The political quarterly Democracy Journal recently published a four-essay collection, titled The Stakes in Asia, on the future of U.S.-Asian relations. APARC's Southeast Asia Program Director Donald K. Emmerson contributed to this collection the essay Southeast Asia: China’s Long Shadow. The other contributors included Glen Fukushima, former Deputy Assistant United States Trade Representative for Japan and China, Sheena Chestnut Greitens, Associate Professor at the University of Texas at Austin, and Duyeon Kim, Adjunct Senior Fellow with the Indo-Pacific Security Program at the Centre for New American Security.

On June 30, 2021, Democracy hosted a panel discussion, moderated by journalist and Asia expert Steve Clemons, that brought all four experts together to examine the latest developments in Asia and how the United States might successfully engage with the region in the years to come. Watch here:

"Haley's thesis is a critical analysis of the human rights discourse on North Korea. She notes that the human rights abuses are indisputable; but she finds a degree of tone-deafness around human rights activism that she traces to an absence of definition of terms," says Dafna Zur, Associate Professor, Korean Literature and Culture and Director of the Center for East Asian Studies. “Her inquiry led to two threads of analysis: the first is a deconstruction of some of the assumptions made by human rights' actors (and her exposure of their sometimes contradictory approaches); and the second is her reading of North Korean fiction as a way of understanding the relationship between the individual and the state. Haley's thesis brings a fresh perspective on what is typically a highly charged topic, and leaves room for possible policy adjustments.”

In Gordon's own words: "My thesis explores the contentious conversation surrounding North Korean human rights. If there is widespread agreement that North Korea’s human rights situation is appalling, then why is there still such heated disagreement over how best to improve it? What exactly are we talking about when we say ‘human rights’ in the context of North Korea? By way of answering these questions, I argue that the various governments, NGOs, activists, and international bodies that have a stake in the human rights conversation prioritize different historical goals and motives—denuclearization, reunification of the Korean Peninsula, regime change, etc.— that then shape their approaches to human rights.”

“I argue that it is also important to examine how human rights are conceived of within North Korea, in order to better understand—although not condone—the country’s ongoing abuses.” Gordon comments, “In the absence of an open and honest rights dialogue within the DPRK, I analyze state-sanctioned works of fiction, looking at how human rights, as manifested in the relationship between the state and individual, are presented to the North Korean populace. These stories illuminate a concept of human rights that prioritizes the right to survival of the North Korean nation itself; one that is very much at odds with the goals of other stakeholders."

Sponsored by the Korea Program and the Center for East Asian Studies, the writing prize recognizes and rewards outstanding examples of writing by Stanford students in an essay, term paper or thesis produced during the current academic year in any discipline within the area of Korean studies, broadly defined. The competition is open to both undergraduate and graduate students.

Past Recipients:
9th Annual Prize (2020)
8th Annual Prize (2019)
7th Annual Prize (2018)
6th Annual Prize (2017)
5th Annual Prize (2016)
4th Annual Prize (2015)
3rd Annual Prize (2014)
2nd Annual Prize (2013)
1st Annual Prize (2012)

Despite tensions in the summit lead-up, the two leaders were overly cordial in their remarks after the meeting. Rose Gottemoeller, lead US negotiator for the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START), joined The World's host Marco Werman to offer insight.

Read the rest at The World

In a congratulatory note written to the graduating cohort, Tom Fingar, the Shorenstein Fellow at the Asia-Pacific Research Center (APARC), similarly encouraged the students to lean into the unique perspective they’ve gained from their experiences during this year.

“This year was extraordinary in many ways, but the disruptions and coping mechanisms of the COVID pandemic may be more indicative of the world you will inherit than the one we are leaving behind. Discovering new ways to do normal things has prepared you for whatever comes next as well as or better than any other experiences and accomplishments might have. Go forth with confidence that you are ready for whatever lies ahead.”

For most of the MIP graduates, what lies ahead are careers in government, the military, technology, clean energy, law, diplomacy, and research which will take them afield to Washington D.C., New York, Los Angeles, Texas, Florida, the United Kingdom, Ukraine, Belgium, Sudan and the United Arab Emirates in the coming months. For some, there are a few more years of school as they work to complete joint degrees in additional areas of policy and governance.

