The China Program at Shorenstein APARC had the pleasure of hosting Professor Min Ye of Boston University’s Pardee School of Global Studies on October 14, 2020. Her program, moderated by China Program Director Jean Oi, focused on the much-discussed but poorly-understood Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), announced in 2013 by President Xi Jinping. While it is not widely known exactly what the BRI is or what Beijing hopes it will accomplish, it has been described as something of a modern silk road, connecting China to dozens of other countries through trade and extensive infrastructure projects. Based on research conducted for her recently published book, The Belt Road and Beyond: State-Mobilized Globalization in China: 1998-2018, Professor Ye enlightened the audience on a surprisingly critical element of this global program: the domestic component.

While Ye began her research with the assumption that many hold about the BRI—that it is primarily a global, internationally-focused initiative—as she continued her research, she found that many, if not most, BRI projects are either entirely domestic or have strong ties to domestic programs. To this end, she posed three questions during her program: Why did Chinese leadership launch the BRI in 2013? How did the Chinese state and businesses implement the BRI? and, What are the internal and external outcomes of the BRI?

To answer these questions, Ye explained the theoretical frameworks she used to understand both the BRI and China's "state-mobilized globalization." Firstly, Ye's "Chinese-State Framework" breaks the Chinese governmental system into three parts: Party Leadership, State Bureaucracy, and Subnational Actors. Each of these elements affect the others, as well as policy surrounding the BRI. However, this division also creates fragmentation in authority and ideology. Secondly, her “State-Mobilized Globalization” framework explains the process surrounding Chinese national strategy. Ye posits that national strategies are generally prompted by crises faced at lower levels of government, particularly when a lack of efficiency or communication is causing “state paralysis.” Once the strategy is announced in order to coordinate efforts and solve the crisis, it enters a feedback loop in which plans are adjusted and changed according to ground-level conditions. These frameworks informed the empirical studies used to answer Ye’s research questions.

The drivers of the BRI, argues Ye, were threefold: strategic, diplomatic, and economic. It was believed by interested parties within China that such an international initiative could ease tensions related to the United States and maritime Asia, as well as generally improve diplomatic relations for the country. China’s industries were also facing problems related to overcapacity, and economic and financial groups wished to use their excess capital to invest abroad. Actors from several different levels in China, including national agencies, local governments, and private entrepreneurs, were involved in executing BRI projects intended to alleviate these tensions. Different cities saw different sides of this implementation: Chongqing, one of China’s largest cities, is heavily dominated by state capital, with its main BRI actors being State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs). Wenzhou, a port city in Zhejiang province, is by contrast dominated by private entrepreneurs.

With diverse implementation comes diverse outcomes. Ye argues that some BRI projects have been helpful in reforming cities’ structural economy, while others have helped upgrade industry. The BRI has managed to alleviate some of the tensions listed above, but at the same time, it has created its own problems. While there has been a massive internal mobilization effort for BRI projects, there exists a disconnect between the domestic situation and demands for transparency from outside actors.

Ye concluded her talk by tying her research to current developments related to COVID-19. While one might imagine that a global pandemic would be a significant inhibitor to an international trade and infrastructure project, Ye finds just the opposite. Because the BRI is, in fact, quite domestically focused, many BRI projects are continuing at a rapid pace, albeit with digital adjustments. Some projects, such as the New Infrastructure Plan, were actually fast-tracked in the wake of the pandemic outbreak. Ye predicts that as COVID-19 restrictions ease and the world returns to “normal,” these domestic and digital elements will be combined with the BRI’s original projects.

An audio recording of this program is available at the link below, and a video recording is available upon request. Please contact Callista Wells, China Program Coordinator at cvwells@stanford.edu with any inquiries.

