Audio: APARC Scholars on China’s Belt and Road Initiative
Twelve-year-old Lena is growing up poor and malnourished on Chicago’s West Side. She buys Blue Juice and Hot Chips from the corner store on her way to school. She and her classmates can afford the flavoured sugar water and salty starch, but this cheap “food” that fills up her stomach provides no nutritional value.
Lena is one of over 20 million Americans living in food deserts, places without access to a full-service grocery store within two miles. Yet while Lena buys her Hot Chips, an affluent family nearby uses an online retail platform to order their weekly delivery of fresh, nutritious food – at prices that Lena and her family can’t afford. Despite a surge of technology innovations in food retail, Lena and her family represent a growing number of underserved customers around the world.
Recent experimental evidence finds that the decision maker in a collective decision making entity with proposal power attracts a disproportionate amount of the blame or reward by those materially affected by these decisions. In the case of coalition governments evidence suggests that voters have heuristics for assigning responsibility for economic outcomes to individual parties and that they tend to disproportionately direct the economic vote toward the Prime Minister party. This essay demonstrates that voters also identify the Finance Minister party as an agenda setter on economic issues depending on whether the coalition context exaggerates or mutes its perceived agenda power. We define cabinet context as the extent to which coalition parties take issue ownership for particular policy areas. We find that when decision making is compartmentalized, voters perceive the finance minister as having agenda power and hence it receives a relatively larger economic vote; in more “diffuse” cabinet contexts it is the PM Party that is attributed responsibility for the economy.
He draws on theory, experiments and public opinion analysis to understand how citizens solve decision-making challenges. This includes looking at how citizens use information shortcuts to make decisions. For example in ‘Context and Economic Expectations: When Do Voters get it Right?’ (British Journal of Political Science, 2010), he demonstrates how information shortcuts result in quite accurate expectations regarding price fluctuations in 12 European countries. One of his current areas of interest is the micro-foundations of cheating and unethical behaviour. He has run real effort tax compliance experiments designed to understand who cheats at taxes, the results of which are summarized in ‘Why We Cheat?’ (currently under review). An extension of this project examines tax compliance in different tax regimes.
Ray has served as Associate Editor of the American Journal of Political Science and the Journal of Experimental Political Science. He is one of the founders of the European Political Science Association and the International Meeting on Behavioural Science (IMESBESS), and he is currently Vice President of the Midwest Political Science Association. In 2015, Ray was selected as a member of the UK Cabinet Office Cross-Whitehall Trial Advice Panel to offer Whitehall departments technical support in designing and implementing controlled experiments to assess policy effectiveness. He was recently nominated to the Evidence in Governance and Politics network.
This event is co-sponsored by the Hoover Institution.
Bloomberg Businessweek writes on China's historic economic reforms and the future to come, quoting Scott Rozelle and REAP's work on education and human capacity building in rural China. Read full text here.
"...About 80 percent of students are “left-behind kids” — children whose parents left for higher-paying jobs, usually on the industrial east coast, and who are looked after by grandparents, relatives or friends.
'China has failed to invest in its single most important asset: its people,' said economist Scott Rozelle at Stanford University. 'It has one of the lowest levels of education.'..."
Yuhei is a Research Scholar (post-doc) at the Japan Program of the Asia-Pacific Research Center (APARC) at Stanford University for the academic year of 2018-2019. His broad research interest centers around understanding how firms and people interact over a social and geographic space, and how such interactions shape the socio-economic space in turn. Currently, he is working on projects that elucidate how Japanese firms form firm-to-firm trade linkages and what it implies for Japanese economies. Yuhei obtained his Ph.D in Economics from MIT in 2018. From 2019, Yuhei will join the Department of Economics at Boston University as an assistant professor.
Under the title “Political Contestation and New Social Forces in the Middle East and North Africa,” the Program on Arab Reform and Democracy convened its 2018 annual conference on April 27 and 28 at Stanford University. Bringing together a diverse group of scholars from across several disciplines, the conference examined how dynamics of governance and modes of political participation have evolved in recent years in light of the resurgence of authoritarian trends throughout the region.
