President Donald Trump’s chief arms control envoy last week acknowledged the possibility that the 2010 New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START) could be extended, but he added, “only under select circumstances.”  He then put down conditions that, if adhered to, will ensure the Trump administration does not extend the treaty.

New START and Extension

New START limits the United States and Russia each to no more than 700 deployed strategic missiles and bombers and no more than 1,550 deployed strategic warheads.  It expires by its terms on February 5, 2021 but can be extended for up to five years.  The Trump administration has adamantly refused to do that.

From the perspective of U.S. national security interests, extending New START is a no-brainer.  As confirmed by the State Department’s annual report, Russia is complying with the treaty’s limits.  Extension would keep Russian strategic forces constrained until 2026.  It would also ensure the continued flow of information about those forces produced by the treaty’s data exchanges, notifications, on-site inspections and other verification measures.

And extension would not force a single change in U.S. plans to modernize its strategic forces, as those plans were designed to fit within New START’s limits.

Russian officials, including Vladimir Putin, have raised New START extension since the first days of the Trump administration.  In 2017, Trump administration officials deferred on the issue, saying they would consider extension after (1) completion of a nuclear posture review and (2) seeing whether Russia met the treaty’s limits, which took full effect in February 2018.

Russia fully met the limits in February 2018.  At about the same time, the administration issued its nuclear posture review.  Yet, more than two years later, New START extension remains an open question.

On June 24, Amb. Marshall Billingslea, the president arms control envoy, briefed the press on his meeting with his Russian counterpart two days before in Vienna.  Asked about extending New START, Amb. Billingslea—never a fan of the treaty or, it seems, any arms control treaty—left the option open.  However, he described three conditions that will block extension.

China

Amb. Billingslea’s first condition focused on China, which he claimed had “an obligation to negotiate with [the United States] and Russia.”  Beijing certainly does not see it that way—saying no, no and again no—citing the huge disparity between the size of the Chinese nuclear arsenal and those of the United States and Russia.  China has less than one-tenth the number of nuclear warheads of each of the two nuclear superpowers.

To be sure, including China in the nuclear arms control process is desirable.  But Beijing will not join a negotiation aimed at a trilateral agreement.  What would such an agreement look like?  Neither Washington nor Moscow would agree to reduce to China’s level (about 300 nuclear warheads).  Nothing suggests either would agree to legitimize a Chinese build-up to match their levels (about 4,000 each).  Beijing presumably would not be interested in unequal limits.

This perhaps explains why, well more than one year after it began calling for China’s inclusion, the Trump administration appears to have no proposal or outline or even principles for a trilateral agreement.

For its part, Moscow would welcome China limiting its nuclear arms.  The Russians, however, choose not press the question, raising instead Britain and France.  Amb. Billingslea pooh-poohed the notion, but France has as many nuclear weapons as China, and Britain has two-thirds the Chinese number.  The logic for bringing in one but not the other two is unclear.  The question raises yet another hinderance to including China.

A more nuanced approach might prove more successful.  It would entail a new U.S.-Russian agreement providing for reductions beyond those mandated by New START.  Washington and Moscow could then ask the Chinese (and British and French) to provide transparency on their nuclear weapons numbers and agree not to increase their total weapons or exceed a specified number.  Much like his president, however, the arms control envoy does not appear to be into nuance.

Non-Strategic Nuclear Weapons

Amb. Billingslea’s second condition dealt with including in a new negotiation nuclear arms not constrained by New START, especially Russia’s large number of non-strategic nuclear weapons.  Again, this is laudable goal, but getting there will require much time and unpalatable decisions that the Trump administration will not want to face.

Russian officials have regularly tied their readiness to discuss non-strategic nuclear arms to issues of concern to them, particularly missile defense.  The Trump administration,  however, has made clear that it has zero interest in negotiating missile defense.

Even if Moscow severed that linkage, negotiating limits on non-strategic nuclear weapons would take time.  New START limits deployed strategic warheads by virtue of their association with deployed strategic missiles and bombers.  The only warheads directly counted are those on deployed intercontinental ballistic missiles and submarine-launched ballistic missiles.

By contrast, most if not all non-strategic warheads are not mounted on their delivery systems.  Monitoring any agreed limits would require new procedures, including for conducting on-site inspections within storage facilities.  This does not pose an insoluble challenge, but it represents new territory for both Washington and Moscow.  Working out limits, counting rules and verification measures will prove neither quick nor easy.

