International Relations

FSI researchers strive to understand how countries relate to one another, and what policies are needed to achieve global stability and prosperity. International relations experts focus on the challenging U.S.-Russian relationship, the alliance between the U.S. and Japan and the limitations of America’s counterinsurgency strategy in Afghanistan.

Foreign aid is also examined by scholars trying to understand whether money earmarked for health improvements reaches those who need it most. And FSI’s Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center has published on the need for strong South Korean leadership in dealing with its northern neighbor.

FSI researchers also look at the citizens who drive international relations, studying the effects of migration and how borders shape people’s lives. Meanwhile FSI students are very much involved in this area, working with the United Nations in Ethiopia to rethink refugee communities.

Trade is also a key component of international relations, with FSI approaching the topic from a slew of angles and states. The economy of trade is rife for study, with an APARC event on the implications of more open trade policies in Japan, and FSI researchers making sense of who would benefit from a free trade zone between the European Union and the United States.

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Panelists:

Young-Sun Ha, Chairman, East Asia Institute, South Korea; Professor emeritus, Political Science and International Relations, Seoul National University

Wang Hwi Lee, Professor, Political Science, Ajou University, South Korea

Thomas Fingar, Shorenstein APARC Fellow, Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies, Stanford University

Gi-Wook Shin (moderator), Director, Shorenstein APARC;  William J. Perry Professor of Contemporary Korea, Stanford University

 

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Editor's Note:  The observations in this article are based on the author’s conversations with Ukrainians, both inside and outside of government, and others in Kyiv during an October 31-November 2, 2019 visit.
 

How do Ukrainians assess the performance and prospects of President Volodymyr Zelenskiy, now five months in office, as he tackles the country’s two largest challenges: resolving the war with Russia and implementing economic and anti-corruption reforms? In two words: cautious optimism. Many retain the optimism they felt when Zelenskiy swept into office this spring, elected with more than 70% of the vote. At the same time, they express caution about how his presidency will perform.

OPTIMISM

Almost everyone credits Zelenskiy with being open-minded and genuinely sincere in his desire to promote reform, make progress in ending the conflict with Russia in Donbas, and build a successful Ukrainian state. They see his young supporting team — the cabinet ministers’ average age is 39 — as energetic and pro-reform. They want to move quickly.

Zelenskiy has brought many new faces into his presidential office. Likewise, new faces populate the cabinet of ministers and his political party, Sluha Narodu (Servant of the People, which was also the name of his television show before he became president). These people went through their formative years in the mid 1990s and 2000s. Like Zelenskiy himself, they came of age after the collapse of the Soviet system.

Zelenskiy, moreover, has a position unique for Ukrainian presidents since the country regained independence in 1991. He has his own man as prime minister, and Sluha Narodu controls a solid majority of seats in the Rada (parliament). He thus is well positioned to press through reforms and other changes — and has every incentive to do so since, if things go badly, he will have no one to blame other than himself.

All of this generates optimism that, finally, Ukraine can make a definitive breakthrough and proceed quickly down the path to becoming a normal European state — what many joined the Maidan Revolution protests to achieve. However, cautions also arise.

CAPACITY TO MAKE DOMESTIC CHANGES?

Some question whether Zelenskiy’s team has the professional skills and intellectual capacity to manage the government and deliver real change. They have set some lofty ambitions. For example, Prime Minister Oleksiy Honcharuk has suggested the economy will grow by 40% in five years. Accomplishing that will prove a challenge. It will require a focused reform program and discipline among Sluha Narodu members in the Rada.

Whether Sluha Narodu can maintain the needed discipline is, for many, an open question. The party holds 252 of 423 seats in the Rada; another 27 seats that would represent Crimea, illegally annexed by Russia in 2014, or parts of Donbas occupied by Russian and Russian proxy forces, remain unfilled. As it takes 226 votes to pass legislation, Sluha Narodu has real political power. But questions have arisen about differences within the party, with some already seeing factions aligning with particular oligarchs. Lack of party unity could bode ill for Zelenskiy’s legislative agenda.

Another question concerns the nature of Zelenskiy’s relationship with oligarch Ihor Kolomoisky, who owns the television channel that broadcast Zelenskiy’s popular comedy show. A September Zelenskiy-Kolomoisky meeting in the presidential office undercut prior Zelenskiy assurances that Kolomoisky would have no influence over him.

