The Political Economy of Transatlantic Free Trade
In his State of the Union address on February 12 President Obama announced that the US will set up a Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership with the European Union. The US and the EU will soon start negotiations to create the world’s largest free trade area. The agreement will eliminate tariff barriers and harmonize regulatory and technical standards. It is argued that this will add up to two percent to GDP. The US and the EU already trade goods and services worth $ 2.7 billion per day. This seminar will discuss the politics and economics of such an agreement.
This event is part of The Europe Center's series on the "European and Global Economic Crisis."
Reuben W. Hills Conference Room
Christophe Crombez
Encina Hall
Stanford University
Stanford, CA 94305
Christophe Crombez is a political economist who specializes in European Union (EU) politics and business-government relations in Europe. His research focuses on EU institutions and their impact on policies, EU institutional reform, lobbying, party politics, and parliamentary government.
Crombez is Senior Research Scholar at The Europe Center at the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies at Stanford University (since 1999). He teaches Introduction to European Studies and The Future of the EU in Stanford’s International Relations Program, and is responsible for the Minor in European Studies and the Undergraduate Internship Program in Europe.
Furthermore, Crombez is Professor of Political Economy at the Faculty of Economics and Business at KU Leuven in Belgium (since 1994). His teaching responsibilities in Leuven include Political Business Strategy and Applied Game Theory. He is Vice-Chair for Research at the Department for Managerial Economics, Strategy and Innovation.
Crombez has also held visiting positions at the following universities and research institutes: the Istituto Italiano di Scienze Umane, in Florence, Italy, in Spring 2008; the Department of Political Science at the University of Florence, Italy, in Spring 2004; the Department of Political Science at the University of Michigan, in Winter 2003; the Kellogg Graduate School of Management at Northwestern University, Illinois, in Spring 1998; the Department of Political Science at the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign in Summer 1998; the European University Institute in Florence, Italy, in Spring 1997; the University of Antwerp, Belgium, in Spring 1996; and Leti University in St. Petersburg, Russia, in Fall 1995.
Crombez obtained a B.A. in Applied Economics, Finance, from KU Leuven in 1989, and a Ph.D. in Business, Political Economics, from Stanford University in 1994.
Debating the future of food in Africa
Collier, a distinguished economist and author of the award-winning book “The Bottom Billion”, was direct in his opening remarks.
“Smallholder agriculture has been a persistent productivity disaster for Africa,” said Collier. “Despite a huge land area to population ratio and higher proportion of its labor force engaged in food production, Africa is still not able to feed itself. The smallholder business model of the last 50 years is fundamentally flawed…maybe it is time for a Plan B.”
African agricultural productivity remains astoundingly low and stagnant at about $500 per person per year. His solution: debunk the ‘myth of the efficient peasant’ and rural romanticism and support commercial agriculture and urban growth.
Commercial agriculture reaps economies of scale that provide advantages often beyond reach for smallholder farmers yet are critical to agricultural production in Africa—risk finance, liquidity, technology, logistics, and knowledge of markets. Collier points to the success of Brazil and Thailand—two emerging economies that differ in scale of commercial organization, but have become major agricultural exporting countries.
Byerlee, a renowned economist and director of the 2008 World Development Report, agreed with Collier that commercial agriculture is likely Africa’s future, but that market-oriented smallholder farmers will play the lead role.
“We have much to learn from emerging business models,” said Byerlee. “Smallholders and agribusiness have complementary assets that can contribute to commercial agriculture, and states and investors must help facilitate smallholder inclusion in these models.”
Byerlee noted that the choice between small-scale or large-scale production models depend on transaction costs and type of commodity, and are context specific. Small- to medium scale production is best suited to most types of products in Africa especially food staples and many labor intensive products (e.g, diary). This follows the example of Thailand that not only has succeeded in food production but alone exports more than the value of all sub-Saharan Africa. Value chains that require stronger coordination with processing and shipping (e.g., sugar and palm oil), demand market standards (e.g, export horticulture) or are taking pioneering risks (e.g., new crops in new areas) may be better suited for large-scale production. Benefits may still be large if they create good jobs—a major challenge for Africa’s future.
Where to invest in Africa’s future?
