Abstract: This book seeks to understand the connection between Pakistan and Islamist militancy. The book argues that, since Pakistan’s founding in 1947, it has used religiously motivated non-state actors as strategic tools to compensate for acute political and material weakness. Over time, this policy has become so important as to constitute a central pillar of Pakistani grand strategy. Contrary to conventional wisdom, Pakistan’s militant strategy has not been wholly disastrous. Over the decades, it has achieved important domestic and international successes, helping Pakistan to strengthen its domestic political foundations, confront stronger adversaries, undermine South Asia’s territorial status quo, and shape the strategic environment in Afghanistan. Recently, however, these successes have given way to severe problems, as Pakistan has lost control of its proxies, been forced to make damaging resource tradeoffs, and risked inciting catastrophic war with an increasingly powerful India. These problems undermine regional stability and threaten the survival of the Pakistani state. The weakness that originally made Pakistan’s militant strategy useful has now made support for militancy extremely dangerous. If Pakistan does not abandon its strategy of jihad it may face catastrophe.

About the Speaker: S. Paul Kapur is Professor in the Department of National Security Affairs at the U.S. Naval Postgraduate School. He is also an Affiliate at Stanford University’s Center for International Security and Cooperation, and a Visiting Fellow at the Observer Research Foundation in New Delhi. Previously, he was on the faculties of the U.S. Naval War College and Claremont McKenna College, and was a visiting professor at Stanford University’s Center for International Security and Cooperation. His research and teaching interests include the strategic use of militancy, nuclear weapons proliferation, deterrence, and South Asian and Pacific Ocean regional security. Kapur is author of Dangerous Deterrent: Nuclear Weapons Proliferation and Conflict in South Asia (Stanford University Press, 2007) and co-author of India, Pakistan, and the Bomb: Debating Nuclear Stability in South Asia (Columbia University Press, 2010). His articles have appeared in leading journals such as International Security, Security Studies, Asian Survey, Washington Quarterly, and in a variety of edited volumes. Kapur manages several strategic engagement projects for the U.S. Department of Defense. He received his Ph.D. in political science from the University of Chicago and his B.A. from Amherst College.

For more than two decades the Association of Southeast Asian Nations has been at the center of multilateral arrangements for security in the Asia-Pacific. That keystone role has gained global support. In 2010 Secretary of State Clinton called ASEAN “the fulcrum of regional architecture”; in 2014 her successor said, “We must continue to support ASEAN’s centrality.” The governments of China, Japan, India, and Australia, among many others, have joined the chorus of support for ASEAN’s linchpin role. What explains ASEAN’s success?

Prof. Vuving’s answer is threefold: In the first place, ASEAN’s hard power weakness is a diplomatic strength, captured in the legitimacy of cooperative norms such as “open regionalism” and the “ASEAN Way.” Second, ASEAN’s location and character as an autonomous but inoffensive actor between Northeast and South Asia, between China and the United States, and between the Pacific and Indian Oceans allows it to play a “bridging” role between different geopolitical zones and potentially rival players.  Third, this bridging position has proven useful in managing changes in the relative power and status of major Asian-Pacific states. Prof. Vuving will also suggest that the unity of ASEAN’s own member states is less critical to ASEAN centrality than commonly thought.

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