Abstract:

Electoral competition, like athletic competition, requires its own norms of fair play. While the rules of the game, and the institutional umpire to enforce those rules, are important components for achieving the goal that the competition be fair, they do not suffice. The participants themselves must have their own standards of fair play apart from the rules and the referee. This need is particularly acute with respect to negative campaign ads, since the First Amendment bars the government from umpiring the fairness of those ads. But the same problem applies to other aspects of electoral competition, including compliance with campaign finance rules. What are these norms of fair electoral competition? Are they only intuitive, or can they be systematized? More specifically, insofar as incumbent candidates are officeholders, does due process constrain the use of their power to attain an unfair advantage in their race for reelection?

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Abstract:

Compulsory voting reinforces the distinctive and valuable role that elections play in contemporary democracy. Some scholars have suggested that mandatory voting laws can improve government responsiveness to members of poor and marginalized groups who are less likely to vote. Critics of compulsory voting object that citizens can participate in a wide variety of ways; voting is not important enough to justify forcing people to do it. These critics neglect the importance of voting’s particular role in contemporary democratic practice, though. The case for compulsory voting rests on an implicit, but widely shared, understanding of elections as special moments of mass participation that manifest the equal political authority of all citizens. The most prominent objections to mandatory voting fail to appreciate this distinctive role for voting and the way it is embedded within a broader democratic framework.

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Emilee is an assistant professor of Political Science at Stanford. Her current research project examines the distinctive value of voting in contemporary democratic practice, and its significance for electoral reform and the ethics of participation.

Abstract:

From El Salvador to Pakistan, high levels of internal violence characterize a growing number of poorly consolidated electoral democracies. Gangs, violent criminals, insurgents, and low-intensity conflict seem to entrench in many of these countries for decades. But some countries have managed to reduce extreme levels of violence. How did they succeed? And why were other, similarly situated countries unable to achieve similar success? Based on current and historical case studies, this upcoming book identifies continuities that suggest why these countries are so violent, and commonalities in the paths countries have taken to reduce violence. The findings are policy-focused and unexpected, even undesired. But they offer ideas to policy-makers based on the reality of what has worked, rather than the hopes of what might be achieved.

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The Russian Economy is in a recession due to a perfect storm of the low oil prices, sanctions and the lack of reforms. First time since 1998, Russians see a major fall in their real incomes. How long will the recession continue?  What can the Russian government do? What will happen after the recession is over?
 

Sergei Guriev is a professor of economics at Sciences Po in Paris, France. From 2004 to 2013, Dr. Guriev was a tenured professor of economics and rector of the New Economic School in Moscow. He will begin an appointment as Chief Economist of the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development in 2016.

Abstract:

India has the third largest system of higher education in the world, with many expecting this system to drive India's economic development going forward. And yet there is profound variation across this system, as some public universities perform admirably even as others suffer from endemic problems that we associate with weak states: absenteeism, bribery, and the like. What explains why some public universities seem to function so well even as others struggle? I argue that the presence or absence of meritocratic practices explains this variation, and in this talk, we shall examine the conditions under which meritocracy comes about. This research brings together five years of archival work, more than one-hundred interviews, as well as data from a large survey I conducted.

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Dinsha Mistree is a Postdoctoral Fellow at CDDRL, where he studies governance in developing countries. He is currently working on a book project examining India's higher education sector. Dinsha's previous work has appeared or is forthcoming at Comparative Politics, Springer Press, and Cambridge University Press. Dinsha holds a PhD in Politics from Princeton as well as Bachelor's and Master's Degrees from MIT.

A wealth of research has been conducted on optimal procedures for government procurement of services and the best use of public resources. However, education policy is almost never discussed in these terms, even though many governments in developed countries spend more on education services than any other good or service, with the exception of healthcare. In order to establish an optimal procurement system for education services, features such as performance incentives should be considered. While we move towards developing the optimal education procurement system, simple reforms should allow governments to avoid waste and improve equity. 

Derek Neal is a Professor in the Department of Economics and on the Committee on Education at the University of Chicago.

He researches the design of incentive systems for educators, exploring design flaws in performance pay and accountability systems, and highlighting the advantages of providing incentives through contests among schools. He is currently involved in research projects on increasing student learning in China and Uganda. He is a past President of the Midwest Economics Association and a Fellow of the Society of Labor Economists. He is a former editor of the Journal of Political Economy, the Journal of Labor Economics, and the Journal of Human Resources.