Stanford University

Security

FSI scholars produce research aimed at creating a safer world and examing the consequences of security policies on institutions and society. They look at longstanding issues including nuclear nonproliferation and the conflicts between countries like North and South Korea. But their research also examines new and emerging areas that transcend traditional borders – the drug war in Mexico and expanding terrorism networks. FSI researchers look at the changing methods of warfare with a focus on biosecurity and nuclear risk. They tackle cybersecurity with an eye toward privacy concerns and explore the implications of new actors like hackers.

Along with the changing face of conflict, terrorism and crime, FSI researchers study food security. They tackle the global problems of hunger, poverty and environmental degradation by generating knowledge and policy-relevant solutions. 

How Credible Nuclear Security Guarantees Backfire

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For spring quarter 2022, CISAC will be hosting hybrid events. Many events will offer limited-capacity in-person attendance for Stanford faculty, staff, fellows, visiting scholars, and students in accordance with Stanford’s health and safety guidelines, and be open to the public online via Zoom. All CISAC events are scheduled using the Pacific Time Zone. 

                                                                                           

About the Event: Existing literature posits that the main challenge for nuclear security guarantees lies in making the promise of protection sufficiently credible. If allies do not believe their guarantor will actually come to their aid, they may seek alternate means of protection, including by investing in nuclear infrastructure. Credible security guarantees, on the other hand, are thought to reassure allies. In contrast to this approach, Dr. Sukin argues that credible nuclear guarantees can backfire. These guarantees can cause clients to fear that their guarantors will drag them into a precipitous nuclear conflict. Fears of nuclear escalation by their guarantor can drive clients to distance themselves from their alliance or seek stronger independent nuclear capabilities. Using survey experiments and case studies of U.S. alliances in East Asia and Europe, this project explores the risks of credible U.S. nuclear security guarantees.


About the Speaker: Dr. Lauren Sukin is currently a MacArthur Nuclear Security Fellow at Stanford University’s Center for International Security and Cooperation. In September 2022, she will join the Department of International Relations at the London School of Economics and Political Science as an Assistant Professor of International Relations. Dr. Sukin holds a Ph.D. (2021) and M.A. (2020) from the Department of Political Science at Stanford University. She also holds A.B.s from the Departments of Political Science and Literary Arts at Brown University (2016). Dr. Sukin’s research examines issues of international security, focusing on the role of nuclear weapons in international politics.

Virtual to Public. Only those with an active Stanford ID with access to William J Perry Conference Room in Encina Hall may attend in person. 

Lauren Sukin
Seminars
Research Seminar Series

Researcher Perceptions of Current and Future AI

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For spring quarter 2022, CISAC will be hosting hybrid events. Many events will offer limited-capacity in-person attendance for Stanford faculty, staff, fellows, visiting scholars, and students in accordance with Stanford’s health and safety guidelines, and be open to the public online via Zoom. All CISAC events are scheduled using the Pacific Time Zone. 

About the Event: Artificial intelligence (AI) has enormous potential for both positive and negative impact, especially as we move from current-day systems towards more capable systems in the future. However, as a society we lack an understanding of how the developers of this technology, AI researchers, perceive the benefits and risks of their work, both in today's systems and impacts in the future. In this talk, Gates will present results from over 70 interviews with AI researchers, asking questions ranging from "What do you think are the largest benefits and risks of AI?" to "If you could change your colleagues’ perception of AI, what attitudes/beliefs would you want them to have?"


About the Speaker: Dr. Vael Gates is a postdoctoral researcher at the Institute for Human-Centered Artificial Intelligence (HAI) and the Center for International Security and Cooperation (CISAC) at Stanford University. They study perceptions of AI safety, and are currently interviewing technical AI researchers to understand their views about risks from AI. They previously completed their PhD at UC Berkeley, formalizing and testing computational models of social collaboration.

