North Korea’s economy continues to move ahead despite years of isolation and international trade restrictions. The economy is performing at a moderate rate with a mean GDP growth rate of 0.7 percent from 2004 to 2015, and appears to be a focus of the regime’s policy decision-making, researchers have found.

“The government has embraced markets as an acceptable and effective way to improve performance and enhance legitimacy but maintains the ability to regulate marketized activities,” SK Center Fellow Yong Suk Lee and Shorenstein APARC Fellow Thomas Fingar wrote in a joint report released today.

The report, available in English and Korean (forthcoming), is an outcome of research collaboration between the Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center (APARC) and the Institute for National Security Strategy (INSS), a research body focused on national security policy that is part of the South Korean government.

Conducted over the course of six months, the collaboration included two roundtable meetings at Stanford and in Seoul with the report’s co-authors from the INSS, Kwang-Jin Kim and Hyung-Seog Lee, and Korea-focused scholars at Shorenstein APARC, including Gi-Wook Shin, director of the center; Kathleen Stephens, the William J. Perry Fellow; and Daniel Sneider, associate director for research.

“We set out with the research question ‘how is the current North Korean regime performing,’ and through our engagements with the INSS, were able to combine our expertise and look at the question from new and different angles,” said Shin, also a professor of sociology and director of the Korea Program, who initiated the collaboration.

The researchers participated in discussions and parsed through data and qualitative accounts, including surveys from the INSS and reporting by journalists. From their collaboration, they determined two approaches to understanding the country’s economic and institutional expansion since Kim Jong-un assumed power six years ago, both of which are outlined in the report.

Their first approach suggests that organizational and personnel changes in Kim Jong-un’s cabinet, key ministries and committees were undertaken, at least in part, to enact operational effectiveness and a more productive economy.

“There’s evidence that indicates new appointments by Kim Jong-un were intended to maintain or enhance the ability of the government to meet continuing and new policy objectives,” said Fingar, a political scientist with an emphasis on Northeast Asia.

Kim Jong-un has attempted to consolidate control by removing at least two-dozen officials in the government’s main governing body – the Korean Workers’ Party, and in some cases, promoting them to different positions.

In the report, the researchers mapped the systems of North Korea’s three rulers since its founding in 1948 and the significant leadership changes under Kim Jong-un, noting that recent vice-premier promotions have included new economic responsibilities.

Personnel changes in the military have also involved positions responsible for oversight of foreign relations, commerce, oil and statistics, which suggest that officials are judged not only on their loyalty to the regime, but also on their performance at the job, Fingar said.

Their second approach suggests that North Korea’s improved economic performance is linked to its expansion of markets, and since 2009, its increased trade and investment with China.

“While the government maintains the ability to regulate market activities, North Korea’s growing dependence on the ‘private sector’ is a sign of the priority assigned to it and of its movement away from a socialist-style economy,” said Lee, an economist and deputy director of the Korea Program.

Officially licensed markets in North Korea have been estimated to number in the hundreds and the government collects taxes from them. There also exists a similar estimate for unofficial markets operating in the country, according to data cited in the report.

The researchers said it is improbable that North Korea will abandon market-oriented activities and capital inflows from outside its borders, particularly from China, in a time of tightening sanctions from the U.N. Security Council and other countries in response to North Korea’s repeated nuclear and missile tests.

“Taken together or apart, the two approaches we’ve put forth provide a comprehensive puzzle for future study,” said Lee. “We hope this report brings additional lenses that researchers can apply to analyze the performance of the North Korean regime and that policymakers can use to assess the efficacy of international sanctions.”

Colonel Patrick Winstead, the 2016-17 FSI senior military fellow at Shorenstein APARC, writes about the second annual orientation at U.S. Pacific Command headquarters

The mission of the Department of Defense (DoD) in the Indo-Asia-Pacific region recently became a bit clearer for 22 faculty and military fellows from Stanford, the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, the Naval Postgraduate School and the Daniel K. Inouye Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies (APCSS). The U.S.-Asia Security Initiative at the Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center (APARC) in the Freeman Spogli Institute (FSI) organized a group of faculty and fellows for a two-day orientation of United States Pacific Command (USPACOM) and its component military organizations in and around Honolulu, Hawaii, April 13-14, 2017. The purpose of the orientation was to provide researchers with a comprehensive understanding of how America’s armed forces both develop and implement U.S. national security strategy, doctrine and policy throughout Asia.

