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During the severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) outbreak in 2003, Taiwan reported 346 confirmed cases and 73 deaths. Of all known infections, 94% were transmitted inside hospitals. Nine major hospitals were fully or partially shut down, and many doctors and nurses quit for fear of becoming infected. The Taipei Municipal Ho-Ping Hospital was most severely affected. Its index patient, a 42-year-old undocumented hospital laundry worker who interacted with staff and patients for 6 days before being hospitalized, became a superspreader, infecting at least 20 other patients and 10 staff members. The entire 450-bed hospital was ordered to shut down, and all 930 staff and 240 patients were quarantined within the hospital. The central government appointed the previous Minister of Health as head of the Anti-SARS Taskforce. Ultimately the hospital was evacuated; the outbreak resulted in 26 deaths. Events surrounding the hospital’s evacuation offer important lessons for hospitals struggling to cope with the COVID-19 pandemic, which has been caused by spread of a similar coronavirus.

Read the Full Study in the Journal of Hospital Medicine

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SHP's Jason Wang and colleagues provide five key steps to managing infections in hospitals during the COVID-19 pandemic in this Journal of Hospital Medicine study, drawing on lessons from previous hospital-based coronavirus infections.

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Join Cyber Policy Center, June 17rd at 10am Pacific Time for Patterns and Potential Solutions to Disinformation Sharing, Under COVID-19 and Beyond, with Josh Tucker, David Lazer and Evelyn Douek.

The session will explore which types of readers are most susceptible to fake news, whether crowdsourced fact-checking by ordinary citizens works and whether it can reduce the prevalence of false news in the information ecosystem. Speakers will also look at patterns of (mis)information sharing regarding COVID-19: Who is sharing what type of information? How has this varied over time? How much misinformation is circulating, and among whom? Finally, we'll explore how social media platforms are responding to COVID disinformation, how that differs from responses to political disinformation, and what we think they could be doing better.

Evelyn Douek is a doctoral candidate and lecturer on law at Harvard Law School, and Affiliate at the Berkman Klein Center For Internet & Society. Her research focuses on online speech governance, and the various private, national and global proposals for regulating content moderation.

David Lazer is a professor of political science and computer and information science and the co-director of the NULab for Texts, Maps, and Networks. Before joining the Northeastern faculty in fall 2009, he was an associate professor of public policy at Harvard’s John F. Kennedy School of Government and director of its Program on Networked Governance. 

Joshua Tucker is Professor of Politics, Director Jordan Center for the Advanced Study of Russia, Co-Director NYU Social Media and Political Participation (SMaPP) lab, Affiliated Professor of Russian and Slavic Studies and Affiliated Professor of Data Science.

The event is open to the public, but registration is required.

Online, via Zoom

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On May 28th, President Trump signed an executive order threatening to revoke CDA 230 protections, which would expose social media companies to increased liability for content that is posted on their sites. The Cyber Policy Center team responded on June 1 in a public webinar. The event was recorded.

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On Thursday, President Trump signed an executive order threatening to revoke CDA 230 protections, which would expose social media companies to increased liability for content that is posted on their sites. This comes on the heels of Twitter, last week, fact-checking two misleading tweets from the president about mail-in voting. Critics of the executive order say the White House is overstepping its authority, and cannot limit the legal protections that social media companies currently hold under federal law.
 
Join the Stanford Cyber Policy Center's team Monday June 1 at 8AM PST for President Trump’s Executive Order on Platforms and Online Speech: Stanford’s Cyber Policy Center Responds, with Nate Persily, Faculty Co-Director of the Cyber Policy Center and Director of the Program on Democracy and the Internet; Daphne Keller, Director for the Program on Platform Regulation and former associate general counsel for Google; Alex Stamos, Director of the Cyber Center’s Internet Observatory and former Chief Security Officer at Facebook; Marietje Schaake, Policy Director for the Cyber Policy Center and former Member of EU Parliament; and Eileen Donahoe, Executive Director of the Global Digital Policy Incubator and former US Ambassador to the UN Human Rights Counsel, in conversation with Cyber Center Director Kelly Born.

Monday, June 1st
8am PDT
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* Please note all CISAC events are scheduled using the Pacific Time Zone.

 

Livestream: Please click here to join the livestream webinar via Zoom or log-in with webinar ID 924 4971 4330.

 

About the Event: International statebuilding aims to transform weak, conflict-affected states into stable modern states, grounded in rule of law, market economies, and liberal democracies (Barnett 2006, Mann 2012). International organizations (IOs) play a central role in this effort. By deploying country-level statebuilding missions in conflict-affected states, IOs aim to co-govern with the conflict-affected state for a defined period of time, helping to strengthen the capacity of the state to govern itself. International relations scholarship assumes that once IOs exercise, possess, and assert their authority to intervene on a country’s domestic territory they do not have to renegotiate this authority. We argue, in contrast, that most agreements between IOs and the host government are incomplete contracts that give weak states substantial authority over the intervening IO. We demonstrate that in a context of changing sovereignty norms, weak states have consistently used their authority to resist the influence of IOs and reduce the effectiveness of international statebuilding efforts. To test the observable implications of these claims, we employ a mixed method research design that integrates text-as-data analysis with in-depth case studies.

 

About the Speakers:

 

Susanna P. Campbell is an Assistant Professor at the School of International Service and Director of the Research on International Policy Implementation Lab (RIPIL) at American University. Her research examines the sub-national behavior of international actors in fragile and conflict-affected states, addressing debates in the statebuilding, peacebuilding, peacekeeping, international aid, and global governance literatures. She uses mixed-method research designs and has conducted extensive fieldwork in conflict-affected countries, including Burundi, Democratic Republic of Congo, Nepal, Sudan, South Sudan, and East Timor. She has received grants from the Swiss National Science Foundation, the Swiss Network for International Studies, the United States Institute of Peace, and the Swedish and Dutch governments, among others. In 2018, she won the School of International Service Scholar-Teacher of the Year Award and the Excellence in PhD Mentoring Award.

Prof. Campbell’s first book, Global Governance and Local Peace (Cambridge University Press, 2018), argues that because global governance actors are accountable to external stakeholders, seemingly “bad behavior” by country-based staff is necessary for local peacebuilding performance. It was shortlisted for the 2020 Conflict Research Society Book of the Year Prize and featured as one of the 2018 top picks for engaged scholarship by Political Violence @ a Glance. She is finishing a co-authored second book, Aid in Conflict, that explains the aid allocation behavior of international donors in war-torn countries. Her work has also been published by Columbia University Press, International Studies Review, International Peacekeeping, Journal of Global Security Studies, and Political Research Quarterly, among others. Prior to graduate school, she worked for the United Nations, International Crisis Group, and the Council on Foreign Relations and recently served as a senior advisor for the Task Force on Extremism in Fragile States, mandated by the US Congress. She received her PhD from Tufts University and was a Post-Doctoral Researcher at Columbia University’s Saltzman Institute of War and Peace Studies and The Graduate Institute in Geneva.

 

Aila M. Matanock is an Associate Professor of Political Science at the University of California, Berkeley. Her research addresses the ways in which international and other outside actors engage in fragile states. She uses case studies, survey experiments, and cross-national data in this work. She has conducted fieldwork in Colombia, Central America, Europe, Melanesia, Southeast Asia, and elsewhere. She has received funding for these projects from many sources, including the National Science Foundation (NSF), the Minerva Research Initiative, the National Center for the Study of Terrorism and the Response to Terrorism (START), and the Center for Global Development (CGD). Her 2017 book, Electing Peace: From Civil Conflict to Political Participation, was published by Cambridge University Press. It won the 2018 Charles H. Levine Memorial Book Prize and was a runner up for the 2018 Conflict Research Society Book of the Year Prize. It is based on her dissertation research at Stanford University, which won the 2013 Helen Dwight Reid award from the American Political Science Association. Her work has also been published by the Annual Review of Political Science, Governance, International Security, International Studies Quarterly, Journal of Politics, Perspectives on Politics, and elsewhere. She worked at the RAND Corporation before graduate school, and, since then, she has held fellowships at the Center for International Security and Cooperation (CISAC) and the Hoover Institution at Stanford University and the Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation at UCSD. She received her Ph.D. in political science from Stanford University and her A.B. magna cum laude from Harvard University.

 

Virtual Seminar

Susanna P. Campbell and Aila M. Matanock
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* Please note all CISAC events are scheduled using the Pacific Time Zone

 

Seminar Recording: https://youtu.be/M7DEG62NsVQ

 

About the Event: In recent years, small modular reactors (SMRs, i.e. nuclear reactors with electric capacities less than 300 MWelec) have received bipartisan, Congressional support on the pretense that their development will reduce the mass and radiotoxicity of commercially generated nuclear waste. However, these metrics are of limited value in planning for the safe management and disposal of this radioactive material. By analyzing the published design specifications for water-, sodium-, and molten salt-cooled SMRs, I here characterize their notional, high-level waste streams in terms of decay heat, radiochemistry, and fissile isotope concentration, each of which have implications for geologic repository design and long-term safety. Volumes of low- and intermediate-level decommissioning waste, in the form of reactor components, coolants, and moderators, have also been estimated.

The results show that SMRs will not reduce the size of a geologic repository for spent nuclear fuel, nor the associated future dose rates. Rather, SMRs are poised to discharge spent fuel with relatively high concentrations of fissile material, which may pose re-criticality risks in a geologic repository. Furthermore, SMRs—in particular, designs that call for molten salt or sodium coolants—entail increased volumes of decommissioning waste, as compared to a standard 1100 MWelec, water-cooled reactor. Many of the anticipated SMR waste challenges are a consequence of neutron leakage, a basic physical process that reduces the fuel burnup efficiency in small reactor cores. Common approaches to attenuating neutron leakage from SMRs, such as the introduction of radial neutron reflectors, will increase the generation of decommissioning waste. The feasibility of managing SMR waste streams should be performed before these reactors are licensed, and future clean energy policies should acknowledge the adverse impact that SMRs will have on radioactive waste management and disposal.

 

About the Speaker: Dr. Lindsay Krall is a MacArthur post-doctoral fellow and a geochemist at SKB. Her post-doctoral research assesses the technical credibility of recent DOE programs related to SNF management, in particular those centered around deep borehole disposal and advanced nuclear reactors.

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Lindsay Krall was a MacArthur Postdoctoral Fellow at CISAC, 2019-2020. She couples Earth science with energy policy to study the back-end of the nuclear fuel cycle, focusing on geologic repository development. She began this research in 2009, coincident with the termination of the United States’ project to develop a repository for high-level nuclear waste. After completing her bachelor's degree in Industrial and Operations Engineering at the University of Michigan in 2011, she moved to Stockholm to work at the Swedish Nuclear Fuel and Waste Management Company. In 2017, Lindsay was awarded a Ph.D. in geochemistry by Stockholm University, and between 2017 and 2020, she was a MacArthur post-doctoral fellow, first at George Washington University and then, at CISAC. During this time, she assessed the technical viability of concepts to dispose of spent nuclear fuel in deep boreholes and she characterized the radioactive waste streams that might be generated in advanced fuel cycles and discussed their implications for geologic disposal.

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The New START Treaty has come under fire in recent weeks. Marshall Billingslea, President Trump’s new special envoy for arms control, said the Obama administration negotiated a very weak verification regime, which is odd because Trump administration officials have repeatedly acknowledged the security benefits of New START.

Read full article at Bulletin of Atomic Scientists

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Senior U.S. officials reportedly have discussed conducting a nuclear weapons test for the first time in 28 years.  Some apparently believe that doing so would provide leverage to persuade Russia and China to agree to Washington’s proposal for a trilateral nuclear arms negotiation.

In fact, a U.S. nuclear test would most likely have a very different effect:  opening the door for tests by other countries to develop more sophisticated nuclear weapons.  A smarter policy would maintain the current moratorium on nuclear testing, and ratify and seek to bring into force the 1996 Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT).

Several media sources have reported that a recent Deputies Committee meeting (composed of deputy or under secretaries of the Departments of State, Defense and Energy and senior representatives from other relevant agencies such as the Joint Chiefs) discussed a “rapid [nuclear] test.”  It was suggested that this could provide leverage to press Moscow and Beijing to take up the Trump administration’s proposal for a trilateral negotiation on nuclear arms.

No consensus was reached.  Apparently, representatives from State and Energy’s National Nuclear Security Administration opposed the idea.  They were correct to do so.

Beijing opposes a trilateral negotiation since the United States and Russia each have well more than ten times as many nuclear weapons as does China.  How would a U.S. nuclear test influence that calculation?

