The following article first appeared on The Diplomat.

With the historic U.S.-North Korea summit on the immediate horizon, we must recognize that denuclearization will not and cannot be permanent or irreversible as long as there is a desire to reverse it. U.S. President Donald Trump may strike a “grand deal” with North Korean leader Kim Jong-un to denuclearize North Korea, but Kim can — and most likely will — reverse course at his convenience to construct new nuclear weapons. By focusing solely on denuclearization, we risk losing sight of the bigger, more important picture — that is, transforming North Korea into a normal state that no longer sees the need to pursue nuclearization for deterrence, survival, or any other reason.

Much of debate has centered on why Kim suddenly emerged from long-held silence to take the world’s center stage through a series of summits. Was he pressured by toughened sanctions, as Trump credits himself for? Or was it an expression of Kim’s confidence as a leader of a now de facto nuclear power, with more leverage for negotiation? Or has he simply been trying to buy time to avoid war — to get through the unpredictable and ruthless Trump’s tenure as U.S. president? Yet, what really matters now is not so much the question of why Kim came to the table, but rather how we can make the latest détente sustainable without repeating the failures of the past. Will it be different this time?

With the Trump-Kim summit now back on the track after a 24-hour drama of cancellation then resumption, each side seems to have softened its stance by lowering the bar. Next week in Singapore, both leaders will be sorely tempted by clear political and economic interests to paint the meeting as a success. Real challenges, however, will arise as the logistical details of North Korea’s denuclearization are discussed following the summit. The Trump team is unlikely to abandon its goal of the CVID (complete, verifiable, and irreversible denuclearization) of North Korea, while Kim and his men will stand firmly against this all-out approach so as not to follow the footsteps of Libya, Iraq, or Ukraine. North Korea has reportedly demanded a CVIG (complete, verifiable, and irreversible guarantee) of the security of the current regime, but there is a great danger that these deals, if made, will be nothing more than another sheet of paper full of empty words. The deep mistrust between the two countries cannot be overcome overnight, especially considering that both leaders have pretty bad track records of reneging on previous commitments. Neither CVID nor CVIG has much chance of being realized in the current context, from either a technical or a practical perspective.

With all this skepticism, why should we still bother playing this game with North Korea again? It is because we see a window of opportunity to guide North Korea into the international community through processes of diplomatic communication, exchange, and engagement. North Korea’s summit diplomacy has revealed its desire to appear a normal state. Kim vigorously showcased four summit meetings  — twice each with China’s Xi Jinping and South Korea’s Moon Jae-in — and numerous high-level meetings, within two months, all within the parameters of conventional “state-to-state” relationships, departing from past practices. Standing side-by-side with the South Korean president to read out a joint declaration, immediately releasing news of Kim’s summit meetings through its media, presenting Kim’s wife, Ri Sol-ju, as the state’s first lady — all of this would have been unthinkable in his father or grandfather’s generation.

North Korea’s latest efforts at international recognition as a normal state may be insincere and ill-intentioned, but even so, we should continue to allow North Korea and Kim to experience firsthand what it feels like and means to be treated as a normal state and a normal leader according to the ordinary conventions of international diplomacy. Although the goal seems so far away and unreachable, we should strive to normalize North Korea in all respects — its economy, its domestic and international politics, its integration into international institutions, and its adherence to international laws, norms, rights, duties, orders, etc.

CVID can still serve as a short- to mid-term goal, but not as a definitive solution to the long-standing North Korean threat. Whatever is decided at the upcoming summit, a more comprehensive roadmap should be set for enacting desirable transformations in security and economic relations with North Korea, putting the country on a path to become a stable and normal state increasingly integrated into the international community, where it would feel secure without a need for nuclear armament. As Trump says, he is starting a “process” of dealing with North Korea; the upcoming summit should be the beginning of an opportunity to advance this goal. After all, a normal North Korea can achieve CVID, but CVID cannot achieve a normal state.

Gi-Wook Shin is director of the Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center at Stanford University, and Joyce Lee is a research professional in the Korea Program at the Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center at Stanford University.

"Containing Iran’s belligerent actions abroad should be a high priority for the Trump administration, as well as engaging in arms control to limit Iran’s ballistic missile program and supporting ideas of democracy and human rights," writes Michael McFaul and Abbas Milani in The Washington Post. Read the full article here.

On May 14 and 15, 2018, many of the CISAC fellows were lucky enough to visit the United States Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM) at Offutt Air Force Base near Omaha, Nebraska. USSTRATCOM oversees strategic deterrence on multiple fronts, including nuclear weapons, missile defense, and, until recently, cyber-attacks. This trip was only the latest iteration of a longstanding relationship between CISAC and USSTRATCOM to foster research and debate on deterrence, assurance, and nuclear security

Our visit involved several highlights. General John Hyten, Commander of USSTRATCOM, took time out of his schedule to speak with us during breakfast on the first day. We were briefed on the global mission and history of USSTRATCOM, strategic planning, laws of armed conflict, nuclear modernization, and cybersecurity. The fellows were also able to visit the Global Operations Center and Battle Deck, where many of USSTRATCOM’s most important day-to-day functions take place. Several CISAC fellows (including me) had the opportunity to brief both military and civilian members of USSTRATCOM on a range of issues spanning from nuclear terrorism to the proliferation of offensive cyber capabilities to the domestic politics of American citizens’ growing perception (now at a historic high) of national decline.

I walked away from the experience with three strong impressions.

First, USSTRATCOM is populated with thoughtful individuals who have deeply sober attitudes about the devastating impact of using nuclear weapons. Each person we met was committed to ensuring the nation’s security but emphasized how seriously they took the notion of nuclear conflict and how they all sought never to prevent conflicts from reaching that point.

Second, I was struck by how everyone at USSTRATCOM was open to discussing new or provocative ideas. During our breakfast, General Hyten called upon one of the fellows working on Russian nuclear doctrine. It was clear that he was aware of the fellow’s work and disputed its conclusion. The two conversed about their differing views for several minutes before agreeing to disagree. Another one of our fellow’s briefings focused on the origins of the recent United Nations treaty on the prohibition of nuclear weapons. Her talk drew some skepticism, but also many questions and generated a very civil discussion. USSTRATCOM invited us to speak, took our arguments seriously, and sought to understand any viewpoint that they felt could be valuable.

Third, and lastly, there is enormous need and potential to continue building connections between the military (or government more broadly) and the academic community. Visiting USSTRATCOM highlighted how scholars who study security may not fully grasp the realities behind how to effect and maintain it. This might lead to academic work that tends to be unrealistic or too reductive. Conversely, both military and civilian members of USSTRATCOM may be so engrossed in addressing specific problems that they sometimes miss the forest for the trees or overlook fallacies in their strategic logic. This could result in policies that have unintended and, given USSTRATCOM’s purview, severe consequences. Collaboration between these two worlds is perhaps the best tool we have for solving both problems simultaneously. The potential ramifications are too important not to do so.

Eric Min is a Zukerman Postdoctoral Fellow in Social Sciences at the Center for International Security and Cooperation at Stanford University, where he also obtained his Ph.D. in Political Science. His research focuses on the application of text analysis, machine learning, and statistical methods to analyze the dynamics of conflict and diplomacy. Starting in the fall of 2018, he will be an Assistant Professor in Political Science at the University of California, Los Angeles. He can also be found on Twitter.