The trip began with a visit to the headquarters of USPACOM at Camp H.M. Smith. After receiving briefings about USPACOM's mission and operations, the group engaged in roundtable discussions with General Terrence O’Shaughnessy (Commander, U.S. Pacific Air Forces); Major General Kevin B. Schneider (Chief of Staff, USPACOM); Rear Admiral Mark Montgomery (Director for Operations, USPACOM); Major General Steven Rudd (Director for Strategic Planning and Policy, USPACOM); as well as other key joint directors and members of the command staff. The faculty and fellows provided short presentations on the situation in the South China Sea, U.S.-Philippine relations and cyber warfare to an audience of mid-grade military officers and civilian personnel assigned to USPACOM.

In addition to meeting with the leadership of USPACOM, the group was also afforded the opportunity to interact with personnel from the four separate component commands. Deputy Commanding General of U.S. Army Pacific, Major General Charlie Flynn, provided a command briefing at the U.S. Army Pacific headquarters at Fort Shafter. The briefing stimulated a wide-ranging discussion about Army initiatives and activities in support of USPACOM’s mission in the Indo-Asia-Pacific region. At Marine Corps Base Hawaii at Kaneohe Bay, under the guidance of trainers, the visitors took part in a hands-on experience operating Humvee simulators in a virtual-reality convoy setting and firing simulated weapons that Marines typically employ in combat operations. The first day of the trip ended with a working dinner at the historic Nimitz House with the Commander of the U.S. Pacific Fleet, Admiral Scott Swift, where the conversation ranged from Chinese military modernization to evolving U.S. naval doctrine.

Those themes carried into the second day, when the group met for several hours with faculty at APCSS for plenary presentations and multiple breakout sessions to facilitate in-depth dialogue on select topics including the threats posed by nuclear weapons on the Korean Peninsula and in South Asia. The day continued with a tour of the U.S.S Hopper, an Arleigh-Burke class guided missile destroyer, based at Pearl Harbor, Hawaii. Once onboard, the ship’s captain, Lieutenant Commander J.D. Gainey, provided briefings on Hopper’s mission and operational capabilities. In addition, the group spoke with members of the ship’s crew. The experience allowed the faculty and fellows to interact informally with sailors who serve in the Asia-Pacific theatre and to candidly discuss issues of concern. The second day of the orientation ended with a visit to the headquarters of U.S. Pacific Air Forces and a dialogue with O’Shaughnessy and his staff about the unique security challenges of the Indo-Asia-Pacific region, such as tyranny of distance, limited support bases and multiple emerging threats, and how those challenges impact the Air Force and the entire U.S. military’s preparations for contingencies in the region.

Overall, the orientation provided a unique opportunity to engage directly with high-level leaders of USPACOM and to learn first-hand about the challenges faced by those who serve in the armed forces. The orientation also provided a forum to discuss the United States’ national security interests in the region and its efforts to maintain peace and stability in the Indo-Asia-Pacific and to help maintain a rules-based, liberal democratic order.

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"If the threat posed by North Korea’s nuclear weapons were easy to solve, the problem would have been solved long ago. In addressing the threat from North Korea, a very real threat in which the North Korean’s could develop ICBMs that could deliver nuclear weapons to the American mainland, the United States must confront two very difficult challenges," explains Stephen Krasner in the Lawfare. Read the whole article here. 

Emily Tuong-Vi Nguyen, a Stanford student studying human biology, writes about the Asia Health Policy Program’s international conference on diabetes

The Asia Health Policy Program at the Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center hosted the Net Value in Diabetes Management Workshop in March to discuss progress on an international research collaboration. Research teams from Hong Kong, Singapore, China, Taiwan, South Korea and the United States convened at the Stanford Center at Peking University (SCPKU) in Beijing to work on research that compares utilization and spending patterns on diabetes across different countries and to develop a method for measuring the net value of diabetes internationally, based on previous methods discussed in a Eggleston and Newhouse et al. 2009 study with Mayo Clinic Data for Type 2 diabetes.

