Ukrainians rode a wild roller coaster in March.  President Volodymyr Zelensky began the month by firing the prime minister and reshuffling the cabinet, prompting concern that oligarchs were reasserting their influence.  COVID-19 and its dire economic implications, however, refocused attention.  At the end of the month, the Rada (Ukraine’s parliament) passed on first reading legislation key to securing low-interest credits from the International Monetary Fund.

Meanwhile, controversy flared over the Donbas.  A March 11 agreement reached by Zelensky’s chief of staff broke a long-standing Ukrainian position by giving status to the so-called Donetsk and Luhansk “people’s republics”—the parts of Ukraine’s eastern region of Donbas occupied by Russian and Russian proxy forces.  It is unclear if Kyiv will go forward with the agreement.

Cabinet Reshuffle

On March 4, Prime Minister Oleksiy Honcharuk resigned at Zelensky’s request.  Honcharuk and his cabinet were widely viewed as inexperienced but honest and pro-reform.  Only in office for six months, Honcharuk’s team did not have time to achieve much of its ambitious agenda.

The new prime minister, Denys Shmyhal, brought little in the way of a national reputation, and the new cabinet lacks the reformist sheen of its predecessor.  Few took Zelensky’s reason for the reshuffle—the cabinet’s supposed ineffectiveness—at face value.  Some speculated that falling approval ratings provided the real motive.  Others wondered whether this signified Zelensky’s shedding the pro-reform, anti-corruption persona that won him the top job in 2019 and feared a return to the country’s unfortunate tradition of quiet government dealings with oligarchs.

Reformers became more depressed on March 5 when Prosecutor General Ruslan Riaboshapka was fired for refusing to investigate Petro Poroshenko, Zelensky’s predecessor.  Riaboshapka had a sterling reputation.  His replacement has never served as a prosecutor, is personally close to Zelensky, and ran on his party’s parliamentary ticket.  Her appointment raises doubts about the independence of the Prosecutor General’s Office.

The timing of the reshuffle—just as Kyiv sought to secure a new $5.5 billion agreement with the IMF—puzzled many.  Departing Finance Minister Oksana Makarova had made significant progress in negotiations with the IMF, but her immediate successor, Ihor Umanskiy, questioned the value of working with the Fund.

Back on Track, at least with IMF?

The newly appointed prime minister spent the month stressing the importance of securing the IMF program.  While he expressed his readiness to travel to Washington to meet the Fund’s leadership, the IMF told Kyiv to first complete two key preconditions.

One was Rada passage of a banking law that would prevent former owners whose banks had been nationalized from regaining ownership.  This targeted oligarch Ihor Kolomoisky, a former owner of PrivatBank.  After a 2016 audit revealed PrivatBank’s accounts were short $5 billion, the government nationalized it and made good the missing funds.  However, Kolomoisky recently suggested legal action to regain ownership or compensation, a deal-breaker for the IMF.

Kolomoisky has a link to the president, as he owns the television network that broadcast the comedy show in which Zelensky played a common man suddenly thrust into the presidency.  How the government handles the ownership of PrivatBank has become a litmus test for Zelensky.

The second issue was Rada passage of an agricultural reform bill that would lift a moratorium on the sale of agricultural land.  Ukraine has 30 percent of the world’s black earth, and the agricultural sector represents a bright spot in the economy.  But the prohibition on land sales denied private farmers the ability to use their land as collateral to secure loans to buy better seed, fertilizer and equipment.

While the Rada debated these measures in March, the rising number of COVID-19 cases and looming economic downturn focused attention on the need for the IMF program.  On March 30, the Rada sacked Umanskiy, replacing him with a new minister with established reform credentials, and replaced the minister of health as well.  It then approved, on first reading, the banking and agricultural land reform laws. 

The Rada has not satisfied the IMF completely, but March closed with Ukraine seemingly on track to secure its IMF program and suggestions that the Fund might make available more than $5.5 billion.  The vote on the banking law suggests a major break between the president and Kolomoisky, although doubts persist about Zelensky’s commitment to reform.  In any case, Kyiv will be swamped by the challenges of managing simultaneous health and economic crises.