Moscow has linked a negotiation on all nuclear weapons (going beyond the deployed strategic warheads constrained by the 2010 New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty) to U.S. readiness to address issues such as missile defense constraints, a no-go area for the Trump administration.  How would a U.S. nuclear test change that?

The more likely impact of a U.S. nuclear test would be to open the door to resumed testing by other countries.  China, which has conducted 47 nuclear tests—less than one-twentieth the number conducted by the United States—might jump at the chance to test more sophisticated weapons designs.  India and Pakistan, who each conducted a small handful of tests in 1998, could likewise consider new testing.  They could blame Washington for breaking a nuclear testing moratorium that all countries, except North Korea, have observed since 1998.[*]

 

Ending the moratorium would not advance U.S. security interests.  The United States has conducted about as many nuclear weapons tests as the rest of the world combined (and 30 percent more than the number conducted by the Soviet Union/Russia).  U.S. weapons scientists learned more from testing.  When I served as a diplomat at the American Embassy in Moscow in 1988, I accompanied a U.S. team to the Soviet nuclear test site at Semipalatinsk (in what is now Kazakhstan).  Our Soviet hosts showed us a vertical shaft for an upcoming underground test; it was about three feet in diameter.  A U.S. team member from the test site in Nevada, which the Soviets would visit the following month, commented that U.S.-drilled vertical shafts for nuclear tests typically were nine to eleven feet in diameter.  That maximized the area above the weapon for instruments that would gather a burst of data in the nanosecond before they vaporized.

The testing moratorium and the CTBT, if ratified and entered into force, would seem to lock in an area of U.S. advantage regarding nuclear weapons and nuclear effects.  Why would we want others to test and erode that advantage?

Up until the idea of gaining leverage with Beijing and Moscow arose, the primary possible reason for a return to testing was if it became necessary to confirm the reliability of a weapons type in the stockpile.  However, the National Nuclear Security Administration has overseen for 25 years the Stockpile Stewardship Program, intended to confirm that U.S. nuclear weapons are safe, secure and reliable without having to test them in a manner that produces a nuclear yield. To do so, the program uses supercomputers, modeling and tools such as the Dual Axis Radiographic Hydrodynamic Test Facility (think of the world’s most powerful X-ray device).

Each year, the commander of Strategic Command and the directors of the national nuclear laboratories at Los Alamos, Sandia and Lawrence Livermore certify the safety and reliability of the nuclear stockpile.  When I visited Los Alamos several years ago, the director told me that, as long as the Stockpile Stewardship Program was funded, he was confident that nuclear testing was not needed.  He added that, as a result of the program, weapons scientists had learned things about how nuclear weapons work that they did not and could not learn from testing nuclear weapons underground.

The smart thing for U.S. national interests is to continue the moratorium, ratify the CTBT, and press others to ratify so that the treaty can be brought into force.  The Senate failed to give consent to ratification in 1999, due to concerns about how to maintain the stockpile’s reliability without nuclear testing and about monitoring the treaty.  The Stockpile Stewardship Program, just in its beginning stage then, can now answer the first concern and has been doing so.

As for monitoring a test ban, U.S. national technical means have improved over the past two decades, and the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty Organization has established the International Monitoring System with some 300 stations around the world.  It can detect underground nuclear explosions down to below one kiloton (the weapon that destroyed Hiroshima had a yield of 15 kilotons) as well as detecting tests in the atmosphere or ocean, both of which are banned by the 1963 Limited Test Ban Treaty.  Once in force, the CTBT also provides for an inspection mechanism.

As former Secretary of State George Shultz said in 2013, senators might have been correct not to consent to ratification in 1999, but given the Stockpile Stewardship Program’s development and enhanced monitoring systems, they would be right to vote for ratification now.

Conducting a nuclear test to bring China and Russia to the negotiating table will not work.  It will instead open the door for others to resume testing and close a nuclear weapons knowledge gap that favors the United States.  That will not make us safer or more secure.  It is an unwise idea that hopefully will continue to meet resistance within the U.S. government.

 

 

[*] The Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency stated in May 2019 that Russia “probably is not adhering to its nuclear testing moratorium in a manner consistent with the [CTBT’s] ‘zero-yield’ standard” but backed away from that assertion in answer to a follow-up question, in which he said that Russia had the “capability” to conduct very low-yield tests.  A June 2019 U.S. statement affirmed the assessment that “Russia has conducted nuclear weapons tests that have created nuclear yield” but provided no back-up information.  Moscow heatedly denied the charge.

