In recent years, social media’s role in shaping social discourse has become more evident than ever. A global pandemic fueled by misinformation, an insurrection orchestrated online, and many other global events reminded us that the way in which social media companies outline their rules and practices directly affects the way we interact, behave and exchange ideas within a society. By shaping social media, we do, in fact, shape society.

At the Ford Dorsey Master's in International Policy (MIP), I research how policymakers can enhance the positive outcomes of social media and mitigate the risks they pose. It is clear today that this task is not one government can take on alone. Regulating Big Tech is just not enough. Only combined efforts of governmental and private entities can successfully tackle the great challenges introduced by online platforms. During my summer internship as a Public Policy Intern at the Oversight Board, I examined the role of non-governmental forms of online platform regulation.

The Oversight Board is an independent body of 20 global experts that examine the most significant and difficult content moderation decisions made by Facebook. In each case, the Board determines whether Facebook’s decision to take down a post or keep it up was in line with the platform’s Community Standards and values, and with International Human Rights Standards. Within 90 days of taking a case, the Board issues a binding decision on whether a piece of content should remain on the platform and a set of policy recommendations Facebook must respond to within 30 days. To date, the Board issued 14 decisions, including the widely-discussed case regarding the removal of former president Donald Trump from the platform.

While the Board’s policy recommendations are not binding, the transparent nature in which Facebook responds to them encourages adoption, and in practice, the platform has adopted most recommendations to date. For example, in August, Facebook announced that following a recommendation by the Board, the platform will start notifying users when it identifies that content violates its Community Standards through a governmental referral. This development, long advocated for by digital rights organizations, will help users identify frequent government censorship.

The Board is a unique organization not only in its novel approach to social media regulation, but also because of its global impact on every Facebook user regardless of borders and jurisdictions. As such, the Board should reflect the diverse user base of the platform, and it does. As part of the communication team, I was able to work with leading digital rights professionals from around the world and with team members to help facilitate engagement with stakeholders from every part of the globe. This included identifying global and regional stakeholders who have a particular interest in the Board’s cases and encouraging them to participate in deliberations by submitting public comments. These comments help the Board consider the wide range of perspectives and contexts of each case. I worked on a case involving content relating to the Israeli-Palestinian surge of violence in May 2021 and a Policy Advisory Opinion about the disclosure of private residential addresses. 

Through my internship, I was able to better understand the unique role the Oversight Board has in the overall regulatory framework of social media. Many criticize the Board for its narrow scope and limited impact. These arguments have merit, but I also witnessed firsthand how the Board’s efforts have guided crucial changes to Facebook’s policies, including on contentious issues where users from different regions have virtually contradictory concerns. Such changes could not, and should not, have been mandated by governments. While not a solution to all the problems posed by social media, I can appreciate today that the Oversight Board has a critical and unique role in solving some of them. In the current state of social media regulation, that should not be underestimated.

This interview was first published by the Stanford News Service.

When President Joe Biden meets with his Chinese counterpart President Xi Jinping next week, they will both want to show the world that the two countries have common and compatible objectives and that cooperation is possible, says Stanford scholar Thomas Fingar.

While there are real differences between the two countries, global threats exist that require joint effort to address, such as nuclear proliferation and the danger of new arms races, said Fingar in an interview with Stanford News Service.

In anticipation of the upcoming summit scheduled for Monday, Fingar discusses what to expect when the two leaders meet and what goals Biden will want to work towards as it fits with his larger objectives for the U.S.

Fingar is a Shorenstein fellow at The Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center (APARC), which is part of the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies. He is leading a multi-year study, China and the World, that seeks to better understand China’s global engagement.

Fingar returned to Stanford in 2009 after having served as the first deputy director of national intelligence for analysis and, concurrently, as chairman of the National Intelligence Council. Fingar served previously as assistant secretary of the State Department’s Bureau of Intelligence and Research (2000-01 and 2004-05), principal deputy assistant secretary (2001-03), deputy assistant secretary for analysis (1994-2000), director of the Office of Analysis for East Asia and the Pacific (1989-94) and chief of the China Division (1986-89). Between 1975 and 1986 he held several positions at Stanford University, including senior research associate in the Center for International Security and Arms Control.

Where does diplomacy between the U.S. and China now stand?

Friction between Beijing and Washington did not put an end to diplomatic exchanges, but having markedly different approaches has inhibited the two sides. Simply stated, the United States has sought to work on specific global and bilateral problems to achieve priority objectives such as limiting greenhouse gases and reducing the dangers of unconstrained nuclear, space and cyber competition. China has maintained that “building trust” and improvement of the overall bilateral relationship are prerequisites for progress on specific issues. Developments in the run-up to the summit, such as the joint climate statement in Glasgow, suggest that Beijing has relaxed its preconditions.