The research teams from various Asian countries are attempting to calculate the net value of diabetes in those countries by observing the changes in diabetes value and spending. These calculations include monetizing the value of health benefits of new treatments and improvements in health, as well as avoided spending on treatments when prevention was effective, and associated mortality and probability of survival. Previous models used to measure diabetic values and risks, such as the United Kingdom Prospective Diabetes Study (UKPDS) risk engine that was created from U.K. data and populations, are not very relevant for Asian populations. The goal is to create separate risk models specifically suited for populations from Hong Kong, Singapore, China, Taiwan and South Korea.

During the workshop that spanned two days, the research teams had an opportunity to share updates on their individual projects and to discuss methods and ideas for future collaboration.

On the first day, each research team presented its work, describing data sets and explaining the risk models that were used or developed. Karen Eggleston, director of the Asia Health Policy Program, delivered introductory remarks and shared current progress by the Japan and Netherlands research teams on calculating value and risk for diabetes with data from the Netherlands and Japan. The data sets from those two countries were best estimated by the JJ Risk Engine for the Japan data and the UKPDS model for the Netherlands data.

Chao Quan of the University of Hong Kong presented the risk model used for Hong Kong populations. His work primarily looked at how the UKPDS risk engine predicted risk in Hong Kong populations as compared to a local Hong Kong risk engine and how to best calibrate the Hong Kong risk engine. His next step will be to monetize the value for improved survival in diabetes in Hong Kong. He offered to re-estimate the model using the risk factors available on others’ datasets so that the Hong Kong risk model could potentially be used by other teams as well.

Stefan Ma and Zheng Li Yau of the Ministry of Health of Singapore discussed the 5-year prediction model and statistical methods they used for all-cause mortality of Singaporean individuals with diabetes. Their work is based on Singapore’s extensive administrative and claims data as well as data provided by the national health surveys conducted every six years by the National Health Service of Singapore. The researchers plan to look into how their overall risk model compares with models for specific subpopulations, such as Chinese, Malay and Indian populations in Singapore.

Katherine Hastings from the Stanford University team, led by principal investigator Latha Palaniappan, presented preliminary ideas about measuring cardiovascular risk with the Atherosclerotic Cardiovascular Disease Risk Score in analyses of Stanford health system diabetic patients. The researchers are collaborating with a clinical bioinformatics team at Stanford to use machine learning to expedite the analysis.

Min Yu and Haibin Wu of the Zhejiang Center for Disease Control and Prevention shared results from their analysis of health data collected from community health centers for diabetes management, diabetes surveillance data, cause of death data and insurance claims data that showed relationships between different patient characteristics and insurance types. The researchers then estimated the annual cost of Type 2 diabetes and its complications in Tongxiang province, China.

Hai Fang and Huyang Zhang of Peking University worked with claims data of diabetic patients insured by the New Cooperative Medical Scheme in Beijing, and at the workshop, shared regression analyses on the relationship between outpatient visits and inpatient admissions.

Jianqun Dong of the People’s Republic of China Center for Disease Control and Prevention presented ongoing research about diabetes management in China, including preliminary results of a randomized control trial of diabetes self-management strategies.

Wankyo Chung of Seoul National University shared preliminary estimates of a risk model for mortality among diabetic patients in South Korea and discussed next steps for estimating net value of diabetes management using the detailed clinical and claims data available in South Korea.

On the second day, the workshop concluded with a videoconference between workshop participants in Beijing and collaborators at Stanford Graduate Business School, including Stanford professor Latha Palaniappan and Harvard visiting professor Joseph P. Newhouse, using the Highly Immersive Classroom.

The workshop was a good opportunity for the research teams to discuss preliminary models, to offer each other suggestions regarding research methods, and to discuss the future direction of the international collaboration on the net value of diabetes. All research teams are preparing comparative research papers that will be included in the working paper series of the Asia Health Policy Program. A follow-up event will be held at Stanford in November 2017 in recognition of World Diabetes Day.

Japan is an increasingly divided country between elites and the public as it grapples with whether it should acquire nuclear weapons itself and not rely on America’s protection, a Stanford scholar found.