Donbas Controversy

Domestic developments did not grab all of the March headlines.  A March 11 agreement regarding the Minsk Trilateral Contract Group (TCG) became a major point of contention in Kyiv.  The TGC consists of officials of Ukraine, Russia and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, with representatives of the so-called Donetsk and Luhansk “people’s republics” attending as unofficial “invitees.”  It has met for five years but has registered little progress toward implementing the objectives of the 2015 Minsk II agreement:  ending the fighting and restoring Ukrainian sovereignty over all of Donbas.

Andriy Yermak, the president’s chief of staff, sought to shake up the chessboard and tentatively agreed to a subgroup reporting to the TCG that would include equal numbers of representatives from Ukraine and of the occupied territory, with German, French, OSCE and Russian officials sitting in as observers.  The details leaked and provoked an immediate furor.

First, the subgroup was seen to give status to the two “people’s republics,” something Kyiv has carefully avoided over the course of the six-year-long conflict.  Second, by putting Russia on par with Germany, France and the OSCE, the agreement seemed to accept Moscow’s narrative that Russia is not a party to the conflict and that it is a civil war—despite the fact that Russian and Russian proxy forces occupy parts of Donetsk and Luhansk.

More broadly, critics saw no sign that the Kremlin, which still pulls the strings in occupied Donbas, had decided to end the conflict.

Officials close to the president asserted that the new subgroup would be consultative in nature.  They said the Ukrainian government would select ten members for the subgroup.  Of the ten to speak for the occupied territories, five would come from the ranks of internally-displaced persons who have left occupied Donbas—and Kyiv would influence who was chosen.  Ukrainian officials argued that this would be a favorable make-up (Kyiv picking fifteen of the twenty Ukrainian participants) and, in any case, the subgroup would only make recommendations to the TCG, not take decisions.

The new format poses risks, which officials acknowledge.  By the end of March, Kyiv seemed to have second thoughts, and the agreement was not signed on March 25, as had been planned. 

March was tough for Zelensky, and April may prove even more challenging.  The month began with the president and his government trying to come to grips with COVID-19 and an economy tipping toward recession, tempered by hope that Ukraine can manage the final steps necessary to secure an IMF program.  Battered over the TGC gambit, it is possible Kyiv will let the idea for a new subgroup die quietly.  As he nears the end of his first year as president, Zelensky, who came to the office a political neophyte, is finding just how difficult governing—for real, not in a television comedy show—can be.

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As we watch President Trump tell the states they have to do more to find their own personal protective equipment for their health-care workers, governors lash back with demands for a national leader who will unlock the emergency powers of the federal government.

The response to the COVID-19 pandemic has exposed major weaknesses in the federalist system of public health governance, which divides powers among the federal, state and local governments, argues SHP’s Michelle Mello in this New England Journal of Medicine commentary.

The coronavirus, she writes, “is exactly the type of infectious disease for which federal public health powers and emergencies were conceived: it is highly transmissible, crosses borders efficiently, and threatens our national infrastructure and economy.”

“Strong, decisive national action is therefore imperative,” writes Mello, a professor of medicine and a professor of law, and Rebecca L. Haffajee, a policy researcher at the RAND Corporation. “Yet the federal response has been alarmingly slow to develop, fostering confusion about the nature of the virus and necessary steps to address it.”

The authors warn this “lack of interjurisdictional coordination has and will cost lives.”

Though states must respect constitutionally protected individual rights — such as due process, equal protection and freedom of travel and association — the Constitution puts primary responsibility for public health with the states, cities and counties. It gives them the right to exercise broad police powers to protect their citizens’ health during ordinary times.

In extraordinary times — like the one we’re experiencing now — states and the federal government can activate emergency powers to expand their abilities to act swiftly and protect human life and health. All 50 states and dozens of localities and the federal government have declared emergencies.

“The resulting executive powers are sweeping: they can range from halting business operations, to restricting freedom of movement, to limiting civil rights and liberties, to commandeering property,” Mello and Haffajee write in the NEJM Perspective.

This emergency legal framework has led to too few checks-and-balances on poor decisions—historically, in the direction of being overly aggressive, write the authors. They note a good example is when New Jersey’s governor ordered a nurse returning from Sierra Leone during the 2014 Ebola outbreak into quarantine, contrary to Centers for Disease Control and Prevention guidelines.

Too Little Too Late? 

