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Melissa Morgan
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Every year, students in the Ford Dorsey Master's in International Policy (MIP) at the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies participate in the Policy Change Studio, a pioneering two-quarter program designed to provide our master's students with the know-how to bring about change in the world.

In 2020, many of the internships and outreach opportunities for our students were reduced or cancelled altogether because of the COVID-19 pandemic. By 2021, most of our students were able to participate in virtual programs with our policy partners. After two years of adapting, we're excited that the 2022 cohort of MIP students once again has the opportunity to work in-person with their partner organizations and meet changemakers on the ground to evaluate and fine-tune the impacts of their policy work.

Keep reading to see where our students have been working around the world.
 

Tunis, Tunisia

Emily Bauer, Soomin Jun and Kyle Thompson have been in Tunisia working with Wasabi, a communications company, working to understand the root causes of Tunisia’s large informal economy and find incentives for greater formal sector participation.

Pretoria, South Africa

Janani Mohan and Eli MacKinnon have been in South Africa with a local branch of the United Nations Development Programme to work on the longstanding problem of South Africa's highly skewed income distribution and vast disparities in employment access across different regions and social groups.

Jakarta, Indonesia

Sylvie Ashford, Calli Obern, Daniel Gajardo and Sarah Baran traveled to Indonesia to work with the U.S. Department of Energy's National Renewable Energy Laboratory's (NREL) local branch that is tackling policy barriers to decarbonizing industrial heat sources in the country.

Washington D.C., United States

Eyal Zilberman, Chaeri Park, Me Me Khant and Mikk Raud went from the West Coast to the East to the Washington D.C.-based Cyber Threat Alliance (CTA) to identify ways the U.S. government can reduce the prevalence of ransomware attacks against public and private entities.

India

Shirin Kashani, Madeleine Morlino and Amanda Leavell are working with SheThePeople, a female-first digital media website founded by Draper Hills alumna Shaili Chopra, that focuses on women-related journalism.

Tallinn, Estonia

Johannes Hui, Dave Sprague, Bradley Jackson and Arelena Shala partnered with the International Centre for Defense and Security (ICDS), a strategic policy think tank, to investigate the use of sub-threshold, grey-zone and hybrid military countermeasures to deter Russian provocations in the Baltic-Nordic region.

The Ford Dorsey Master's in International Policy

Want to learn more? MIP holds admission events throughout the year, including graduate fairs and webinars, where you can meet our staff and ask questions about the program.

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Students from the 2022 cohort of the Ford Dorsey Master's in International Policy participate in the Policy Change Studio.
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Where Our Master's Students are Making Policy Impacts in 2022

From women's health and reproductive rights in India to cybersecurity issues in Washington D.C., students from the 2022 cohort of the Ford Dorsey Master's in International Policy are tackling big policy projects in the Policy Change Studio.
Where Our Master's Students are Making Policy Impacts in 2022
The Ford Dorsey Master's in International Policy class of 2023
Blogs

Meet the Ford Dorsey Master’s in International Policy Class of 2023

The 2023 class of the Ford Dorsey Master’s in International Policy are finally here on campus and ready to dive into two years of learning, research and policy projects at the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies.
Meet the Ford Dorsey Master’s in International Policy Class of 2023
Protestors wave flags in front of San Francisco's Ferry Building against the military coup in Myanmar
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Working from Home While Worrying For Home

About the author: Me Me Khant ’22 was an FSI Global Policy Intern with the The Asia Foundation. She is currently a Ford Dorsey Master’s in International Policy student at Stanford University.
Working from Home While Worrying For Home
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Students from the 2022 cohort of the Ford Dorsey Master's in International Policy have been working all over the world with policy partners as part of their capstone projects.
Students from the 2022 cohort of the Ford Dorsey Master's in International Policy have been working all over the world with policy partners as part of their capstone projects.
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The 2022 cohort of the Ford Dorsey Master's in International Policy has been busy this quarter getting out of the classroom and into hands-on policymaking with partner organizations in Tunisia, Estonia, India and beyond.

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Michael McFaul, director of Stanford's Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies, and several other members of the International Working Group on Russian Sanctions will speak about and answer questions about the group's new white paper, "Action Plan on Strengthening Sanctions against the Russian Federation." The event will begin with brief presentations from these speakers, followed by comments from other members:
 

  • Sergei Guriev, Professor of Economics at Sciences Po Paris and former Chief Economist at the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development.z
  • Edward Fishman, former Russia and Europe Lead at the U.S. Department of State Office of Economic Sanctions Policy and Implementation and Member of the Secretary of State’s Policy Planning Staff.
  • Daniel Fried, former State Department Sanctions Coordinator and Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs.
  • Iryna Mudra, Chief Compliance Officer at the State Savings Bank of Ukraine.
  • Natalia Shapoval, Vice President for Policy Research at the Kyiv School of Economics.
  • Dr. Benjamin Schmitt, Project Development Scientist at Harvard University, Senior Fellow for Democratic Resilience at the Center for European Policy Analysis and Rethinking Diplomacy Fellow at Duke University.

