In May 2023, Thai pro-democracy reformer and lawmaker Pita Limjaroenrat led Thailand’s Move Forward Party to a stunning victory in the general election on a platform of progressive change. The party won a clear mandate from over 14 million voters, but conservative powers and military-appointed senators blocked Pita’s path to the prime ministership. Fifteen months later, Thailand’s Constitutional Court dissolved the Move Forward Party – the same fate its predecessor, the Future Forward Party, met in 2020. The court also barred Pita from politics for a decade.

It is a story he recounts in his political memoir, The Almost Prime Minister, and one he discussed at a February 2025 fireside chat hosted by APARC’s Southeast Asia Program. In his current role as a Senior Democracy Fellow back at his alma mater, the Harvard Kennedy School, Pita continues to champion transparent and equitable governance, coaches a new generation of political leaders, and strategizes a democratic path forward for Thailand. 

On May 29, 2026, Pita returned to Stanford for a follow-up discussion with APARC Director Kiyoteru Tsutsui, who also serves as co-director of the Southeast Asia Program. Pita examined political developments in Thailand since the contentious 2023 election, the tensions between Thailand and Cambodia, the crisis in Myanmar, ASEAN’s role in the region, and how Thailand and other middle powers should hedge their bets amid the U.S.-China competition and a fragmenting world order. 

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Anatomy of a Defeat

Pita’s opening remarks focused on the outcome of Thailand’s recent general election, in which the People’s Party – the successor to the dissolved Move Forward Party – suffered a decisive defeat. Entering the February 8, 2026, election, the People’s Party had hoped to convert widespread calls for democratic reform into power. Instead, the conservative Bhumjaithai Party secured a clear victory and then joined forces with the third-place populist Pheu Thai Party to form a coalition government.

Pita, who had campaigned for the People’s Party ahead of the election – a political activity he remains eligible to undertake despite being barred from seeking office – offered a candid assessment of the party’s loss.

Lower voter turnout was a key determinant of the February 8 election results, he argued: at 65 percent, it was sharply down from 76 percent in the 2023 general election that he won. Many voters came to believe that the costs of participating in the political process outweighed the potential benefits, Pita said.

That is the calculus of autocrats when they manipulate elections, he argued. Recognizing that electoral participation is the linchpin of a representative democracy's legitimacy and power, and that voter turnout of upward of 70 percent would all but guarantee a People Party victory, "they want to make sure that the cost of going to an election is higher than the benefit."

Pita pointed to his experience as evidence. Despite winning the 2023 election, Thai supporters now see him, three years later, living in Boston rather than governing from Bangkok. The message to voters, he said, is clear: If you keep voting and nothing changes, then why bother?

Pita calls this "voter fatigue by design" – a tactic used by autocrats to make politics seem “dramatized, boring, or irrelevant.”

He labels this Thai establishment's effort to convince voters that political participation is futile as “constituency.” It is one element in a “five C’s framework” that explains the People’s Party’s recent election defeat, he says.

A second factor, which he names “competitive collusion,” was evident in the decision by conservative candidates to coordinate their efforts – whether by merging campaigns or stepping aside – to avoid splitting the vote and present a unified front against the reformist People’s Party.

Third, conflict – by which Pita refers to the recent flare-up of tensions between Thailand and Cambodia – rallied nationalistic sentiment, lending greater legitimacy to the military and thus benefiting the conservative parties associated with it.

The fourth element, according to Pita, is Thailand’s Constitution, under which the Election Commission – the country’s sole election management body – is effectively appointed by the King on the recommendation of the Senate. “So I felt the [February 2026] election was not fair,” Pita said. “There was no linkage to the people, and there were no checks and balances.”

Finally, Pita pointed to the People Party's own missteps, which he categorizes as “candidacy.” He described a “Brahmin left versus merchant right” dynamic, arguing that the party became overly focused on technocratic, urban-centered policies and lost touch with the rural grassroots base that had been crucial to the Move Forward Party’s 2023 electoral success.

Regional Flashpoints: Cambodia and Myanmar

On the Thailand-Cambodia border dispute, Pita called for a renewed commitment to diplomacy, arguing that lasting peace can only be achieved through dialogue. He pointed to the Joint Boundary Commission, the bilateral body the two countries established in 1997 to oversee the demarcation of their border, as the most viable mechanism for resolving the dispute.