“Today, we find ourselves in the opposite situation: the federal government has done too little,” the authors write. “Perhaps because of misleading early statements from federal officials about the gravity of the COVID-19 threat, public sentiment has weighed against taking steps that would impose hardships on families and businesses.”

The tumbling stock market and unprecedented 10 million unemployment claims last month also have created further pressure by the federal government to project a sense of calm.

“The resulting laconic federal response has meant that a precious opportunity to contain COVID-19 through swift, unified national action has been lost — a scenario that mirrors what occurred in Italy,” they write.

So the states had to pick up where the federal government fell short, the authors note. Many jurisdictions issued stay-at-home orders; others did not. As of March 31, more than a dozen governors had yet to issue statewide stay-at-home orders and eight had only ordered partial measures. Yet many jurisdictions turn a blind eye, they note, to noncompliance with social-distancing recommendations issued by the CDC, as evidenced by crowded beaches and children congregating in public parks.

“This is the dark side of federalism: it encourages a patchwork response to epidemics,” the authors write.

“A federal takeover of all public health orders would be out of step with our federalist structure,” the authors state, but there remain three good options:

• “The White House must reverse its current trajectory toward prematurely weakening existing federal measures and the resolve of governors who are enforcing stay-at-home orders and school closures.” Trump said last week he wanted the United States “opened up and raring to go by Easter.” A few days later, he heeded the call of medical experts and extended social-distancing guidelines until the end of April, but public health experts believe the crisis will likely be with us longer.
• Congress should “use its spending power to further encourage states to follow a uniform playbook for community mitigation that includes measures for effective enforcement of public health orders.” It could threaten to withhold some federal funds from states that do not comply.
• “Congress could leverage its interstate-commerce powers to regular economic activities that affect the interstate spread” of COVID-19, such as restricting large businesses from traveling and operating across state lines in ways that expose workers to risk.

The White House could also make further use of the Defense Production Act (DPA) to direct private companies to produce badly needed ventilators and personal protective equipment for health-care workers, the authors write. Trump has ordered General Motors to manufacture ventilators and the $2 trillion stimulus package includes $1 billion for DPA projects.                                                                     

“Learning is difficult in the midst of an emergency, but one lesson from the COVID-19 epidemic is already clear: when epidemiologists warn that a pathogen has pandemic potential, the time to fly the flag of local freedom is over,” the authors conclude. “Yet national leadership in epidemic response works only if it is evidence-based. It is critical that the U.S. response to COVID-19 going forward be not only national, but rational.”

Agricultural and development economist Christopher B. Barrett, a visiting scholar with the Center on Food Security and the Environment (FSE), gave a lecture at Stanford on food systems advances over the past 50 years that have promoted unprecedented reduction globally in poverty and hunger, averted considerable deforestation, and broadly improved lives, livelihoods and environments in much of the world (watch video here or below).

In that lecture, and a related interview with FSE Senior Fellow Roz Naylor (watch video here or below), Barrett shared perspectives on the reasons why, despite advances, those systems increasingly fail large communities in environmental, health, and increasingly in economic terms and appear ill-suited to cope with inevitable further changes in climate, incomes, and population over the coming 50 years. Barrett explored the new generation of innovations underway that must overcome a host of scientific and socioeconomic obstacles. 

To support Stanford students working in the area of contemporary Asia, the Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center is offering up to ten research assistant internships for summer 2020 and up to three predoctoral fellowships for the 2020-21 academic year. The Center will review applications starting April 15 and expects to fill the positions by April 30, 2020. 

Amid the fallout of the COVID-19 pandemic, students are facing summer internship cancelations and hiring freezes. They are left wondering about the long-term implications of the current crisis for their academic careers and their access to future jobs and valuable work experience.

At Shorenstein APARC, we want to do all we can to support Stanford students. That’s why we are announcing new internship and fellowship opportunities for current students working in the area of contemporary Asia: research assistant internships for the summer quarter of 2020 and predoctoral fellowships for the 2020-21 academic year.

The summer internships are all remote: research assistants will work as telecommuters. Regarding the predoctoral fellowships, we hope we can all have a normal 2020-21 academic year, in which case we expect the fellows to be in residence, but we will reassess the evolving COVID-19 situation closer to the appointment start dates and shift to flexible, online options as needed.