"Young Africans are voting with their feet in droves to leave smallholder agriculture because it is impoverishing and boring, “ said Collier. “The economic tragedy for Africa is that cities haven’t been the engines of economic opportunity and wage employment.”
Collier argued investments in cities over agriculture are needed to prepare for an urban future and must be done quickly due to one dangerous fact—climate change.
“Climate change is the train coming down the tracks and it is already happening in Africa,” warned Collier. “The continuing deterioration of African agriculture is already set in stone. The last 50 years of carbon emissions are going to continue to devastate Africa’s climate over the next 50 years.”
Collier fears climate change will shift Africa’s competitive advantage in agriculture to Northern Eurasia and North America. Therefore, limited investment dollars must shift to cities which are more climate resilient. Byerlee disagrees.
“There is overwhelming and convincing evidence that agricultural growth is important for poverty reduction and food security,” said Byerlee. “Look at the Green Revolution in Asia and the institutional reforms in China in the early 1980s.”
The 2008 World Development Report also found GDP growth from agriculture benefits the income of the poor two to four times more than GDP growth from non-agriculture. So why isn’t this working for sub-Saharan Africa?
Byerlee points to Africa’s history of poor macroeconomic policies that have disadvantaged African farmers. Smallholder farmers have traditionally been taxed at high levels (as much as 50 percent 20 years ago before liberalization programs started kicking in). Rates have come down dramatically to 15-20 percent, but are still significantly higher than other countries.
“African states must level the playing field,” said Byerlee.
Government investment in public goods at four percent of agricultural GDP still lags behind that enjoyed by most other countries. That is less than half of what has been spent in Asia over the last couple of decades where investment in core public goods, R&D, rural roads, and irrigation have really made a difference.
Access to land and finance must also improve to support the growth of smallholder agribusiness. This especially includes secure, low cost, and transferrable land rights to allow efficient smallholders to expand.
Greater investment is also needed in technology and information. Research and development in Africa have been traditionally underfunded and understaffed. Despite involvement of agricultural research groups such as CGIAR over the last 40 years, only 35 percent of food crop area is planted to improved varieties. Smallholder farmers also often lack business development skills and access to primary education – a critical constraint to growth.
Reasons for optimismMany of these macropolicies are slowing changing, and that makes Collier and Byerlee hopeful.
“After four decades in sub-Saharan Africa I feel optimistic about Africa’s food systems and future,” said Byerlee. “I see exciting opportunities in terms of market growth, private interest, and improved policies.”
Yields in Africa are low, but there is room for significant improvement. The continent is home to potentially 240 million hectares of uncultivated land and less then 20 percent of irrigation potential has been tapped.
African agricultural systems are transforming rapidly in response to rising rates of income growth, urbanization, and shifts in demand for high value and processed food, and feed for livestock. Higher food prices are incentivizing farmers to enter the market and increasing farmer income. Regional markets now accounting for only 5-10% of trade have much potential to expand, and Byerlee projects the value of African urban food markets to quadruple over the next 20 years.
Renewed investment in Africa is another reason for optimism. After decades of declining support donor agencies are refocusing their efforts on supporting agricultural development in Africa. Private sector investment, ranging from local to foreign investors, is also increasing. Collier spoke of the value pioneer commercial investors are bringing to unused and underutilized, but arable lands in Africa. These larger investors are better able to internalize the benefits of infrastructure supply while creating jobs and opening new markets.
The spur in foreign investment has drawn some fire from opponents worried about ‘land grabbing’. Collier and Byerlee both pointed out the need to differentiate between commercial investors and land speculators. The latter are being scrutinized, and for good reason.
Land speculators are leasing huge tracts of land over long time horizons and banking on the land’s option value if there is a big spike in food prices. This takes potentially arable land out of near-term production and out of the hands of local communities. Byerlee suggests governments impose controls on how rapidly the land is developed as one way of managing this problem.
What will a successful African food system look like in 2050?
"African peasantry as we know it today will not be preserved," projects Collier.
“If commercialization is successful most Africans will live in big coastal cities like the US and Europe,” said Collier. “Most of the remaining rural population will move to the hinterland of the big cities, because profitable agriculture will be selling into the big cities from close vicinity."