The primary test case for that relationship remains Privatbank, in which Kolomoisky was a major shareholder. The National Bank of Ukraine nationalized Privatbank in 2016, after an audit revealed losses on the order of $5.5 billion. Kolomoisky has filed suit to reclaim his ownership share or wants $2 billion in compensation. He won a favorable ruling in a Ukrainian court earlier this year, though he lost a ruling in a parallel case in London.

Questions about Privatbank’s future have slowed consideration by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) of a new program of credits for Ukraine. If Kolomoisky were to prevail, that would almost certainly kill the IMF program. However, the ministers of finance and economy oppose any compromise with Kolomoisky, and Zelenskiy supporters point to statements by the president and his office that Zelenskiy will not let Kolomoisky win. They express frustration that those statements have not satisfied IMF officials.

Another concern is that Zelenskiy follows opinion polls too closely and adjusts his positions if they appear unpopular. For example, Zelenskiy came out shortly after his election in favor of allowing the sale of agricultural land (a moratorium on such sales dating back to the 1990s has proven a major impediment to development of Ukraine’s agricultural sector). Apparently based on poll results, he subsequently decided to limit sales to Ukrainian citizens. While it might not be surprising that he follows polls, his approval rating in early October exceeded 70% — wildly high by Ukrainian standards. He has political space to take controversial decisions that might go against pollsters’ findings.

PEACE, DONBAS, AND RUSSIA

The simmering conflict in eastern Ukraine, where Russian and Russian proxy forces occupy part of Donbas, has now entered its sixth year. Zelenskiy attaches top priority to ending that conflict and restoring Ukrainian sovereignty. He and his team justify this in real and understandable terms: More Ukrainian soldiers die each week along the line of contact. Moreover, they feel that now could offer their best opportunity to reach a settlement with Moscow.

Zelenskiy seeks a summit meeting of the “Normandy format,” which would involve Russian President Vladimir Putin, German Chancellor Angela Merkel, and French President Emmanuel Macron. To try to shake things loose on Donbas, Zelenskiy endorsed the Minsk agreements reached in 2014 and 2015, accepted the “Steinmeier formula” for implementation of Minsk (albeit reinterpreting its terms), and ordered Ukrainian military forces to disengage and pull back from the line of contact in two locations, with a third disengagement possible in the near future.

The president’s team hopes these steps will set up a summit meeting in which progress can be made or, failing that, the blame falls on Putin. Other Ukrainians worry, however, that Zelenskiy appears too eager for agreement. That could lead Putin to up his demands. They also question whether he has solid red lines on where to stop in any negotiation with the more experienced Russian leader.

CONCERN ABOUT RELATIONSHIPS WITH WEST

As Kyiv prepares for a possible Normandy format summit, Ukrainians are nervous about the backing they will receive from Germany and France. They note the decision to re-admit Russia to the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, the nearing completion of the Nord Stream II gas pipeline, and the apparent French desire to move toward business as usual with Moscow and restore the G-8 by bringing Russia back in. All these actions strike Ukrainians as steps to return to a more normal Europe-Russia relationship, despite the fact that the Russians have done nothing to correct their aggressions of the past five-plus years.

Ukrainians also express nervousness about whether the congressional impeachment inquiry might lead to a reduction in U.S. support for Ukraine. Ukrainian officials note that Secretary of State Mike Pompeo’s decision last week to cancel a visit to Kyiv just two days after it was proposed did not help in this regard. Kyiv wants full U.S. backing as it prepares for the possible Normandy summit, especially as Ukrainians see the United States as the only Western country that can serve as a counterbalance to Russia.

SO, CAUTIOUS OPTIMISM

The bottom line is that Ukrainians are both optimistic and cautious about what Zelenskiy might achieve. Depending on whom one speaks to, the emphasis on optimism or caution varies, though caution seems to win out more than optimism, at least in the short term.

Zelenskiy faces two early tests: how he handles a Ukrainian-Russian-German-French summit meeting (assuming that it happens), and whether he can reassure the International Monetary Fund and others (both in Ukraine and in the West) that he will protect Privatbank and that there will be no compromise with Kolomoisky. These questions will affect judgments about Zelenskiy’s ability over the longer term to press forward with the kinds of economic reforms and anti-corruption measures that would enable a significant acceleration in Ukraine’s growth rate and in its movement toward European normalcy.