APARC will review applications for both opportunities on a rolling basis starting April 15, 2020. The Center will select up to ten research assistants and up to three predoctoral fellows by April 30, 2020.

Read on to learn more about these offerings and the application requirements, and follow the guidelines below to submit your candidacy.

Summer 2020 APARC Research Assistant Internships

Shorenstein APARC is seeking highly motivated and dedicated undergraduate and graduate students to join our team as paid research assistant interns for the summer quarter of 2020. Research assistants will work with assigned APARC faculty members on projects focused on contemporary Asia, studying varied issues related to the politics, economies, populations, security, foreign policies, and international relations of the countries of the Asia-Pacific region.

All positions will be for eight weeks starting late June or early July 2020. The hourly pay rate is $17 for undergraduate students, $25 for graduate students.

Research assistant positions are open to current Stanford students only. Undergraduate- and graduate-level students are eligible to apply.

Apply Now

• Complete the application form and submit it along with these two (2) required attachments:
  • CV;
  • A cover letter (up to 1 page).
• Arrange for a letter of recommendation from a faculty to be sent directly to APARC. Please note: the faculty members should email their letters directly to Kristen Lee at kllee@stanford.edu.

We will consider only complete applications that include all the abovementioned supporting documents.  

2020-21 Shorenstein APARC Predoctoral Fellowships

APARC is inviting applications from current Stanford students for the 2020-21 Shorenstein APARC Predoctoral Fellowship. The fellowship supports predoctoral students working within a broad range of topics related to contemporary Asia. 

Up to three fellowships are available to Ph.D. candidates who have completed all fieldwork and are nearing the completion of their dissertation. The Center will give priority to candidates who are prepared to finish their degree by the end of the 2020-21 academic year.

Shorenstein APARC offers a stipend of $36,075 for the 2020-21 academic year, plus Stanford's Terminal Graduate Registration (TGR) fee for three quarters. We expect fellows to remain in residence at the Center throughout the year and to participate in Center activities.

Apply Now

• Complete the application form and submit it along with these three (3) required attachments:
  • CV;
  • A cover letter including a brief description of your dissertation (up to 5 double-spaced pages);
  • A copy of your transcripts. Transcripts should cover all graduate work and include evidence of recently-completed work.
• Arrange for two (2) letters of recommendation from members of your dissertation committee to be sent directly to Shorenstein APARC. Please note: the faculty/advisors should email their letters directly to Kristen Lee at kllee@stanford.edu.

We will consider only complete applications that include all the abovementioned supporting documents. 

There is a Korean expression that means “to become soaked by a drizzle without noticing.” This metaphor is a timely warning against the gradual decline of democratic norms. Though some of the changes underlying this global phenomenon are subtle, they are producing creeping, piecemeal erosions of democracy and pluralism. The signs of democratic backsliding are now emerging everywhere in South Korean society, and a failure to recognize and robustly counter their effects may create future costs that prove unbearable. 

My new article, “Korean Democracy Is Sinking Under the Guise of the Rule of Law,” published in the April 2020 issue of the South Korean magazine Shindonga (New East Asia, the oldest monthly in Korea), examines how the Moon administration is sinking into a democratic recession and considers its actions as a case study with lessons for averting broader, global trends in democratic decline.

In all corners of the world, we witness freely elected leaders gradually dismantle democratic institutional safeguards, fuse political polarization with chauvinistic populism, and focus on narrow interpretations of the national interest just as China and Russia expand their scope of influence via “sharp power,” subversive means.

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As my analysis shows, this crusading mindset has insinuated itself into more concrete actions by the Moon government, such as the calculated blurring of the separation of powers through political interference in the courts, deliberate changes to longstanding election laws that damage the spirit of democracy, and the blatant use of double standards and ideological loyalty in the execution of national policies. Similar patterns are taking hold in populist governments the world over, and – perhaps most disconcertingly – they transpire not through the strong-arming of a military coup or violent political disruption but through the legal procedures and policies meant to keep such canker in check.

To overcome its wave of democratic recession South Korea must cast away political polarization and demonstrate a firm resolve to act in accordance with democratic norms. The upcoming April 15 legislative election must sound a clear alarm against all actors who damage these core principles, regardless of their party affiliation and irrespective of their ideology. 

Read the complete English translation of my article or the original Korean version here: