North Korea today threatened military action against South Korea if it did not end its propaganda broadcasts along the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) within 48 hours. The broadcasts against the North are being systematically blared by loudspeakers over the border.   

South Korea resumed the broadcasts earlier this week after an 11-year hiatus, in retaliation for North Korea’s planting landmines just outside a South Korean DMZ guard post that crippled two South Korean soldiers on Aug. 4.

David Straub, associate director of the Korea Program at the Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center and a former Korean affairs director at the U.S. Department of State, offers insights on the situation. Straub also spoke on PRI's "The World" radioshow on Aug. 20, the audioclip and summary can be accessed by clicking here.

What’s behind the current tensions on the Korean Peninsula?

Fundamentally, the current situation is just another symptom of the underlying problem, which is the division of Korea into two competing states, with one of them—North Korea—having a Stalinist totalitarian system and a Maoist-style cult of personality. Since North Korea can’t compete with the South economically and diplomatically, it uses the threat of force or the actual use of it to try to intimidate South Korea. The North Koreans know that South Korea tends to “blink first” and step back because it is democratic and its leaders are concerned about civilian casualties.

The current situation is also related to the leadership transition in North Korea, with leader Kim Jong Un succeeding his father Kim Jong Il three years ago. Kim Jong Un still feels insecure, which is clearly evidenced by his execution of his powerful uncle Jang Seong-taek in 2013 and many other leaders there as well. To solidify support for his rule, he also manufactures a South Korean threat to rally his people behind him.

What does North Korea want?

North Korea’s immediate demand is that South Korea stop its propaganda broadcasts across the DMZ. The South Korean broadcasts criticize the North Korean system and its leaders, which is something that the North, with its cult of personality, can’t accept. But the South resumed the broadcasts only because the North Koreans recently snuck into the South Korean side of the DMZ and viciously planted landmines just outside a South Korean guard post. These were clearly intended to maim South Korean soldiers. They did just that, blowing the legs off two young men.

The North Korean regime’s long-term aim is not just to survive but also to get the upper hand on South Korea, and eventually try again to reunify the peninsula on its own terms. That explains why North Korea behaves as it does, rather than reform its system and reconcile with the South.

The North also demands an end to all U.S. and South Korean military exercises on the peninsula—even though the North has a much larger military than the South and U.S. forces there combined and is developing nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction. Ultimately, the North wants to end the U.S.-South Korean alliance and see U.S. forces withdrawn from the peninsula, in the belief that it will open the way to eventual victory over the South.

Why did the South resume the broadcasts? Was it a good idea?

South Korea resumed the loudspeaker broadcasts in retaliation for the maiming of two of its soldiers on August 4th. Rather than retaliate by attacking militarily, the South resumed the loudspeaker broadcasts because the South Korean military knows that North Korean leaders hate them.

The South Korean military believes that North Korean leaders hate the broadcasts because they are effective in educating young North Korean soldiers and civilians in earshot about the nature of the regime and its leaders. The South Korean military seems to assume that the broadcasts are effective in that regard because they anger the North Korean leaders so much. But I think the reason the broadcasts anger the North Korean leaders is due to the cult of personality. The North Korean system can’t accept the idea of its leaders being criticized.

So I don’t think it was necessarily a wise step on the part of the South Korean military to resume the broadcasts. On the other hand, politically, by crippling two South Korean soldiers, the North Koreans had left South Korea with no option but to respond in some way. After the North Koreans killed fifty South Koreans in two separate sneak attacks five years ago, the South Korean government warned that it was not going to sit back the next time. The resumption of the broadcasts has further raised tensions but, frankly, given the danger of war on the peninsula, the South doesn’t have a lot of good ways to respond to North Korean provocations.

How serious is the situation?

North Korea has now threatened military action in 48 hours if South Korea doesn’t end the propaganda broadcasts. The North often makes threats. Usually, it doesn’t carry them out, but sometimes it does.

The United States and South Korea are conducting an annual military exercise together in the South until the end of August—something else that the North Koreans are demanding an end to. Most experts feel that the North is unlikely to launch a major provocation while the American presence is bolstered and the U.S. and South Korean militaries are paying full attention. The North Korean leaders know they are weaker than our side, so they usually avoid frontal assaults and instead engage in sneak attacks, at times and places and in ways of their own choosing.

There is more uncertainty in recent years because of the aggressive and threatening behavior thus far of Kim Jong Un, who is young and inexperienced. He seems anxious about his position in the North and prepared to take risks to bolster it, including rallying the people behind him by raising tensions with the South. We also don’t know if the North feels freer to engage in major provocations because it has developed at least a handful of nuclear devices since its first nuclear test in 2006.

So I myself wouldn’t be afraid to visit Seoul now but the situation bears even closer watching than usual.

