This article originally appeared in The Jerusalem Strategic Tribune.

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The numbers tell part of the story. While US merchandise trade with the Southeast Asian region grew by a respectable 62.4% from 2010 to 2019 (the last pre-pandemic year), China’s trade increased by an impressive 115% during the same period, according to the statistics of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). Over a longer period, the US share of the region’s total merchandise trade fell from 16.1% in 2000 to 11.6% in 2020, while China’s share rose from 4.3% to 19.4%. Although infrastructure investment numbers are harder to come by, there is no question that China is playing a much more significant role in Southeast Asian infrastructure development than the US.

Some of the relative decline in the US economic role in the region is the inevitable result of China’s dramatic economic growth and the resulting increased trade and investment. That trend, however, only partly explains the US predicament. Over the past 10–20 years, Beijing has been much more aggressive in its economic statecraft than Washington. Beijing signed a Free Trade Agreement with ASEAN, then joined a new multilateral trade agreement—the Regional Cooperation and Economic Partnership (RCEP)—and more recently asked to join the high-standard Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP) free trade accord. On infrastructure, China established the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank and the high-profile Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), which aims to funnel billions of dollars into infrastructure projects in Southeast Asia and elsewhere.

The BRI initiative generally has been welcomed in the region for one simple reason: Southeast Asia has huge and urgent infrastructure needs—estimated by the Asian Development Bank to be $210 billion per year through 2030—that it cannot meet by mobilizing domestic resources. Through BRI, Beijing is offering to meet a portion of those needs with greater speed and fewer conditions than other would-be partners. Southeast Asian governments have lined up for BRI projects, with outgoing Philippine President Rodrigo Duterte, Indonesian President Joko Widodo, and former Malaysian Prime Minister Najib Razaq having signed on for more than $20 billion of BRI-funded infrastructure projects in the 2015–2018 period. Although the BRI has been the subject of substantial criticism for overpromising, project delays, quality problems, employing Chinese rather than local labor, and raising the host government’s debt obligations, the initiative still dominates the discussion of infrastructure in the region.

The US, meanwhile, has underperformed in terms of its economic diplomacy. Most importantly, in 2017 it summarily withdrew from its primary economic initiative in the region, the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) free trade agreement. President Trump’s decision to pull out of that accord was a severe geostrategic and economic blunder, as TPP would have bound the US into the broader region for a generation or more, as well as facilitated greater US trade with a number of fast-growing economies. With the US out of the TPP and China joining RCEP, the prospects are for a growing percentage of ASEAN trade to be with China (and other RCEP partners) and for the US and American businesses to lose further ground.

The US also has struggled to compete on infrastructure. The US is not going to match China, particularly in areas such as road, rail, and port development, but it could do more. The Trump administration launched several initiatives—including the Blue Dot Network, Clean EDGE Asia, and the establishment of the Development Finance Corporation (DFC), a larger, more ambitious version of the Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC), a federal entity that helps insure US ventures abroad—all of which sought to leverage private sector funding to offer high-quality projects. The Biden administration has followed up with the Partnership for Global Infrastructure and Investment, announced in June in coordination with G-7 partners, and promised via the Quad $50 billion in infrastructure funding. To date, however, these initiatives generally have not significantly changed the overall infrastructure picture in the region.

The US failure to engage in the region’s burgeoning free trade networks—combined with the big splash that China’s BRI initiative is making and the lack of a countervailing American initiative—is fueling the perception in the region that the US is a declining economic player. In an ASEAN 2021 survey of regional opinion leaders, 76% believed China was the most influential economic partner in the region, compared to less than 10% who felt that way about the US. Even more telling, I recall asking a senior Myanmar economic minister in 2017 why he had led private-sector roadshows to China, Japan, and South Korea but not the US, and he replied: “We didn’t even think of the US.”

Thus, the US faces a problem of both reality and perception. To address this, the US does not need to match Chinese numbers. It does, however, need to find a way to re-energize its trade engagement and to become a more significant player in Southeast Asian infrastructure, and to do so in ways that change the narrative in the region.