He envisions a mixture of different types of commercial agriculture ranging from consolidated family farms as is the norm in the US to large-scale enterprises as seen Brazil, but agriculture will not employ a lot of people. He sees an opportunity for commercial agriculture to piggyback off the infrastructure put in place by extractive natural resource companies.
Byerlee foresees Africa headed down a path similar to Thailand where a more egalitarian, smallholder commercial farmer model dominates (2-5 hectares). Large-scale farming has a legacy of failure in Africa, he said. He sees better prospects for large-scale irrigated rice and perhaps oil palm. Oil palm was actually an African crop prior to moving primarily to Malaysia and Indonesia. The value of South East Asian exports of palm oil is now greater than all agricultural exports from sub-Saharan Africa. In fact, Africa now imports $3.5 billion in palm oil.
“With billions of dollars at stake, big Asian companies are investing in Africa with the potential to create millions of jobs,” said Byerlee. “Oil palm could be a really big opportunity to transform African agriculture in the humid tropics, but state support is needed to facilitate inclusion of smallholders and safeguard social and environmental standards."
Africa has the natural resources to become a major player in the global agricultural export market and to bring down its alarmingly high malnutrition and poverty rates. What’s needed now is the political will, guidance, and investment to make that happen.
Part of the Solution or Part of the Problem? Experts on Climate Change in Southeast Asia
Officials, scholars, and activists have long believed in improving environmental policy in developing countries by fostering desirable values and practices through networks of experts. Tim Forsyth will question this faith by arguing that all too often such networks ignore the limitations of global environmental assessments and the politics involved in producing and using expert opinion. Using preliminary evidence from Indonesia and Thailand, he will show how Procrustean advice and local agendas affect efforts to mitigate climate change, and what that can mean for the generation of greenhouse gas (through energy use) and its absorption in sinks (through forest conservation). Forsyth argues that more deliberative institutions of environmental information, judgment, and decision can better accommodate local knowledge and vulnerabilities, strike productive balances between mitigation and adaptation, and thereby address climate change in Southeast Asia in more timely and effective ways.
Tim Forsyth is Reader in Environment and Development in the Department of International Development at the London School of Economics and Political Science. He has published widely on matters of politics of environmental science and policy in Southeast Asia including Critical Political Ecology: The Politics of Environmental Science (Routledge, 2003); Forest Guardians, Forest Destroyers: The Politics of Environmental Knowledge in Northern Thailand (with A. Walker, Washington University Press, 2008); and International Investment and Climate Change: Energy Technologies for Developing Countries (Earthscan, 1999). He was a co-author of the chapter on climate change in the international Millennium Ecosystem Assessment (2005).
Philippines Conference Room
Tim Forsyth
Shorenstein APARC
Stanford University
Encina Hall, Room C309
Stanford, CA 94305-6055
Tim Forsyth joins the Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center (Shorenstein APARC) during the 2012–13 academic year from the London School of Economics and Political Science, where he is a reader in environment and development at the Department of International Development.
His research interests encompass environmental governance, with particular reference to Southeast Asia. The main focus is in implementing global environmental policy with greater awareness of local development needs, and in investigating the institutional design of local policy that can enhance livelihoods as well as mitigate climate change. Fluent in Thai, Forsyth has worked in Thailand, Indonesia, the Philippines and Vietnam. He will use his time at Shorenstein APARC to study how global expertise on climate change mitigation is adopted and reshaped according to development agendas in Southeast Asia.
Forsyth is on the editorial advisory boards of Global Environmental Politics, Progress in Development Studies, Critical Policy Studies, Social Movement Studies, and Conservation and Society. He has published widely, including recent papers in World Development and Geoforum.He is also the author of Critical Political Ecology: The Politics of Environmental Science (2003); Forest Guardians, Forest Destroyers: the Politics of Environmental Knowledge in Northern Thailand (2008, with Andrew Walker); and editor of the Routledge Encyclopedia of International Development(2005, 2011).
Forsyth holds a PhD in development from the University of London, and a BA in geography from the University of Oxford.
Is the Party Over? The Obsolescence of Authoritarian Growth in Singapore and Malaysia
In Singapore the People’s Action Party has held power continuously since 1959, having won 13 more or less constrained legislative elections in a row over more than half a century. In Malaysia the Alliance Party and its heir, the National Front, have done nearly as well, racking up a dozen such victories over the same 54-year stretch. These records of unbroken incumbency were built by combining rapid economic growth with varying degrees and types of political manipulation, cooptation, and control.