Verification

Amb. Billingslea earlier suggested some dissatisfaction with New START’s verification measures, though he did not articulate any particular flaw, and, as noted, the State Department’s annual compliance report says Russia is meeting the treaty’s terms.  Last week, he made verification measures for his desired U.S.-Russia-China agreement the third condition for New START extension. 

Verification measures are critical.  Treaty parties have to have confidence that all sides are observing the agreement’s limits or, at a minimum, that any militarily significant violation would be detected in time to take countervailing measures.  Working out agreement on those measures will prove a long process, even in just a bilateral negotiation, especially if it addresses issues such as stored nuclear weapons.  That is not just because of Russian reluctance to accept intrusive verification measures such as on-site inspection; the U.S. military also wants verification measures that do not greatly impact its normal operations.

Russian officials have reiterated their readiness to extend New START now.  Amb. Billingslea’s conditions will thwart extension for the foreseeable future.  That’s unfortunate.  By not extending New START, the Trump administration forgoes a simple action that would strengthen U.S. national security and make Americans safer.

From the CISAC Co-Directors

June 9, 2020

Today, CISAC scholars have released a statement of solidarity with all those who suffer from, and peacefully protest against, police brutality and systemic racism. We are all profoundly affected by the painful last minutes of George Floyd’s life. His death was racism in its most blatant form, but it is not an isolated event. Rather, it is part of a wider pattern and deeper stain on our national experience. As jarring as George Floyd’s death was to watch, countless other people of color suffer structural violence and a slower death over the course of their lives as a consequence of deeply ingrained inequality and discrimination. For too long, too many have been deprived of the simple expectation of the opportunity to live, work, and raise their families in safety. Black and brown communities, as well as other minority communities, continue to be systematically denied equal access to their most basic rights, as well as to financial opportunity, education, and medical care—circumstances that have been all brought into even sharper relief by the COVID-19 pandemic. Their lived experiences are unfathomable, and too often ignored, by many who are sheltered by their own privilege. As hundreds of thousands peacefully march to end this injustice, following in the best traditions of our democracy, we stand with them.

The statement below was initiated by CISAC Fellows. We thank the Fellows for their initiative at a time when everyone should rise to the occasion and act. At the same time, we realize that statements of solidarity are insufficient. As co-directors, we accept that our responsibility is to lead CISAC in a manner that helps combat racism and other forms of injustice so that true equality is actually attained. Our power and position of privilege as a policy center at a renowned university extends well beyond the relevance of our scholarship. Every decision, no matter how small, should reduce privilege and increase access to resources at Stanford. The road forward will not be easy. Since each of us is a product of unique circumstance with a different perspective, there will not always be agreement. But, by taking action beyond our scholarship, by expanding the voices at our table, by carefully and thoughtfully listening to those voices, and by committing to concrete steps—small and large—we can together make the world safer and more just. This is a burden we all must bear, and we will.

As the co-directors of CISAC, we commit to publicly releasing an action plan outlining specific additional steps we will take as an institution—in coordination with the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies—no later than the beginning of the fall quarter of 2020.

If you are part of the Stanford community and would like to add your signature to the statement below, please do so at this link.

Rod Ewing and Colin Kahl

Co-Directors

Center for International Security and Cooperation

Stanford University

Statement of Solidarity from CISAC

We the undersigned scholars at the Center for International Security and Cooperation (CISAC) express our anguish and outrage at the brutal killing of George Floyd—and the killings of Ahmaud Arbery, Breonna Taylor, Tony McDade, Nina Pop, David McAtee, and countless other black Americans who have lost, and continue to lose their lives, as a consequence of police brutality and racism. These recent injustices are only the tip of an iceberg of systemic racism and the violence stemming from it.

To all those in the Stanford community and beyond experiencing hardship and pain in these difficult times, we stand with you. We express our solidarity with the Black Lives Matter movement and all minority groups that face the indignity and violence of structural inequality every day.  

We condemn the use of violence against peaceful protesters. As experts in national and international security, we are deeply concerned with threats to deploy military forces to suppress constitutional rights—actions that endanger the very core of our democracy. 