Recognizing this reality, the Biden administration recently launched the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework (IPEF), which is expected to result in negotiations on trade, supply chains, clean energy, and decarbonization, as well as on tax and corruption issues. The administration touted this initiative as reflecting the needs and realities of the 21st-century global economy. The good news is that seven of the ten ASEAN member nations signed onto IPEF, presumably reflecting their interest in greater US economic engagement and their hope that IPEF can produce just that. Skeptics say the initiative does not offer the promise of greater access to the US market via tariff reductions, which normally would be the carrot to entice other governments into adopting the high standards Washington wants. Also, as Matthew Goodman of the Center for Strategic and International Studies has pointed out, the fact that the administration is unwilling to take any negotiated agreement to Congress for ratification is likely to raise doubts in the minds of Asian partners about the IPEF’s durability, since a future administration can easily toss it aside.

Despite or maybe because of these doubts, the US needs to do all it can to turn the IPEF into something that is economically meaningful. Can it produce a digital trade agreement, real substance on strengthening supply chains, or can it possibly even use trade facilitation tools to enhance market access as former senior US trade official Wendy Cutler has suggested in a recent podcast hosted by the Center for Strategic and International Studies? It is too early to say, but the bottom line is that many in the region—and indeed even in the US—will remain privately doubtful until and unless the IPEF shows that it can result in tangible business and economic benefits.

The White House put the IPEF forward because it believes it lacks the political support either to join the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership or to launch another significant trade initiative. The domestic politics of trade might be tough right now, but that is not an excuse that is going to go very far in Southeast Asia. The region is not going to say “no problem, we understand.” Instead, it will go ahead without the US. If Washington wants to maintain influence, it needs to find a way to make the domestic politics on trade work. That almost certainly will entail appealing to bipartisan concern about Chinese geostrategic dominance, as trade alone probably will not sell.

On infrastructure, the various US initiatives to date have disappointed to some extent, although the Development Finance Corporation has been a step in the right direction. They do little other than offer the prospect of quality to give the US a competitive edge over Chinese-funded projects. The Chinese offer relatively speedy approval processes, low or zero conditionality deals, and complete project packages, including financing. Chinese state companies often are willing to undertake projects that do not appear to be commercially viable. Plus, Chinese political leaders weigh in personally to push the projects forward. I have seen this on the ground, in Indonesia and Myanmar, countless times. The Chinese pull out all of the stops, with intensive lobbying and full financing, and they often win.

Economic officials in the region complain that the multilateral development banks and Japan, which also offer substantial infrastructure deals, move much more slowly and laboriously than China. The design, discussion, and approval process often takes many years. With the US, it is almost always the private sector taking the lead, and private American companies have a hard time finding well-developed, “bankable” infrastructure projects in the region. Plus, US companies often come to the table without full financing or even all the pieces of the project. Government lobbying and financing usually lags, if it is there at all.

If the US is going to compete effectively for infrastructure projects in the region, it is going to have to change the way it does business. To begin with, the US will have to make it easier for Southeast Asian governments to say “yes” to deals. That means offering the full project package, including financing, and accelerating the project preparation and approval timeline to come closer to matching that of the Chinese. It also means more government funding for project development along with heavy US government lobbying, including by the president when appropriate, for major projects. The US is not going to engage in bribery or support projects that destroy communities or the environment, nor should it. But it needs to use just about all the other available tools to compete.

The US should consider establishing an overseas infrastructure czar in Washington who can lead and oversee government-business teams that identify potential projects where the US can compete, put together a full project package, including private and public financing, and then aggressively lobby the host government for approval. I often hear that the US does not work that way on overseas business. Perhaps, but if Washington wants to win some victories—and more significant projects—it needs to be willing to adopt new thinking.

Re-engaging on trade and winning more infrastructure deals are essential, but there is one more thing the US needs to do to reverse the perception that it is a declining economic player in Southeast Asia. It needs to do a much better job of telling its economic story. For example, the US remains the largest foreign investor in Southeast Asia, but I am willing to bet few people in the region know that. Similarly, America remains a huge market for Southeast Asian exports, just slightly smaller than China, but again that is not well known or much talked about in the region. The US should devote more resources and time to telling this story and to reminding the region of the incredible power of American private sector innovation and the US commitment to quality investment. Better communications alone will not solve the problem, but combined with trade and infrastructure initiatives it can help the US persuade the governments and people of Southeast Asia that it remains a major economic partner.

