Intensifying Divisions

Larry Diamond, Mosbacher Senior Fellow in Global Democracy

The January 6 insurrection was the gravest assault on American democracy since the Civil War, and it came much closer to disrupting the peaceful transfer of power (and possibly our democracy itself) than we realized at the time.

Rather than providing a sobering lesson of the dangers of political polarization, the insurrection seems only to have intensified our divisions, and the willingness to contemplate or condone the use of violence. According to a recent Washington Post survey, a third of Americans feel violence against the government could be justified in some circumstances —a sharp increase from 16 percent in 2010 and 23 percent in 2015.

Sadly, many politicians have not been the least bit chastened by the close brush with a constitutional catastrophe. The “Big Lie” that Biden did not legitimately win the 2020 election retains the support of most Republicans and a substantial proportion of independents. Around the country, Republican legislatures have been introducing, and in many states adopting, bills that would give Republican legislatures the ability to reverse or sabotage legitimate electoral outcomes, and other bills that make it more difficult for people (especially Democratic-leaning groups) to vote. All of this is doing deep damage to the global reputation and hence “soft power” of American democracy.

Although they are generally relieved that Trump is no longer president, our allies remain deeply worried about the stability and effectiveness of American democracy.

What gives me some hope is the expanding network of civil society organizations documenting the multiple threats to electoral integrity in the U.S. But we are going to need much more widespread and resourceful mobilization to counter the downward spiral of our democracy.

Problems at Home, Issues Abroad

Francis Fukuyama, Olivier Nomellini Senior Fellow

The Capitol uprising on January 6 marked a grave crisis in American institutions, when a sitting President refused to transfer power peacefully and sought to actively overturn an election.  The Republican Party, rather than repudiating the uprising and marginalizing its organizers, instead rallied in subsequent weeks to normalize the event.  These developments, while bad in themselves from the standpoint of US politics, also sent an unmistakable geopolitical signal that the Biden presidency would not represent an American return to “normal” internationalism.  The Administration would lead a deeply polarized country uncertain of its own global role.

This is the point at which geopolitics and domestic unrest come together. The single greatest weakness of the United States today does not lie in its economy or military power, but in the deep polarization that has affected American politics.  This is not just speculation, but something underlined by Kremlin-linked commentators, as Françoise Thom has detailed: in the words of one, "the decrepit empire of the Stars and Stripes, weakened by LGBT, BLM, etc." makes "it is clear that it will not survive a two-front war."  They see that a significant number of Republicans believe that the Democratic Party represents a bigger threat to the American way of life than does Russia.  A country that cannot rally around sensible public health measures during a pandemic will not rally around defense of freedom abroad.  This is the significance of January 6:  it has hardened partisan divisions rather than being the occasion for national soul-searching.

Read Francis Fukuyama's full commentary in American Purpose.

Democracy vs. Partisanship

Didi Kuo, Senior Research Scholar at CDDRL

It has been a year since rioters stormed the United States Capitol in an effort—an organized, violent effort—to declare Donald Trump the rightful winner of the 2020 presidential election. The riots signaled a dangerous turn in American politics, an attack on the basic, fundamental institutions of democracy. For democracy to work, all sides must agree on the rules of the game: the fairness of the balloting and counting process, the routine and peaceful transfer of power. We now see what happens when the institutions and procedures of elections are delegitimated.

Our political leaders can act now to restore confidence in elections. They can do so by protecting election administrators from threats of violence, by depoliticizing oversight of elections, and by passing democratic reforms. Although President Biden’s Freedom to Vote Act and John Lewis Voting Rights Advancement Act have been blocked by Republicans, narrower versions of these bills could create stricter federal election standards. And Americans can organize to protect democracy through civic groups that push for ballot access and election integrity, particularly at the state level. Politicians and activists alike must make clear that election administration is not a partisan issue. As the nation enters the third year of a global pandemic and an upcoming midterm election, our leaders must make strengthening democracy their utmost priority.

Watch Kuo's conversation with Hakeem Jefferson about the anniversary of the riots at the U.S. Capitol.

Epistemic Fractures and Exploitation

Herbert Lin, Senior Research Scholar at CISAC

The failure of the Jan. 6 insurrection provided an opportunity for the United States to collectively take a step back from the conspiracy theories and lies that pervaded American political discourse in the preceding couple of years. But alas, the nation failed to take advantage of that opportunity, with tens of millions of Americans maintaining their delusions as strongly as ever. Substantial numbers of Americans continue to believe that Donald Trump really won the 2020 election, and the number of QAnon adherents and believers was virtually unchanged.

