(Amy Zegart, co-director of the Center for International Security and Cooperation, wrote the following essay for The Atlantic.)

Today The Washington Post dropped the bombshell that President Trump had revealed classified information about the Islamic State to Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov and Russian ambassador Sergey Kislyak when the three of them met at the White House last week. You know a story is big when it gets as many concurrent visitors as the story about the infamous Access Hollywood video. There was no hiding near bushes in the dark this time to walk back the damage. Deputy National-Security Advisor Dina Powell declared the story “false,” and the administration also called out the big guns, with Secretary of State Rex Tillerson and National Security Advisor H.R. McMaster dutifully rushing into the breach to discuss the breach, using oh-so-carefully worded statements about how the president did not reveal “sources or methods” or any “military operations” that were not already known publicly.

So just how bad is the damage? On a scale of 1 to 10—and I’m just ball parking here—it’s about a billion. The story, which has since been confirmed by The Wall Street Journal, The New York Times, Reuters, Buzzfeed, and CNN, notes that the president could have jeopardized a critical source of intelligence on the Islamic State. Not America’s source. Somebody else’s. Presumably from an allied intelligence service who now knows that the American president cannot be trusted with sensitive information.

The type of information Trump cavalierly shared fell under a classification known as “code word,” according to the Post. There are three basic levels of classified information. Confidential information is defined as anything that could reasonably be expected to “cause damage” to American national security if shared without authorization. Secret information is one step up, considered to have the potential to cause “serious damage” if revealed. Top Secret information is a higher classification level still, comprising anything that could reasonably be expected to cause “exceptionally grave damage” to U.S. national security if revealed.

Code word is beyond Top Secret. It limits access to classified information to a much narrower pool of people to provide an extra layer of security. Many secrets are super-secrets—Harry Truman, as vice president, didn’t know about the Manhattan project. He learned of it only after Franklin Delano Roosevelt died and Truman was sworn in as president. Code word classification is so far off the scale, even fake spies rarely refer to it in the movies. Technically, the president can "declassify" anything he wants, so he did not violate any laws. But as Lawfare notes, if the president tweeted out the nuclear codes, he also wouldn't violate the law—but he would rightly be considered unfit for office.

Did Trump reveal intelligence crown jewels or just boast about the fact that he liked diamonds? According to the Post he revealed information about a purported ISIS plot involving laptops. It’s likely, however, that Tillerson, McMaster, the Postand the Times are ALL correct: The president did not reveal sources or methods or military operations. But that doesn’t matter much if he gave away information that will enable the Russians to identify the source or the methods. It looks like he did, since according to the Post’s account he talked about the content of a specific plot, the potential harm, and the location of the city in the Islamic State’s territory where the allied state’s intelligence service detected it. It was almost everything except the GPS coordinates. The denials by Tillerson and McMaster are a classic case of intelligence super-parsing—saying things that are technically and narrowly true but may not be accurate at all. No spin can hide the fact that the breach was deadly serious and reckless in the extreme.

Then there’s the impact on America’s unnamed ally, whom the Post reported was already nervous about sharing such sensitive intelligence with the United States. It is difficult to penetrate the Islamic State, and there is a major risk that this breach will close down a vital source. It’s an even bigger deal in the big picture, potentially jeopardizing intelligence cooperation with other U.S. allies around the world. Trump already raised intelligence eyebrows when he turned his Mar-a-Lago dining area into an impromptu Situation Room after the North Koreans decided to launch a ballistic missile. The president and his aides used the lights on cell phones to illuminate field reports, in full view of resort dinner guests snapping photos. If you’re known as someone who cannot keep a secret, the world’s secret-keepers are not going to tell you much.

“Can you believe the world we live in today?” President Trump said, according to one official in the two Sergeis meeting. “Isn’t it crazy?”

Yes, Mr. President. It’s crazy.

Moon Jae-in was elected South Korea’s president on a pledge to address domestic inequality and to renew dialogue with North Korea. In the midst of Tuesday’s vote, Shorenstein APARC scholars offered insight to local and international media outlets.

Gi-Wook Shin, professor of sociology and director of Shorenstein APARC’s Korea Program, provided comment to The Economist about the challenges facing an administration led by Moon, a progressive candidate who is assuming power when an active conservative camp remains. He is also cited in an article in the New York Times focused on Moon's economic agenda and featured in a video from a Korea Society event that examines next steps for the new president.

Rennie Moon, the Koret Fellow in the Korea Program, co-authored an analysis piece on the East Asia Forum with Shin analyzing recent polls and the Moon administration's economic and security agenda.

Daniel Sneider, associate director for research at Shorenstein APARC, wrote an analysis piece for The National Bureau of Asian Research. In the piece, he explores how the election could impact the U.S.-Republic of Korea alliance amid escalating tensions on the Korean Peninsula.

Kathleen Stephens, the William J. Perry Fellow at Shorenstein APARC, appeared in a live interview on CNBC. In the taping, she discusses the significance of the vote and the new administration’s priorities as Moon swiftly takes office following the removal of his predecessor.

