What’s at stake in this year’s midterm elections? After months of contentious primary races, the 2018 midterms will determine which party controls Congress this January. Join us for a panel discussion featuring Bruce Cain, Director of the Bill Lane Center for the American West at Stanford University, and Mirya Holman, Associate Professor of Political Science at Tulane University. We will discuss the important campaign issues, the diversity of candidates running, and the role gender issues are playing across the House and Senate races.

Abstract: Australia is dealing with nuclear waste disposal issues on two separate fronts.  In 2015, South Australia began to consider expanding their role in the nuclear fuel cycle as a way to leverage their nuclear expertise, based on their extensive uranium mining.  A Royal Commission proposed consideration of the development of a deep geologic repository for high-level radioactive waste from international sources (since Australia has none).  In 2016 Premier Jay Weatherill decided against an international repository after a community-based consultation process also opposed it.  At the same time, the Commonwealth of Australia has revived its search for a low-level radioactive waste disposal site and a storage facility for intermediate-level waste. Again, South Australia is in play, with three sites volunteering their land for further consideration.  As a result, a siting process is ongoing in Kimba and Barndioota, South Australia, with sides both strongly for and adamantly against development of a low-level waste facility in their community.  Both nuclear waste situations have informed and affected the other, but it’s not clear that South Australia is ready to host nuclear waste any time soon in the near future.

Speaker Bio: Allison M. Macfarlane is Professor of Science and Technology Policy at George Washington University and Director of the Center for International Science and Technology Policy at the University’s Elliott School of International Affairs. She recently served as Chairman of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission from July, 2012 until December, 2014. As Chairman, Dr. Macfarlane had ultimate responsibility for the safety of all U.S. commercial nuclear reactors, for the regulation of medical radiation and nuclear waste in the U.S., and for representing the U.S. in negotiations with international nuclear regulators. She was nominated by President Obama and confirmed by the Senate. She was the agency’s 15th Chairman, its 3rd woman chair, and the only person with a background in geology to serve on the Commission.

Dr. Macfarlane holds a doctorate in geology from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology and a bachelor's of science degree in geology from the University of Rochester. During her academic career, she held fellowships at Radcliffe College, MIT, Stanford, and Harvard Universities. She has been on the faculty at Georgia Tech in Earth Science and International Affairs and at George Mason University in Environmental Science and Policy.

From 2010 to 2012 she served on the Blue Ribbon Commission on America's Nuclear Future, created by the Obama Administration to make recommendations about a national strategy for dealing with the nation's high-level nuclear waste. She has served on National Academy of Sciences panels on nuclear energy and nuclear weapons issues. Dr. Macfarlane has also chaired the Science and Security Board of the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, the folks who set the “doomsday clock.”

Her research has focused on environmental policy and international security issues associated with nuclear energy. Her expertise is in nuclear waste disposal, nuclear energy, regulatory issues, and science and technology policy. As Chairman of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, she pushed for a more open dialogue with the public, for greater engagement with international nuclear regulators and, following the Fukushima accident, for stricter safety protocols at U.S. nuclear reactors. She also advocated for a more family-friendly workplace.  She has spoken on a wide range of topics, from women and science to nuclear policy and regulatory politics.

In 2006, MIT Press published a book she co-edited, Uncertainty Underground: Yucca Mountain and the Nation's High-Level Nuclear Waste, which explored technical issues at the proposed waste disposal facility at Yucca Mountain, Nevada. Dr. Macfarlane has published extensively in academia and her work has appeared in Science, Nature, American Scientist, The Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, and Environment Magazine.

Abstract: Recent tensions on the Korean peninsula and in the South China Sea have raised concerns that provocative actions, such as the use of insulting rhetoric or military force, might trigger unwanted escalation and embroil the United States in a costly war. The international relations literature, however, is ill equipped to explain these escalatory dangers of provocation. There is no theory of crisis escalation that explains the escalatory mechanisms of provocation and there is no clear conception of what it means to provoke. This paper develops a novel theory of provocation that explains how provocative rhetoric and military actions can distinctively lead to unwanted crisis escalation and conflict. This escalatory logic of provocation can potentially explain a host of important crisis-related behavior other than explosive outcomes, such as how a relatively minor issue becomes salient and intractable to resolve, and how a state that was once willing to concede a stake in dispute stands firm to risk war. To further clarify the distinctive dangers of this logic of provocation, the paper contrasts three alternative logics of unwanted escalation that are referred to as an “accidental escalation logic,” a “security dilemma logic,” and a “crisis bargaining logic.” The overlooked importance of the logic of provocation is then demonstrated in a case study of the Sino-India War of 1962 which uses original language sources. The conclusion draws implications for coercive diplomacy.

Speaker Bio: Hyun-Binn Cho is a Stanton Nuclear Security Postdoctoral Fellow at CISAC. His research interests are in crisis escalation, coercive diplomacy, and security in the Asia-Pacific, with a focus on China and the Korean peninsula. Binn received his Ph.D. in Political Science from the University of Pennsylvania in 2018. Previously, he was a pre-doctoral fellow at the Institute for Security and Conflict Studies at George Washington University, and a visiting doctoral student at the School of International Studies at Peking University. He is proficient in Mandarin Chinese, fluent in Korean, and holds an M.A. in Political Science from Columbia University, an M.A. in International Relations from Seoul National University, and a B.Sc. in Government and Economics from the London School of Economics. 

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In Malaysia, criminality is a highly political question, and that is mainly why local scholarship on the topic is rare. Yet political participation by outlaws and criminalized groups is not new. Begun in 2008, Dr. Lemière’s research explores uncharted territory: how criminality related to politics in semi-authoritarian Malaysia, with a focus on the ruling party (UMNO) from 2008 to 2018.  She shows how gangs have created umbrella (Malay) NGOs, like Pekida (shown here in caricature), to formalize their ties to political parties. For gangs, political militancy has become a business; political parties (mostly UMNO) have sub-contracted political actions and violence to such groups. Dr. Lemière’s research raises question regarding the nature of civil society and democratization, and offers a new perspective of ethno-religious controversies and clashes in the 20th and 21st centuries.

Sophie Lemière is a political anthropologist at Harvard’s Ash Center for Democracy in its program on Democracy in Hard Places. Her research examines the nexus between religion, politics, and criminality in a comparative perspective. She will be at Stanford in the fall before transferring to the National University of Singapore in the spring.

Dr. Lemière has held research positions in Singapore at the Asia Research Institute (NUS) and the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (NTU).  She has been a visiting fellow at the University of Sydney, Cornell, UC Berkeley, and Columbia. She received her PhD from Sciences-Po in Paris. Her dissertation was the first study on the political links between gangs and umbrella NGOs in Malaysia.  Her master’s research on apostasy controversies and Islamic civil society was awarded second prize for young scholars by the International Institute for the Study of Islam in the Modern World (1998-2008) in Leiden.

Dr. Lemière believes it is essential for academics to disseminate their research findings widely, especially in the countries they study. Accordingly, her publications have been written both general and academic readers within and beyond Malaysia. She is the editor of a series of books on “Malaysian Politics and People.” Misplaced Democracy was released in 2014.  Illusions of Democracy (2017) will be re-published in 2018, and a third volume is expected in 2019, when her monograph “Gangsters and Masters: Complicit Militancy and Authoritarian Politics” will also appear. She is currently working on a political biography of Malaysia’s current prime minister during his recent campaign: “The Last Game: Malaysian Politics through Mahathir’s Eyes.”

Dr. Lemière maintains a blog on Mediapart and contributes regularly to New Mandala, The Conversation, Le Monde, and Libération among other outlets.  She has also begun to develop several documentary film projects with French production companies, including a series on arts and politics. Her first film “9/43” featuring the Malaysian cartoonist Zunar was chosen one of the 25 best movies at the French short-film festival Infracourt in 2016.

Drell Lecture Recording: https://youtu.be/NKN6xLhTjIo

Drell Lecture Transcript: 

Speaker's Biography: Alex Stamos is a cybersecurity expert, business leader and entrepreneur working to improve the security and safety of the Internet through his teaching and research at Stanford University. Stamos is an Adjunct Professor at Stanford’s Freeman-Spogli Institute, a William J. Perry Fellow at the Center for International Security and Cooperation, and a visiting scholar at the Hoover Institution. As a Chief Security Officer at Facebook and Yahoo and a co-founder of iSEC Partners, Alex has investigated and responded to some of the most seminal events in the short history of cybersecurity, and has been called the “Forrest Gump of Info Sec” by friends. He is working on election security via the Defending Digital Democracy Project and advising NATO’s Cybersecurity Center of Excellence. He has spoken on six continents, testified in Congress, served as an expert witness for the wrongly accused, earned a BSEE from UC Berkeley and holds five patents.

Abstract: This research proposes, develops, and demonstrates a quantitative risk analytic method for integrating a set of modern deterrence considerations with respect to nuclear weapon arsenals and policies. These considerations include multiple prospective models of antagonist behaviors, multiple levels of conflict escalation, multiple weapon capabilities and effects, and nuanced policies for protagonists and antagonists. A mathematical basis for this approach is developed on the foundation of infinite-horizon, risk-sensitive Interactive Partially Observable Markov Decision Processes (IPOMDP). This foundation allows multiple decision agents to identify optimal policies when managing conflict scenarios in the face of the tradeoff between achieving political goals and avoiding the consequences of various forms of conflict. A set of deterrence-effectiveness metrics that center on the probability of specific opponent actions and conflict outcomes occurring are suggested, and a method for evaluating them is proposed. The resulting modeling and analysis framework captures complex behaviors and escalation dynamics, identifies approximately optimal policies in specific conflict scenarios, and is extensible to a large array of possible conflict scenarios. An example analysis, based on fictitious data, analyzes a bilateral, nuclear-armed, peer-state competition in a conflict escalation scenario. The example analysis evaluates various nuclear weapons arsenals and stated employment policies by examining the optimal conflict management solutions produced by the method and by comparing deterrence-effectiveness metrics. The products of this research can serve as a foundation for future work to expand the model’s capabilities and enhance its performance. Most importantly, it will provide valuable insights to policy and decision makers in government.

Speaker Bio: Jason C. Reinhardt is a national security systems analyst and Distinguished Member of Technical Staff at Sandia National Laboratories. His work focuses on probabilistic analysis methods, quantitative and non-quantitative approaches for risk analysis and management, as well as the modeling and analysis of strategic interaction in conflict escalation, asymmetric deterrence, and stability. Jason received his Ph.D. in Risk Analysis from Stanford University School of Engineering’s Department of Management Science and Engineering. He also holds a M.S. in Electrical Engineering from Stanford University, and a B.S. in Electrical Engineering from the Purdue School of Electrical Engineering at Indianapolis.