 

Originally for Brookings: https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2019/11/04/five-months-…

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This event is co-sponsored with The Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies

 

Seminar Recording: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-vHBvzWHcpw&feature=youtu.be

 

Abstract: The world’s largest organization is also one of its most mysterious. The Department of Defense (DOD) employs more men and women than Amazon, McDonald’s, FedEx, Target, and General Electric combined. Yet most Americans know little about it beyond its $700 billion budget and iconic five-sided headquarters. Now, the leader who knows the Pentagon best pulls back the curtain on an institution that many regard with a mix of awe and suspicion, revealing not just what it does but why, and why it matters. Former Secretary of Defense Ash Carter will offer an insider’s account of how America’s military works—and how it should work. It is also a timely reassessment of U.S. foreign policy and national security strategies in a rapidly changing world, and a timeless reflection on the leadership qualities essential to not only run but also reform a dauntingly complex organization. 

 

Speaker's Biography:

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For or over thirty-five years Ash Carter served in numerous jobs in the Department of Defense, mostly recently as the twenty-fifth Secretary of Defense under President Obama. He currently serves as the Director of the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at Harvard Kennedy School and an innovation fellow at MIT. He also is a Rhodes scholar with a PhD in nuclear physics.

Ash Carter 25th Secretary of Defense
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North Korea’s international trade has increased by more than three times since mid-1990's. Using various data sources and a frontier theory of international trade, North Korea's economic gains from trade can be quantified to show the gains are substantial. This implies that the opportunity cost of abandoning economic openness is high, thus, this is an important leverage to promote North Korea’s political openness and denuclearization. However, the current economic openness of North Korea has a fundamental limitation because of its heavy reliance on China. The China-dependence pattern of its trades has only recently emerged. It is worth noting that North Korea’s trades were much more diversified before 2008. The comparative advantage analysis shows that North Korea’s trades can be diversified as before; and cooperation among North Korea, South Korea, and the United States can play an important role for the diversification if it is shaped from global perspectives rather than by the bilateral relations.

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Hyeok Jeong (PhD, University of Chicago) is a professor at the Graduate School of International Studies (GSIS), Seoul National University. His main research interests include economic growth and development, productivity and inequality dynamics in relation to financial deepening and labor market issues such as human capital and demographic transition. His recent research agenda also includes the influences of firm and product dynamics on international trade, higher education reform, Korea’s long-term development process, evolution of Korea’s demographic dividends, North Korean economy, and international development cooperation on issues such as knowledge sharing and development finance. Prior to joining the faculty of GSIS in 2015, he was a professor of economics at the University of Southern California and Vanderbilt University; National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies in Japan; and the KDI School of Public Policy and Management in Korea.

 

 

Hyeok Jeong <i>Professor, Seoul National University</i>
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This event is open to Stanford undergraduate students only. 
 
The Center on Democracy, Development, and the Rule of Law (CDDRL) will be accepting applications from eligible juniors on who are interested in writing their senior thesis on a subject touching upon democracy, economic development, and rule of law (DDRL) from any university department.  The application period opens on January 13, 2020 and runs through February 14, 2020.   CDDRL faculty and current honors students will be present to discuss the program and answer any questions.
 
For more information on the Fisher Family CDDRL Honors Program, please click here.
 
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Encina Hall, C152
616 Jane Stanford Way
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Senior Fellow at the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies
Professor, by courtesy, of Political Science
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Stephen Stedman is a Senior Fellow at the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies (FSI) and the Center on Democracy, Development and the Rule of Law (CDDRL), an affiliated faculty member at CISAC, and professor of political science (by courtesy) at Stanford University. He is director of CDDRL's Fisher Family Honors Program in Democracy, Development and Rule of Law, and will be faculty director of the Program on International Relations in the School of Humanities and Sciences effective Fall 2025.

In 2011-12 Professor Stedman served as the Director for the Global Commission on Elections, Democracy, and Security, a body of eminent persons tasked with developing recommendations on promoting and protecting the integrity of elections and international electoral assistance. The Commission is a joint project of the Kofi Annan Foundation and International IDEA, an intergovernmental organization that works on international democracy and electoral assistance.