Fellows will arrive at Stanford in July to begin the three-week academic training program taught by Stanford faculty, policymakers and thought-leaders in the technology sector.

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Stanford's Center on Democracy, Development, and the Rule of Law is proud to announce the 2017 class of Draper Hills Summer Fellows, which is composed of 28 leaders – selected from among hundreds of applications – advancing democratic development in some of the most challenging corners of the world.

In Bahrain, Burma, Rwanda and Sudan our fellows are working on peace-building initiatives to create more tolerant and inclusive societies. Judges and lawyers are holding government and criminals accountable and reforming the rule of law in Argentina, Guatemala and the Philippines. Gender rights activists are creating new tools and programs to protect the safety and freedom of women and girls in India, Kuwait and Papua New Guinea.

In Egypt, Morocco, Pakistan, Serbia and Ukraine, our fellows are serving inside the government as members of Parliament and senior civil servants to advance reform and new policy agendas. Business leaders in Jordan and India launched initiatives to support more inclusive economic growth and social development.

CDDRL is excited to launch another powerful network of leaders determined to advance change in their communities. They will emerge with new tools, frameworks and connections to enhance their work and deepen their impact on democratic reform.

The 2017 class will mark the 13th cohort of the Draper Hills Summer Fellows Program and the fellows will join the Omidyar Network Leadership Forum, an alumni community of over 300 alumni in 75 countries worldwide.

This is the eighth and last in a series of interviews by the Korea Times on North Korea. CISAC's Siegfried Hecker is featured in this story below by Kim Jae-kyoung:

NK estimated to have ability to produce 7 nuclear bombs a year

By Kim Jae-kyoung

A world-renowned nuclear scientist said that U.S. President Donald Trump must to talk to North Korean leader Kim Jong-un by sending an envoy to Pyongyang to avoid a nuclear catastrophe.

"I believe the first talks should be bilateral and informal by a presidential envoy talking directly to Kim Jong-un," said Siegfried S. Hecker, a senior fellow at the Center for International Security and Cooperation (CISAC) at Stanford University, in an interview.

"I believe both Seoul and Beijing would support such talks. These talks may then also help to build the foundation for renewed multilateral negotiations, which, first and foremost must involve South Korea, as well as China," he added.

Hecker, the co-director of CISAC from 2007 to 2012, has visited North Korea several times to assess the plutonium program at the Yongbyon Nuclear Scientific Research Center since 2004.

He stressed that it is most important to convey the message that nuclear weapons cannot be used under any circumstances.

"There is no such thing as a limited nuclear war. Any explosion of a nuclear device on the Korean Peninsula is a catastrophe of indescribable proportions," he said.

The internationally recognized expert in plutonium science, global threat reduction and nuclear security said that the Trump administration and the new South Korean government face the challenge of avoiding a nuclear detonation on the Korean Peninsula.

He believes that such an incident could result from a miscalculation or overconfidence by the Kim Jong-un regime as well as an accident with the nuclear weapons in the North.

"A conventional confrontation may turn nuclear with an inexperienced leader in charge," he said. "Or, in the case of instability in the North, who will control the nuclear weapons? These are serious concerns that must be addressed now," he added.

Hecker, who served as the director of the Los Alamos weapons laboratory in New Mexico, the birthplace of the atomic bomb, from 1986 to 1997, estimated that North Korea, although he is uncertain, may have sufficient material for 20 to 25 nuclear weapons.

NK's nuclear capabilities evolving 

He explained that the size of its nuclear arsenal depends primarily on how much plutonium and highly enriched uranium North Korea has produced.

"The sophistication of the arsenal depends primarily on nuclear testing. With five nuclear tests conducted over 10 years, North Korea is likely able to produce nuclear devices small enough to fit on missiles that can reach all of South Korea and Japan," he said.

He also estimated that the totalitarian country can produce sufficient plutonium and highly enriched uranium for six to seven bombs per year.

"However, all estimates are uncertain because we know little about the North's capacity to produce highly enriched uranium since it is not possible to monitor such facilities from afar," he said.

In his view, the world does not have to accept the reclusive country as a "nuclear weapons state," but it must be treated as a country with a nuclear arsenal.

"Whether we like it or not, North Korea is a country with nuclear weapons," he said. "The final aim is to have a denuclearized Korean Peninsula, but that will take time. It will have to be done in sequence of halt, roll back and then eliminate."

However, Hecker dismissed North Korea's claim that it has the capability to fire an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) all the way to the U.S. mainland.

"I do not believe North Korea is capable of reaching the U.S. mainland with a nuclear-tipped missile today. It is working on developing such a capability, but it will likely take another five years or so," he said.

Hecker explained that it has not demonstrated all the aspects of necessary rocket technology or the ability to make a nuclear warhead small enough to be able to survive atmospheric reentry.

"Besides, to actually launch a nuclear warhead on an ICBM you must have complete confidence that it will not blow up on the launch pad," he added. "They cannot have such confidence based on their missile launch history."