For all, the shared experiences of the last fifteen months have created a unique bond. Corie Wieland, a graduating second-year student and the president of the International Policy Student Association, affirmed to her fellow graduates that, “Whether in one month, one year, or ten years, all of us will always be merely a Zoom call or group chat away. No matter the time zone or the country, our friendships have already proven true.”

That commitment and gratitude to the MIP community is shared throughout the Class of ‘21. Anna Nguyen Yip, a specialist in cyber policy and security, says that despite the upheaval of the past year, she feels prepared to move out of the classroom and into the world. 

“As I am graduating from Stanford, I am more confident than ever to embark on the next chapter of my career,” said Nguyen Yip. "This has been the perfect opportunity to combine my passions in education, frontier technologies, and public policy. I will be eternally grateful for the amazing experience I had at MIP.”

U.S. President Joe Biden and Russian President Vladimir Putin held a short summit yesterday in Switzerland that both sides described as substantive, efficient, and without rancor. Did the meeting advance Biden’s objective of building a stable and predictable U.S.-Russia relationship? The short answer: too early to tell.

The meeting took place at a time when U.S.-Russia relations are at their lowest point in 30 years. Unlike his four predecessors, Biden did not enter office with the goal of building a positive relationship with Russia. Stable and predictable are his administration’s watchwords. The White House accordingly sought to keep summit expectations modest.

In the event, the atmospherics at the Geneva lakeside villa appeared encouraging. When meeting with foreign leaders, Putin has a bad habit of arriving late — sometimes hours late — but he showed up on time for this U.S. president. That provided a good start. In his post-summit press conference, the Russian president seemed to go out of his way to express respect for Biden.

That said, whether the meeting qualifies as a success will depend on what happens in the coming months. Biden administration officials have since January talked about their readiness to push back and hold Russia to account for unacceptable actions in tandem with their readiness to cooperate where U.S. and Russian interests converge. In his separate post-meeting press conference, Biden said he had made no threats but did tell Putin that interference in American politics and certain cyber actions were out of bounds and would provoke an American response. With regard to the latter, he alluded to significant U.S. government cyber capabilities.

In his press conference, President Putin took no responsibility for interference in U.S. politics or cyberattacks, but no one expected he would. The big question now: Does the Kremlin continue those activities? That will offer one metric by which to judge the success of yesterday’s summit.

President Biden said the United States would continue to speak out on democracy and human rights, calling that part of America’s DNA. He specifically raised the case of regime opponent Alexei Navalny, whose name Putin avoids, referring instead to “the gentleman in question.” We will see what happens, but the Kremlin takes the view that what happens inside Russia is Russia’s business alone. Putin deflected questions about domestic repression, resorting to his trademark “whataboutisms.” (Biden rejected the Russian leader’s attempt to equate demonstrations for democratic rights in Russia with the January 6 assault on the Capitol.)

The two presidents issued a single joint statement, worked out in advance, in which they reiterated Ronald Reagan and Mikhail Gorbachev’s formula that “a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought.” The statement noted their agreement to launch an “integrated bilateral Strategic Stability Dialogue… to lay the groundwork for future arms control and risk reduction measures.” Biden told the press that he and Putin had discussed next steps in arms control.

Washington and Moscow should get the Strategic Stability Dialogue underway soon. These are discussions that can cover a broad range of questions, including those on which one side or the other may not be prepared to negotiate. The bigger issue will be how long it will take U.S. and Russian officials to work out the mandate (or mandates) for specific negotiations. Secretary of State Antony Blinken has talked about the U.S. interest in a negotiation that would cover and limit all U.S. and Russian nuclear weapons, strategic and non-strategic — a logical follow-on to the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START). While not necessarily rejecting that, Russian officials focus on other issues, including missile defense and long-range, precision-guided conventional strike weapons. Reconciling the different priorities may not prove simple.