For as long as policymakers and scholars of international relations have sought to understand the actions of actors on the global stage, they have also debated the intentions of governments and the role those intentions play in statecraft. In a new article in the Journal of Chinese Political Science, Center Fellow Oriana Skylar Mastro proposes a new research agenda for deciphering Chinese intentions. She argues that the current treatment of intentions in international relations is not granular enough to allow for a nuanced understanding of what China wants, how it plans to achieve it, and what the implications will be for the United States and the U.S.-led world order.

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Mastro suggests that there are theoretical and empirical issues with how existing scholarly accounts have defined, measured, and operationalized intentions in the context of understanding China’s rise. She presents five propositions that should drive research moving forward. 

Her first point in advancing a theory of intentions requires a definition distinct from aspirations, motives, preferences, objectives, goals, and grand strategy. She argues that “intentions consist of purposefully designing or manipulating means to achieve some end,” implying “clear formulation and deliberateness.”

Second, a theory of intentions should analytically separate ends from means but include both process intentions and outcome intentions, says Mastro. Process intentions refer to “the preferred methods and the factors that influence how a country thinks it is best to achieve its goals,” outcome intentions to “what one wants to bring about, accomplish or attain.” Scholars thus need to differentiate between what China wants and how it plans to achieve those goals. For example, some argue that China is a “revisionist” power seeking to increase its influence by changing aspects of the international order to further its interests, not a “revolutionary” power intending to upend the system entirely. But more accurately, Mastro notes, “China has revisionist outcome intentions, not process intentions, with respect to international institutions; countries are revolutionary powers when they have both.”

Another problem is that existing measurements of intentions tend to rely on values that are largely subjective and uninformative in explaining what a country is doing and how others should respond. For example, scholars often see revisionist intentions as bad and status quo intentions as good. But Mastro points out that the United States was revisionist after WWII: it set up the network of international institutions that make up the current international system. Why, then, should we ascribe a negative label to China’s revisionist efforts to leverage those institutions for its benefit? According to Mastro, it is more accurate to assess whether intentions are detrimental or beneficial for specific actors. For example, “Chinese intentions to control more of the South China Sea are detrimental to U.S. interests, even if China pursues those interests without using force." 

Fourth, Mastro contends that states’ intentions vary not only by issue area but also within a particular issue area, and therefore it is empirically problematic to analyze one variable describing everything a state wants. She argues that a state’s intentions can vary even within specific spheres of activity, such as security, and in many cases, a particular issue cannot be dissected cleanly into economic or security tropes like China’s One Belt, One Road initiative.

Her fifth proposition addresses a debate in the literature about uncertainty and intentions: while there may be uncertainty about intentions, that does not make them unknowable. Mastro suggests that, in practice, “current intentions are knowable to a great degree... future intentions are less knowable, as states have yet to formulate them — but how the pursuit of current intentions unfolds largely shapes future intentions.”

The study of China and its intentions must be more granular and deeply data-driven, Mastro concludes. The view that “China is revisionist/bad and the United States is status quo/good” risks creating a series of assumptions that hamper good policy, she warns. Embracing the five propositions she lists will allow for a more productive research agenda and policy recommendations based on data instead of “wishful thinking.” For Mastro, this new framework is an important launching pad from which U.S. policymakers not only can better consider China’s intentions but also think innovatively about how to win over partners and build new types of power.

“It’s a great honor, for the second time, to have a chance to address your community, the community of Stanford University, to students, to professors, to all the Americans who feel support, who are feeling nervous because of our fight for freedom,” Zelenskyy said, speaking through an interpreter. “I’m grateful for your interest and for so many sincere good viewpoints and expressions that I can see.”

While much has changed since September, much has remained the same, Zelenskyy said. “Ukraine is the country where everything is possible … Ukraine is the country who destroyed the myth about the enormous capabilities of the Russian forces.”

During his speech, the Ukrainian president drew a parallel between the deadly mass shooting this week in Uvalde, Texas, where an 18-year-old gunman fatally shot 19 schoolchildren and two adults, and the incomprehensible violence inflicted by 18-year-old Russian troops in Ukraine.

“We are living in terrible times when American people express their condolences because of the death of [Ukrainians] at war and we express our condolences because of death” during peacetime in America, he said. “Accept my condolences, please.”

'We Remain Free'

Zelenskyy was introduced by Michael McFaul, director of FSI and former U.S. ambassador to Russia. McFaul thanked Zelenskyy for honoring the Stanford community with his presence and said that Stanford has a long history of engagement with Ukraine, including more than 200 Ukrainians participating in various training programs mostly run through FSI. He noted that many Stanford alumni now work for Zelenskyy.

“I want to thank you, your warriors, and all Ukrainians for leading the fight for democracy, freedom, and sovereignty, and against tyranny, repression, and imperialism, not only in Ukraine but for the entire free world in the fight between democracy and dictatorship, colonialism and independence, and good and evil,” McFaul said. “No nation in the world is sacrificing more than Ukrainians. … In these dark times in Ukraine, around the world, and even here, yes, in my own country, we need heroes. You are a hero, Mr. President, not just for Ukraine, not just for Europe, but for the entire world.”
 

Several audience members brought Ukrainian flags or wore outfits of bright blue and yellow – the country’s national colors. Gazing out across the audience, Zelenskyy noted people were not wearing armored vests or helmets, nor were they cowering in bomb shelters or wounded by enemy shelling. “Unfortunately, this is not the case for Ukraine,” he said.

Answering the question he first posed to the Stanford audience, Zelenskyy said that what matters most for him is to give his country everything necessary to defend its freedom, such as “the weapons that can help us overcome the might of the Russian army, the sanctions that will stop the flow of money used for the Russian terror finance,” war tribunals, and more.

Zelenskyy said he was inspired after visiting Stanford last September as he considered what the U.S. and Ukraine could accomplish together.

“I believe that many of you will indeed visit Ukraine, help Ukraine in the reconstruction after the war, because this is the biggest project for freedom, and your generation will take its crucial part in it,” Zelenskyy said. “Our citizens’ towns are devastated, our seas are blocked, but we remain free.”

'See the Truth'

More than two dozen people stood in line to ask Zelenskyy a question during the event, oftentimes addressing the Ukrainian president in his own language. Zelenskyy’s responses were often lighthearted, prompting laughter from the energetic early morning crowd. He jokingly told one student that she looked Ukrainian – though she was German – and said she should thank her parents for that. He teased another student for speaking about his youth in the past tense.

Other times, the back-and-forth between Zelenskyy and the audience was more somber. First-year MBA student Olga Chyumanskaya said she is “a young Russian person who shares democratic values [of] freedom, and would like to see my home country develop in a different direction.” The Russian community abroad is working to support Russian independent journalism and Ukrainian refugees, she said, but every day, she asks herself if she did enough. On Friday, she asked Zelenskyy what more she should do.

Zelenskyy told Chyumanskaya that she and other Russians could help pierce the state-sponsored bubble of disinformation that envelops their home country. “You see the truth,” he said. “You get the knowledge in the United States. You can demonstrate to the world which is bigger than Russia, which is bigger than Ukraine, [or] any country, for that matter. The world is big. And we have to remove the frontiers, open the borders, and bring the truth in with our knowledge, with conviction, so much with persuasion.”

School of Medicine student Solomiia Savchuk and computer sciences graduate student Zoe Von Gerlach are co-founders of TeleHelp Ukraine, a telehealth resource initiated by Stanford students to connect Ukrainians in need of medical assistance to U.S.- and Ukraine-based physicians. On Friday, they asked Zelenskyy about how Stanford students can further assist, as well as why activism abroad is important.

Zelenskyy said there’s a need not only for blood and oxygen but also for psychological rehabilitative support now and after the war, in which telehealth resources could greatly help. He encouraged the students to contact McFaul to discuss ways they might connect with Ukraine’s Ministry of Health. He added that students’ activism is “extremely important” in reminding world leaders of the need to support Ukraine, as this war “recognizes no distances.”

In closing the event, Zelenskyy reminded the audience that around the world, some are studying at universities while others are drafted into war and won’t live to write a college thesis.

“That is a terrible story. That’s why I would like to wish to all the students, I would like to wish you a long and interesting life in what you’re doing – in science, in journalism, in art, in whatever [you do],” he said. “I would sincerely like to wish you peace.”

A Ukrainian-language transcript of President Zelenskyy's prepared remarks at Stanford is also available.

This article first appeared in The Diplomat magazine.

U.S. President Joe Biden will first meet new South Korean President Yoon Suk-yeol in Seoul on May 21. It will be an important meeting for both leaders – not only to strengthen the South Korea-U.S. alliance but also to collaborate on a range of pressing issues, from North Korea to the Russia-Ukraine War to the protection of liberal democracy. The summit, to be held just 11 days after Yoon was inaugurated as president, will be his debut as a political leader on the international stage. Unlike political veteran Biden, Yoon formally entered politics only last summer and has yet to develop a policy track record. What should we expect from the new South Korean president at this first summit?

During the hotly contested campaign, Yoon’s opponents criticized him as South Korea’s Donald Trump. Western media and pundits also tended to portray him in a similar vein as an “anti-feminist political novice” with a “Trump-style brand of very divisive identity politics.” To be sure, he is not a conventional democratic leader who values negotiation and compromise; he envisions a strong South Korea that can stand up to China and North Korea, echoing Trump’s “America First.” Yet such a characterization risks setting off a false alarm that can badly mislead the United States and other allies in how they approach his administration.

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First and foremost, Yoon is not a “political outsider” in the same sense as Trump. While Yoon, unlike every South Korean president since democratization, has no legislative experience in the National Assembly, he served as prosecutor-general during the Moon Jae-in administration, a leadership position often requiring sound political judgment as well as legal expertise. Yoon built his reputation as a fierce fighter against abuse of power and corruption, shifting public opinion in his favor. This degree of legal, policy, and political experience is a far cry from starring on “The Apprentice.”

Crucially, Yoon curried strong support among conservatives, successfully mobilizing diverse factions to create an anti-Moon coalition and win the election, similar to Biden’s victory in the 2020 election. Whereas the Trump administration was filled with individuals offering only limited policy experience, and many critical appointed positions were left vacant, Yoon is supported by the seasoned conservative establishment joining his administration. In this respect, Yoon recalls George W. Bush, whose first formal foray into Washington politics came after serving as governor of Texas and who relied on the close network of the Republican establishment, such as Dick Cheney and Donald Rumsfeld, for policy and political guidance.

Yoon’s key cabinet and presidential office nominees are well-known figures with extensive policy backgrounds. New Unification Minister Kwon Young-se is a four-time member of the National Assembly and served as Seoul’s envoy to Beijing during the Park Geun-hye administration. Yoon’s national security advisor, Kim Sung-han, is a professor at Korea University who served as the vice minister of foreign affairs and trade during the Lee Myung-bak administration. Yoon is also supported by a powerful group of South Korean elites who attended Seoul National’s law school, his alma mater. Such heavy reliance on experienced hands of the conservative establishment reduces uncertainty for the Biden administration.

Yoon is expected to adopt a largely conventional conservative stance on major policy issues, both domestic and foreign. His economic policy is likely to be market-led and minimize state intervention, replacing Moon’s policies such as “income-driven growth” that Korean conservatives branded as socialist. On foreign policy, Yoon seeks to strengthen the U.S. alliance and restore relations with Japan, which, under Moon, were the most precarious they have been since the normalization of relations in 1965.

It is noteworthy that, as president-elect, Yoon sent his special delegation to the United States and Japan followed by the European Union, but not to China and Russia, departing from past precedent. Yoon is expected to take a firm stance against Beijing and Pyongyang rather than embrace appeasement.

At the upcoming summit, Yoon will have the opportunity to assure global audiences that he is not South Korea’s Trump but a reliable partner of the United States and other allies with shared democratic values. In his inaugural speech, he repeatedly stressed the importance of “freedom” to clearly signal his resolve to protect liberal democracy both at home and abroad. This is great news for Biden, who badly needs support from allies like South Korea in his fight against global autocracy.

Just as Yoon will be tested, the summit presents a chance for Biden to demonstrate he is prepared to work closely together with the new South Korean president, overcoming the concerns unearthed during his campaign, in order to bolster the alliance and democracy.