Online, via Zoom

Encina Hall
616 Jane Stanford Way
Stanford, CA 94305-6055

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Senior Fellow, Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies
Ken Olivier and Angela Nomellini Professor of International Studies, Department of Political Science
Peter and Helen Bing Senior Fellow, Hoover Institution
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Michael McFaul is the Ken Olivier and Angela Nomellini Professor of International Studies in Political Science, Senior Fellow at the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies, and the Peter and Helen Bing Senior Fellow at the Hoover Institution, all at Stanford University. He joined the Stanford faculty in 1995 and served as FSI Director from 2015 to 2025. He is also an international affairs analyst for MSNOW.

McFaul served for five years in the Obama administration, first as Special Assistant to the President and Senior Director for Russian and Eurasian Affairs at the National Security Council at the White House (2009-2012), and then as U.S. Ambassador to the Russian Federation (2012-2014).

McFaul has authored ten books and edited several others, including, most recently, Autocrats vs. Democrats: China, Russia, America, and the New Global Disorder, as well as From Cold War to Hot Peace: An American Ambassador in Putin’s Russia, (a New York Times bestseller) Advancing Democracy Abroad: Why We Should, How We Can; and Russia’s Unfinished Revolution: Political Change from Gorbachev to Putin.

He is a recipient of numerous awards, including an honorary PhD from Montana State University; the Order for Merits to Lithuania from President Gitanas Nausea of Lithuania; Order of Merit of Third Degree from President Volodymyr Zelenskyy of Ukraine, and the Dean’s Award for Distinguished Teaching at Stanford University. In 2015, he was the Distinguished Mingde Faculty Fellow at the Stanford Center at Peking University.

McFaul was born and raised in Montana. He received his B.A. in International Relations and Slavic Languages and his M.A. in Soviet and East European Studies from Stanford University in 1986. As a Rhodes Scholar, he completed his D. Phil. in International Relations at Oxford University in 1991. 

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In a talk hosted by the Program on Arab Reform and Democracy on April 19, 2022, Erin A. Snider, Assistant Professor at Texas A&M University’s Bush School of Government and Public Service, discussed his latest book Marketing Democracy: The Political Economy of Democracy Aid in the Middle East (Cambridge University Press 2022).

During the event, co-sponsored by Stanford’s Abbasi Program in Islamic Studies and the Center for African Studies, Snider examined the construction and practice of democracy aid in Washington, D.C., and in Egypt and Morocco — two of the highest recipients of US democracy aid in the region. Her research shows how democracy aid can work to strengthen rather than challenge authoritarian regimes.

You can purchase the book online, and watch a recording of the event below:

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The Program on Arab Reform and Democracy (ARD) at CDDRL hosted a talk featuring Erin A. Snider, Assistant Professor at Texas A&M University’s Bush School of Government and Public Service, who discussed her latest book – Marketing Democracy: The Political Economy of Democracy Aid in the Middle East (Cambridge University Press 2022).

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Banner card for the 2022 Oksenberg Conference

This year’s Oksenberg Conference, "Prospects for the New Sino-Russian Partnership,” explores the “why” and “so what” of this newly bolstered alliance that has been declared as a partnership “with no limits.” What does it mean for the U.S. and other non-autocratic states? Given Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and the unprecedented economic sanctions that the US and its allies have slapped on Russia in the wake of that attack, the more immediately important question is: What does this alliance mean for China? How strong is this new bond with Russia? China now finds itself in an extremely difficult position as it tries to protect its own economic relationships with the US and its allies in Europe and Asia. What can or will China do about Russia? How was this alliance sold to the domestic audience of each country?

A roundtable of experts on China and Russia, including those with extensive government experience, joins us to examine this critically important relationship and address the many questions that it raises. Each panelist will present 10-12 minutes of opening remarks before turning to a moderated discussion. During the last 20 minutes, the moderator will pose curated questions to the roundtable from the audience.

The Oksenberg Conference is held annually and honors the legacy of the late Stanford professor Michel Oksenberg (1938-2001), who was a Senior Fellow at Shorenstein APARC and the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies. Professor Oksenberg also served as a key member of the National Security Council when the U.S. normalized relations with China, and consistently urged that the U.S. engage with Asia in a more considered manner. In tribute, the Oksenberg Lecture recognizes distinguished individuals who have helped to advance understanding between the U.S. and the nations of the Asia-Pacific.

Panelists in alphabetical order:

Una Aleksandra Bērziņa-Čerenkova is a political scientist, China scholar, Head of Political Science Doctoral Programme and China Studies Centre at Rīga Stradiņš University, Head of the Asia program at the Latvian Institute of International Affairs, a member of the China in Europe Research Network (CHERN) and European Think Tank Network on China (ETNC). She has held a Senior visiting research scholar position at Fudan University School of Philosophy, Shanghai, China, and a Fulbright visiting scholar position at the Center for East Asian Studies, Stanford University. Bērziņa-Čerenkova publishes on PRC political discourse, contemporary Chinese ideology, EU-China relations, Russia-China, and BRI and her most recent monograph is Perfect Imbalance: China and Russia.

Thomas Fingar is the former first Deputy Director of National Intelligence for Analysis and Chairman of the National Intelligence Council, currently at Stanford as a Shorenstein APARC Fellow in the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies. From 2005-2008, he served as the first Deputy Director of National Intelligence for Analysis and, concurrently, as Chairman of the National Intelligence Council. Fingar previously served as Assistant Secretary of the State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research (2000-2001 and 2004-2005), Principal Deputy Assistant (2001-2003), Deputy Assistant Secretary for Analysis (1994-2000), Director of the Office of Analysis for East Asia and the Pacific (1989-1994), and Chief of the China Division (1986-1989). Fingar's most recent books are Uneasy Partnerships: China and Japan, the Koreas, and Russia in the Era of Reform (Stanford, 2017), Fateful Decisions: Choices that will Shape China’s Future, co-edited with Jean Oi (Stanford, 2020), and From Mandate to Blueprint: Lessons from Intelligence Reform (Stanford, 2021)

Alex Gabuev is a Senior Fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. His research is focused on Russia's policy toward East and Southeast Asia, political and ideological trends in China, and China's relations with its neighbors—especially those in Central Asia. Prior to joining Carnegie, Gabuev was a member of the editorial board of Kommersant publishing house and served as deputy editor in chief of Kommersant-Vlast, one of Russia's most influential newsweeklies. He has previously worked as a nonresident visiting research fellow at the European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR) and taught courses on Chinese energy policy and political culture at Moscow State University. Gabuev is a Munich Young Leader of Munich International Security Conference and a member of Council on Foreign and Defense Policy (Russia).

Michael McFaul is Director at the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies, the Ken Olivier and Angela Nomellini Professor of International Studies in the Department of Political Science, and the Peter and Helen Bing Senior Fellow at the Hoover Institution. McFaul is also an International Affairs Analyst for NBC News and a columnist for The Washington Post. He served for five years in the Obama administration, first as Special Assistant to the President and Senior Director for Russian and Eurasian Affairs at the National Security Council at the White House (2009-2012), and then as U.S. Ambassador to the Russian Federation (2012-2014). He has authored several books, most recently the New York Times bestseller From Cold War to Hot Peace: An American Ambassador in Putin’s Russia. Earlier books include Advancing Democracy Abroad: Why We Should, How We Can; Transitions To Democracy: A Comparative Perspective (eds. with Kathryn Stoner); Power and Purpose: American Policy toward Russia after the Cold War (with James Goldgeier); and Russia’s Unfinished Revolution: Political Change from Gorbachev to Putin.

Evan Medeiros is a Professor and Penner Family Chair in Asia Studies in the School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University and former top advisor on the Asia-Pacific in the Obama Administration, responsible for coordinating U.S. policy toward the Asia-Pacific across the areas of diplomacy, defense policy, economic policy, and intelligence. Prior to joining the White House, Medeiros worked for seven years as a senior political scientist at the RAND Corporation and served at the Treasury Department as a Policy Advisor-China to Secretary Hank Paulson Jr., working on the U.S.-China Strategic Economic Dialogue. Medeiros is a member of the Board of Directors of the National Committee on U.S.-China Relations, a member of the International Advisory Board of Cambridge University's Centre for Geopolitics, and a Life Member of the Council on Foreign Relations.

Jean Oi (Moderator) is the William Haas Professor of Chinese Politics in the Department of Political Science and a Senior Fellow of the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies (FSI) at Stanford University. She also directs the China Program at the Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center at FSI and is the founding Lee Shau Kee Director of the Stanford Center at Peking University. Oi has published extensively on political economy and the process of reform in China. Her books include State and Peasant in Contemporary China: The Political Economy of Village Government and Rural China Takes Off: Institutional Foundations of Economic Reform. Recent edited volumes include Zouping Revisited: Adaptive Governance in a Chinese County, co-edited with Steven Goldstein, and Fateful Decisions: Choices That Will Shape China's Future, co-edited with Thomas Fingar. 

Jean C. Oi

Via Zoom.

Una Aleksandra Bērziņa-Čerenkova

Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies
Stanford University
Encina Hall, C-327
Stanford, CA 94305-6055

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Shorenstein APARC Fellow
Affiliated Scholar at the Stanford Center on China's Economy and Institutions
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Thomas Fingar is a Shorenstein APARC Fellow in the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies at Stanford University. He was the inaugural Oksenberg-Rohlen Distinguished Fellow from 2010 through 2015 and the Payne Distinguished Lecturer at Stanford in 2009.