In 2003-04 Professor Stedman was Research Director of the United Nations High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change and was a principal drafter of the Panel’s report, A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility.

In 2005 he served as Assistant Secretary-General and Special Advisor to the Secretary- General of the United Nations, with responsibility for working with governments to adopt the Panel’s recommendations for strengthening collective security and for implementing changes within the United Nations Secretariat, including the creation of a Peacebuilding Support Office, a Counter Terrorism Task Force, and a Policy Committee to act as a cabinet to the Secretary-General.

His most recent book, with Bruce Jones and Carlos Pascual, is Power and Responsibility: Creating International Order in an Era of Transnational Threats (Washington DC: Brookings Institution, 2009).

Director, Fisher Family Honors Program in Democracy, Development and Rule of Law
Director, Program in International Relations
Affiliated faculty at the Center for International Security and Cooperation
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Encina Hall, C150
616 Jane Stanford Way
Stanford, CA 94305

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Center Fellow, Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies
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Didi Kuo is a Center Fellow at the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies (FSI) at Stanford University. She is a scholar of comparative politics with a focus on democratization, corruption and clientelism, political parties and institutions, and political reform. She is the author of The Great Retreat: How Political Parties Should Behave and Why They Don’t (Oxford University Press) and Clientelism, Capitalism, and Democracy: the rise of programmatic politics in the United States and Britain (Cambridge University Press, 2018).

She has been at Stanford since 2013 as the manager of the Program on American Democracy in Comparative Perspective and is co-director of the Fisher Family Honors Program at CDDRL. She was an Eric and Wendy Schmidt Fellow at New America and is a non-resident fellow with the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. She received a PhD in political science from Harvard University, an MSc in Economic and Social History from Oxford University, where she studied as a Marshall Scholar, and a BA from Emory University.

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Following the death of ISIS leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi and the decision by President Donald Trump to remove U.S. troops from northern Syria, there are many questions surrounding the future of the region, which is controlled in part by Al-Qaeda-affiliated extremists, former Special Presidential Envoy for the Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS Brett McGurk told Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies Director Michael McFaul on the World Class podcast.



ISIS initially gained momentum in Syria in 2012, when the government had eroded and a state of anarchy was developing, said McGurk, who is the Payne Distinguished Lecturer at the Center for International Security and Cooperation. “Starting in 2012 and 2013, thousands of foreign extremist fighters were pouring into Syria, looking for extremist groups to join. And Baghdadi’s guys — which became ISIS — basically took advantage of this.”

By 2014, ISIS controlled a territory with about eight million people and had revenues of about $1 billion a year, McGurk noted.

“I was an early advocate that we needed military force almost immediately,” he said. “To get someone recruited right into Syria, then go blow himself up at a kid’s soccer game, or an ice cream shop — if you have that pipeline, you know you have something pretty serious.” 

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The Anti-ISIS Strategy
In the summer of 2014, President Barack Obama decided to take action, with a few conditions: first, that the coalition against ISIS would be broad, and include countries outside of the United States; second, that U.S. troops would work with local partners in Iraq and Syria to fight the terror group; and third, that the coalition would share the costs and burdens associated with the military campaign.

“The campaign launched during the third week of August or so during that summer, and it was a real war,” McGurk said. “It was a very difficult, town-by-town struggle, but a successful war.”

The Death of al-Baghdadi
While al-Baghdadi will be replaced by a successor, the former ISIS leader is “somewhat irreplaceable,” said McGurk. He claimed to be a caliph — a religious leader in Islam believed to be a successor to the Prophet Mohammed — and in 2014 declared the territory controlled by ISIS in Iraq and Syria a caliphate, or Islamic state.

“People around the world who pledge allegiance to ISIS pledge allegiance to him — so Baghdadi is a unique figure,” McGurk said. “His removal from the scene is excellent news.”

Related: Read Brett McGurk’s thoughts on what it takes for U.S. foreign policy to succeed in the Middle East

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Former Special Presidential Envoy for the Global Coalition to Counter ISIS Brett McGurk listens to questions from reporters during a Pentagon briefing May 19, 2017. Photo: Win McNamee - Getty Images
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