On August 9, 2018, the Shorenstein Asia Pacific Research Center (APARC) hosted a conference, “Break Through: Women in Silicon Valley, Womenomics in Japan" with support from the Acceleration Program in Tokyo for Women (APT). Women thought-leaders and entrepreneurs from Stanford, Silicon Valley, and Japan came together to discuss innovative ideas for narrowing the gender gap, and cultivated interpersonal support networks and collaboration across the Pacific. The report, which is an outcome of the conference, offers an analysis and discussion of the themes and takeaways from the day. 

We demonstrate the importance of intertemporal marginal propensities to consume (iMPCs) in disciplining general equilibrium models with heterogeneous agents and nominal rigidities. In a benchmark case, the dynamic response of output to a change in the path of government spending or taxes is given by an equation involving iMPCs, which we call the intertemporal Keynesian cross. Fiscal multipliers depend only on the interaction between iMPCs and public deficits. We provide empirical estimates of iMPCs and argue that they are inconsistent with representative- agent, two-agent and one-asset heterogeneous-agent models, but can be matched by models with two assets. Quantitatively, models that match empirical iMPCs predict deficit-financed fiscal multipliers that are larger than one, even if monetary policy is active, taxation is distortionary, and investment is crowded out. These models also imply larger amplification of shocks that involve private borrowing, as we illustrate in an application to deleveraging.

Highly readable yet deeply researched, this book serves as an essential guide to the many ways in which Japan has risen to become one of the world's most creative and innovative societies.

• Challenges conventional views of Japan as mired in two unproductive "lost decades" by documenting the myriad ways in which the nation has embraced creativity and innovation

• Describes the ways in which Japan has transformed our lives and explains the guiding principles of one of the world's least understood, most vibrantly creative societies

• Explains how Japan, as the world's first non-Western developed nation, can inspire other nations at a time when America's economic and social models are being challenged as never before

• Argues that, in a world that seems to have lost its direction in the face of threats ranging from terrorism to angry populism, Japan can assume greater leadership in preserving global peace and prosperity

Chapter 4 of this book, Departing from Silicon Valley: Japan's New Startup Ecosystem, was written by Shorenstein APARC Research Scholar Kenji Kushida.

Under what we call Abenergynomics, Japanese Prime Minister Abe Shinzō has used energy policy to support the growth objectives of Abenomics, even when the associated policies are publicly unpopular, opposed by utility companies, or harmful to the environment. We show how Abenergynomics has shaped Japanese policy on nuclear power, electricity deregulation, renewable energy, and climate change.

A recently developed small area estimation technique is used to geographically derive detailed estimates of consumption-based poverty and inequality in rural Shaanxi, China. These estimates may be helpful for targeting since there is wide variability in poverty rates within Shaanxi but low levels of inequality within most counties and townships. We also investigate whether including environmental variables in the equation used to predict consumption and poverty improves upon typical approaches that only use household survey and census data. Ignoring environmental variables appears likely to produce targeting errors.

Using rural household panel data from three Chinese provinces, this paper identifies determinants of long-term poverty and tests the duration dependence on the probability to leave poverty. Special emphasis is given to the selection of the poverty line and inter-regional differences across provinces. Results suggest that the majority of population seems to be only temporary poor. However, the probability to leave poverty for those who were poor is differently affected by poverty duration across provinces ranging from no duration dependence in Zhejiang to highly significant duration dependence in Yunnan. The number of nonworking family members, education, and several village characteristics seem to be the most important covariates.

In contrast to its decentralized political economy model of the 1980s, China took a surprising turn towards recentralization in the mid-1990s. Its fiscal centralization, starting with the 1994 tax reforms, is well known, but political recentralization also has been under way to control cadres directly at township and village levels. Little-noticed measures designed to tighten administrative and fiscal regulation began to be implemented during approximately the same period in the mid-1990s. Over time these measures have succeeded in hollowing out the power of village and township cadres. The increasing reach of the central state is the direct result of explicit state policies that have taken power over economic resources that were once under the control of village and township cadres. This article examines the broad shift towards recentralization by examining the fiscal and political consequences of these policies at the village and township levels. Evidence for this shift comes from new survey data on village-level investments, administrative regulation and fiscal oversight, as well as township-level fiscal revenues, expenditures, transfers (between counties and townships) and public-goods investments.

Recruiting and retaining leaders and public servants at the grass-roots level in developing countries creates a potential tension between providing sufficient returns to attract talent and limiting the scope for excessive rent-seeking behavior. In China, researchers have frequently argued that village cadres, who are the lowest level of administrators in rural areas, exploit personal political status for economic gain. Much existing research, however, compares the earnings of cadre and non-cadre households in rural China without controlling for unobserved dimensions of ability that are also correlated with success as entrepreneurs or in non-agricultural activities. The findings of this paper suggest a measurable return to cadre status, but the magnitudes are not large and provide only a modest incentive to participate in village-level public administration. The paper does not find evidence that households of village cadres earn significant rents from having a family member who is a cadre. Given the increasing return to non-agricultural employment since China’s economic reforms began, it is not surprising that the return to working as a village cadre has also increased over time. Returns to cadre-status (such as they are) are derived both from direct compensation and subsidies for cadres and indirectly through returns earned in offfarm employment from businesses and economic activities managed by villages