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Since 2016, SPICE has offered regional online courses to top high school students in Japan. The first regional course was offered to high school students in Tottori Prefecture. Since then, SPICE has increased its regional online course offerings to high school students in Hiroshima Prefecture, Kawasaki City, and Oita Prefecture. These courses present creative and innovative approaches to teaching Japanese high school students about U.S. society and culture and global themes. 

All four courses recently finished their 201920 term. The course instructors were most pleased with the achievement of their students and thus had an exceedingly difficult time choosing only two honorees for each course. This article provides a brief overview of each course and the naming of the student honorees.

 

Stanford e-Hiroshima
Given Hiroshima Prefecture’s historical ties with the United States, Stanford e-Hiroshima had special significance to the students and its Instructor Rylan Sekiguchi. Some of the course topics included Japanese immigration from Hiroshima to the United States, World War II, and the Honolulu-Hiroshima sister city relationship. Sekiguchi announced the honorees as follows:

Student Honoree: Ryoya Matsuyama
School: Hiroshima Prefectural Sera High School
Project Title: Ocean Acidification in Japan and the U.S.

Student Honoree: Karin Umeshita
School: Hiroshima Prefectural Hiroshima High School
Project Title: Survey of the Stanford Research Park as Industry-Academia Collaboration System

 

Stanford e-Kawasaki
Kawasaki City is a large industrial city in the greater Tokyo area with a population of approximately 1.5 million, making it Japan’s sixth most populous city. It is one of Japan’s most ethnically diverse cities. Many Japanese multinational companies are based in Kawasaki. Thus, Stanford e-Kawasaki’s main themes of entrepreneurship and diversity were familiar to students in concept, yet unfamiliar to their academic experience. Instructor Maiko Tamagawa Bacha announced the student honorees as follows:

Student Honoree: Shiori Makino
School: Tachibana High School
Project Title: Mindsets of Failure in American Comic Superheroes and Japanese Comic Superheroes 

Student Honoree: Yuki Nakata
School: Kawasaki High School
Project Title: The Role of Languages in a Diverse Society: The Case of Having an Official Language in a Company

 

Stanford e-Oita
Oita Prefecture, known for its hot springs, is located in the mountainous island of Kyushu. Having lived and taught on Kyushu for three years, Stanford e-Oita Instructor Kasumi Yamashita felt at home with her students. The focus of the course was the United Nations Sustainable Development Goals. Yamashita announced the honorees as follows:

Student Honoree: Hozuki Mori
School: Hita High School
Project Title: Education for Students Who Can’t Go to School

Student Honoree: Ken White
School: Oita Uenogaoka High School
Project Title: Immigration in Oita

 

Stanford e-Tottori
Tottori Prefecture is the least populous prefecture in Japan and is known for its seafood and nature, including its iconic sand dunes. The first kanji character of Tottori means “bird,” and Stanford e-Tottori Instructor Jonas Edman has helped his students gain a bird’s-eye view of U.S. society and culture with a focus on U.S.–Japan relations. Edman announced the honorees as follows:

Student Honoree: Mai Kageyama
School: Yonago Higashi High School
Project Title: Differences of Body Image Between Japan and the U.S.

Student Honoree: Yumeka Mizuno
School: Yonago Higashi High School
Project Title: Japanese Educational Issues and Their Solutions


The SPICE staff is looking forward to honoring these eight students at a ceremony at Stanford University on March 29, 2021. Each student will be given the opportunity to make a formal presentation in front of members of the Stanford community and the Consulate General of Japan in San Francisco.


SPICE also offers online courses to U.S. high school students on Japan (Reischauer Scholars Program), China (China Scholars Program), and Korea (Sejong Korea Scholars Program), and online courses to Chinese high school students on the United States (Stanford e-China Program) and to Japanese high school students on the United States and U.S.–Japan relations (Stanford e-Japan).

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Jasmin Moshfegh is a PhD candidate in Health Economics. She studies how and why innovations in healthcare diffuse, how they shape healthcare provision, and how they affect health inequality. Her dissertation work is supported by the Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality (R36 award).

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