The conference’s second panel, tilted “Situating Gender in the Law and the Economy,” featured Texas Christian University Historian Hanan Hammad, who assessed the achievements of the movement to fight gender-based violence in Egypt. Focusing on Gulf Cooperation Council states, Alessandra Gonzales, a Visiting Postdoctoral Fellow at the Stanford Institute for Economic Policy Research, analyzed the differences in female executive hiring practices across local and foreign firms. Stanford University Political Scientist and FSI Senior Fellow Lisa Blaydes presented findings from her research on women’s attitudes toward Female Genital Mutilation (FGM) in Egypt.
The fourth panel of the conference, “The Economy, the State, and New Social Actors,” featured George Washington University Associate Professor of Geography Mona Atia, who presented on territorial restructuring and the politics governing poverty in Morocco. Amr Adly, an Assistant Professor of Political Science at the American University in Cairo, analyzed the relationship between the state and big business in Egypt after the 2013 military coup. Rice University Professor of Economics Mahmoud El-Gamal shared findings from his research on the economic determinants of democratization and de-democratization trends in Egypt during the past decade.
The conference included a special session featuring former fellows of the American Middle Eastern Network at Stanford (AMENDS), an organization dedicated to promoting understanding around the Middle East, and supporting young leaders working to ignite concrete social and economic development in the region. AMENDS affiliates from five different MENA countries shared with the Stanford community their experiences in working toward social change in their respective countries.
Shorenstein APARC's annual overview for academic year 2017-18 is now available.
Download it for information on the wide variety of Center research from the the past academic year, Shorenstein APARC's educational activities, and major Center events like the Shorenstein Journalism Award.
Romain Wacziarg is a professor of economics at the UCLA Anderson School of Management and a research associate at the National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER). The paper that he will be presenting is co-authored by Guillaume Blanc, Brown University.
This talk is part of the Economic History Seminar Series, and is co-sponsored by The Europe Center.
Economics Building
Room 351
A large literature is focused on governments’ fiscal policy making under the disciplining force of fiscal rules. That literature is devoted to map governments’ incentives for (non)compliance, but widely ignores the role of fiscal rule enforcement. This is remarkable, given the situation in the European Union, where we observe frequent breaches of the fiscal rules in the absence of sanctions. This paper focuses therefore on the incentives of the European Commission as enforcer of the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) and on how individual governments take these incentives into account. Based on actual cases and literature on international agreements we distinguish rationales which make the Commission lenient. Accordingly, we present a game theoretical model to map the interaction between the Commission and governments under incomplete information. We find that unforeseen fiscal needs stemming from crises or other contingencies enhance enforcement costs for the Commission. Given that crises require additional public expenditures, our model shows that some enforcement costs are welfare enhancing. We also find that governments have an incentive to emphasize the fiscal impact of crises to increase the Commission’s enforcement costs. Moreover, governments might even overstate crises’ fiscal impact to hide other expenditures. In doing so, governments exploit their informational advantage over their budget allocation and crisis solving costs. Finally, we provide examples related to Europe’s migrant crisis and national security to support our theoretical findings.
This article presents a political economic analysis of exit from federations. Over time, members’ benefits from being in a federation can fluctuate because of changes in the state of the world. If a member stops benefitting, it may wish to secede i.e. exit the federation. Based on a real options model, we show that state-contingent exit penalties can induce socially efficient exit decisions. In addition to the substantive implications, this represents a methodological contribution to real options theory. Even if ex-ante specified exit penalties cannot be made state-contingent, they may still enhance social welfare by preventing secession wars. This finding runs counter to the dominant view in the literature that exit clauses should be avoided in federations. As a first test of the model, we derive five hypotheses and show that they hold for the breakup of Yugoslavia and all cases known to us of federations with an exit clause.