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Vael Gates
Seminars
Research Seminar Series

Global Perspectives on Crypto-Asset Regulation

image of encina hall at stanford with blue overlay and headshots of Valerie Shen of Third Way and Aman Nair of CIS

Join us on Tuesday, March 15th from 12 PM - 1 PM PT for “Global Perspectives on Crypto-Asset Regulation” featuring Valerie Shen of Third Way, Aman Nair of the Centre for Internet and Society, in conversation with Kelly Born of the Hewlett Foundation. This weekly seminar series is jointly organized by the Cyber Policy Center’s Program on Democracy and the Internet and the Hewlett Foundation’s Cyber Initiative.

About The Seminar: 

Since the launch of Bitcoin, the world’s first cryptocurrency, just over 10 years ago, the cryptocurrency market has grown to over $2.4 trillion, tripling in value in the last year alone. In addition to its many purported benefits, cryptocurrency poses challenges to the environment, privacy, financial stability, and more. Cryptocurrencies have played an increasing role in the rise of cybercrimes, including ransomware and money laundering. In light of this the Biden Administration, European Union, Indian government, and countries around the world are actively exploring regulatory options to address these and other concerns. On March 15 join Aman Nair of India’s Centre for Internet and Society and Valerie Shen of Third Way, in conversation with Kelly Born of the Hewlett Foundation, to discuss the use cases and limitations of crypto-assets, compare relevant regulatory regimes from around the world, discuss the debate over the proper legal and regulatory framework for crypto-enabled crime, and explore how to govern crypto-assets while supporting widespread financial stability.

Speakers:

Valerie Shen
Valerie Shen directs Third Way's National Security Program and Cyber Enforcement Initiative, a nonpartisan dedicated to strengthening governments’ abilities to identify, stop, and bring malicious cyber actors to justice. Third Way’s National Security program focuses on cutting edge policy ideas and to keep our country safe  against foreign adversaries in the ever-changing and developing cyber ecosystem.  Valerie served as the Chief National Security Counsel to the House Oversight and Reform Committee for Chairman Elijah E. Cummings. She oversaw all national security and homeland security matters from cyber operations and federal law enforcement, to counterterrorism, defense, and counterintelligence. Valerie was also an investigative counsel for the Select Committee on Benghazi and the Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee. Valerie was also a post-doctoral fellow at Georgetown University’s Center for National Security focusing on China’s social media and influence operations. Valerie earned her J.D. from Georgetown University Law Center and her bachelor's degree in Politics from Pomona College.

Aman Nair
Aman Nair is a policy researcher at the Centre for Internet and Society, India (CIS). He leads the financial technologies research agenda at CIS and has been focusing on research on crypto-assets and blockchain technology. He also works on issues of data governance and access to justice. 

Overcoming Foreign Influence in Social Media

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Amy Zegart
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American adversaries such as Russia and China are using cyber-enabled deception operations to spread divisive messages. In 2016, Houston’s Islamic Da’wah Center became the site of two dueling protests, both of which began in online communities formed by a Kremlin-backed organization. Discovering and calling out specific disinformation campaigns can be difficult, but by increasing awareness that our adversaries are actively trying to inflame divisions in our society, we can begin to counter these insidious efforts.

Watch with PolicyEd

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American adversaries such as Russia and China are using cyber-enabled deception operations to spread divisive messages.

The Weapons the West Used Against Putin

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Amy Zegart
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Russia’s invasion of Ukraine looks like a horrific Cold War throwback. Once again, a strongman rules in Moscow, Russian tanks are rolling across borders, and a democratic nation is fighting for its survival, street by street, day by day, armed with little more than Molotov cocktails and a fierce belief in freedom. For all the talk of emerging technologies and new threats, the violence in Ukraine feels raw and low-tech, and the world suddenly looks old again.

And yet, amid all these echoes of the past, Russia’s invasion has ushered in one development that is altogether new and could dramatically change geopolitics in the future: the real-time public disclosure of highly classified intelligence.

Read the rest at The Atlantic

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Never before has the United States government revealed so much, in such granular detail, so fast and so relentlessly about an adversary, Amy Zegart writes. What are the implications of this new strategy?

Chinese Grand Strategy

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Cover of the book 'Strategy in the Contemporary World' and screenshot of first page of Oriana Skylar Mastro's chapter "Chinese Grand Strategy"

This chapter briefly covers the history of Chinese grand strategy since 1949 before focusing most heavily on China's strategy of rejuvenation under Xi Jinping. It also covers some of the domestic factors that have influenced Chinese grand strategy over time. It then highlights two components central to China's grand strategy — its approach to international institutions and its maritime ambitions. The chapter ends with a discussion of the United States shift to great power competition with China.

Below is an excerpt from Mastro's chapter in Strategy in the Contemporary World, edited by John Baylis, James J. Wirtz, and Jeannie L. Johnson, reproduced by permission of Oxford University Press.
 

Download excerpt

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Nuclear Deterrence and the US-China Strategic Relationship

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Nuclear Deterrence and the US-China Strategic Relationship
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December 2021

Military Competition With China: Harder Than the Cold War?

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Military Competition With China: Harder Than the Cold War?
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September 2021
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In Strategy in the Contemporary World, edited by John Baylis, James J. Wirtz, and Jeannie L. Johnson, Oriana Skylar Mastro examines the evolution of Chinese grand strategy from Mao Zedong to Xi Jinping, its drivers, and its implications.

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Oriana Skylar Mastro
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Oxford University Press

Students Find Solidarity and Community Amidst the Conflict in Ukraine

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Melissa Morgan
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The war now being fought in Ukraine has shaken the world and its institutions to the core. With its focus on international affairs and unique relationship to Ukraine and the Ukrainian community, shock and anxiety about the uncertainties of the future have been particulalry keen amongst the students, faculty and staff at the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies (FSI).

The weekend after Russia's invasion of Ukraine, students came together at the McFaul residence for a teach-in about the unfolding events. In addition to hearing remarks from FSI's director, Michael McFaul, students had an opportunity to share their thoughts, worries and tears for the senseless violence being perpetrated.

Following this evening of solidarity, we asked students from the FSI community to share their feelings about that night and the larger implications of the evolving conflict. Me Me Khant (Master's in International Policy, '22), Anastasiia Malenko (Political Science and Economics, '23), Calli Obern (MIP, '22) and Mikk Raud (MIP, '22) offered their reflections.

Finding Connection in International Solidarity
 

I recently shared a space with a group of Stanford Ukrainian students who bravely shared their stories — feelings of guilt for being abroad, standing up for their friends fighting at home, calling for solidarity for democracy, losing sleep while worrying for families at home, but above all, the feeling of hope & determination that Ukraine will rise victoriously in the end.

I am a student from Myanmar, and I was in a similar space last February when the Burmese military staged a coup against the government and plunged my home country into violence. I heard my Ukrainian peers fully. I’ll never fully understand what the Ukrainians are going through right now, but I felt connected in our suffering and rage.
 

When you are far from home watching your home burn, it’s the tears, it’s the silence, it’s the tremor in your voice, it’s a hug — that reminds you are not alone.
Me Me Khant
MIP Class of 2022 (GOVDEV)


As the evening ended, there was a moment when one of the Ukrainian students came to me to tell me that he was so sorry for #WhatsHappeningInMyanmar. I told him, “Thank you. I am sorry too. I can only imagine what you are going through.” In response he asked, “But you feel it, yeah?”

For a moment, we stood there, teared up, in silence. It was simply powerful. I felt understood. I felt the support. And this was all while I was trying my best to not make this about Myanmar and to give them space for their own grief and trauma. It was not empty words of sympathy. It was a shared moment.

This is why across-movement international solidarity is important. When you are in it together, when vocabulary falls short to describe the immense trauma you are going through, when you are far from home watching your home burn, it’s the tears, it’s the silence, it’s the tremor in your voice, it’s a hug — that reminds you are not alone.

Me Me Khant, Master's in International Policy, Class of 2022

Me Me Khant

Ford Dorsey Master's in International Policy Student, '22
Profile

Living By the Ideals of Democracy


In political science classes at Stanford, we talk a lot about the ideals of democracy and legitimacy, about sovereignty and independence. Ukrainians don’t just talk about these ideas— they live by them.

A week ago, Russia invaded my home, bringing war to a peaceful democracy. Since then, my days and nights have been full of fear. However, my experience as a Ukrainian living abroad doesn't compare to what my friends and family are going through back home. Even under the constant threat of enemy fire, they still manage to help — collecting humanitarian aid,organizing transportation, coordinating national and local volunteering networks.

This way of living did not begin this month. For centuries, my nation has fought heroically for our independence and distinct cultural identity: our people defended Ukrainian symbols in the face of repressions, broke free of the Soviet Union, and shook off dictators time and time again to re-establish our democracy. For the first time, the world sees our fight. You see us face devastation the post-WWII world vowed would never happen again. As Russians bomb cities —destroying kindergartens, hospitals, orphanages, and schools — you witness our resilience. You watch our people take to the streets and stand against the occupying forces trying to enter our cities, singing the national anthem and telling Russians to leave our land.
 

We talk a lot about the ideals of democracy and legitimacy, about sovereignty and independence. Ukrainians don’t just talk about these ideas— they live by them.
Anastasiia Malenko
Political Science and Economics, '23


This time, our fight is global, and, Ukrainians abroad are united in the fight. In under a week, the Ukrainian community at Stanford has launched a Joint Statement on Russia's War Against Ukraine, obtaining more than 800 signatures so far. We created the StandWithUkraine website with resources in 15 languages on organizations accepting donations, volunteering opportunities, reliable information sources, and templates for political advocacy.

The broader Stanford community has inspired me with their support as well. I appreciated Prof. McFaul's event that brought Ukrainians and MIP students together, especially because it demonstrated the FSI's community's unique ability to help. I hope that this potential can result in concrete actions, including further advocacy, donations, and volunteering. As scholars who have devoted their lives to the study of democracy, your time to act is now: join the fight to save Ukraine and Europe.

Anastasiia Malenko

Anastasiia Malenko

Political Science and Economics, '23
Profile

Uniting Abroad and at Home


As students of international policy, it is easy to distance ourselves from conflicts around the world. We are taught to examine them analytically through an international relations lens, hypothesizing what might be motivating a leader like Putin, Xi, or Biden to act in a certain way. But having the chance to hear from Ukrainian students and leaders across the Stanford community bridged what we study in the classroom and read in the news with what is actually happening to families and friends on the ground.
 

The international community has shown that it can unite and respond when a foreign state violates international laws and norms – and we must not forget this.
Calli Obern
MIP Class of 2022 (ENRE)


Listening to their stories and learning how we can assist, as policy students and citizens, was a reminder that we are not powerless — public opinion and advocacy can push policymakers to stand up for democracy and against violations of sovereignty and human rights.

Unfortunately, there have been too many instances of unnecessary fighting and occupying of foreign land, including by my own country the United States. The international community has shown that it can unite and respond when a foreign state violates international laws and norms – and we must not forget this should future invasions occur anywhere around the world.

Calli Obern, Master's in International Policy ('22)

Calli Obern

Ford Dorsey Master's in International Policy Student, '22
Profile

Doing All We Can


The tragedy that is unfolding in Ukraine hits especially close to home for me both physically and emotionally – even more so after hearing all the touching stories of our Ukrainian friends at professor McFaul’s house.

I am from Estonia, another country unlucky enough to have an aggressive Russia as a neighbor. Should Putin meet any success in Ukraine, my homeland very well may be picked as the next target. Ironically enough, Putin’s invasion of Ukraine has only made NATO stronger, and as a member of the alliance, we should feel safe. But I also cannot overlook the irony and am even ashamed that the cost of NATO unity seems to be the complete destruction of Ukraine, who is essentially doing the fighting for all of us. Thousands of Ukrainian lives have ended, and millions will be emotionally damaged forever.

Emotionally, witnessing the thousands of casualties on both sides as a result of one man’s idea of a parallel universe and disregard of human life is heartbreaking. I also fear we are on the verge of making the same mistakes we have already made in the past. While the West has already done a lot to help Ukraine, are we doing enough? In a few months, after potentially thousands more innocent people have been massacred, will we be able to look our Ukrainian friends in the eyes and truly say we did all we could? As of now, it seems like the answer is no.
 

In a few months, after potentially thousands more innocent people have been massacred, will we be able to look our Ukrainian friends in the eyes and truly say we did all we could?
Mikk Raud
MIP Class of 2022 (CYBER)


We are dealing with consequences, not the cause. While it is controversial to advocate for NATO to get directly militarily involved for the defense of Ukraine, there is a good chance that if we don’t intervene now, we will have to do so at a much higher cost in the future. The risk is huge, given Russia’s nuclear arsenal. In that line of thought, my own Estonia would probably be among the first targets, should a NATO-Russia war break out.

But in moments like this, it is important to have a higher risk tolerance than in times of peace. We are past the diplomatic appeasement period. The Russian Army is not the mighty creature it was portrayed to be and can be defeated. But for that to happen, we must all stand up to it, and support the conditions for the Russian population to stand up and reclaim their country from the dictator. There is no more peace in Europe, and peace elsewhere will also not last if Putin is not stopped now. My heart is broken for Ukraine already. I do not want it to be broken again for Estonia or Latvia, or for Germany and France.

As an international policy student and as a citizen of the free world, I invite all Western decision-makers to ask themselves this: when Ukraine may be in complete rubbles, when a ruthless dictator has gotten his way at the cost of an entire nation and is hungry for more, when the history books are written, will I be able to comfortably say that I did everything I could to prevent it? If the answer is no, then it’s time to get back to work. Long live free Ukraine!

Mikk Raud

Mikk Raud

Ford Dorsey Master's in International Policy Student, '22
Profile


 

Resources on the Ukraine-Russia Conflict

As the war in Ukraine evolves, the Stanford community is working to provide support and perspectives on the unfolding crisis. Follow the links below to find FSI's resource page of expert analysis from our scholars, and to learn how to get involved with #StandWithUkraine.

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Protestors wave flags in front of San Francisco's Ferry Building against the military coup in Myanmar
Blogs

Working from Home While Worrying For Home

About the author: Me Me Khant ’22 was an FSI Global Policy Intern with the The Asia Foundation. She is currently a Ford Dorsey Master’s in International Policy student at Stanford University.
Working from Home While Worrying For Home
The Ford Dorsey Master's in International Policy class of 2023
Blogs

Meet the Ford Dorsey Master’s in International Policy Class of 2023

The 2023 class of the Ford Dorsey Master’s in International Policy are finally here on campus and ready to dive into two years of learning, research and policy projects at the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies.
Meet the Ford Dorsey Master’s in International Policy Class of 2023
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Students from the FSI community gather for a teach-in about the Ukraine conflict at the McFaul residence in Palo Alto, CA.
Students from the FSI community gather for a teach-in at the McFaul residence about the conflict unfolding in Ukraine.
Calli Obern
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Four students from the FSI community share their thoughts on the conflict in Ukraine, its implications for the world, and the comfort and solidarity they have felt in communing with one another at Stanford.

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The Russian Invasion of Ukraine: Voices from Kyiv

This event is open Stanford affiliates online via Zoom.

Register for Zoom  

The Russia-Europe Working Group and The Europe Center are hosting a conversation with panelists from the Kyiv School of Economics regarding the unfolding events in Ukraine. 

Nataliia Shapoval is the Chairman of KSE Institute and Vice President for Policy Research. She guided and conducted policy research on public procurement, cost of HIV disease, the financial burden of health care costs, private-sector driven growth strategies. She served as a contributor to the Ukraine reform monitoring project of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Also, Shapoval is a member of the Editorial Board of VoxUkraine.