Just over ten years after becoming the first U.S. ambassador to Japan to participate in the Hiroshima Peace Memorial Ceremony in 2010, Ambassador John Roos spoke about his experiences with 26 high school students in Stanford e-Japan from throughout Japan. In his October 16, 2020 online talk, Ambassador John Roos noted that his tenure in Japan—2009 to 2013—was defined by three major issues: (1) the 2011 Great East Japan Earthquake or 3/11; (2) Operation Tomodachi (“friend” in Japanese) during which the U.S. Armed Forces helped in disaster relief following the 3/11 crisis; and (3) the Hiroshima Peace Memorial Ceremony on August 6, 2010.

Regarding the first and second issues, Ambassador Roos recalled, “I was proud that the United States was there to help the people in Japan who obviously faced one of the biggest crises in your history… Vice President Biden came to Japan and the two of us traveled up to the Tohoku region because he wanted to see firsthand how he could help and how the United States could help, and I saw him interacting with not only the leaders but the people of the Tohoku region.” In addition to Operation Tomodachi, the youth-focused Tomodachi Initiative—a public-private partnership between the U.S.-Japan Council and the U.S. Embassy in Tokyo, with support from the Government of Japan—was born out of support for Japan’s recovery from the 2011 Great East Japan Earthquake. Regarding the third issue, Ambassador Roos shared, “I was the first United States ambassador to go to the Hiroshima commemoration ceremony. And I did that because I felt it was important to show respect for all of the victims of World War II and particularly obviously the victims of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. I did it because I felt that it was helping to promote President Obama’s agenda of the elimination of all nuclear weapons.”

During his talk, Ambassador Roos coupled his sharing of specific personal recollections with general insights on being the U.S. ambassador to Japan. For example, he explained that the role of the U.S. ambassador to Japan is twofold. First, the U.S. ambassador’s responsibility is to protect and look after the health and safety of the Americans that live in Japan—about 150,000 of them—including another 50,000 U.S. military personnel and their dependents. Second, nurturing and looking after the relationship between Japan and the United States, of course, is critical. He not only touched upon economic, political, and security relations but also emphasized the importance of student-to-student exchange. Concerning the latter, he is concerned that students from the United States are not spending enough time in Japan, and students in Japan are not spending enough time in the United States.

His insights profoundly connected to a student from Kyoto who commented, “When I am older, I hope to become a diplomat and maybe even an ambassador, so I’m really excited to get to talk to you today.” She continued, “What do you think makes a successful ambassador?” Ambassador Roos replied, “I hope you become the ambassador to the United States… Obviously, an ambassador needs to deal with all of the different policy issues and many difficult issues, but I think the most important thing is—and you may not expect this—but it is to listen… and to learn and to hear all sides of the equation… to show empathy.”

The current fall 2020 session of Stanford e-Japan is the 12th offering of the course since 2015. Stanford e-Japan is made possible by Mr. Tadashi Yanai, Chairman, President, and CEO of Fast Retailing Co., Ltd. Mr. Yanai and Ambassador Roos share a mutual concern for the need for students in Japan and the United States to spend more time in each other’s countries.

As a closing question, Stanford e-Japan Instructor Meiko Kotani asked Ambassador Roos what he expects from Japanese high school students and what role he thinks they should play to foster the U.S.–Japan relationship. Roos responded, “Well, first of all, let me tell you how impressed I am by this group of students. The reason I am doing this session at 9:00pm on a Friday night is because I think you are the future of the relationship. So I encourage you to find ways to connect with the younger generation of [the United States] because in the end, we need you. We need the best and brightest minds, not only in the United States but in Japan and the rest of the world to confront some pretty big challenges we have in the world right now… When I listen to you, it gives me a tremendous amount of hope, and so I’m just honored to have had the opportunity to talk with you.”

After Ambassador Roos signed off, the students shared some points that especially resonated with them. Among these were the deep respect that Ambassador Roos has for Japan and his visit to all 47 prefectures; the importance he placed upon the need for high school students in Japan to communicate with high school students in the United States; the importance he placed upon the leadership of the United States to be humble despite its power; and the importance of empathy. And since 2020 marks the 75th anniversary of the end of World War II, the following words that Roos stated seemed to especially resonate with the students: “President Obama said that we may not eliminate nuclear weapons in his lifetime or my lifetime. I hope in your lifetime.”