The presidents discussed cyber activities, on which the sides agreed to conduct bilateral consultations. However, Washington and Moscow may come to that dialogue with different perspectives as to what constitutes a cyber “problem” and on how to fix it. Adding a layer of complexity is that fact that both sides use, and presumably intend to continue using, cyber means for intelligence-gathering purposes.

Biden and Putin identified other questions — including Afghanistan, keeping Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons, the Arctic, and climate change — where the two countries arguably share interests. How discussions on those questions develop remain to be seen.

The two presidents touched on tough issues, foremost Russia’s conflict against Ukraine. Biden said he communicated U.S. support for Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity. They agreed that the Minsk process offers the way forward for settling the simmering conflict in Donbas, though they clearly differ as to how the Minsk agreements should be implemented.

The presidents decided that their ambassadors should return to their respective embassies, a sensible step since following up on Geneva will require a fair amount of bilateral diplomacy.

All in all, White House officials and the president should be pleased with the mini-summit in Switzerland and Biden’s press conference. The meeting accomplished what they said they wanted to do: lay out what egregious Russian behavior would cross red lines, triggering a punitive response, and identify areas, particularly related to strategic stability, on which the United States and Russia might cooperate. The hard work of building on the presidents’ discussions will shortly begin. That will determine, likely months down the road, whether Geneva qualifies as a success for U.S. interests.

Originally for Brookings

Presidents Joe Biden and Vladimir Putin will meet in Geneva on June 16, at a time when US-Russian relations have hit a post-Cold War nadir. Biden can use the meeting to make clear the kinds of Russian actions that he considers unacceptable and for which there will be consequences while opening cooperative channels on the few issues where US and Russian interests converge. The White House seeks to keep expectations modest, correctly so.

Biden’s offer in April of a summer summit caught many by surprise, likely including Putin himself. Although the Kremlin played coy about agreeing to meet, the Russian president would not pass up the opportunity, if for no other reason than a meeting with the American president plays to his sense of his and Russia’s importance on the world stage.

While the previous four American presidents came to office expressing hopes of building a positive relationship with Russia, Biden administration officials have set a more limited objective: a stable and predictable relationship. They have made clear their intention to hold the Kremlin to account for egregious misbehavior but also expressed readiness to work with Moscow where interests overlap. In its first four months, the administration applied sanctions against Russia for interfering in the 2020 US presidential election and the SolarWinds hack while agreeing to extend the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty to 2026.

When they meet in Switzerland, Biden should address three sets of issues. First, he should candidly describe to Putin the kinds of Russian actions that he will regard as unacceptable and to which the administration will respond, either with sanctions or in other ways. Interference in American domestic politics should top the list. State-sponsored cyberattacks that sabotage US government systems or private-sector controls for critical infrastructure should also rank high on the list, as should the actions of cyber criminals if allowed to continue to operate freely in Russia against US targets. Although it will be anathema to the Russian president, Biden should note the sorts of human rights violations that will draw US sanctions.

Putin will deny interfering in US politics or conducting cyberattacks, asserting that Washington has no proof, while rejecting the legitimacy of US concerns about what happens within Russia. Biden should not waste time arguing. He should aim instead to ensure that Putin has a clear understanding of what conduct is out of bounds. If American reactions are predictable in Moscow, that could affect cost-benefit calculations when the Kremlin weighs potential actions—perhaps even swaying the decision in some cases.

The second set of issues includes those areas where bilateral cooperation appears possible. One such area is arms control, in which both countries have expressed an interest. The presidents might agree to an early round of bilateral strategic stability talks, which could usefully bring together senior officials to discuss the range of nuclear arms and related issues, including missile defense, third-country nuclear forces, precision-guided conventional strike systems, and the space and cyber domains. The talks could also address nuclear doctrines and steps the two militaries might take to reduce the risk of conflict by accident or miscalculation.

Launching formal negotiations will require more time. The Biden arms control team is not yet fully in place, and the administration will want to conduct at least the first part of a nuclear posture review to underpin its negotiating approach. The more difficult problem, however, stems from the two sides’ different priorities. Washington wants negotiations that will produce limits on all US and Russian nuclear arms, including non-strategic nuclear weapons. Russian officials, on the other hand, seem to attach priority to limiting missile defense and long-range conventional strike systems. Reconciling these different priorities may not prove easy. If Moscow chooses to link questions, an early tough decision could confront the Biden administration: Is the US interest in limiting and reducing all nuclear arms so intense that it would be prepared to countenance some constraints on missile defense?

There may be other specific areas where cooperative discussions make sense. US and NATO military forces will depart Afghanistan by September. Neither the United States nor Russia has an interest in that country plunging into chaos or the Taliban returning to power—and troubles in Afghanistan would be 5,000 miles closer to Moscow than Washington. Climate change could offer an area, though the seriousness of the Kremlin’s intent to tackle that challenge remains unclear.

The third set of questions are those where US and Russian interests clash and no early resolution appears possible. The biggest is Russia’s conflict with Ukraine. Washington wants to see Ukraine develop as a stable, independent, democratic state free to choose its own foreign policy course. Moscow wants to pull Ukraine back into Russia’s sphere of influence or, failing that, it seeks to pressure and destabilize Kyiv so as to frustrate efforts at reform and building a modern European state.

Biden should underscore US support for Ukraine; note that the Russia-Ukraine conflict poses the biggest obstacle to moving the US-Russia relationship back to something approaching “normal;” and make clear that, for starters, the Kremlin needs to make a major change in its course on Donbas, a region in eastern Ukraine where an ongoing conflict has claimed the lives of more than 13,000 people. He might offer to engage more directly—with Kyiv, not over the heads of the Ukrainians—if that would promote a settlement in Donbas. Putin will claim Russia is not a party to the conflict. Biden should reply—perhaps not the only time in this meeting—that a working relationship between the two requires that neither treat the other like an idiot.

The meeting is worthwhile and can modestly advance US interests. It will be useful for Putin to hear clearly and directly what Russian actions cross the line and will merit a response. Push-back and sanctions against Moscow’s misbehavior should be complemented by a degree of engagement, and the summit could set in motion a process to reopen serious US-Russian arms negotiations after a decade’s absence. But genuine gains will come only well down the road. The meeting in Geneva is not about achieving a reset or breakthrough; it is about better management of a difficult relationship that will remain troubled for the foreseeable future.

Originally for Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists

This interview by Melissa De Witte originally appeared in Stanford News.

The upcoming summit between President Joe Biden and President Vladimir Putin is not rewarding the Russian leader for his bad behavior: It’s opening negotiations and delivering a warning to him instead, says Stanford scholar Kathryn Stoner.

Here, Stoner is joined by Stanford political scientist and former U.S. Ambassador to Russia Michael McFaul, Payne Distinguished Lecturer at CISAC and former Deputy Secretary General of NATO Rose Gottemoeller and Russia historian Norman Naimark to discuss what to expect at the summit in Geneva on Wednesday.

The meeting, the scholars say, could reset U.S.-Russia relations, signal deterrence on certain issues – including cybersecurity in light of attacks like the SolarWinds breach that the U.S. has blamed on the Russian Foreign Intelligence Service – and launch strategic stability talks related to nuclear weapons.

Interviews have been edited for length and clarity. For more information on what to expect about the Biden-Putin summit from FSI scholars, visit the FSI website.

Where does diplomacy now stand between the U.S. and Russia?

Naimark: Russian-American relations are at their lowest point since the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991, perhaps even since the last years of Gorbachev’s rule. When relations are fraying between the world’s two most powerful nuclear powers, the coming of the summit on June 16 between President Biden and President Putin should be welcomed. It’s worth recalling the heightened military tensions just three months ago between Moscow and Washington, when Moscow moved tens of thousands of troops to the Ukrainian border and mobilized its air and sea power in the region. Both leaders have emphasized that they seek stability, reliability and predictability in their bilateral relations; at the same time, their respective administrations have warned that expectations should be kept at the minimum for any kind of serious breakthrough at the summit.