Even more alarming has been the cynical exploitation of such trends by elected officials in their quest to gain or retain political power. Rather than standing up for the rule of law and defending the conclusions of an independent judiciary regarding various allegations of election fraud, they have pointed to such outcomes as yet more evidence of a system rigged against them. We now live in a environment in which no conceivable evidence can persuade true believers to change their minds, and the resulting epistemic fractures translate into a once-unified nation sharply divided against itself.  A worse national posture to meet the challenges of coming great-power competition could not be imagined.

Read more of Herbert Lin's analysis of contemporary security issues and power competition in his latest book, Cyber Threats and Nuclear Weapons (Stanford University Press, 2021).

The Need to Protect and Invest In Elections

Matthew Masterson, Non-resident Fellow at the Stanford Internet Observatory

The insurrection on January 6th left a scar on American Democracy. For the first time in our history, America did not have a peaceful transition of power. The effects of that day continue to be felt every day in election offices across the United States. Election officials, the guardians of our Democracy, are targets of harassment and threats fueled by the ongoing lies regarding the integrity and accuracy of the election. Worse yet, there have been little no consequences for these threats against our democracy. While some who participated in January 6^th are being investigated and prosecuted, those responsible for the threats against election officials have faced little to no accountability for their actions. Facing ongoing threats and little support from law enforcement election officials are leaving their jobs out of fear for their own safety and the safety of their families.

Healing the wound of January 6th won’t be easy; there must be accountability for the damage done to our democracy. American democracy is resilient and strong, but can not survive the unchecked attacks against it. Those who seek to profit from the lies about 2020 need to be held accountable for selling out democracy in pursuit of their own political and financial gain. They must be defeated at the ballot box or their businesses made to pay the price  by Americans unwilling to accept holding democracy for ransom. As we bring accountability, we need to invest in continuing to improve the security, accessibility and integrity of the process. We need to fund elections on an ongoing basis like the national security issue they are. The only response to this sustained attack on our democracy is a sustained investment in protecting it.  

Russia maintains the world’s largest nuclear arsenal and the most powerful conventional military forces in Europe. Russian military units currently are deployed — uninvited and unwanted — in Ukraine, Georgia, and Moldova. As Russia’s massing of military power near Ukraine prompted a crisis, President Vladimir Putin has demanded legally-binding security guarantees for… Russia.

On December 17, the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs took the unusual step of publishing draft U.S.-Russia and NATO-Russia agreements that encapsulate Moscow’s desired guarantees. The substance of the drafts and the way the Russians publicized them do not suggest a serious negotiating bid.

If the Kremlin is serious about negotiating and deescalates the situation near Ukraine, the West could engage on some elements of the drafts. Many, however, will go nowhere — as Moscow surely knew.

DRAFT NATO-RUSSIA AGREEMENT

Russia’s draft “Agreement on Measures to Ensure the Security of the Russian Federation and Member States of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization” would require that NATO members commit to no further enlargement of the alliance, including in particular to Ukraine. There is little enthusiasm within NATO now for putting Ukraine on a membership track, as Putin and other Russian officials undoubtedly understand. However, the alliance will not reverse its long-standing “open door” policy. That would require consensus, and few allies, let alone all 30, would agree that Russia can dictate NATO policy in this way.

This suggests that a middle ground of “not now but not never” might offer a way to kick this thorny can down the road. That is, if Moscow wishes to defuse the situation.

Another article in the Russian draft would require that NATO deploy no forces or weapons in countries that joined the alliance after May 1997. That month, NATO committed not to permanently station substantial combat forces in new members and said it had “no intention, no plan, and no reason” to deploy nuclear weapons on their territory. From 1997 to 2014, NATO deployed virtually no troops or equipment in new member states.

That changed following Russia’s seizure of Crimea. NATO now deploys, on a rotating basis, relatively small multinational battlegroups in the Baltic states and Poland. It is difficult to see NATO agreeing to withdraw them absent a significant change in Russia’s military posture. However, the draft treaty would impose no requirements for redeployment of Russian forces.

Such provisions will prove non-starters with the alliance. Others might get a more positive reception. These include language on consultative mechanisms, such as the NATO-Russia Council, and the establishment of a hotline between NATO and Russia. Indeed, NATO has proposed NATO-Russia Council meetings, though Moscow suspended diplomatic relations with NATO in October.

The draft treaty also would bar deployment of intermediate-range missiles in areas where they could reach the other side’s territory. Of course, the 1987 Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty banned all U.S. and Russian intermediate-range missiles. However, Russia’s deployment of the intermediate-range 9M729 cruise missile in violation of the treaty led to its collapse.

This idea sounds like Putin’s 2019 proposal for a moratorium on deploying intermediate-range missiles in Europe. While NATO turned that aside, it might be worth a second look, provided that Russia affirmed that it would apply to the 9M729 and had appropriate verification measures.

The draft treaty’s proposed bar on any NATO military activity in Ukraine, eastern Europe, the Caucasus, or Central Asia is an overreach, but some measures to limit military exercises and activities on a reciprocal basis might be possible. There is a history of such provisions, for example, the Vienna Document’s confidence- and security-building measures.

DRAFT U.S.-RUSSIA TREATY

The draft “Treaty between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on Security Guarantees” also contains unacceptable provisions. Washington likely will not agree to a requirement that the two countries “not implement security measures … that could undermine core security interests of the other Party.” Moscow has shown it has a very broad definition of what it thinks could undermine its security. Likewise, it is unrealistic to ask the United States to prevent further NATO enlargement; Washington will not agree to close the “open door,” and even if it were to do so, it could not persuade all 29 other allies to agree to change the policy.

While interest could develop in the draft NATO-Russia agreement’s provision on intermediate-range missiles, there will be no interest in the draft U.S.-Russia treaty provision which would effectively ban U.S. intermediate-range missiles from Europe while leaving Russia free to deploy such missiles against NATO countries. The provision limiting the ability of heavy bombers and surface warships to operate in and over international waters will find no fans in Washington or, for that matter, in the Russian military.

Discussion on other provisions regarding military activities might be possible. It is unreasonable for Moscow to seek a veto over Kyiv’s foreign policy direction. However, the concern expressed by Putin earlier in December and then repeated about U.S. offensive missiles in Ukraine able to strike Moscow in a matter of minutes poses a different question. That concern could prove easy to address, as there is no indication that Washington has ever considered it. Other such Russian concerns might also be addressed, along with U.S. (and NATO) concerns about certain Russian military activities.

The draft provision requiring that all nuclear weapons be deployed on national territory should go into another forum. Biden administration officials hope to begin a negotiation with Russia that would cover all U.S. and Russian nuclear arms. That is the proper place for this issue. Whether a requirement that all nuclear weapons be based on national territory would prove acceptable to Washington would depend on the overall agreement and consultations with allies.

PROPOSALS INTENDED TO FAIL?

The unacceptable provisions in the two draft agreements, their quick publication by the Russian government, and the peremptory terms used by Russian officials to describe Moscow’s demands raise concern that the Kremlin may want rejection. With large forces near Ukraine, Moscow could then cite that as another pretext for military action against its neighbor.

If, on the other hand, these draft agreements represent an opening bid, and the Russians seek a serious exchange that also addresses the security concerns of the other parties, some draft provisions could offer a basis for discussion and negotiation. The North Atlantic Council stated last week that NATO is “ready for meaningful dialogue with Russia.” U.S. national security adviser Jake Sullivan reiterated that point: “We’ve had dialogue with Russia on European security issues for the last 20 years… That has sometimes produced progress, sometimes produced deadlock. But we are fundamentally prepared for dialogue.”

A deescalation of the situation near Ukraine would help greatly. U.S. and NATO officials will not want to engage as long as Russia hangs a military threat over Kyiv. Another question is the format. Washington and Moscow can have bilateral discussions, but negotiations have to include all affected parties, including Ukraine. The United States and Russia cannot cut a deal over the heads of the Europeans and Ukrainians. As Sullivan said, “nothing about you without you.”

The sides should come to the table prepared to address the other’s legitimate security concerns. Agreeing on the meaning of “legitimate” will consume long hours. For example, it is unlikely that the United States (or NATO) will compromise on the principle — to which Moscow has agreed as a signatory to the 1975 Helsinki Final Act — that states have a right to choose their own foreign policy course. The question of military activities in the NATO-Russia region is a different issue, and NATO has already shown its readiness to undertake commitments in that regard.

These discussions and any negotiation will be long, complex, and arduous. That is the kind of work that diplomats do. Getting started down that path, however, will require very different signals than those the West and Ukraine have seen from Moscow the past several weeks.

Originally for Brookings Institution's Order from Chaos blog