It took some time to count the ballots, but the American electorate has rendered its judgement. While there may be legal challenges and a recount or two, Joe Biden will become the 46th U.S. president next Jan. 20.  

This outcome will displease some in Moscow. The Russian government, in particular its security services, worked to support President Trump’s election in 2016 and again this year. It is not hard to understand why. Trump has divided Americans, weakened U.S. alliances, and badly tarnished the American reputation abroad. For those sitting in the Kremlin, what’s not to like? 

Trump’s loss thus may seem a defeat for Russia. But a Biden presidency can offer a silver lining for the Kremlin. 

First, Biden’s foreign policy will be predictable. Few jobs in Moscow could have been tougher the past four years than America-watcher. How to explain Washington’s policy under Trump to president Putin or Foreign Minister Lavrov? The U.S. president refused to criticize Putin or Russian misbehavior and talked about good relations. Meanwhile, the U.S. government sanctioned Russian individuals and entities, provided lethal military assistance to Ukraine, and bolstered the U.S. military presence in Central Europe. 

With Biden, the president’s attitude and the administration’s policy will match. The Kremlin may not like certain elements of that policy, but it will understand it.  

Second, Biden can be expected to professionalize relations, both on issues where interests coincide and where major differences divide the two countries. He recognizes that, even when bilateral relations are at a low point, dialogue matters. Trump proved an unreliable interlocutor. He had a weak grasp of the U.S.-Russia agenda, took little time to prepare, and paid no intention to implementation. The Trump-Putin encounters had, at best, insignificant results, and Secretary of State Pompeo had no regularized relationship with Lavrov to compensate.  

Under the Biden administration, the Russians can expect a return to more regular diplomatic dialogue at senior levels. 

Third, Biden will want guardrails to manage the adversarial aspects of the U.S.-Russia relationship, beginning with arms control.  Over the past six months, the Trump administration badly overplayed its hand on extending the 2010 New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty.  The former vice president has said he would extend New START without conditions. That would continue the treaty’s limits and the flow of information from its verification and transparency provisions, benefiting the security interests of both countries.  

A Biden administration, moreover, could go beyond that. For example, a regularized military-to-military dialogue could prove useful at a time when U.S. and Russian military forces operate more frequently in close proximity.  Neither side has an interest in an accident or miscalculation triggering an inadvertent conflict. 

Fourth, Biden has the disposition to tackle problems that may require months, perhaps longer, to resolve. Trump wanted immediate results. Even had he bothered to take the time to get smart on a particular issue, he lacked the patience necessary to work out settlements to difficult disputes. 

Biden’s approach could help address the toughest nuts on the U.S.-Russia agenda, such as Moscow’s conflict against Ukraine — which U.S. officials have termed the biggest barrier to a more positive development of the bilateral relationship. The Kremlin manages policy on Donbas; no one will solve it without talking to Putin. Trump achieved nothing. While Biden has made clear his strong support for Ukraine, engaging his authority more directly alongside that of the German and French leaders could shake up a process that has devolved into stalemate. 

In may rankle in Moscow that Biden called Russia the main threat to the United States, but that is objectively true:  Russia is the only country in the world with the power to physically destroy America, and it has acted robustly in recent years to undermine U.S. authority and goals. (If it’s any consolation, Biden sees China as posing the long-term challenge.) 

The Biden presidency will not mean a new reset. The U.S.-Russia relationship has many troubled issues. Moscow should understand that Biden and his administration will push back against malign Russian activities. The Kremlin will have to rein its security services, which pursue unacceptable action such as stirring discontent in American domestic politics. 

However, if Putin and the Kremlin exercise some moderation, they can expect from the next American president a readiness for serious dialogue — including on differences — of a kind that has been noticeably absent in recent years. That will not produce rapid or broad agreement, but it could help the two countries better manage their competition and, perhaps over time, chip away at the problems that currently divide them. 

Originally for Moscow Times