Sayuri Romei, a political scientist and predoctoral fellow at Stanford’s Center for International Security and Cooperation (CISAC), has a new working paper that describes how Japanese society is grappling with its nuclear future. Romei researches the U.S.-Japan relationship, nuclear security, nationalism and identity in East Asia.

“The shift in the Japanese nuclear debate at the turn of the 21st century did not stem directly from a willingness to deter the new and urgent looming military threats, but was rather the result of a very limited security role that collapsed after the end of the Cold War, and took the shape of a disoriented and shaky Japanese identity,” she wrote.

Japan, a country that suffered two nuclear bombs in WWII, has a well-justified historical “nuclear allergy” that long restrained nuclear weapons ambitions, Romei said. But today, internal questions about Japan’s national sense of identity is causing elites to reconsider the nuclear military option.

She said it’s true that the tone in that debate has been changing in recent years as Japan’s security landscape changes – North Korea and China are building up their nuclear and conventional military programs. On top of this, when the Cold War ended in 1991, the “nuclear umbrella” that the U.S. afforded Japan became “theoretically less justified in an evolving security context,” as Romei describes it. Japan, in turn, sought reassurance from the U.S. that it would not abandon her.

Rethinking Japan's security

Yet the turn of the 21^st century is hardly the first time that Japanese elites have discussed a nuclear option, or that they have felt a sense of mistrust towards their ally, she said. Rather than a break from the past, Japanese elites’ behavior suggests a continuity in their thinking:

“It would therefore be more correct to talk of a renaissance of the nuclear debate, rather than an erosion of the nuclear taboo,” Romei said.

What is new in today’s nuclear statements, however, is the increasing intertwining between rethinking security identity issues, a rising nationalism, and a more challenging regional environment, she said.

Along with the necessity to rethink Japan’s security arrangement, pre-WWII nostalgia and nationalism have been growing in Japan as Prime Minister Shinzō Abe's constitutional reforms are being enacted, Romei said. And so, some top officials are reevaluating Japan's nuclear policy in favor of a more self-sufficient approach that fits their increasingly nationalist mood.

“The line between the rethinking of a Japanese security identity and pushing a nationalist agenda into the current nuclear policy is very thin,” wrote Romei.

No longer do Japanese nationalists wish to be perceived as the “faithful dog” in the U.S-Japan alliance, as they resent the “lack of a healthy postwar nationalism,” she said. Restarting some of the country’s nuclear power plants after the Fukushima Daiichi accident was even described by one leading Japanese politician as the first step toward the country acquiring nuclear weapons of its own, she added.

Though some Japanese scholars argue that Japan has been preparing for the acquisition of nuclear weapons since the end of WWII, Romei said that the link between the two sides of the nuclear coin was never really visible in Japan: indeed, the government has historically succeeded in making a sharp distinction between nuclear power for peaceful vs. military purposes.

‘Still very sensitive’

One well-known trait of Japan’s nuclear history is that Japan has a strong popular peace and anti-nuclear movement with public opinion polls set against acquiring nuclear weapons, Romei said. Peace, security, and nuclear matters are in fact deeply linked in postwar Japanese history.

“The constant and consistent work of peace associations and the massive organized demonstrations against Prime Minister Abe’s security reform plans that took place across Japan during the entire summer in 2015 are a relevant sign that public opinion is still very sensitive to a change of pace,” she wrote.

But public opinion and elite opinion “do not speak the same language and are heading in different directions,” she wrote. Elites – political  and  thought leaders, for example – continue to allude to a nuclear option for Japan to defend itself unilaterally, with or without the American nuclear umbrella.

“This sudden proliferation of nuclear statements among Japanese elites  in 2002 has been directly linked by Japan watchers to the break out of the second North Korean nuclear crisis and the rapid buildup of China’s military capabilities,” Romei said.

Trusting America?

But those external threats, she said, are actually used as a “pretext to solve a more deep-rooted and long-standing anxiety that stems from Japan’s own unsuccessful quest for a less reactive, and more proactive post-Cold War identity,” Romei noted.

The level of trust that Japanese elites feel towards their American ally is an important leitmotiv in the country’s nuclear debate, she said.

