly will rise, and a credible threat of U.S. military action is likely the most effective deterrent of China’s provocations that could escalate the conflict over territorial claims there. Biden surely will work hard to rebuild the trust of other allies in the region, with the hope of containing China through multilateral alliances. South Korea is a particularly important partner in this effort, and Suga would be wise to rehabilitate Japan-ROK relations that have been marred by complicated historical issues. The U.S. can help mediate the process.

Similarly, on economy and trade, multilateral frameworks such as the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP) and the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) will become more important, and Japan will continue to encourage the U.S. to participate in these agreements. However, this might not be realistic given the domestic political environment in the U.S. The best-case scenario in the short term is probably the U.S. valuing the World Trade Organization (WTO) again. In this vein, the U.S. regaining the trust and respect of Europe is important, because China continues to lure European countries with its attractive economic and trade packages. 

On environmentalism, both Suga and Biden have declared that their countries will work toward zero emissions by 2050. On this issue, China’s cooperation is critical. While China also has committed to working toward zero -emissions by 2060, it likely will use this issue to gain other concessions from the U.S. Biden may face a difficult political decision at some point on whether to a) compromise on environmentalism and incur the wrath of the left wing of the Democratic party or b) sacrifice U.S. national interest in other areas for an agreement on environmentalism and risk losing support from independents and moderate Republicans. Japan would worry about the latter scenario.

Finally, Biden is expected to be more involved than Trump regarding China’s human rights issues. He’s likely to call out situations in Xinjiang and Hong Kong, among others. Japan will join the chorus, and mix in the North Korean abduction issue, which largely has been silenced internationally as a consequence of Trump’s bromance with Kim Jong Un. China will counter these criticisms by pointing to racism in the U.S. as evidence of American hypocrisy. This might embarrass the U.S. but can be a net positive, if China’s naming and shaming leads to more efforts by the U.S. government to address racism. This dynamic is reminiscent of the Cold War era, when the Soviet Union countered America’s criticisms of civil and political rights violations by pointing to racism in the U.S., facilitating advancements during the civil rights movement.

Overall, on hard issues such as security and trade, a drastic change is unlikely; rehabilitating relations with allies, and revaluing multilateral frameworks, will be the most likely changes under a Biden administration. On more values-oriented issues such as environmentalism and human rights, domestic politics in the U.S. plays a significant role in shaping Biden foreign policy. Assuming that Democrats don’t win both of the Senate seats in Georgia’s runoff elections, Biden will face a Republican Senate that can block appointments for key cabinet positions and some of his foreign policy priorities.

For Japan, Biden’s remark about the Senkaku Islands was an excellent start. With such a commitment secured, Suga can play the diplomatic game from a position of strength and mediate between the U.S. and China. This is a role that Japan can thrive in, as its shrewd management of relationships with both the U.S. and China in the past few years indicates. Japan’s success in playing this role could define international relations in the Asia-Pacific for the next decade or two.