Stoner: We’ve lost a lot of leverage because of the withdrawal from global politics that started under the latter part of the Obama administration and continued with Trump with his America First platform, which meant America alone. There is some leverage, it’s just how much. We don’t necessarily want to destabilize Russia because it’s a big, complicated country with nuclear weapons, but all signs point to Putin staying in office until 2036. He’s not going away. I think we have to try to signal deterrence on certain issues, like trying to move into another former Soviet republic as he is doing with Ukraine, Georgia and potentially Belarus, but then cooperate in other areas where it is productive to do so.

What do you think about some of the criticisms toward Biden meeting with Putin? For example, that Biden meeting with Putin is only rewarding him for his bad behavior.

Stoner: There is a reasonable question about why Biden and Putin are meeting and if it is somehow rewarding Putin for bad behavior by having a summit with the President of the United States. Rather than rewarding Putin, however, I think this meeting could be Biden’s warning to him that if hacking and other cyberattacks continue, we have a menu of things we could do as well.

Naimark: There is no reason that the American president cannot talk about difficult subjects like cybersecurity, ransomware attacks, human rights, the release of Alexei Navalny, the protection of Ukrainian sovereignty and other important items on the American agenda while focusing on issues of mutual interest: the future of arms control, global warming and the regulation of the Arctic, and outer space. One can always hope that, like the last summit on Lake Geneva between Russian and American leaders [Mikhail Gorbachev and Ronald Reagan] in November 1985, this one can lay the groundwork for serious improvements in relations in the near future.

Is this meeting a reset of diplomatic relations between the two nations?

Stoner: I know in Washington it is popular to say that Biden is not having a reset of relations with Russia when past presidents all have tried that. I think that’s wrong. I do think it is a reset in the relationship in that there should be more clarity and stability, but that doesn’t mean it’s going to be friendly and universally cooperative, given that we still see many differences in perspectives and some antagonism too. Still, Russia and the U.S. need to talk because there are a lot of issues in common where it would be helpful to coordinate with Russia. After all, even in the depths of the Cold War, the leaders of both countries still talked. Russia has reestablished itself as the most formidable power in Europe and it looks like Biden is acknowledging that and the fact that the U.S. can no longer afford to ignore Russia.

Is there anything the two leaders will be able to agree upon?

McFaul: I used to organize these kinds of meetings when I worked in the government and back when President Medvedev was there. We would have these meetings as a way to force our governments to produce what is called in State Department-speak “deliverables.” We didn’t have meetings to have them, we wanted to get things done. In the first Obama-Medvedev meeting we had a long list of deliverables when they met in July of 2009.

But there is no way that will happen with Putin today because he doesn’t really want to cooperate, he doesn’t really want deliverables. That’s challenging for President Biden, I think, because he has said that he wants a stable, predictable relationship with Putin. I think that’s fine to aspire to, but I don’t think Putin is that interested in that kind of relationship, so that creates a challenge of substance for summits like this.

Gottemoeller: With such different threat perceptions, the two presidents are not going to agree in Geneva about what should go into the next nuclear treaty. They can agree, though, to put their experts together to hammer it out. They can also agree to put the two sides together to tackle the different threat perceptions and the question of what stability means. Finally, they can agree to a deadline, so the talks don’t stall. It won’t be a headline-grabbing outcome, but at least Moscow and Washington will get moving again on the nuclear agenda.

Where can Biden make progress?

McFaul: I think the most likely place to make progress is to launch strategic stability talks, which is an abstract phrase for beginning the process of negotiations about nuclear weapons and their delivery vehicles that would be a follow-on to the New START treaty. Biden and Putin rightfully extended the New START treaty early in his term for five years, and I think that was very smart. I personally worked on that treaty, so I think it’s a good treaty and deserves to be extended. But it’s going to run out really fast because the next set of negotiations are going to be much more complicated. I hope they would start some process to begin those negotiations now.

Gottemoeller: Maybe the only place where President Biden can make progress with Vladimir Putin in Geneva is the nuclear agenda with Russia. Since the two men agreed, in February, to extend the New START treaty by five years, they have put out a clear public message that they intend to pursue a deal to replace New START and to launch strategic stability talks. They are not going to have identical ideas, however, about what those two goals mean.