From 2005 through 2008, he served as the first deputy director of national intelligence for analysis and, concurrently, as chairman of the National Intelligence Council. Fingar served previously as assistant secretary of the State Department’s Bureau of Intelligence and Research (2000-01 and 2004-05), principal deputy assistant secretary (2001-03), deputy assistant secretary for analysis (1994-2000), director of the Office of Analysis for East Asia and the Pacific (1989-94), and chief of the China Division (1986-89). Between 1975 and 1986 he held a number of positions at Stanford University, including senior research associate in the Center for International Security and Arms Control.

Fingar is a graduate of Cornell University (A.B. in Government and History, 1968), and Stanford University (M.A., 1969 and Ph.D., 1977 both in political science). His most recent books are From Mandate to Blueprint: Lessons from Intelligence Reform (Stanford University Press, 2021), Reducing Uncertainty: Intelligence Analysis and National Security (Stanford University Press, 2011), The New Great Game: China and South and Central Asia in the Era of Reform, editor (Stanford University Press, 2016), Uneasy Partnerships: China and Japan, the Koreas, and Russia in the Era of Reform (Stanford, 2017), and Fateful Decisions: Choices that will Shape China’s Future, co-edited with Jean Oi (Stanford, 2020). His most recent article is, "The Role of Intelligence in Countering Illicit Nuclear-Related Procurement,” in Matthew Bunn, Martin B. Malin, William C. Potter, and Leonard S Spector, eds., Preventing Black Market Trade in Nuclear Technology (Cambridge, 2018)."

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Alex Gabuev

Encina Hall
616 Jane Stanford Way
Stanford, CA 94305-6055

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Senior Fellow, Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies
Ken Olivier and Angela Nomellini Professor of International Studies, Department of Political Science
Peter and Helen Bing Senior Fellow, Hoover Institution
mcfaul_headshot_2025.jpg PhD

Michael McFaul is the Ken Olivier and Angela Nomellini Professor of International Studies in Political Science, Senior Fellow at the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies, and the Peter and Helen Bing Senior Fellow at the Hoover Institution, all at Stanford University. He joined the Stanford faculty in 1995 and served as FSI Director from 2015 to 2025. He is also an international affairs analyst for MSNOW.

McFaul served for five years in the Obama administration, first as Special Assistant to the President and Senior Director for Russian and Eurasian Affairs at the National Security Council at the White House (2009-2012), and then as U.S. Ambassador to the Russian Federation (2012-2014).

McFaul has authored ten books and edited several others, including, most recently, Autocrats vs. Democrats: China, Russia, America, and the New Global Disorder, as well as From Cold War to Hot Peace: An American Ambassador in Putin’s Russia, (a New York Times bestseller) Advancing Democracy Abroad: Why We Should, How We Can; and Russia’s Unfinished Revolution: Political Change from Gorbachev to Putin.

He is a recipient of numerous awards, including an honorary PhD from Montana State University; the Order for Merits to Lithuania from President Gitanas Nausea of Lithuania; Order of Merit of Third Degree from President Volodymyr Zelenskyy of Ukraine, and the Dean’s Award for Distinguished Teaching at Stanford University. In 2015, he was the Distinguished Mingde Faculty Fellow at the Stanford Center at Peking University.

McFaul was born and raised in Montana. He received his B.A. in International Relations and Slavic Languages and his M.A. in Soviet and East European Studies from Stanford University in 1986. As a Rhodes Scholar, he completed his D. Phil. in International Relations at Oxford University in 1991. 

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Evan Medeiros
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Shorenstein APARC Japan Program April 18 Webinar information card: Japan's Foreign Policy in the Aftermath of the Russian Invasion of Ukraine, including photo portraits of speakers Hiroyuki Akita, Yoko Iwama, and Kiyoteru Tsutsui

April 18, 5:00 p.m - 6:30 p.m. PT / April 19, 9:00 a.m. - 10:30 a.m. JT

Russia’s invasion in Ukraine has transformed the landscape of international security in a multitude of ways and reshaped foreign policy in many countries. How did it impact Japan’s foreign policy? From nuclear sharing to the Northern Territories, it sparked new debates in Japan about how to cope with Putin’s Russia and the revised international order. With NATO reenergized and the United States having to recommit some resources in Europe, how should Japan counter an expansionist China, an emboldened North Korea, and a potentially hamstrung Russia to realize its vision of Free and Open Indo-Pacific? What might be the endgame in Ukraine and how would it impact the clash of liberal and authoritarian forces in the Indo-Pacific region? Featuring two leading experts on world politics and Japan’s foreign policy, this panel tackles these questions and charts a way forward for Japan.

Square photo portrait of Yoko Iwama

Yoko Iwama is Professor of National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies (GRIPS). She is also the director of Security and Strategy Program and Maritime Safety and Security Program at GRIPS. 

She graduated from Kyoto University in 1986 and earned her PhD in Law. Having served as Research Assistant of Kyoto University (1994–97), Special Assistant of the Japanese Embassy in Germany (1998–2000), and Associate Professor at GRIPS (2000), she was appointed Professor at GRIPS in 2009. She was a student at the Free University of Berlin between 1989-1991, where she witnessed the end the reunification of the two Germanies. 

Her specialty is international security and European diplomatic history centering on NATO, Germany, and nuclear strategy. 

Her publications include John Baylis and Yoko Iwama (ed.) Joining the Non-Proliferation Treaty: Deterrence, Non-Proliferation and the American Alliance, (Routledge 2018); “Unified Germany and NATO,” (in Keiichi Hirose/ Tomonori Yoshizaki (eds.) International Relation of NATO, Minerva Shobo, 2012). 

Her newest book The 1968 Global Nuclear Order and West Germany appeared in August 2021 in Japanese. She is working on a co-authored book on the origins and evolution of the nuclear-sharing in NATO and a co-authored book on the Neutrals, the Non-aligned countries and the NPT.  

Square photo portrait of Hiroyuki Akita

Hiroyuki Akita is a Commentator of Nikkei. He regularly writes commentaries, columns, and analysis focusing on foreign and international security affairs. He joined Nikkei in 1987 and worked at the Political News Department from 1998 to 2002 where he covered Japanese foreign policy, security policy, and domestic politics. Akita served as Senior & Editorial Staff Writer from 2009 to 2017, and also worked at the “Leader Writing Team ” of the Financial Times in London in late 2017. 

 Akita graduated from Jiyu Gakuen College in 1987 and Boston University (M.A.). From 2006 to 2007, he was an associate of the US-Japan Program at Harvard University, where he conducted research on US-China-Japan relations. In March 2019, he won the Vaughn-Ueda International Journalist Award, a prize for outstanding reporting of international affairs. He is an author of two books in Japanese: “Anryu (Power Game of US-China-Japan)”(2008), and “Ranryu (Strategic Competition of US-Japan and China)”(2016). 

Square photo portrait of Kiyoteru Tsutsui

Kiyoteru Tsutsui is the Henri H. and Tomoye Takahashi Professor, Professor of Sociology, Senior Fellow at the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies, and Deputy Director of the Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center, where he is also Director of the Japan Program. He is the author of Rights Make Might: Global Human Rights and Minority Social Movements in Japan (Oxford University Press, 2018), co-editor of Corporate Responsibility in a Globalizing World (Oxford University Press, 2016) and co-editor of The Courteous Power: Japan and Southeast Asia in the Indo-Pacific Era (University of Michigan Press, 2021).  

 

Kiyoteru Tsutsui
Kiyoteru Tsutsui

Via Zoom Webinar

Yoko Iwama Professor & Center Director National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies (GRIPS)
Hiroyuki Akita Commentator Nikkei
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Marketing Democracy book talk

Erin A. Snider joins ARD to discuss her recently released book, Marketing Democracy: The Political Economy of Democracy Aid in the Middle East (Cambridge University Press, 2022).

For nearly two decades, the United States devoted more than $2 billion towards democracy promotion in the Middle East with seemingly little impact. To understand the limited impact of this aid and the decision of authoritarian regimes to allow democracy programs whose ultimate aim is to challenge the power of such regimes, Marketing Democracy examines the construction and practice of democracy aid in Washington DC and in Egypt and Morocco, two of the highest recipients of US democracy aid in the region.

Drawing on extensive fieldwork, novel new data on the professional histories of democracy promoters, archival research and recently declassified government documents, Erin A. Snider focuses on the voices and practices of those engaged in democracy work over the last three decades to offer a new framework for understanding the political economy of democracy aid. Her research shows how democracy aid can work to strengthen rather than challenge authoritarian regimes. Marketing Democracy fundamentally challenges scholars to rethink how we study democracy aid and how the ideas of democracy that underlie democracy programs come to reflect the views of donors and recipient regimes rather than indigenous demand. 

ABOUT THE SPEAKER 

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Erin A. Snider
Erin A. Snider is an assistant professor at Texas A&M University’s Bush School of Government and Public Service. Her research and teaching focus on the political economy of aid, democracy, and development in the Middle East. She was a Postdoctoral Fellow at Princeton University’s Niehaus Center for Globalization and Governance, a Fulbright scholar in Egypt, a Gates Scholar at the University of Cambridge, and a Carnegie Fellow with the New America Foundation in Washington, D.C. Her first book, Marketing Democracy: The Political Economy of Democracy Aid in the Middle East was published with Cambridge University Press. Other research has been published in International Studies Quarterly, PS: Political Science and Politics, and Middle East Policy, among other outlets. She holds a PhD in politics from the University of Cambridge and an MSc in Middle East Politics from the School of Oriental and African Studies (SOAS), University of London.

This event is co-sponsored by the Abbasi Program in Islamic Studies and the Center for African Studies at Stanford University.​

Hesham Sallam

Online via Zoom

Erin A. Snider Assistant Professor Associate Professor of Political Science and Islamic Studies Texas A&M University’s Bush School of Government and Public Service
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Cover of the book 'Strategy in the Contemporary World' and screenshot of first page of Oriana Skylar Mastro's chapter "Chinese Grand Strategy"

This chapter briefly covers the history of Chinese grand strategy since 1949 before focusing most heavily on China's strategy of rejuvenation under Xi Jinping. It also covers some of the domestic factors that have influenced Chinese grand strategy over time. It then highlights two components central to China's grand strategy — its approach to international institutions and its maritime ambitions. The chapter ends with a discussion of the United States shift to great power competition with China.

Below is an excerpt from Mastro's chapter in Strategy in the Contemporary World, edited by John Baylis, James J. Wirtz, and Jeannie L. Johnson, reproduced by permission of Oxford University Press.
 

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In Strategy in the Contemporary World, edited by John Baylis, James J. Wirtz, and Jeannie L. Johnson, Oriana Skylar Mastro examines the evolution of Chinese grand strategy from Mao Zedong to Xi Jinping, its drivers, and its implications.

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Oriana Skylar Mastro
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Cover of the journal Asia Policy (vol 17.1, Jan. 2022)
How should we understand China’s grand strategy and intentions? The ascendance of Xi Jinping and the beginning of a slew of economic projects like the Belt and Road Initiative, interpreted by many as a tool in the framework of strategic competition with the United States, caused many to see Beijing as increasingly expansionist.5 Some more alarmist analysts, such as Department of Defense policy adviser Michael Pillsbury, have characterized China as having a grand scheme to supplant the United States as the sole global superpower.6 Others see strategic folly in overestimating the threat, focusing instead on the strong fundamentals of U.S. power7 or emphasizing China’s weaknesses and domestic challenges.8 Indeed, the range of academic inquiry and conflicting viewpoints is a testament to the complexity of understanding China and its role on the global stage.

Enter The Long Game: China’s Grand Strategy to Displace American Order, one of the most recent and significant attempts to understand what China wants. Written by Rush Doshi, a former Brookings fellow turned National Security Council staffer in the Biden administration, the book encapsulates rigorous social-scientific research approaches, clear argumentation, and policy relevance as well as is accessible to the average reader. 

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Oriana Skylar Mastro reviews Rush Doshi’s book The Long Game: China’s Grand Strategy to Displace American Order (New York: Oxford University Press, 2021).

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This essay was originally published in Foreign Affairs magazine.

On January 30, North Korea fired an intermediate-range ballistic missile from the north province of Jagang, its seventh rocket test this year. At first glance, this may not seem like a huge deal. The rockets are not, after all, the nuclear bombs and intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) that North Korea has tested in the past. Russia is currently massing troops on the Ukrainian border, and COVID-19 cases are surging around the world thanks to the Omicron variant. By comparison, the launches may look like a lesser concern—just another routine military provocation from Pyongyang.

But the tests aren’t coming at a routine moment. Instead, they are occurring at a time of stark, rising competition between the United States and the Pacific’s other great power: China. Washington sold nuclear submarines to Australia as part of a new, trilateral security arrangement along with the United Kingdom. U.S. assistant secretary of defense Ely Ratner declared that deterring China from attacking Taiwan is “an absolute priority.” In explaining the United States’ withdrawal from Afghanistan, U.S. President Joe Biden argued Washington needed to refocus its energy and resources on the “serious competition with China.” The pivot to Asia, long elusive, is clearly underway.


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In this context, North Korea’s tests take on a new meaning—and it is dangerous for U.S. ambitions. The heightened threat of North Korean missile attacks incentivizes both Japan and South Korea to avoid alienating Beijing, which they hope will help keep Pyongyang in check. (China is North Korea’s main patron and sole ally.) It also means both Japan and South Korea are likely to redouble their militaries’ focus on Pyongyang rather than support U.S. operations elsewhere in Asia. And if the United States has to bolster its armed posture on the Korean Peninsula, whether to assuage Seoul’s and Tokyo’s fears, better deter North Korea, or fight in an actual conflict, Washington will need to reposition forces designed to constrain China elsewhere. Pyongyang’s weapons program was long seen as a liability for Beijing, given the erratic and unpredictable behavior of North Korea’s leaders. Now, it is becoming an asset.