Tymofiy Mylovanov is a President of Kyiv School of Economics and an advisor to Ukraine's presidential administration. During his professional career, he has taught at a number of European and American universities, including Rheinische Friedrich–Wilhelms–Universität Bonn, the University of Pennsylvania, and University of Pittsburgh. Tymofiy’s research interests cover such areas as theory of games and institutional design. He has been published in leading international academic journals including Econometrica, American Economic Review, the Review of Economic Studies.

Tymofii Brik is the Head of Sociological Research at the Kyiv School of Economics. In 2018, he received the N. Panina “best young sociologist of Ukraine” award. He received his Ph.D. in social science at the University of Carlos III (Madrid) and obtained a Master’s degree in Sociology and Social Research from Utrecht University. In 2018 and 2019-2020 he was a visiting researcher at Stanford University and New York University, respectively.

Anna Bulakh is an expert and advisor on international security and technologies. Currently she is part of the Hybrid warfare Task Force at Kyiv School of Economics and Ukrainian tech community. Anna has 10 years of experience in security and defence policies. She is a former Research Fellow at the International Centre for Defence and Security in Tallinn and Prague Security Studies Institute. Since 2019 she has also be part of the IT community in AI, cyber and information security. Anna was a policy adviser to Reface, an AI powered app on synthetic media. Anna is a Co-Founder of Cappture.cc, a start-up funded by the Startup Wise Guys accelerator program, and former Program director at Disinfo.Tech. Both companies focused on developing solution to help combat online threats and disinformation. In her work she is dealing with issues such as tech impact of national security, information and cyber security, broader national security policies and resilience building.

Online via Zoom for Stanford affiliates.

Nataliia Shapoval Charmain of KSE Institute and Vice President for Policy Research Panelist Kyiv School of Economics
Tymofiy Mylovanov President of Kyiv School of Economics Panelist Kyiv School of Economics
Tymofii Brik Head of Sociological Research Panelist Kyiv School of Economics
Anna Bulakh Research Fellow Panelist International Centre for Defense and Security
Panel Discussions

Foreign Policy in Hard Economic Times

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For winter quarter 2022, CISAC will be hosting hybrid events. Many events will offer limited-capacity in-person attendance for Stanford faculty, staff, fellows, visiting scholars, and students in accordance with Stanford’s health and safety guidelines, and be open to the public online via Zoom. All CISAC events are scheduled using the Pacific Time Zone. 

                                                                                           

About the Event: Freddy Chen has developed a domestic political theory to explain the consequences of economic shocks for foreign policy. He argues that political leaders have incentives to improve their perceived competence by linking economic grievances to foreign countries. This linkage, in turn, increases public desire for more hawkish foreign policy. Nonetheless, leaders’ ability to make such connections depends on whether they can successfully manipulate information about the culpability for economic shocks. Therefore, the extent to which leaders can control the information environment determines whether an economic shock leads to more aggressive foreign policy. Survey experiments fielded on the American public and a unique sample of U.S. foreign policy analysts show that the information environment shapes elites’ expectations about leaders’ political behavior, public perceptions of leader competence, perceived culpability for the economic shock, and public preferences over foreign policy. Moreover, a cross-national analysis demonstrates that an economic shock tends to increase foreign policy hawkishness if the shock is more foreign-related or if the public has less access to a potential voice of the opposition. This article advances our understanding of the relationship between economic shocks, foreign policy, and public opinion as well as the interactions between domestic politics and international relations, with important implications for both political science research and policymakers.

About the Speaker: Frederick Chen is a Ph.D. Candidate in the Department of Political Science at the University of Wisconsin–Madison and currently a Pre-doctoral Fellow at the Center for International Security and Cooperation at Stanford University. His research focuses on how economics and security can interact to influence international relations, particularly through domestic political mechanisms. His work has appeared in the Journal of Politics and Conflict Management and Peace Science. He received the David A. Lake Award for best paper from the International Political Economy Society. He earned his M.A. in International Relations from Peking University (2016) and B.A. in International Politics from Tsinghua University (2013).

Virtual to Public. Only those with an active Stanford ID with access to William J Perry Conference Room in Encina Hall may attend in person. 

Frederick R. Chen CISAC
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Research Seminar Series

Invasions Are Not Contagious

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Oriana Skylar Mastro
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This essay was originally published in Foreign Affairs magazine.

As Russian President Vladimir Putin intensifies his assault on Ukraine, a growing number of U.S. military and foreign policy analysts are voicing concern that China may be emboldened by Russia’s example and try to take Taiwan by force. “If Russia can grab chunks of Ukraine or install a puppet regime and withstand economic sanctions, that could embolden nationalists in China to look to Taiwan and think they could do the same,” Ian Johnson, a China expert at the Council on Foreign Relations, has argued. Representative Michael McCaul, Republican of Texas, made a similar argument in an interview last month, as did retired Army General Jack Keane, who said that Chinese President Xi Jinping sees “weakness in the West and how that can advantage him in terms of his national objectives as well.”

Xi is certainly watching events in Ukraine, but his calculus for whether to use force against Taiwan is shaped primarily by domestic factors, not foreign ones. As I have argued in Foreign Affairs, Chinese leaders are considering “armed reunification” with Taiwan more seriously than at any time in the last 50 years. But Xi will assert Chinese control over the island only if he is confident his military can conduct a successful amphibious invasion and if he believes the timing is right for his own career.

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Shifts in the international environment would be important for Taiwan if they changed Xi’s thinking on either count. But the war in Ukraine has not. Xi’s views about U.S. power and resolve and about the likely international response to an invasion of Taiwan probably remain unchanged. If anything, China’s desire not to invite comparisons with Russia at a time when the world is united against Moscow will lengthen its timeline for taking control of Taiwan, not shorten it.

Too Big to Sanction?

The economic sanctions that the United States, Canada, and many European countries have imposed on Russia give China little reason for pause. To the contrary, these punitive measures simply confirm Beijing’s previous assessments of the possible economic repercussions of using force against Taiwan. Chinese leaders expect the economic costs of an invasion to be heavy but acceptable—partly because of how the international community has responded to Chinese provocations in the past and partly because Beijing’s foreign policy is designed to convince countries to stay out of China’s “internal” affairs, such as the status of Taiwan.

That is not to say the economic measures Washington and its allies have imposed on Russia in recent days are insignificant. The United States and European countries have blocked Russia’s access to most of its foreign currency reserves, making it impossible for Moscow to intervene to prop up its collapsing currency. They have frozen the assets of senior Russian officials, including Putin himself. And they have moved to exclude big Russian banks from SWIFT, the global financial messaging system.

China’s ability to retaliate against the West with economic sanctions of its own is much greater than Russia’s.
Oriana Skylar Mastro

But the United States and its allies could do more to punish Russia. They could bar all transactions with Russia, whether trade or financial. They could seize all Russian assets within their jurisdictions. Washington could announce secondary sanctions on anyone using U.S. dollars for any transaction with Russia. Most important, the United States could use these and other measures to prevent Russia from exporting oil and gas. Letting Russia continue to export oil and gas would be like letting China sell consumer electronics even after it had taken Taiwan by force.

If the United States and its allies have been cautious in their response to Russia, they are likely to be even more restrained when responding to China — and Beijing knows it. China’s ability to retaliate against the West with economic sanctions of its own is much greater than Russia’s. Singapore, which announced trade and banking restrictions against Moscow, trades about $2.5 billion worth of goods with Russia each year — but $57 billion worth of goods with China. China’s leaders likely do not fear U.S.-led economic sanctions in the event of a Taiwan takeover because they probably think that China’s own productive capacity, resources, and friendly partners will allow them to survive on their own, especially since China will soon be the world’s largest economy. They are probably right. China could absorb the types of sanctions being imposed on Russia. And given China’s ability to inflict pain on Western countries, any measures levied against Beijing would likely be softer than those imposed on Moscow.