While during the Cold War U.S. credibility was mainly linked to Japan’s limited role as an ally in a bipolar era, after the collapse of this system Japanese elites slowly began their quest for a new identity, thus questioning and changing the meaning of the U.S.-Japan alliance, Roemi said. Furthermore, the first decade of the 21^st century brought about a new nationalist layer that complicates the issue of trust in the ally by adding a populist tone to the domestic nuclear debate.

Romei believes that if the gap in elite-public opinion continues to widen, Japan’s longstanding “nuclear allergy” could be overwhelmed as the government – not necessarily by design – gradually creates the political and cultural conditions that seemingly justify building nuclear weapons, Romei said.

“The turn of the century brought a new strategic environment in which Japan was forced to question its own post-Cold War identity, without eventually succeeding in an actual change,” she wrote.

Romei urges a careful monitoring of Japan’s nuclear debate moving forward – the major political shift in the U.S. caused by the November 2016 presidential elections is a key reason. America’s future political direction will ultimately affect Japan’s sense of identity by easing the questioning of the U.S.-Japan security arrangement.

While the study of the Japanese nuclear debate cannot necessarily offer a prediction of the country’s future nuclear policy choices, it can serve as an important tool to gauge the evolution of Japan’s own perception of its role in the current world order, she said.

Romei is a nuclear security predoctoral fellow at CISAC for 2016-2017 and a doctoral candidate in international relations at Roma Tre University in Rome, Italy. Her dissertation focuses on the relationship between Japan’s nuclear mentality and its identity evolution in the post-WWII era. 

MEDIA CONTACTS:

Sayuri Romei, Center for International Security and Cooperation: (650) 725-5364, sromei@stanford.edu

Clifton B. Parker, Center for International Security and Cooperation: (650) 725-6488, cbparker@stanford.edu

(The following interview with CISAC's Siegfried Hecker appeared in the May 15 issue of the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists.)

By Elisabeth Eaves

Siegfried Hecker has the rare distinction of being an American who has visited both North Korean and Russian nuclear facilities. An expert on plutonium science and a professor at Stanford University’s Center for International Security and Cooperation, Hecker is also a former director of the Los Alamos National Laboratory. Here he answers questions on Pyongyang’s nuclear capabilities, its most recent missile test, and what influence the new president of South Korea might have on the regional balance of power. He explains how North Korea developed its arsenal despite global opposition, and says there is no conceivable way the United States can destroy all North Korean nuclear weapons with military might.

BAS: Is North Korea currently capable of delivering any nuclear weapons any distance? How do you know?

SH: We know they have nuclear weapons that work because they have tested five nuclear devices over a period of 10 years. That test experience most likely enables them to miniaturize nuclear warheads to make them small and light enough to mount on missiles. They have also demonstrated over many years that they can launch relatively short-range missiles reliably. We have to assume they can mate the warheads and the missiles so as to reach targets anywhere in South Korea and Japan.

BAS: What does Pyongyang’s most recent missile test, which took place on Sunday, tell us about their capabilities and intentions?

SH: The missile experts are still analyzing the test as North Korea releases details and photos. However, they already agree that this missile outperformed any previous North Korean missile launch. It is reported to have traveled nearly 800 kilometers (497 miles) for 30 minutes (splashing down in the Sea of Japan south of the Russian border) and reached an altitude in excess of 2000 km (1243 miles). Since it was launched in a lofted trajectory, it may be able to travel at least 4,000 km (2486 miles) if launched on a standard trajectory. 

This would make it a real intermediate-range ballistic missile that puts Guam within range. But the more important objective of this test was to move North Korea closer to having an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM). 

BAS: What sequence of events might lead Kim Jong-un to launch a nuclear attack on one of its neighbors like South Korea or Japan? 

SH: I cannot imagine any circumstance that would lead Kim Jong-un to launch an unprovoked nuclear attack on anyone. However, we know so little about him and even less about the military that controls the country’s strategic rocket forces that we can’t rule out a miscalculation or a desperate response to a crisis. It is conceivable that they believe a small nuclear weapon could be used to de-escalate or terminate a conventional confrontation on their terms. 

BAS: How big is the largest nuclear bomb tested by North Korea, and can you give a sense of the level of damage such a bomb would cause? 