We reaffirm our commitment to diversity, social justice, and basic human dignity. We also recognize our position of privilege in this deeply unequal society, and find it important to reflect, learn, act, and recommit to these basic values as a community. 

As an academic and policy community, CISAC’s mission is to generate knowledge to build a safer world. But we recognize that mission is impossible to achieve without addressing the structural inequalities that put true safety and security for so many people around the world out of reach. CISAC is committed to diversity, drawing on scholars from a range of disciplines, experience, and racial and cultural backgrounds. CISAC is also committed to civil discourse and constructive dialogue. As a community, we reject hate, intolerance, and discrimination in all its forms. But at this moment of national reflection, we know there is much more we must do to build a more inclusive institution and disrupt the structures of racism and inequality that we knowingly and unknowingly perpetuate. Moving forward, we will redouble our commitment to diversity and inclusion in our events, curriculum, fellowship program, and recruiting and hiring practices. We will do more to include Black, Indigenous, Asian, Latinx, and LGBTQI scholars and voices, as well as those from other underrepresented minorities, in our conversations. As scholars, we also commit to widening the aperture of national and international security conversations to include a fuller appreciation for the role of discrimination and inequality in all its forms.  

List of Signatories (institutional affiliations provided for identification purposes only)

Shazeda Ahmed, Pre-doctoral Fellow, CISAC/Human-Centered AI Institute

Nandita Balakrishnan, Pre-doctoral Fellow, CISAC

Jody Berger, Communications Manager, CISAC

Lauren J. Borja, Post-doctoral Fellow, CISAC 

Daniel Bush, Post-doctoral Fellow, CISAC/Stanford Internet Observatory

Melissa Carlson, Pre-doctoral Fellow, CISAC 

Alicia R. Chen, MIP Student and TA, CISAC

Kevin Chen, Research Assistant, CISAC

Martha Crenshaw, Senior Fellow, CISAC

Elena Crespo, Honors Student '20, CISAC

Christophe Crombez, Senior Research Scholar, The Europe Center, FSI

Debak Das, Pre-doctoral Fellow, CISAC

Larry Diamond, Senior Fellow, CDDRL

François Diaz-Maurin, Affiliate, CISAC

Paul N. Edwards, Senior Research Scholar, CISAC and Director, Program in Science, Technology & Society

Lisa Einstein, MIP Master's Student and TA, CISAC 

Rodney C. Ewing, CISAC Co-Director, Senior Fellow at FSI and Frank Stanton Professor in Nuclear Security, Professor of Geological Sciences

James D. Fearon, Senior Fellow at FSI and Geballe Professor in the School of Humanities and Sciences

Thomas Fingar, Shorenstein APARC Fellow at FSI

Colin Garvey, Postdoctoral Fellow, CISAC & Institute for Human-Centered AI

Jonah Glick-Unterman, CISAC Honors '20, Political Science

Megan Gorman, Associate Director for Administration and Finance at FSI

Rose Gottemoeller, Frank E. and Arthur W. Payne Distinguished Lecturer, CISAC

Andrea Gray, Associate Director, CISAC

Daniel Greene, Post-doctoral Fellow, CISAC

Melissa Griffith, Pre-doctoral Fellow, CISAC 

Anna Grzymala-Busse, Professor of Political Science and Senior Fellow, FSI

Rosanna Guadagno, Director, Information Warfare Working Group, CISAC

Amr Hamzawy, Senior Research Scholar, CDDRL, FSI

David Havasy, Associate Director of Operations, Cyber Policy Center

Gabrielle Hecht, Senior Fellow at FSI, and Frank Stanton Professor of Nuclear Security, CISAC, Professor, History

Siegfried S. Hecker, Senior Fellow at FSI, Emeritus, CISAC

Martin Hellman, Professor, Electrical Engineering, Emeritus

Connor Hoffmann, Research and Programs Assistant, CISAC

David Holloway, Senior Fellow at FSI, and Raymond A. Spruance Professor of International History, CISAC

Edward Ifft, Distinguished Visiting Fellow, Hoover Institution

Colin Kahl, CISAC Co-Director, Steven C. Házy Senior Fellow 

Bronte Kass, Program Manager, FSI

Alla Kassianova, Research Scholar, CISAC

David Kennedy, Donald J. McLachlan Professor of History, Emeritus

Lindsay Krall, Post-doctoral Fellow, CISAC 

David Laitin, James. T. Watkins IV and Elise V. Watkins Professor of Political Science

