As
evidence emerges that the gunmen who caused the carnage in Mumbai were
operatives of the Pakistan-based Lashkar-e-Taiba, one question
reverberates: Was the Pakistani government responsible for the Mumbai
terror attacks?
This
is the wrong question to ask. During the late 1980s and the 1990s, the
Pakistani government created terror organizations such as
Lashkar-e-Taiba as tools of asymmetric warfare against Indian rule in
Jammu and Kashmir. In recent years, however, the jihadis, like the
magic brooms in Goethe's tale, "The Sorcerer's Apprentice," have taken
on a life of their own; along with the government, the army and the
intelligence services, such groups now comprise one of the main centers
of gravity within Pakistan.
Several factors have enabled them to reach this point. The jihadis
have been armed and trained by elements of the Pakistani military and
security services, and are funded by a sophisticated international
financial network. In addition, they enjoy street popularity, and
remain a useful means of combatting India's presence in Kashmir.
Consequently, the Pakistani government has balked at opportunities to
shut them down.
As a result, the militants are now in a position to conduct their
own policy. Like the Goethe's magic brooms, they often act against the
interests of their creators, attacking security personnel,
assassinating government officials and seizing territory within
Pakistan, as well as launching attacks on India that could trigger a
regional war. The question, then, is not whether the Pakistani
government was responsible for the Mumbai attacks, but who will now
play the role of sorcerer and rein in the jihadis.
In theory, either the Pakistani or the Indian government could do
so. But Mumbai has shown that neither side is up to the task. The
Pakistani government cannot prevent militants from using its soil to
strike India. The Indians are completely unable to anticipate or repel
such attacks. In addition, they lack the military capabilities needed
to clear militant strongholds within Pakistani territory.
The situation requires a radical re-thinking of South Asia's
security. Both sides must adopt policies that transcend their
traditional comfort zones. The Pakistani government must forswear
militancy, end support for the jihadis and accept international
military and financial assistance in crushing them. The Pakistani
government needs to recognize that the costs of supporting militancy
outweigh its benefits, and that Mumbai may be the last chance to get
control of the situation. If the government does not act against the
militants now, then it may lose control of the state, or find itself
drawn into a catastrophic conflict with India in the wake of another
terrorist attack.
The Indians, for their part, must start to take their own security
more seriously. In 1991, after suffering a major financial crisis, the
Indian government came to terms with the failures of its socialist
development model and adopted a free-market approach to economic
growth. Similarly, India must use this crisis to wholly revamp its
security infrastructure. If it fails to do so, the country's impressive
economic expansion of recent years will be for naught. Simply put,
international corporations will view the country as being too dangerous
and refuse to do business there.
The road to real improvement in India will be long and complex, but
the Indians can start by properly training and equipping their police
and domestic security personnel, who were outgunned and outwitted for
nearly three days in Mumbai by just a handful of terrorists.
Simultaneously, New Delhi must address the legitimate concerns of its
own Muslim community, including the long-aggrieved Kashmiri population,
so that overseas terrorists do not find willing collaborators within
India.
Finally, there is another player in this subcontinental drama: the
United States. The United States, which has forged a strategic
partnership with India, can quietly and privately nudge New Delhi to
address the internal tensions in Kashmir. More important, however, the
United States must use its leverage as Pakistan's largest source of
bilateral assistance to press the Pakistanis to end their support for
the jihadis. It cannot continue to provide Islamabad with billions of
dollars to fight the war on terror while Pakistan-based militant groups
conduct operations like the Mumbai attacks. If Pakistan is to continue
to benefit from American largesse, it must demonstrate a tangible
commitment to ending support for such organizations.
None of these steps will provide an overnight solution to the
problems laid bare by the Mumbai attacks. But, in time, they can help
South Asia to create its own modern-day sorcerer, and deal with the
militant forces that Pakistan has unleashed over decades. If the region
fails to do so, its story, unlike Goethe's, will not have a happy
ending.
Sumit Ganguly is the director of research of the
Center on American and Global Security at Indiana University,
Bloomington, and an adjunct senior fellow of the Pacific Council on
International Policy. S. Paul Kapur is associate professor at U.S.
Naval Postgraduate School; the views he expresses in this article do
not necessarily reflect those of the U.S. government.