For China, this switch comes at an opportune time. Under President Xi Jinping, Beijing has grown more impatient, expansionist, and belligerent. It is increasingly possible that China will try to seize control of Taiwan, especially since the peaceful unification of the mainland and the island is clearly no longer an option. Xi is closely watching the U.S. response to North Korea’s provocations and drawing lessons about Washington’s credibility. To prevent conflict in the Korean Peninsula and keep pace in its competition with Beijing, the United States will need to come up with new ways to unite its allies and prove its resolve in the region.

Cracking Through

North Korea’s latest rockets may not be capable of reaching the continental United States, but that hardly means they aren’t dangerous. Missile defense systems cannot see low-flying objects until they are near their targets, and this year’s first and second tests were of hypersonic advanced boost-glide vehicle missiles, which can travel at low altitudes, evade radar, and maneuver to avoid last-second interception. In the third test, the North Korean military successfully launched a missile off a moving train, indicating that Pyongyang can fire rockets from a mobile system, in turn making both tracking and targeting even more difficult (especially given the country’s vast railway system). In other words, these recent tests may have neutralized U.S. missile defense capabilities, such as the U.S.-deployed Terminal High Altitude Area Defense missile system and the Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense system.

These capabilities were designed to protect Japan and, especially, South Korea. Their erosion comes at a tricky time for the United States’ relations with the latter. Biden has yet to designate a U.S. ambassador to Seoul, and he appointed a special envoy for North Korea only in May of last year. The president placed new sanctions on North Korea in December 2021, but they were human rights-related and largely viewed as symbolic. In response to January’s missile threats, the Biden administration implemented its first weapons-related sanctions, but they were relatively limited in scope. Some South Korean analysts now believe that the administration discusses North Korean issues with Seoul not because it seriously intends to resolve them but more to persuade the South Korean government to help the United States compete against Beijing. South Koreans fear that the Biden administration’s prioritization of China comes at the expense of the denuclearization of North Korea.

North Korea has explicitly tied its missiles to U.S. involvement in Taiwan.
Sungmin Cho and Oriana Skylar Mastro

This is a welcome development for Beijing. Chinese analysts view South Korea as a weak link in the United States’ East Asian alliances, and Beijing is trying to divide Washington and Seoul through a combination of compliments and threats. In August 2020, Chinese media praised South Korea’s efforts to "be objective and keep its friendship with China," and several weeks later, Chinese scholars commended South Korea’s “kindness to China” in a time of “U.S. suppression.” But after South Korean President Moon Jae-in discussed Taiwan with Biden at their May 2021 summit, China’s Foreign Ministry warned South Korea not to “play with fire.” It is telling that Chinese scholars at a government-affiliated institute are arguing openly that China needs to raise the cost of South Korea’s cooperation with the United States on Taiwan.

North Korea’s missile capabilities are helping accomplish this task. The newer rockets more effectively threaten South Korea, and they increase Seoul’s doubts about the efficacy of U.S. deterrence. North Korea has explicitly tied its menacing assets to the issues surrounding the island. Pyongyang has publicly criticized the United States policies’ on Taiwan and threatened that “tragic consequences” will result from U.S. support. “The indiscreet meddling by the U.S. into the issue of Taiwan entails a potential danger of touching off a delicate situation on the Korean peninsula,” North Korea’s vice foreign minister said in a statement. These words could make Seoul think twice about backing the United States in the Taiwan Strait.

Japan is more difficult to split from Washington. But North Korea’s activities can certainly draw some of Japan’s attention away from Beijing. Although Tokyo was getting onboard with playing a greater role in deterring China and defending Taiwan, Japan’s Ministry of Defense has identified North Korea’s military capabilities as a “grave and imminent” threat, and there is no doubt that the government’s focus will shift if Pyongyang escalates its provocations. In the White House’s statement regarding Biden’s January 21 meeting with Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida, Taiwan was mentioned only once. In comparison, the two leaders cited North Korea three times, condemned the country’s recent missile tests, and committed to work with South Korea more closely. Although Tokyo could theoretically focus on both North Korea and China, in practice it might struggle. Pyongyang poses a far more direct threat to Japanese lives and territory than does Beijing, and it would be hard for Japanese leaders to concentrate on China if North Korea grows more belligerent.

Drawing the Heat

North Korea’s new capabilities don’t help Beijing just diplomatically. The tests provide tangible, military benefits. The United States has been attempting to enlist South Korea in its efforts to strengthen deterrence across the Taiwan Strait. But Pyongyang’s new missiles mean Seoul is less likely to focus its military somewhere other than North Korea, especially if it continues the provocations. Indeed, a South Korean expert on Chinese politics has argued that when Washington asks for support in its contest with Beijing, Seoul should explain that it is too busy handling Pyongyang.

To reassure its allies, the United States may also need to refocus military attention on the Korean Peninsula, reducing its ability to operate in other parts of Asia. In 2017, when North Korea conducted ICBM and nuclear tests, the United States responded by sending more strategic assets, including heavy naval power, near the Korean Peninsula. If tensions rise high enough, Washington may have to do so again, including by shifting the Seventh Fleet’s operational focus to the area. Stationed in the middle of Japan, this fleet has been one of the United States’ primary tools for deterring Beijing, conducting patrols near the Taiwan Strait and promoting freedom of navigation in the South China Sea. But given past positioning patterns, a crisis on the Korean Peninsula would also most certainly drag the fleet farther north, undermining Washington’s ability to carry out operations elsewhere.

A major war on the Korean Peninsula would prove particularly devastating to the United States’ competition with Beijing. In addition to the Seventh Fleet, the United States Forces Korea’s 28,000 soldiers, 40 F-16 fighters, 90 military aircrafts, 40 attack helicopters, and other assets would immediately become unavailable for operations beyond the peninsula. A majority of the United States Forces Japan’s aircraft, ships, and approximately 55,000 military personnel would also be deployed to Korea. Japan’s own military, which could help the United States if it needed to fight China, would grow busy providing combat support to protect U.S. naval forces—including antisubmarine operations and sea minesweeping—as U.S. troops prepared for an amphibious landing on the peninsula.

For China, a crisis on the Korean Peninsula would be a golden opportunity.
Sungmin Cho and Oriana Skylar Mastro

Beijing, by comparison, is in a better position. The United States has to worry that China will use a North Korea–spurred crisis to invade Taiwan, but the inverse isn’t true: Beijing isn’t concerned that Seoul or Washington will start a war over Taiwan if Pyongyang launches an attack. China’s commitment to North Korea is also not as comprehensive as the United States’ is to Seoul. In the event of a renewed Korean war, China plans to send mostly ground forces into the North. Its air and naval assets would remain focused across the Taiwan Strait.

For China, therefore, a crisis on the peninsula—especially one that evolves into a conflict—would be a golden opportunity to expand its power. It may even make it possible to defeat Taipei. With U.S. intelligence assets supporting troops in Korea, a Chinese amphibious force might be able to move on the island without giving the United States advanced warning. China could establish beachheads on Taiwan long before U.S. forces, bogged down on the peninsula, have time to arrive. The war’s eventual outcome would be a fait accompli.

North Korea’s latest tests may have already made a Chinese attack more likely. As Chinese media happily pointed out, Pyongyang’s January 11 missile launch briefly confused the United States Northern Command’s warning system, grounding some commercial airplanes for 15 minutes. China has the most advanced ballistic and cruise missile program in the world. If North Korea’s offensive strike capability can jeopardize the U.S. early warning system, it surely bodes well for Beijing’s ability to surprise and defeat Washington’s forces.

Better Together

To counter North Korea’s new missile threats and prevent them from helping China, the Biden administration needs a stronger North Korea strategy—one that deters further provocations, reassures South Korea, and demonstrates Washington’s continued resolve and credibility to Beijing. That means Washington must support South Korea’s efforts to advance its offensive capabilities, such as the development of nuclear-powered submarines. South Korea, meanwhile, must scale up its combined exercises with the United States. A stronger U.S.–South Korean alliance will improve the two countries’ combat readiness, which is especially critical at a time when North Korea appears to be building up to another round of ICBM and nuclear tests. Finally, closer ties would make it easier for the United States to marshal allies in its competition against China, including in the Taiwan Strait.

The United States should also use the renewed tensions on the Korean Peninsula to encourage closer Japanese–South Korean cooperation. Seoul has long had highly fraught relations with its former colonial ruler, and the two states have especially struggled to get along in recent years. But for better or worse, the Korean Peninsula, East China Sea, and Taiwan Strait are increasingly intertwined in the current era of strategic competition. Pyongyang's provocations against the United States and its allies on the peninsula can embolden the Chinese Communist Party to act in other regions. And if Beijing can weaken or defeat the United States and its Asian allies anywhere, both the Chinese Communist Party and the Kim regime will be emboldened to act on the peninsula. To cope with this changing security environment, it makes sense for strategists in Washington, Seoul, and Tokyo to package these issues together. By demonstrating greater coordination, the three countries would also make it harder for China or North Korea to fracture Washington’s East Asia alliances, regardless of the contingency.

Finally, these three states must prepare for simultaneous provocations in East Asia, including concurrent conflicts in Taiwan and on the Korean Peninsula. In consultation with one another, the United States and its allies must demonstrate a strong willingness to cooperate and take strategic risks. They should hold more trilateral defense minister meetings, more thoroughly review various contingency scenarios, and discuss how to enhance their combined capabilities. Hopefully, these countries will never need to put these plans and abilities into practice. But to deter Kim Jong Un and Xi Jinping, they need to prove that they can fight two wars—and win both—if the need arises.

Headshot of Oriana Skylar Mastro

Oriana Skylar Mastro

Center Fellow at the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies
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