In both countries, as living standards improved, most people were content to live their lives quietly and to leave politics to the ruling elite. In the last decade, however, quiescence has given way to questioning, apathy to activism, due to policy missteps by the ruling parties, the rise of credible opposition candidates, increasing economic inequality, and the internet-driven expansion of venues for dissent.
As the ground appears to shift beneath them, how are the rulers responding? Will their top-down politics survive? How (un)persuasive have official warnings against chaotically liberal democracy become? Are ethno-religious and even national identities at stake? Are comforting but slanted historical narratives being rethought? And how principled or opportunistic are the agents of would-be bottom-up change?
Sudhir Thomas Vadaketh is the author most recently of Floating on a Malayan Breeze: Travels in Malaysia and Singapore (2012) and The End of Identity? (2012). Before joining The Economist Group in Singapore in 2006 he was a policy analyst on foreign investment for the government of Dubai. He has written for many publications, including The Economist, ViewsWire, and The Straits Times, and been widely interviewed by the BBC and other media. He earned a master’s degree in public policy from the Kennedy School (Harvard, 2005) after receiving bachelor degrees in Southeast Asian studies and business administration (UC-Berkeley, 2002). His service in the Singapore Armed Forces in the late 1990s took him to Thailand, Taiwan, and Australia.
Daniel and Nancy Okimoto Conference Room
African food systems to 2030: Toward inclusive business models
Rapid population growth, urbanization and rising incomes will present an unprecedented opportunity for growth of commercial agriculture and agribusiness in coming years. The value of food consumed in urban areas is set to expand by four times to 2030, but given evidence of a continuing decline in competitiveness much of this could be sourced from imports even in countries with an apparent comparative advantage in agriculture. At the same time, the number of youth entering the labor force will rise to 25 million annually by 2025 putting tremendous pressure on job creation, especially through agriculture. Rising investments in large-scale farming seen in recent years may contribute to increased food supply (although this is highly uncertain given the track record) but some investment, especially in mechanized grain farms, provide few jobs. Even so there is a dire need for increased investment in the sector, both public and private, if it is to realize its potential for growth and poverty reduction.
This paper lays out a number of models of inclusive agribusiness growth, grouped into three categories (i) institutional arrangements for improving productivity of smallholders operating in spot markets, (ii) various types of contract farming arrangements, and (iii) large-scale farms that generate jobs and/or include community equity shares. The institutional and policy context as well as commodity characteristics that favor these models are discussed within a simple transactions cost framework. Examples of apparent successes with each of these models are provided, many based on direct interviews and case studies of innovative firms.
The final section discusses cross-cutting policy priorities to enable the growth of commercial agriculture and agribusiness. These include continuing reforms to liberalize product and input markets, access to technology and skills, stimulating financial and risk markets, securing land rights, and investment in infrastructure through public-private partnerships. Priorities differ by value chain and implementation presents challenges of delicately balancing state intervention and leadership with private initiative. These challenges are illustrated through examples from Africa as well as emerging countries of Asia and Africa.
A comparative institutional analysis of the Fukushima nuclear disaster: Lessons and policy implications
This paper analyzes the causes, responses, and consequences of the Fukushima nuclear power plant accident (March 2011) by comparing these with Three Mile Island (March 1979) and Chernobyl (April 1986). We identify three generic modes of organizational coordination: modular, vertical, and horizontal. By relying on comparative institutional analysis, we compare the modes' performance characteristics in terms of short-term and long-term coordination, preparedness for shocks, and responsiveness to shocks. We derive general lessons, including the identification of three shortcomings of integrated Japanese electric utilities: (1) decision instability that can lead to system failure after a large shock, (2) poor incentives to innovate, and (3) the lack of defense-in-depth strategies for accidents. Our suggested policy response is to introduce an independent Nuclear Safety Commission, and an Independent System Operator to coordinate buyers and sellers on publicly owned transmission grids. Without an independent safety regulator, or a very well established “safety culture,” profit-maximizing behavior by an entrenched electricity monopoly will not necessarily lead to a social optimum with regard to nuclear power plant safety. All countries considering continued operation or expansion of their nuclear power industries must strive to establish independent, competent, and respected safety regulators, or prepare for nuclear power plant accidents.