Japan has been actively pursuing internationalization of its higher education, and recruiting foreign students has been a major part of this endeavor. In 1983, Japan announced its plan to recruit 100,000 foreign students by the year 2000, and in 2008 instituted a plan to recruit 300,000 foreign students by 2020. Subsequent government-led projects such as the Global 30 (2009-2014) and the Top Global University (2014-2023) projects have also stipulated international student recruitment as a major requirement.

As a result, the number of foreign students in Japanese universities has increased significantly from 10,428 in 1983 to 139,185 in 2014. Likewise, foreign faculty numbers have grown from just 418 (0.8% of total faculty) in 1994 to 6,034 (6.8%) in 2014. Although the figures are still relatively low compared with those in Europe and North America, they bring a potentially powerful force for social change to a country marked by high ethnic homogeneity.

In particular, the influx of foreign students and faculty to Japanese universities creates more culturally diverse campuses, often cited as a desirable result of and a key motive for pursuing internationalization. In the U.S. and Europe, such changes have led to significant discursive and programmatic efforts to create a culture of respect for diversity and inclusion. For example, Europe has, despite its critics, consistently articulated the value of "interculturality," diversity, and respect for cultural differences as a broader discourse for European higher education.

However, this is not the case with Japan and most other Asian nations. One major reason is that Japanese universities primarily attract foreign students as a means to particular ends, such as enhancing university prestige, creating "education hubs," filling the gap in the declining college student population and improving international higher education rankings. As a result, Japanese campuses have become much more diverse than in the past. However, appreciation of the intrinsic educational value of a culturally diverse student and faculty body has not been embraced.

Our study shows a noticeable disjuncture between structural, educational and interpersonal levels of diversity. That is, Japanese universities have accepted more and more students of varying racial and ethnic backgrounds (structural diversity), but the curriculum still offers limited opportunities for students to think more deeply about assumptions concerning race, ethnicity and other individual/group differences (educational diversity).

However, despite the politeness of the Japanese, many of the respondents indicated that making friends with Japanese students is difficult, with some pointing this out to be "the hardest part about being in Japan." One foreign student seemed puzzled: "Making real friends is hard. But I don't know why." One South Korean student we interviewed provided a clue: "People here are very individualistic and very independent, I think. In my laboratory, I will be the one who will approach my lab mates, especially the Japanese. They are very helpful but I have to be the one who starts the conversation."

The Japanese government and universities have worked closely to attract foreign students but due to the lack of interpersonal interaction between Japanese and foreign students, Japan is missing out on crucial opportunities in its higher education internationalization efforts.

First, international students gain many opportunities to interact with each other and learn intercultural skills for global citizenship while Japanese students much less so. As one foreign student said, "It's a very diverse environment because we all come from different countries. We can communicate different ways of thinking and share different ideas." Yet, most Japanese students are hesitant to interact with foreign students, missing the chance to learn intercultural skills. As the number of young Japanese going abroad to study has been on the decline in recent years (82,945 in 2004 to 60,138 in 2012), the contribution of foreign students to global education in Japanese colleges will be all the more important.

Second, diversity is instrumental in promoting innovation, and Japan should take advantage of the diversity that foreign students bring to its society. Much research demonstrates the positive effects of diversity on various academic and social outcomes (ability to form out-group friendship networks, increased cultural awareness, acquiring global citizenship skills, improving the campus climate, innovation, etc.). Facilitating diversity and recognizing their long-term effects for innovation and development should be a major goal of higher education in Japan.

Finally, foreign students can be valuable social capital for Japan, especially playing the role of transnational bridges between Japan and their home countries. Many come to Japan to learn about Japanese society and economy, with plans to become a bridge between Japan and their home countries after graduation. However, due to the lack of interpersonal interaction with Japanese students, foreign students often end up interacting primarily among themselves. Thus, they are also likely to bridge among themselves, rather than with Japanese, and that is a loss, given that Japan has invested so much in attracting foreign students.

Japan wants to make its top universities "super global," but they should first realize that this requires more than simply recruiting foreigners. What is most urgent is producing "global citizens" with inter-cultural skills and that can be achieved through the creation of a campus environment and culture that appreciates and respects diversity. It should also better appreciate the value of foreign students as transnational bridges with Japan.

To achieve such goals, Japanese universities need to establish institutional frameworks or programs to promote interaction between Japanese and foreign students. For example, they should offer more courses that both Japanese and foreign students can take together. Rather than just focusing on teaching Japanese languages and cultures to foreign students, Japanese students should be encouraged to take more courses in English and also those on other cultures and societies, ideally together with foreign students. These courses can instill values of cultural diversity in higher education in Japan. Japanese universities also need to ensure that structural segregation, either between programs, courses, dormitories and campuses, isn't an obstacle for promoting greater interaction between foreign and local students.