SH: The highest yield of the North Korean tests to date is in the range of 15 to 25 kilotons—an explosive power similar to the bombs that destroyed Hiroshima and Nagasaki, causing roughly 200,000 immediate fatalities and lingering radiological health effects for many survivors. If such a weapon were to be exploded over Seoul, it is possible that several hundred thousand people or more would perish. 

BAS: If Pyongyang were to attack South Korea or Japan, what would be the immediate and longer-term effects?

SH: The immediate effects would be horrific, the longer-term effects catastrophic. If several bombs exploded over South Korean or Japanese cities, there could be a million or more casualties. Beyond that, the cities would face massive evacuations and long-term building and grounds decontamination efforts. Dangerous radioactive clouds would drift over South Korea, Japan, China, or Russia, depending on the wind flow. An international order would be destroyed. 

BAS: How close is North Korea to being able to attack somewhere as far distant as the United States with a nuclear weapon? What technical leaps does it need to make to achieve that capability?

SH: I believe that North Korea does not yet have the capability to reach the US mainland with a nuclear-tipped missile. It has a very sparse and not very successful long-range rocket test history, although the missile test on Sunday brings it somewhat closer. Its solid-fueled rockets, which are of greatest concern because they can be launched quickly and from hidden locations, have failed regularly. It will need to miniaturize warheads to a much greater extent than it is currently likely capable of doing, and the warheads will have to survive the stresses at launch and the high temperatures and stresses during re-entry. At the current pace, North Korea may be able to make the technological progress required for a nuclear-tipped ICBM in five or so years. 

One corollary question that one must ask, however, is why would North Korea want to strike the US mainland? It is quite clear that it wants to threaten Washington with such a capability, but to launch would be suicidal, and I don’t believe the regime is suicidal. 

BAS: Besides being able to threaten the United States and its allies, what else could the Kim regime be trying to accomplish with its nuclear weapons?

SH: We need to look closely at how the North’s growing nuclear arsenal may change its domestic policies and foreign relations. Domestically, the nuclear arsenal may help justify the regime’s continued call for sacrifice by its citizens. But it may also provide a more solid foundation for the state’s security, allowing it to devote more resources to economic growth. Foreign visitors have reported that living conditions in Pyongyang have improved markedly in the past few years despite international sanctions. Kim Jong-un has officially promoted the dual policy of military and economic growth. 

Looking abroad, the regime’s nuclear arsenal could make it more aggressive in dealings with South Korea and the rest of the region. We have not seen a return to the North’s especially aggressive behavior of the late 1960s. Nevertheless, being one of fewer than 10 states in the world with nuclear weapons may change Pyongyang’s foreign policy toward its neighbors. And we don’t know how possessing a nuclear arsenal will affect the regime’s behavior in a crisis. 

BAS: Is it plausible that a US pre-emptive strike could destroy all North Korean nuclear weapons, fissile material, and nuclear production facilities? Why or why not?

SH: There is no conceivable way the United States could destroy all North Korean nuclear weapons. It is not possible to know where they all are. Even if a few could be located, it would be difficult to destroy them without causing them to detonate and create a mushroom cloud over the Korean peninsula. 

It is even less likely that the United States could locate and demolish all of the North’s nuclear materials. Missile launch sites could be destroyed, nuclear test tunnels could be bombed, production sites could be destroyed, and North Korean missiles could possibly be intercepted after launch. But North Korea is developing road-mobile and submarine-launched missiles, which cannot be located reliably. New test tunnels can be dug. And while we know North Korea has covert production facilities, we don’t know where they are. The US military may not be able to intercept missiles after launch. The bottom line is, military strikes could be used to set back the North Korean nuclear program but not to eliminate it.

Moreover, I believe the US and South Korean governments consider the consequences of any military intervention unacceptably high—in spite of the proclamation that “all options are on the table.” I believe the military option will only really be on the table if North Korea initiates military actions. 

BAS: There is talk that North Korea is about to conduct a sixth nuclear test. What do you make of these reports? Do you have any insight into what to expect?

SH: North Korea has ample technical reason to test again as it moves toward developing a credible nuclear-tipped ICBM. The test site appears to be ready. I believe the only thing that inhibits them from testing is the political fallout they would face—particularly from China and the new South Korean administration.