Pending Financial Reforms in China: Two Bankers' Perspectives
Will China’s new leadership push through new financial reforms? The private sector is growing rapidly but private firms complain about their inability to get loans. Reforms undertaken over the past 20 years have brought change, but much remains to be done. There are now many non-governmental banks and financial institutions operating in China, including foreign firms. But how effectively can they operate? How open is China’s financial system to the non-governmental banks and to foreign participation? Are the challenges different for foreign firms? How might foreign firms best cooperate with local firms as Chinese firms increasingly globalize? Two bankers, James Chen, head of Hollyhigh International Capital, the first investment banking firm specializing in mergers and acquisitions (M&As) in Mainland China, and Carl Walter, recently retired Managing Director, JPMorgan Chase, China, will assess the changes in China’s financial realm.
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James (Mingjian) Chen is the chairman of Hollyhigh International Capital, the first investment banking firm specializing in mergers and acquisitions (M&As) in Mainland China. He is also an adviser of the Beijing Olympics organization. Chen is a member of the liaison committee in the China National Democratic Construction Association, the chairman of the M&A Elite Club, as well as a member of the Fuping Foundation for poverty alleviation. He also serves as the chief editor of the China M&A Review, and has published Winning the Deal and M&A Revolution.
Chen graduated from Tsinghua University’s Department of Economics and Management in 1993. After graduation, he worked as a trader at China Great Wall Financial Company for several years. He then established Tsinghua Unisplendour and Hollyhigh Investment Company, in 1997 and in 1998 respectively. In addition to his work at Hollyhigh, Chen is actively engaged in M&A projects for international corporations, such as Lafarge, Shell, SK, and Scottish & Newcastle.
Chen’s deal between Teda and the Meilun Group was used as the first M&A case study at Tsinghua University. He has lectured at many renowned institutions, including Harvard University and the Economist Intelligence Unit.
Carl E. Walter worked in China and its financial sector for the past 20 years and actively participated in many of the country’s financial reform efforts. While at Credit Suisse First Boston he played a major role in China’s groundbreaking first overseas IPO in 1992, as well as the first primary listing of a state-owned enterprise on the New York Stock Exchange in 1994. He was a member of senior management at China International Capital Corporation, China’s first and most successful joint venture investment bank where he supported a number of significant domestic and international stock and bond underwritings for major Chinese corporations. More recently at JPMorgan he was China chief operating officer and chief executive officer of its banking subsidiary. During this time Walter helped build a pioneering domestic security, risk and currency trading operation.
A long time resident of Beijing before his recent return to the United States, Walter is fluent in Mandarin and holds a PhD from Stanford University and a graduate certificate from Peking University. He is the co-author of Red Capitalism: The Fragile Financial Foundations of China’s Extraordinary Rise as well as Privatizing China: Inside China’s Stock Markets.
Philippines Conference Room
James Chen
Walter H. Shorenstein
Asia-Pacific Research Center
Encina Hall, Room E301
616 Serra St.
Stanford, CA 94305-6055
James (Mingjian) Chen is the chairman of Hollyhigh International Capital, the first investment banking firm specializing in mergers and acquisitions (M&As) in Mainland China. He is also an adviser of the Beijing Olympics organization. Chen is a member of the liaison committee in the China National Democratic Construction Association, the chairman of the M&A Elite Club, as well as a member of the Fuping Foundation for poverty alleviation. He also serves as the chief editor of the China M&A Review, and has published Winning the Deal and M&A Revolution.
Chen graduated from Tsinghua University’s Department of Economics and Management in 1993. After graduation, he worked as a trader at China Great Wall Financial Company for several years. He then established Tsinghua Unisplendour and Hollyhigh Investment Company, in 1997 and in 1998 respectively. In addition to his work at Hollyhigh, Chen is actively engaged in M&A projects for international corporations, such as Lafarge, Shell, SK, and Scottish & Newcastle.
Chen’s deal between Teda and the Meilun Group was used as the first M&A case study at Tsinghua University. He has lectured at many renowned institutions, including Harvard University and the Economist Intelligence Unit.