Katherine Casey, professor of political economy at Stanford Graduate School of Business and the faculty director of the King Center on Global Development, presented her team’s work in a CDDRL Research Seminar on Thursday, May 7. Casey opened her talk establishing that citizen esteem for politicians is on the decline. In the U.S., only 16 percent trust the federal government. Across 30 African countries, while 75 percent believe elections are the best way to choose leaders, only 37 percent are satisfied with how their democracies are working. Casey asserts that the root of this dissatisfaction runs deep, ultimately posing the question: how can high-human-capital, representative individuals be identified, screened, encouraged to run for office, and brought into consideration by political parties? 

Casey’s team examined local governance in Sierra Leone to answer this question, partnering with government and civil society to test an intervention designed to induce candidate entry. The field experiment was a nationwide, randomized controlled trial covering all fourteen local district councils in Sierra Leone. The team chose to focus on local councils because the barriers to entry are low, the work requires competence but is not particularly specialized, and its part-time nature allows candidates to run without quitting their day jobs. The experiment included two rounds of random assignment and implementation. 

The experiment focused on three headline factors: representation, quality, and gatekeeping. During the representation phase, the field team visited villages and spoke with residents to better understand who they would want to represent them. These nominees were then screened for quality using metrics for human capital, work experience, local experience, managerial capital, and conscientiousness. After this screening, candidates' profiles were sent to political parties. Of those nominated at the representation level, 85 percent were willing to share their profiles, and 89 percent said they were interested in running for office. 

When conducting analysis, Casey’s team found that top nominees from the representation stage score higher than both status quo applicants and incumbents on quality metrics, differences that are large in magnitude and highly statistically significant. Many top nominees came from traditional authority lineages, and many work in education, positioning them as alternative elites. Among lower-ranked nominees, only 16 percent ultimately entered electoral races, but this rate rose to 25 percent among top-ranked nominees.  Their entry enhanced the maximum observed quality of applicants in the potential candidate pool.

Analysis was then conducted to determine whether the parties selected any nominees from the profiles, which found that nearly all wards had at least one candidate selected and that nominations increased the likelihood that a local woman would make the candidate list.  Incumbents were highly favored in this election, leaving little space for new entrants to win elected seats.

Casey ended her talk with a few conclusions. Firstly, the intervention successfully identified popular, high-quality, new entrants to politics, drawn from a different set of elites. The nominees self-selected into the entry on quality, boasting the highest observed quality among applicants and selected candidates, which also showed that representation need not trade off quality. Casey’s team also found a challenge in translating willingness to run into formal applications, a challenge she believes could be honed in on with more recruitment efforts. Ultimately, the collaboration between research and policymakers crafted a unique model to empower dissatisfied voters to nominate leaders they want to see in office. 

Miriam Golden’s presentation in CDDRL’s Research Seminar on April 23, 2026, addressed a central puzzle in democratic politics: why are incumbent reelection rates systematically higher in richer democracies? Drawing on cross-national data, she demonstrates a strong positive relationship between national income and reelection rates, a pattern that is both statistically robust and theoretically unexpected. This empirical finding motivates a reassessment of two dominant frameworks — accountability theory, associated with John Ferejohn, and selection theory, associated with James Fearon. Accountability models suggest that voters reward good performance and punish poor performance, but they do not explain cross-national variation in reelection rates. Selection models argue that elections filter out low-quality politicians, implying that poorer countries with lower reelection rates must have dishonest or incompetent politicians, yet empirical evidence does not align well with these inferences.

Golden proposes an alternative framework centered on “capacity gaps,” introducing the resources that politicians have available and voters' ability to discern political performance as key missing parameters. In poorer countries, both state capacity and voter interpretive capacity are constrained. Governments face fiscal and administrative limitations that restrict policy delivery, while voters struggle to distinguish whether poor outcomes result from incompetence, corruption, or structural constraints. As a result, the informational conditions necessary for effective accountability break down. Golden further argues that informational signals are asymmetric: markers of “bad” types, such as corruption scandals, criminal convictions, or dynastic ties, are visible and salient, whereas markers of “good” types, such as competence or honesty, are diffuse and easily mimicked. In these settings, even honest, competent, and well-intentioned politicians are likely to lose office because they are indistinguishable to voters from the malfeasant and incompetent. Even high-performing politicians may not be rewarded electorally, and good types gain no consistent advantage in reelection. 

To evaluate this framework, Golden presents multiple empirical investigations. First, she examines whether voters reward economic performance using within-country variation in GDP growth. The results show that higher growth increases reelection rates, but only in countries with high literacy levels. Since literacy roughly proxies voter discernment capacity, this suggests that performance matters electorally only when voters can interpret it. Second, she analyzes survey data from legislators in Italy and Pakistan to assess whether elections filter out low-quality politicians. She finds that politicians with “bad-type” markers, such as dynastic backgrounds or long tenure, exhibit higher tolerance for corruption yet continue to survive electorally, contradicting selection theory. Third, she tests whether poorer democracies have lower-quality politicians by examining education levels and relative salaries. She finds no meaningful differences in legislator quality across income levels and no relationship between salaries and reelection rates, further weakening selection-based explanations.

Overall, Golden’s approach reconciles several empirical anomalies: the income–reelection relationship, the conditional effect of economic performance, and the persistence of low-quality politicians. At the same time, important questions remain regarding causal identification and measurement, as proxies like literacy may capture broader development effects. Nonetheless, the framework offers a compelling shift in focus from politicians to voters, highlighting how limits in information processing can undermine both accountability and selection in democratic systems.

On Thursday, April 16, Daniel Kelemen (UC Merced) and CDDRL predoctoral fellow Hanna Folsz discussed the consequential outcome of the April 2026 Hungarian election: the victory of Peter Magyar’s Tisza Party over Viktor Orbán’s Fidesz Party in a Rethinking European Development and Security (REDS) seminar co-hosted by the Center on Democracy, Development and the Rule of Law and The Europe Center.

Daniel Kelemen opened the talk, first offering an overview of Viktor Orbán's rise to power. In 2010, Orbán won Hungary’s nationwide election with over two-thirds majority, a majority large enough to allow him to amend the constitution. Having suffered an electoral defeat in the past, Orbán worked to centralize his power. He captured referees — courts and independent bodies — seized control of the media, and demonized and undermined the opposition. Orbán effectively changed the rules of the game, tilting the electoral playing field. 

Kelemen states that there are cases in which smaller authoritarian groups within a larger system are tolerated or protected by national parties because they deliver votes. Orbán operated with the support of Angela Merkel, the former Chancellor of Germany, who largely stopped the EU from taking action against Orbán. Orbán’s party, the Fidesz Party, was a part of Merkel’s EU-wide party, the European People’s Party (EPP), a center-right, Christian party. This support, along with the emigration of dissatisfied voters and continued funding from the EU, helped Orbán stay in power. 

However, Orbán’s Fidesz Party was kicked out of the EPP in 2021. Merkel, who was a strong supporter of Orbán, left office in 2022. Orbán’s policy also became more extreme, raising more concern from European member states. In 2022, the EU Commission cut funding to Hungary, suspending 32 billion euros. Kelemen identifies this suspension of funds as an effective step against Hungary’s regime. 

Kelemen then outlined the implications of Orbán’s fall for Hungary, the EU, and international actors, including Russia and the United States. For Hungary, it means full regime change, as the Tisza Party will likely take efforts to undo Orbán’s autocratic policy changes. For the EU, it means that policy on Ukraine and Russia will be different, because Orbán was using his veto to prevent support for Ukraine and sanctions on Russia. For the US and Russia, Russia lost its supporter and ear in the EU, and the Trump administration lost its closest ally in Europe. On a global note, Orbán was a key figure in trying to bring together far-right populists. After he was kicked out of the EPP, he formed a more autocratic-focused party called MEGA (Make Europe Great Again). 

In a Rethinking European Development and Security (REDS) seminar held on April 9, 2026,  and co-hosted by CDDRL and The Europe Center, Konstantin Sonin, a John Dewey Distinguished Service Professor at the University of Chicago Harris School of Public Policy, presented his research on “The Reverse Cargo Cult: Why Authoritarian Governments Lie to Their People,” offering a theoretical explanation for why regimes such as the Soviet Union would knowingly tell citizens visibly false statements. According to Sonin’s research, authoritarian propaganda is much more complex than simple misinformation or manipulation, as it is often designed not to convince people of a single claim, but to shape how they evaluate information more broadly. 

Sonin begins with a personal anecdote, reflecting on his own experience participating in Soviet elections where there was only one candidate on the ballot, despite the process being presented as a meaningful choice. Using this example, he questions why regimes like the Soviet Union invest so heavily in clearly staged elections or exaggerated portrayals of Western life, even when citizens recognize these distortions. From this, he introduces the idea that such actions are not meant to persuade citizens of a specific falsehood, but instead to influence how they interpret all incoming information. Drawing on the metaphor of a “reverse cargo cult,” he suggests that just as some communities misinterpret the source of Western goods, citizens in authoritarian systems may come to believe that institutions in other countries are equally performative or deceptive. In this sense, narratives about foreign countries become an integral tool for reinforcing domestic political stability. 

He further explores how citizens evaluate elections and the decision to replace an incumbent under uncertainty about both competence and trustworthiness. He recognizes that in these regimes, citizens are not entirely naïve and may often recognize when a leader is lying. However, Sonin shows that even obvious lies can be effective. When a domestic leader lies about conditions that citizens already know to be bad, it signals not only that the leader is untrustworthy but also raises the perceived likelihood that foreign leaders are similarly dishonest. As a result, citizens downgrade their expectations of potential replacements, concluding that alternatives may not be any better. This dynamic ultimately reduces the incentive to replace the incumbent. 

As his theory suggests, negative information about conditions abroad, or even skepticism toward foreign success, can benefit authoritarian leaders. For example, Sonin points to Soviet reactions to the American National Exhibition in Moscow, where displays of a typical American home were dismissed by officials as unrealistic or misleading. This kind of framing encouraged citizens to question whether life in the United States was truly better, reinforcing the idea that shortcomings at home were not unique. As a result, domestic failures appear less exceptional, helping explain why authoritarian propaganda frequently emphasizes criticism of other countries and why such narratives often reinforce one another. 

Sonin concludes by emphasizing that lying in this context is not primarily about persuading citizens of a particular false claim, but about shaping their broader beliefs about the reliability of information. By weakening trust in information overall, leaders can make bad conditions at home seem like the safer or more reliable option compared to the uncertainty of change.