BAS: You recently estimated that North Korea has 20 to 25 nuclear weapons. How do we know?

SH: My estimate that it has sufficient plutonium and highly enriched uranium for 20 to 25 nuclear weapons is highly uncertain because we know so little about its uranium enrichment capacity. All estimates are to a large extent based on the observations my Stanford colleagues and I made during my last visit to Yongbyon in November 2010. To my knowledge, no outsiders have been in their nuclear complex since. So the only direct evidence we have is from that 30-minute tour and discussions with their experts at the centrifuge facility. The rest of the estimate is based on indirect evidence—that is, satellite imagery, and what North Korea chooses to publicize, combined with modeling of their capabilities and acquisitions. 

BAS: North Korea carried out its first nuclear test in 2006. How was it able to go from that widely condemned first test to today’s arsenal despite global opposition? 

SH: How they developed a threatening nuclear arsenal despite global opposition is a sad reflection on unwise US policies and the international community’s approach to preventing nuclear proliferation. Controlling the supply side of proliferation has been the predominant international mechanism for halting nuclear weapons development, but it failed terribly in the North Korean case. The international export system is leaky enough that a determined government can develop indigenous bomb-building capabilities over time. In North Korea, this process was exacerbated by the fact that once they built the Bomb, sanctions and isolation allowed them to build a whole arsenal instead of forcing them to give it up.

Insufficient attention has been paid to the demand side—that is, to why states want nuclear weapons and what can be done to influence the decision to acquire them. In the North Korean case, the Clinton administration greatly slowed North Korea’s drive to the Bomb with diplomacy. The Bush administration rejected diplomacy, but was unprepared for the consequences. It stood by while North Korea built a nuclear weapon. Subsequent attempts at diplomacy amounted to too little, too late. (This should serve as a lesson on the Iran nuclear agreement: if you kill a deal, you better be prepared for the consequences). The Obama administration was greeted with a North Korean nuclear test in 2009 and was never able or willing to pursue diplomacy effectively. It relied on two tactics, imposing sanctions and pressuring China, while North Korea continued to build its arsenal. Washington and Beijing never got on the same page on how to deal with Pyongyang. 

BAS: South Korea just elected a new president who takes a more conciliatory approach to North Korea than his predecessor. How might this affect the North’s nuclear activities?

SH: In the end, the Korean peninsula nuclear crisis has to be resolved to the satisfaction of the Korean people. South Korean President Moon Jae-in favors diplomatic engagement with North Korea. I believe that at this point, it is imperative for Seoul and Washington to craft a unified strategy on North Korea and speak with one voice. That voice should reflect the new South Korean president’s views on finding a diplomatic resolution. I hope that the Trump administration will support President Moon, and that Pyongyang won’t pre-empt diplomacy with a nuclear or long-range missile test. 

BAS: If you were advising president Trump, what would you tell him to do in the next month regarding North Korea? In the next six months? The next year?

SH: In the next few weeks, after consultation with President Moon, President Trump should send an envoy to Pyongyang to tackle the most immediate danger—that is, to avoid a nuclear detonation on the Korean peninsula. There is a danger that overconfidence or miscalculation by Kim Jong-un, or an unpredictable reaction to a crisis, could result in a nuclear detonation. I also have serious concerns about a nuclear-weapon accident in North Korea, particularly if Pyongyang feels threatened and begins to deploy its nuclear arsenal. Moreover, in the case of upheaval or chaos in the North, who will control the weapons, and what will become of them? 

The next six months should be followed up with additional bilateral US-North Korea dialogue, with Washington separately keeping Seoul and Beijing informed. Washington should stress the seriousness of the situation, but also listen to the North’s concerns. 

These dialogues may then lay the foundation within the next year for a resumption of multilateral negotiations to halt, roll back, and eventually eliminate North Korea’s nuclear weapons. Talks could also lay the groundwork for normalizing relations between the North and its neighbors and the United States.

Follow CISAC at @StanfordCISAC and www.facebook.com/StanfordCISAC.

MEDIA CONTACTS:

Siegfried Hecker, Center for International Security and Cooperation: (650) 725-6468, shecker@stanford.edu

Clifton B. Parker, Center for International Security and Cooperation: (650) 725-6488, cbparker@stanford.edu