Biden wants a new arms control deal that will control all nuclear warheads, whether launched on intercontinental strategic-range missiles or on shorter-range systems. He also wants to get a handle on some of the new types of nuclear weapons that the Russians have been developing. One new system, for example, uses nuclear propulsion to ensure that it can fly for many hours at great speed over long distances, earning it the moniker “weapon of vengeance.” These exotic weapons did not exist when New START was negotiated; now, they need to be controlled.

Putin, by contrast, focuses on U.S. long-range conventional missiles that he worries are capable of the accuracy and destructive power of nuclear weapons. The United States, in his view, could use these conventional weapons to destroy hard targets such as the Moscow nuclear command center. He also worries that the United States is producing ever more capable ways to intercept his nuclear missiles and destroy them before they reach their targets. In his worst nightmare, the United States undermines his nuclear deterrent forces without ever resorting to nuclear weapons.

What advice do you have for Biden?

McFaul: One, do not have a one-on-one meeting – just have a normal meeting. Two, I would recommend not having a joint press conference that just gives Putin a podium for the world to say his “whataboutism” stuff; it’s better to have separate press conferences because most of the world will be more interested in what Biden says compared to what Putin says.

Third, I think it’s important to cooperate when you can but also be clear about your differences and don’t pull punches on that. In particular, I want Biden to talk about Alexei Navalny, the Americans who are wrongly detained in Russia today, Crimea still being occupied, Russian proxies in eastern Ukraine, and parts of Georgia that are under occupation. They have been attacking us relentlessly with these cyberattacks, these Russian criminals who in my view have to have some association with the Russian government.

That’s a tough list, but I think it’s really important for President Biden to say those things directly to Putin. I have confidence that he can. I was at their last meeting. I traveled with the vice president in 2011 when he met with then Prime Minister Putin. Biden is capable of delivering tough messages and I hope he uses this occasion to do so again.

What would be a sign that their meeting was productive?

Stoner: One sign the meeting was productive would be if Biden and Putin could agree to establish a joint committee or council on some rules surrounding cybersecurity. Another would be if they make plans to talk again about either replacing or reviving the Minsk-2 agreement [that sought to bring an end to Russia’s war on Ukraine]. And three, a positive sign would be if they plan to do some negotiation on further reducing tactical nuclear weapons or strategic nuclear weapons. An agreement to disagree on some issues, but to continue talking on others would be indicative of at least some small progress.

In collaboration with Global:SF and the State of California Governor’s Office of Business and Economic Development, the China Program at Shorenstein APARC presented session five of the New Economy Conference, "Navigating Chinese Investment, Trade, and Technology," on May 19. The program featured distinguished speakers Ambassador Craig Allen, President of the US-China Business Council; David K. Cheng, Chair and Managing Partner of China & Asia Pacific Practice at Nixon Peabody LLP; James Green, Senior Research Fellow at the Initiative for U.S.-China Dialogue on Global Issues at Georgetown University; and Anja Manuel, Co-Founder and Principal of Rice, Hadley, Gates & Manuel LLC. The session was opened by Darlene Chiu Bryant, Executive Director of GlobalSF, and moderated by Professor Jean Oi, William Haas Professor of Chinese Politics and director of the APARC China Program.

U.S.-China economic relations have grown increasingly fraught and competitive. Even amidst intensifying tensions, however, our two major economies remain intertwined. While keeping alert to national security concerns, the economic strength of the United States will depend on brokering a productive competition with China, the world’s fastest growing economy. Precipitous decoupling of trade, investment, and human talent flows between the two nations will inflict unnecessary harm to U.S. economic interests--and those of California.  

Chinese trade and investments into California have grown exponentially over the last decade. But they have come under increasing pressure following geopolitical and economic tensions between the two nations, particularly in the science and technology sectors. Ambassador Craig Allen, David Cheng, James Green, and Anja Manuel explored the role of Chinese economic activity in California in the context of the greater US-Chinese relationship. Watch now: