When, how, and to what ends do opposition parties look beyond their borders for support? In authoritarian and hybrid regimes, oppositions face formidable obstacles to winning power and ensuring fair elections. International engagement can provide resources to help overcome these barriers, but it also carries risks, from repression to charges of “foreign interference.” In his book project, Samet develops the concept of opposition diplomacy: efforts by opposition politicians to encourage international pressure on regimes through lobbying, international networks, and diaspora allies. Drawing on cross-national data and interviews across Southeast Asia, Europe, and the United States, he shows that oppositions often turn abroad when domestic pathways are blocked, and that such strategies can shape foreign policy decisions like sanctions. Yet these dynamics frequently concentrate international pressure on the most entrenched regimes, unintentionally limiting prospects for reform. The project highlights both the global influence of opposition actors and the limits of democracy promotion.

ABOUT THE SPEAKER

Oren Samet is the Einstein-Moos Postdoctoral Fellow at Stanford’s Center on Democracy, Development and the Rule of Law. His research examines the international dimensions of authoritarian politics and democratization, with a focus on opposition politics and a regional emphasis on Southeast Asia. His work explores opposition competition in authoritarian elections, processes of autocratization, and the challenges of democracy promotion and governance aid. His academic research has appeared in the American Journal of Political Science, Comparative Political Studies, and Political Communication, and he has also written for Foreign Policy, Slate, and World Politics Review. Before academia, he was based in Bangkok, Thailand, as Research and Advocacy Director of ASEAN Parliamentarians for Human Rights, working with politicians and civil society across Southeast Asia. He also served as a Junior Fellow in the Democracy and Rule of Law Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. He holds a Ph.D. in Political Science from the University of California, Berkeley, and a B.A. from Princeton University’s School of Public and International Affairs. He will join Rice University as an Assistant Professor of Political Science in 2026.

Virtual to Public. Only those with an active Stanford ID with access to Room E-008 in Encina Hall may attend in person.

Climate change is among the most contentious issues of the 21st century. Without a shared understanding of its consequences, securing support for climate policies remains difficult. We hypothesize that exposure to tailored opportunities to trade in financial markets, particularly in energy stocks that are central to the green transition, can induce experiential learning and greater policy support for climate mitigation efforts. We test our hypothesis using a randomized controlled trial. We find that randomly assigned exposure to trade in green and brown energy stocks leads treated individuals to express stronger agreement with the view that climate change is driven by human activity, that it will affect quality of life in the U.S., and that the U.S. government and U.S. companies should do more to reduce emissions. Treated respondents also exhibit a greater tendency to donate to climate causes and factor climate change into personal decisions regarding where to live, work, and invest. These attitudinal changes are particularly pronounced among individuals identifying as Republicans, who are more likely to be skeptical of climate change at baseline. In line with our primary theoretical argument, our findings suggest exposure to financial markets incentivizes learning, which in turn shapes climate-related beliefs, preferences, and behaviors.

ABOUT THE SPEAKER

Saumitra Jha is an associate professor of political economy at Stanford’s Graduate School of Business, and a professor of economics and of political science by courtesy. He is also a senior fellow at the Center for Democracy, Development and Rule of Law, in the Freeman-Spogli Institute, and at the Stanford Institute for Economic Policy Research.

Prior to joining the GSB, Saumitra was an Academy Scholar at Harvard University. He has been a fellow of the Niehaus Center for Globalization and Governance and the Center for the Study of Democratic Politics at Princeton University. He received the Michael Wallerstein Award for best published article in political economy from the American Political Science Association for his research on ethnic tolerance. Saumitra has consulted on economic and political risk issues for the United Nations/ WTO and the World Bank. He holds a BA from Williams College, master’s degrees in economics and mathematics from the University of Cambridge, and a PhD in economics from Stanford University.

Virtual to Public. Only those with an active Stanford ID with access to the William J. Perry Conference Room in Encina Hall may attend in person.

Although much work examines foreign aid’s impact on development outcomes, its effect on bureaucracies — institutions that are key to development and profoundly influenced by aid interventions—remains understudied. I argue that project-based aid alters financial and social aspects of work over which bureaucrats hold salient preferences, generating tradeoffs that drive bureaucrats to redirect effort from routine functions toward donor-funded initiatives. Drawing on interviews, surveys, and survey experiments with more than 600 Ugandan bureaucrats, I find that, despite preferring government funding and autonomy, bureaucrats are drawn to better-paid aid projects, thus diverting effort away from regular duties. They also prefer departments with substantial donor funding, although it undermines the equity and teamwork they value. These findings reveal why aid can weaken bureaucracies: the same incentives that boost performance on donor projects divert effort from government programming and erode the organizational cohesion needed for lasting bureaucratic capacity.

ABOUT THE SPEAKER

Maria Nagawa is a Postdoctoral Scholar at the Center on Democracy, Development and the Rule of Law at Stanford University. Maria earned her PhD in Public Policy and Political Science from Duke University and was previously a Postdoctoral Fellow at the Niehaus Center for Globalization and Governance at Princeton University. Maria studies state building and development in the Global South, with a substantive focus on the consequences of foreign interventions, the resilience of civil society, and the organization of state authority. Her book project investigates how foreign aid reshapes bureaucracies in developing countries. Prior to starting her PhD, Maria was a Research Associate at the Economic Policy Research Centre and a Lecturer at Makerere University Business School in Kampala, Uganda. In addition, Maria was a Visiting Researcher at the BRICS Policy Research Center in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil and a Visiting Scholar at the University of Colorado’s School of Public Affairs in Denver, Colorado.

Virtual to Public. Only those with an active Stanford ID with access to Conference Room E-008 in Encina Hall may attend in person.