“If we return to the table and try to negotiate that out, I think that could be a path toward durable peace between Thailand and Cambodia.”

Turning to Myanmar, Pita stressed the need for Thailand and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) to take a more active role in addressing the civil war that has devastated the country since the military coup of February 2021. The conflict’s spillover effects, he noted, extend well beyond Myanmar’s borders, fueling cyber scam operations, human trafficking, and illicit financial activity that directly affect Thailand.

“If the ASEAN core, especially Thailand, with its geographic proximity, doesn't do anything, it's going to keep going in a dangerous drift like that.” 

Pita noted, however, that the crisis in Myanmar has grown more complex in recent years. Beyond the struggle among ethnic armed groups and between the military and pro-democracy forces, it now encompasses resource politics as part of a broader competition over rare earths and China’s expanding strategic interests linked to trade corridors and energy infrastructure.

As China’s involvement in the region deepens through its trade routes and gas pipeline interests, the conflict in Myanmar has become much harder to resolve, he said.

As a way forward, Pita proposed a minilateral coalition comprising key ASEAN states, along with India, China, and possibly Japan and South Korea. The goal, he said, would be to work with Myanmar’s opposition forces to “turn resistance into governance” and lay the groundwork for a viable political transition toward a post-conflict Myanmar.

The Middle Power Moment and U.S.-China Rivalry

Zooming out to the global stage, Pita spoke of his interest in the prospects of a "middle power moment" taking shape, citing Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney’s recent diplomatic tour of the Indo-Pacific region to urge middle power nations, including India, Australia, and Japan, to unite in response to the U.S.-China great power rivalry and the transformation of U.S. foreign policy under the Trump administration.

“Thailand is still the second-largest country in ASEAN,” Pita said. “So we have agency and autonomy. Whether we use it or not, that is something that remains to be seen.”

“You realize that if you rely on the Americans for security and the Chinese for the economy, you are going to be forced to choose sides. And once you choose sides, that's the end of everything that you have.” He argued that, if nations are to avoid being forced to choose sides, they must redefine neutrality as an active capability rather than a passive position.

Here, too, he suggested, flexible, issue-based minilaterals could be beneficial. “So I think we'll see a rise of multilaterals on various issues, whether it's AI governance, semiconductors, maritime management, cybersecurity, or critical minerals.”

From Player to Coach

Forced to the sidelines of Thai politics, Pita has embraced a new role. "My calling now is to groom next-gen leaders. I used to be a player, and I did a good job. And then they stopped me. They forced me to sit down. So I decided to become a coach instead.” At Harvard Kennedy School, he now co-teaches a class on running for public office in developing countries, turning his recent, raw experiences into a textbook for the next generation.

Despite the setbacks, Pita’s message remains one of resilience and determination. When asked if he could still win, he was unequivocal. "I think I can," he stated. “I think about it every single night, to return to the arena and become a player. But I can wait. I could strategize, I could accumulate small victories until I'm strong, vigorous, and capable. And when I return, I will change Thailand for good.”.

In His Own Words: Pita's Column in Matichon Weekly

Pita contributes a regular column to the Thai-language news magazine Matichon Weekly (มติชนสุดสัปดาห์), providing analysis on topics ranging from global economic shifts and international politics to urban development and his experiences engaging with leaders in politics, technology, business, and social activism. In his column of June 12, 2026, he reflects on his May 29 visit to Stanford and APARC.

Below is an English version of the column, generated by Google Translate. It has been mildly edited for accuracy and style.

Palo Alto Annual Event

I'm back at Stanford University and Palo Alto again, after visiting last year. I was so impressed that I've decided I'd like to visit every year if I can, not just because of the good weather and pleasant atmosphere, but because this place is a hub of knowledge, conversation, and unique perspectives on the world that are hard to find elsewhere.

I spent three days as a guest of APARC, or the Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center, Stanford University's Asia-Pacific research center, which is part of the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies (FSI), one of the world's most influential institutions in international relations and public policy, as well as the Hoover Institution, a public policy institute that brings together thinkers, historians, economists, and former policymakers from around the globe.

These three institutions set Stanford apart from typical universities, creating a space where the academic and policy worlds converge tangibly. The people you pass each day might be Larry Diamond, who has studied democratic transitions and declines for decades; Francis Fukuyama, author of The End of History and the Last Man; Gi-Wook Shin, an expert on East Asia; or Kiyoteru Tsutsui, who studies human rights issues. On the other side of the university is a collection of former top U.S. policymakers, from Condoleezza Rice to Michael McFaul, making conversations here both academic and practical. Importantly, the questions I'm asked at Stanford are always more difficult than anywhere else.

Many conversations this year have revolved around the same question: Is the world entering an era where geopolitics and technology are increasingly intertwined? While in the past, technology companies competed to create superior products, today they face geopolitical questions similar to those governments do. From restrictions on chip exports and access to rare earth minerals to energy security and the restructuring of international supply chains, the names Nvidia, TSMC, and ASML are frequently mentioned alongside those of major powers, as the ability to design, manufacture, and control advanced technology has become an integral part of state power.

In the world of AI, the question has changed significantly this year. At Stanford and Silicon Valley, I hear less talk about frontier models than I expected, but more and more talk about inference, compute, and energy. The excitement isn't about how well the next model will perform, but about who can get these models out of the lab and into real-world economic applications first.

On the other hand, competition is shifting from the digital world to the physical world. Waymo's self-driving cars are becoming commonplace on San Francisco streets, while Amazon's Zoox is beginning to enter the fray as a major player. The development of humanoid robots is also being discussed more seriously than ever before. Many believe that the next decade will be the time when AI begins to develop its own "arms and legs," no longer confined to computer screens.

As technology has advanced to this point, the conversation has once again turned to geopolitics. This includes issues such as controls on the export of advanced chips, competition to attract leading researchers, access to energy for hyperscale data centers, and concerns about the concentration of computing power in the hands of a few companies and countries. If in the 20th century, oil was the strategic resource of superpowers, many are beginning to see that in the 21st century, computing may be heading towards a similar status. The world is therefore not just witnessing a technological competition, but a new restructuring of power through technology.

Another thing I always try to do whenever I come to Stanford and Silicon Valley is to meet Thai students, researchers, entrepreneurs, and Thais working in the technology industry. Because, if you look closely, Thais are already a part of the global competitiveness we talk about.

Over the past two years, since being disqualified from politics, I have dedicated part of my time to traveling, meeting, and systematically building a database of Thai talent abroad. This includes scientists, engineers, economists, artificial intelligence researchers, and executives in global technology companies. This trip was no exception. I had the opportunity to meet Thais working at Google, Meta, Apple, Salesforce, Nvidia, OpenAI, and many other leading technology companies. Some work in semiconductors, some develop AI models, and some manage products with hundreds of millions of users worldwide. Many may not be well-known in Thailand, but they are part of the workforce driving the world's future economy today.

Every time I speak with this group of Thais, I leave feeling hopeful. Hopeful to see that Thais can stand at the forefront of industries that are shaping the future of the world, on par with anyone else. And hopeful that their knowledge, experience, and networks can connect and create even more value for Thailand in the future. I can only hope that one day I will have the opportunity to work with them for the future of our nation.

Armed Groups and Electoral Coercion

The election will use facial recognition technologies and biometric fingerprints in around half of the 125 thousand voting booths (mesas), and the certificates of the electoral counts of each of those booths (form E-14) will be digitized and transmitted electronically so that citizens are able to consult the results of the official actas of the electoral process. This means the process is likely to be conducted professionally by the National Registry (Registraduría), an independent body responsible for organizing elections. However, given that many areas of Colombia are still dominated by armed groups, the Defense Ministry has already warned that it cannot guarantee the safety of voters.

Indeed, in about 300 of Colombia's 1103 municipalities, the presence of armed groups is well documented. Those include guerrillas like the ELN that did not accept the 2016 peace agreement, dissident splinter groups from the FARC, cartels, and other criminal organizations like El Cartel del Golfo, but most prominently, around 60 paramilitary organizations with varying levels of discipline and internal cohesion.

Many civil society organizations, including those engaged by the DAL team, have already begun developing electoral observation strategies that extend beyond protecting polling stations on election day. Given the levels of violence faced by candidates, political organizers, and social activists, the central concern is not only what will occur during the congressional elections next month or the presidential vote at the end of May, but rather the broader interaction between electoral administration and democratic institutions, on the one hand, and the diverse actors and specialists in violence that continue to operate across Colombia on the other, particularly in the post-2016 Peace Agreement context.

Civil Society Responses and Local Partnerships

In Bogotá, DAL’s team met with several organizations working on issues relevant to democratic governance in Colombia, including CESJUL, Justicia Racial, DeJusticia, and PARES. The main concerns expressed by the organizations center on the integrity and safety of the 2026 electoral process, particularly in vulnerable territories. They are worried about rising risks of political and electoral violence, especially in regions with a strong presence of armed actors, as well as barriers to voter access and participation affecting Afro-descendant communities. There is also a clear need for stronger data analysis and monitoring capacities to identify risks, support early warning efforts, and inform advocacy. Finally, the organizations are concerned with ensuring the legitimacy and visibility of democratic processes in conflict-affected areas, including the transparency of peace-related representation mechanisms such as the special congressional seats (curules de paz).

The team was particularly impacted by the work of the Victims Unit, led by Gloria Cuartas, in its efforts to secure reparations for victims of the conflict. The Victims Unit (Unidad para las Víctimas) is the Colombian government agency responsible for implementing policies for the comprehensive reparation of victims of the armed conflict, adopting a territorial and victim-centered approach. Its mandate focuses on overcoming conditions of vulnerability, restoring rights, and supporting victims’ active role in rebuilding their life projects and contributing to sustainable peace.

DAL will continue to engage with Colombian organizations through its Democracy Garage, a new model for interacting with democracy practitioners. The Garage seeks to bridge the gap between practitioners and scholars by identifying specific challenges that organizations face in their day-to-day work in support of democracy, which may require the use of political science analytic tools to support their efforts to defend democracy. The coming election in Colombia exhibits some of the most complex challenges the Garage wants to address, related to political polarization, the need to facilitate dialogues across the political spectrum, and the threat posed by violent actors and criminal organizations to the power of citizens to use their voice, vote, and organization in the defense of democracy.

Journalism and Democratic Resilience

DAL is closely following developments in Colombia’s upcoming electoral process and their implications for the resilience of democracy in Latin America. In this context, our team recognizes the value of community journalism on two levels. First, it serves to strengthen journalism itself, advancing freedom of expression, access to information, and the capacity of local actors to document and report on their realities. Second, it functions as a critical tool for enriching research and deepening understanding of social phenomena, particularly in environments marked by violence, territorial inequality, and institutional fragility. Strengthening locally grounded information ecosystems is therefore not only a democratic objective in its own right, but also central to understanding how democratic practices are sustained under conditions of pressure and uncertainty.

To advance this objective, and in line with the Democracy Garage methodology, DAL will support the analysis of media coverage of Colombia’s elections through Terra 360, a bilingual digital communications platform focused on dialogue, democracy, human rights, Buen Vivir (collective well-being), and international cooperation. Terra 360 is an initiative co-developed by DAL, POY Latam, and Social Focus, and in alliance with media organizations, academic institutions, and community-based organizations, including Fundación Gabo. Together, DAL, Terra 360, Fundación Gabo, and Justicia Racial will provide support to enable reporting by journalists working in high-risk regions such as Montes de María, Cauca, and Chocó, where access to reliable information is both most constrained and most consequential for democratic participation.

A Critical Test for Colombia’s Democracy

The convergence of violent actors and deep polarization already presents formidable challenges to the Colombian political process. Yet the politics of the upcoming presidential race add an additional layer of complexity. With many candidates prepared to enter the first round, the election is poised to be highly uncertain and competitive — two conditions that amplify existing vulnerabilities and concerns. It remains to be seen whether Colombia will see continuity in the executive or instead follow the pendular swing exhibited in other parts of the region. In this context of existing vulnerabilities and heightened uncertainty, the work of civil society organizations is critical to safeguard the integrity of the electoral process and to contain the potential incidence of bad actors. These elections are yet another test of the resilience of Colombia’s democratic institutions and the strength of its powerful civil society. 

Introduction and Contribution:

There is a growing recognition, both in and outside of the academy, that democracy requires more than simply voting for and removing incumbents during elections. For one, relying solely on elected representatives deprives those being represented of direct control over decisions that affect them. In addition, it can also generate — as it has in the United States and elsewhere — large gaps in responsiveness and representation, particularly for historically disenfranchised and marginal groups. 

Participatory budgeting (PB) represents one influential attempt to overcome these gaps in democratic practice. First introduced in the 1980s by the Brazilian Workers’ Party (PT), PB empowers voters to allocate public funds to projects that benefit them. Since then, ordinary citizens in thousands of places across the world have helped determine the content of local budgets.

Despite its successes, academics and practitioners remain unclear about how to address and balance considerations related to budget constraints and ease of participation. This coincides with well-known mathematical difficulties surrounding the aggregation of votes, for example, that individually consistent preferences can yield inconsistent group outcomes.

In “Rank, Pack, or Approve,” Lodewijk Gelauff and Ashish Goel introduce a dataset drawn from the novel and comprehensive Stanford Participatory Budgeting platform. The data span over 150 real participatory budgeting processes, or “elections.” Importantly, the elections vary in terms of how ballots are designed and how participants make budgeting decisions. Gelauff and Goel ask how such variation shapes important budgeting outcomes, such as when participants are more likely to become fatigued and abandon the process. 

Two key findings from the study are as follows: First, more complex PB designs lead voters to, perhaps unsurprisingly, spend more time participating; however, this does not significantly increase abandonment or “dropout” rates. Second, voting methods that force participants to deal with cost trade-offs — as opposed to merely indicating their preferences — have been found to generate less expensive projects. 

The reader comes away with a sense of how subtle differences in the design of budgeting elections meaningfully shape the allocation of resources. This will resonate with social scientists who are familiar with how, for example, different kinds of electoral rules shape political competition. To understand Gelauff and Goel’s findings, it helps to first outline how PB elections differ from one another.

Ballot Design and Voting Methods:

The basic PB setup involves organizers choosing a voting method, a list of projects to potentially be funded, and an authentication process (i.e., checking that participants are valid voters). Voters then select or rank projects given the constraints of each voting rule or method. These three rules, captured in the paper’s title, are as follows: 

The first, “K-approval,” asks voters to select up to “K” projects. The top-voted projects receive funding until the budget runs out. K-approval is simple, but its main drawback is that it ignores the costliness of each project: voters only indicate which projects they like, rather than how those choices fit within a fixed budget. The second method, “K-ranking,” asks voters to rank their preferred projects, capturing their preferences in a more fine-grained manner. As votes are aggregated using the Borda scoring method, higher-ranked projects receive greater weight or value. Finally, the “knapsack” method asks voters to choose projects that fit within a fixed budget. This method best allows participants to balance costs in a way that mimics real city councils. However, knapsack is more complex and time-consuming than K-approval or K-ranking, although the online interface design, which mimics a shopping cart, is already much simpler than it would be on paper. 

Data Collection and Findings:

As mentioned, Gelauff and Goel’s data is drawn from the open-source Stanford PB platform. This tool enables cities to conduct online PB elections with a great deal of customizability, including location, budget, language of operation, authentication process (e.g., requiring personal information or sending SMS messages), as well as methods, phases, and windows of voting. Key for the authors’ purposes, it also tracks (anonymous) voters’ choices and how much time they spend during the election. Data collection began in 2014. 

The first key finding is motivated by the fact that election organizers often prefer K-approval for its simplicity. As such, Gelauff and Goel analyze how much time participants spend on their ballots and how often they quit. Although more complex ballots — those with a larger budget and number of projects — are shown to predict longer completion times, they do not significantly increase dropout rates. The authors note that more research is needed to assess whether knapsack specifically affects dropout.

The authors also find that voters select more expensive projects with K-approval compared to the knapsack methods. However, voters indicate similarly expensive preferences for their most-preferred projects under both methods; the key difference appears lower down the list of preferences, where the knapsack constraint forces them to be more cost-conscious. In other words, the knapsack cost constraint doesn’t affect which expensive project participants most prefer. Rather, it limits how many extra expensive projects they can add.

Overall, “Rank, Pack, or Approve” deepens our understanding of how PB can improve direct democratic engagement while reducing burdens on participants. It does this while providing a large quantity of real-world data, compared with prior research that has relied on crowdworkers without a real stake in the budgeting outcome. The authors helpfully illustrate how local governments can design PB processes that are clearer and more inviting to ordinary voters. Subsequent research will benefit from using this powerful data resource, as will organizers seeking to expand local engagement.

*Brief prepared by Adam Fefer.