Taiwan Is Not Ukraine

The Western military response to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine will have an even smaller impact than sanctions on China’s thinking about Taiwan. True, neither the United States nor NATO has deployed troops to fight on Ukraine’s behalf. And U.S. military assistance to Ukraine has been modest: late last month, President Joe Biden instructed the State Department to release up to an additional $350 million worth of weapons from U.S. stocks to Ukraine.

But Russia would have to invade a NATO ally without provoking a U.S. military response for Chinese leaders to seriously question Washington’s commitment to defending Taiwan. Biden has made clear from the beginning of the crisis that his administration will never send troops to Ukraine—a stark contrast with his rhetoric on Taiwan. Just last week, Biden stated unequivocally that the United States would defend Taiwan in the event of a Chinese attack. As a show of support, he also sent to the island a delegation of former U.S. officials led by Mike Mullen, a former chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Chinese planners largely assume the United States would intervene militarily on behalf of Taiwan.
Oriana Skylar Mastro

In any case, Chinese planners largely assume the United States would intervene militarily on behalf of Taiwan. What some of them question is whether the United States could amass enough forces fast enough to blunt a Chinese assault on the island. Ironically, if the United States had launched a military operation in response to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, Chinese leaders would have had further reason to question Washington’s ability to thwart a Chinese assault on Taiwan. The United States does not have the resources to fight the Russians in Europe and prepare adequately for a great-power war in Asia.  

Of course, these facts have not prevented China from trying to manipulate the narrative to undermine Taiwan’s resolve. Chinese state media has been flush with stories about how the United States did not come to Ukraine’s aid and therefore won’t come to Taiwan’s either. Like much of what appears on Chinese state media, however, these stories reflect what Chinese leaders want the world to believe—not what they believe themselves.

Not the Right Time

Chinese leaders are without a doubt considering an attack on Taiwan, but now is not the right time. China’s military is still honing the capabilities it would need to take and hold the island. And Xi is unlikely to take a dangerous gamble on Taiwan before the next Party Congress in late 2022, when he is widely expected to secure a third term as general secretary of the Chinese Communist Party. Xi is also working hard to lessen China’s technological dependence on the West, thus minimizing the impact on any further decoupling after a possible war. For all these reasons, an assault on Taiwan before 2025 is unlikely.

If anything, the crisis in Ukraine creates an additional incentive for China to wait. Beijing does not want the world to equate the two scenarios. From China’s perspective, Ukraine is an independent country engaged in a border dispute with Russia. Taiwan, by contrast, “has always been an inalienable part of China’s territory,” as China’s ambassador to the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, Deng Xijun, put it late last month. In other words, linking the two issues would undermine China’s claim to the island.

China also understands that moving against Taiwan now would solidify fears in the West of an axis of autocrats. The United States may not have the resolve to fight a protracted war to defend Taiwan. But suddenly faced with a need to defend freedom and democracy against an authoritarian alliance, Washington could muster a greater military response and convince its allies to do the same. Partly for this reason, China has desperately tried to maintain some semblance of neutrality during the Ukrainian crisis.

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has certainly changed aspects of the international order. It has rallied European countries against Russia, prompted Germany to increase defense spending, and even convinced historically neutral countries such as Finland, Sweden, and Switzerland to take a stance against Moscow. From China’s perspective, however, nothing Russia or its adversaries have done meaningfully alters the calculus on Taiwan. 

Headshot of Oriana Skylar Mastro

Oriana Skylar Mastro

Center Fellow at the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies

Deterrence and Defense Across the Taiwan Strait

Learn more about Oriana Skylar Mastro's research project analyzing the political and strategic dynamics underpinning deterrence in the region.
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Russia’s War in Ukraine Doesn’t Presage a Chinese Assault on Taiwan

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