Our focus group interviews with Japanese students show that foreign and Japanese students misunderstand each other to a great extent. Foreign students are disappointed that not many Japanese are willing to approach them, but Japanese students are afraid to inconvenience their foreign visitors with their "poor" English. Foreign students are tired from guessing what their Japanese counterparts really feel and think, or their honne, but Japanese students think it is impolite to be too frank and direct even with other Japanese, let alone towards foreign students. To reduce these and other misgivings and gaps in cultural understanding, Japanese universities need to put in place more cross-cultural programs and opportunities for both sides to come into natural contact.

In short, internationalization efforts by Japanese universities should not stop at recruiting foreigners to their campuses. Rather, fostering a tolerant, inclusive university culture where foreigners are considered full, valued members should be considered an important step toward making Japanese universities truly international.

Stanford professor Gi-Wook Shin and Yonsei University professor Rennie J. Moon lead the research project, Diversity and Tolerance in Korea and Asia. This Nikkei Asian Review article was originally carried on July 16 and reposted with permission.

Stanford sociologist Andrew Walder spoke with Ian Johnson of the New York Times about his new book, China Under Mao: A Revolution Derailed. Featured in a Q&A, Walder argues that Mao Zedong led Communist China based more on a simplistic understanding of Stalinist ideology than on a new vision. Walder also compares Mao and current president Xi Jinping.

Of Xi, "He’s adopting some of the symbolism of Mao in the Cultural Revolution," Walder said.

"What Xi is about is unity and stability and economic development, and that’s not what Mao was about. Mao was willing to throw things to the wind. He was willing to gamble. He never thought things could happen if it was orderly. He thought disorder was the midwife of progress. Xi is completely different."

The article can be accessed on the New York Times website.

China's Communist Party academies are drawing upon new ideas from formerly taboo places like business schools in the United States and Europe and sending delegations to absorb lessons from around the world, a Stanford scholar writes in a new book.

Once viewed as inflexible, China's party-managed training academies, or "party schools," are using many of the strategies found in China's hybrid, state-run private sector, said Charlotte Lee, associate director of the China Program at Stanford's Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center.

"As communist parties fell from power in the 1980s and 1990s, there were many predictions of the Chinese Communist Party's demise," Lee said in an interview.

A perception exists, she said, that the party was too rigid to remain relevant and in power, given huge economic changes in China and throughout a more globalized world. But adapting is one way that it has managed to dominate for so long.

The Chinese Communist Party has now ruled China for more than six decades.

Signs of change 

"It is true that if you were to look at official party organization charts, many parts of the Chinese Communist Party are unchanged from the party's early years in power," Lee said. "Yet it is clear that the party has embraced new ideas and opened up to the world in recent decades."

The party schools are important, Lee explained, because they are a key set of organizations that exert political control over the knowledge, skills and careers of leaders throughout Chinese society.

In her new book, Training the Party: Party Adaptation and Elite Training in Reform-era China, Lee concludes that those seemingly static parts of the party have adjusted and that it is no longer "revolutionary," but has become, in its own words, a "learning party."

Lee's 264-page work draws on field research, datasets and trips to the party-run academies where party recruits and elites are trained.

Through conversations with people at the academy campuses she visited around the country Lee discovered the extent to which the schools, and the party, were changing.

For example, the schools are using as one of their core teaching methods the case method approach pioneered by Harvard Business School, which Lee described as a "force of inspiration" for the students.

As a sign of another change, Lee noted that the schools, once almost shrouded in secrecy from the rest of society, are now renting out their office parks to other organizations as a way to raise revenue.

"They are opening up in more than one way," Lee said, adding that the overall process began in the 1980s and accelerated in 2005 when China established state-of-the-art executive leadership academies that required a more legitimate educational approach. 

Organizational machinery

The success of the Chinese economy and market, as well as the rush for revenue and status by many people and organizations in the country, spurred the academies to change. Lee said the party schools are dynamic and entrepreneurial in the way they seek out new student populations and craft new programs, both educational and political.

"This shows how the party's organizational machinery has been more nimble than some would have predicted," she said.

Yet to be seen is whether the revised party-school approach is enough to turn around the larger Chinese Communist Party or deal with the problem of rampant political corruption in the country.

"There's some evidence of new organizational thinking in the party schools, but it is unclear whether this will help with resolving China's corruption problem or spark genuine democratic reform," Lee said.

While eight other political parties technically exist in China, there is no true opposition to the Chinese Communist Party.

Lee began her book while a political science doctoral student at Stanford.

Looking ahead, she is studying how China's education landscape is evolving and how China is constructing new international organizations, like the Asia Infrastructure Investment Bank, that reflect its long-term global ambitions.

She asks, "To what degree might these organizations challenge or supplement the existing global order and how might the U.S. respond intelligently?"

Clifton Parker is a writer for the Stanford News Service.