How does the summit symbolize a diplomatic reset?

Both symbolically and substantively, the summit will empower lower-level officials in both countries to work on issues within their purview. This is more significant in China, where clear signals from the top are necessary for subordinates to engage, but it will also help to mitigate paralysis on the U.S. side resulting from competing visions of how best to address China-related issues.

What issues will be top of mind for Biden and Xi?

Both will want to diminish exaggerated characterizations of bilateral friction as evidence that we have entered a new Cold War and may be on the verge of conflict, and that cooperation on any issue is impossible. We have very real disagreements, but we also have many common or compatible objectives. Helping domestic and external audiences to understand that things are not nearly as dire as many observers contend will be a priority objective. Beyond that, I think clarifying matters of greatest concern to the other side and establishing mechanisms to address them will be on the agenda.

What areas can they agree on and where can they make progress?

They are likely to find it easier to agree on issues requiring joint effort than on the best way to address issues like nuclear proliferation (Iran and North Korea), new weapons systems and the danger of new arms races (hypersonic glide vehicles, cyber and kinetic threats to nuclear surveillance and command and control systems) and transition to cleaner energy sources.

What areas will spark disagreement and will these issues come up?

I suspect that both leaders will feel compelled to raise all of the high salience concerns in their countries. For Biden, that list includes Xinjiang, Hong Kong, PRC [People’s Republic of China] actions near Taiwan and the rollback of opportunities for Americans in China. Xi will raise U.S. military operations around China’s periphery, arms sales and relations with Taiwan, restrictions on visas for Chinese citizens and Chinese investment in the U.S., among other issues.

What would signal that the meeting was productive?

The fact that it has occurred will be significant because it will open the door to other, hopefully, less contentious exchanges across a broad spectrum of issues. Easing of travel restrictions should be easy to achieve but of more than symbolic importance. I doubt that the meeting is designed to solve any of the difficult issues in our relationship.

What do you think about Biden’s approach to China?

I agree with the President’s focus on his largely domestic “Build Back Better” agenda. Spending the time, effort and political capital necessary to secure approval of measures to address infrastructure, energy, education, childcare, internet access and a host of social justice, pandemic and voter protection issues are, in my opinion, more important than trying to improve relations with China for the sake of improving the relationship. Where working with China is necessary and/or perceived to be possible for achieving other domestic and foreign policy goals, he should do so. I think the fact that this summit is taking place is a sign that he is attempting to do that, but I judge that he is unwilling to jeopardize his ability to achieve higher priority objectives by making concessions to Beijing merely to create the appearance of a better relationship.

Center Fellow Oriana Skylar Mastro discussed America's strategic, military, and economic interests in Taiwan, as well as the potential for an outbreak of armed conflict on WBUR's "On Point" with Meghna Chakrabarti. 

Mastro first reflected on the escalation of Chinese miliary activity in the Taiwan Strait and the potential likelihood of conflict in the immediate future, stating that, "The increase in recent tensions does not tell us that there's a higher likelihood of war...we have this uptick in Chinese military activity in the vicinity of Taiwan...the number of air incursions in particular has increased exponentially."

The month of October, in particular, saw record high rates of Chinese aircraft with a record high on October 4 with 56 aircraft, and 159 aircraft total entering Taiwan's air defense identification zone.

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Mastro then suggested that the recent displays of military power are not indicative of a plan to invade Taiwan immediately. "I think this is mainly political signaling, Beijing is trying to tell Taiwan, you're on your own...as much as the United States can make statements, can make agreements like AUKUS with the Australians, when push comes to shove, they are not here," she said.

Mastro indicated that the situation with Taiwan is part of a larger great power competition in which China aims to exert global influence. "The bottom line is that China has a different vision of what it wants the world to be like. And it's not only that China wants to control what governments do, they want to control what corporations, universities, individuals can say and do," she said.

"China has demonstrated whenever it has economic power, diplomatic power, or military power, they are more than willing to use it to hurt others...if [U.S.] national security has been free from foreign dictation, being free from other countries telling the United States and the American people what to do, then it's absolutely critical that we stand up to China," said Mastro.

When asked about the prevention of armed conflict, Mastro argued that "War is very easy to prevent, you just give the other side everything they want. The difficulty is ensuring our own peace and security, stability and prosperity in the face of this challenge. And so for that reason, I think [Taiwan] is very important, and Taiwan is only the the biggest Flashpoint and the first step to ensuring that the United States maintains its position in Asia and therefore its position in the world."

Listen to the full conversation here.