John Lee, Finance and Research Administration Manager, CISAC

Gabriela Levikow, Research Assistant, CISAC

Herb Lin, Senior Research Scholar, CISAC

Steve Luby, Senior Fellow FSI and Professor of Medicine, Infectious Diseases

Xinru Ma, Post-doctoral Fellow, CISAC

Robert J. MacCoun, James & Patricia Kowal Professor of Law, Stanford University

Beatriz Magaloni, Senior Fellow at FSI and Professor, Political Science

Iris Malone, Post-doctoral Fellow, CISAC

Michael May, Professor Emeritus, Engineering-Economic Systems and Operations Research, CISAC

Michael McFaul, Director, Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies

Brett McGurk, Frank E. and Arthur W. Payne Distinguished Lecturer, CISAC

Katie McKinney, Research Assistant, CISAC 

Taylor McLamb, Research Assistant, CISAC

 Bryan Metzger, CISAC Honors '20, CISAC

John C Mitchell, Mary and Gordon Crary Family Professor, Computer Science

Asfandyar Mir, Post-doctoral Fellow, CISAC

Gary Mukai, Director, Stanford Program on International and Cross-Cultural Education

Norman M. Naimark, Senior Fellow at FSI and Professor, History

Scott K. Nelson, Development Associate, Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies

Anna Nguyen Thuy An,  Master's in International Policy, Asia Pacific Fellow, FSI

Megan Palmer, Executive Director, Bio Policy & Leadership Initiatives, Bioengineering

Reid Pauly, Post-doctoral Fellow, CISAC

Steven Pifer, William Perry Research Fellow, CISAC 

Eric H. Phillips, MD, MPH, Alumni-Class of 1975

William M. Phillips III, Affiliate, CISAC

Maxime Polleri, Post-doctoral Fellow, CISAC

Michelle Pualuan, Program Administrator, Cyber Policy Center

David Relman, Senior Fellow at FSI, and Thomas C. and Joan M. Merigan Professor Stanford School of Medicine

Scott Sagan, Senior Fellow at FSI, and Caroline S.G. Munro Professor of Political Science, CISAC

Kenneth A. Schultz, Professor, Political Science

Rylan Sekiguchi, Manager of Curriculum and Instructional Design, Stanford Program on International and Cross-Cultural Education

Elliot Serbin, Research Analyst, CISAC

Gi-Wook Shin, Director, Shorenstein APARC

Tim Stearns, Professor, Biology, Professor, Genetics 

Kathryn Stoner, Senior Fellow and Deputy Director at FSI

Michael R. Tomz, Professor of Political Science

Julien de Troullioud de Lanversin, Post-doctoral Fellow, CISAC

Harold Trinkunas, Deputy Director, CISAC 

Gil-li Vardi, Lecturer in History, CISAC

Amelie-Sophie Vavrovsky, Student and Researcher, International Policy

Debbie Warren, Events & Bechtel Conference Center Manager, FSI

Allen S. Weiner, Director, Program in International and Comparative Law, Stanford Law School

Jeremy Weinstein, Professor of Political Science, CISAC

Leonard Weiss, Visiting Scholar and Network Affiliate, CISAC

Katherine Welsh, Administrative Associate, FSI/CDDRL

Alice Wenner, Communications Associate, FSI

Tara Wright, Communications, Cyber Policy Center

Amy Zegart, Senior Fellow at FSI and Senior Fellow at the Hoover Institution, CISAC

Fred Cohen was the first person to introduce the term “computer virus.” In a 1984 paper, he defined it as “a program that can ‘infect’ other programs by modifying them to include a possibly evolved copy of itself. With the infection property, a virus can spread throughout a computer system or network using the authorizations of every user using it to infect their programs. Every program that gets infected may also act as a virus and thus the infection grows.” (The original 1984 paper was eventually published in 1987.) Since then, the security company Kaspersky claims, rightly so, that “when it comes to cybersecurity, there are few terms with more name recognition than ‘computer viruses.’”

This bit of history has taken on new meaning now that the world is in the midst of a global pandemic caused by a biological virus, the novel coronavirus, that induces an unusual and novel disease, COVID-19.

Read the rest at Lawfare Blog