International Relations

FSI researchers strive to understand how countries relate to one another, and what policies are needed to achieve global stability and prosperity. International relations experts focus on the challenging U.S.-Russian relationship, the alliance between the U.S. and Japan and the limitations of America’s counterinsurgency strategy in Afghanistan.

Foreign aid is also examined by scholars trying to understand whether money earmarked for health improvements reaches those who need it most. And FSI’s Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center has published on the need for strong South Korean leadership in dealing with its northern neighbor.

FSI researchers also look at the citizens who drive international relations, studying the effects of migration and how borders shape people’s lives. Meanwhile FSI students are very much involved in this area, working with the United Nations in Ethiopia to rethink refugee communities.

Trade is also a key component of international relations, with FSI approaching the topic from a slew of angles and states. The economy of trade is rife for study, with an APARC event on the implications of more open trade policies in Japan, and FSI researchers making sense of who would benefit from a free trade zone between the European Union and the United States.

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Oriana Skylar Mastro
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This opinion piece first appeared in the New York Times.


President Biden’s recent trip to Asia nearly went off without a hitch — until Taiwan came up. Mr. Biden was asked whether the United States would respond “militarily” if China sought to retake the self-ruled island by force.

“Yes,” he said. “That’s the commitment we made.”

It was one of the most explicit U.S. defense guarantees for Taiwan in decades, appearing to depart from a longtime policy of “strategic ambiguity.” But it’s far from certain that the United States could hold off China.

I have been involved in dozens of war games and tabletop exercises to see how a conflict would turn out. Simply put, the United States is outgunned. At the very least, a confrontation with China would be an enormous drain on the U.S. military without any assured outcome that America could repel all of China’s forces. Mr. Biden’s comments may be aimed at deterring a Chinese attack, and hopefully they will.

After a decades-long military modernization, China has the world’s largest navy and the United States could throw far fewer ships into a Taiwan conflict. China’s missile force is also thought to be capable of targeting ships at sea to neutralize the main U.S. tool of power projection, aircraft carriers. The United States has the most advanced fighter jets in the world but access to just two U.S. air bases within unrefueled combat radius of the Taiwan Strait, both in Japan, compared with China’s 39 air bases within 500 miles of Taipei.

If China’s leaders decide they need to recover Taiwan and are convinced that the United States would respond, they may see no other option but a pre-emptive strike on U.S. forces in the region. Chinese missiles could take out key American bases in Japan, and U.S. aircraft carriers could face Chinese “carrier killer” missiles. In this scenario, superior U.S. training and experience would matter little.


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The need to project power across vast distances also makes U.S. forces vulnerable to China’s electronic and cyberwarfare capability. China could disrupt networks like the United States Transportation Command, which moves American assets around and is considered vulnerable to cyberattacks. China may also have the ability to damage satellites and disrupt communications, navigation, targeting, intelligence-gathering, or command and control. Operating from home turf, China could use more-secure systems like fiber-optic cables for its own networks.

Under a best-case battle scenario for the United States, China would attack only Taiwan and refrain from hitting American forces to avoid drawing in U.S. military might. This would allow the United States time to bring its forces into the region, move others to safety and pick where and when it engages with China.

If the United States did ever intervene, it would need regional allies to provide runways, ports and supply depots. But those partners may be eager to stay out of the crossfire.

I’m not the only one who’s worried. A 2018 congressionally mandated assessment warned that America could face a “decisive military defeat” in a war over Taiwan, citing China’s increasingly advanced capabilities and myriad U.S. logistical difficulties. Several top former U.S. defense officials have reached similar conclusions.


Mr. Biden’s remarks were made in the context of Ukraine, and America’s failure to prevent that war may be driving his thinking on Taiwan. Mr. Biden may be calculating that Russia’s setbacks in Ukraine will give China pause and that guaranteed U.S. intervention in a conflict over Taiwan would cost Beijing too much, even if it took the island.

But comparing Ukraine and Taiwan is problematic. Beijing views Taiwan — self-ruled since 1949 — as an integral part of Chinese territory since ancient times, a significantly deeper attachment than Vladimir Putin’s obsession with Ukraine. Reunifying the island with the mainland is one of the Chinese Communist Party’s most cherished goals, and China would see U.S. intervention as a bitter betrayal of the “one China” principle — the idea that China and Taiwan belong together, which Washington has acknowledged since the 1970s.

China’s military is bigger and more formidable than Russia’s, and its economy far larger, more resilient and globally integrated. Rallying support for economic sanctions against Beijing during a conflict — China is the biggest trading partner of many countries — would be more challenging than isolating Russia.

The White House is once again walking back Mr. Biden’s comments, saying official policy has not changed.

If so, then Mr. Biden should stop rocking the boat and focus instead on strengthening America’s position in the Taiwan theater. This doesn’t just mean more weapons for Taiwan and a more robust U.S. military presence in the region, though the former would help the island hold out if China attacked, and both would boost deterrence.

It also means shrewd diplomacy. Mr. Biden needs to stand firm against Chinese intimidation of Taiwan, while working to ease Beijing’s anxieties by demonstrating a stronger U.S. commitment to a peaceful resolution of the Taiwan issue. Mr. Biden should also persuade regional friends to provide more bases for the United States to use. This not only increases U.S. operational flexibility but also heightens deterrence.

Whatever Mr. Biden’s calculations, departing from the “strategic ambiguity” that has helped keep peace for decades misses the point. The main question for President Xi Jinping must be not whether the United States would join in, but whether China could beat the United States in a battle for Taiwan. Twenty years ago, China’s poorly trained army and largely obsolete naval and air forces had no chance. But that was then.

Many will applaud Mr. Biden for standing up for democratic Taiwan in the face of Chinese threats. But he could be putting the island in greater danger, and the United States may not be able to come to the rescue.

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Honor guards prepare to raise the Taiwan flag in the Chiang Kai-shek Memorial Hall square.
Honor guards prepare to raise the Taiwan flag in the Chiang Kai-shek Memorial Hall square ahead of the Taiwanese presidential election on January 14, 2016 in Taipei, Taiwan.
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Many will applaud Mr. Biden for standing up for democratic Taiwan in the face of Chinese threats. But he could be putting the island in greater danger, and the United States may not be able to come to the rescue.

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Noa Ronkin
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South Korea’s cultural wave has swept across the world. Known as Hallyu, the Korean Wave spans music, film, TV, fashion, and food, expressing soft power that engages global audiences and transforms the ways in which they view and consume pop culture. North Korea, by contrast, is a systemic abuser of human rights and remains fixed on the pursuit of military might that poses regional and international threats. These two divergent aspects of Korea that intrigue scholars and the public alike were the focus of a conference that marked the 20th anniversary of the Korea Program at Stanford’s Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center (APARC).

The two-day event, held on May 19 and May 20, convened leaders from academia, government, and the entertainment industry to explore how to translate the wide fascination with South Korea’s pop culture wave and North Korea’s geopolitics into an increased academic interest in Korea and to envision new horizons for the field of Korean studies. The conference featured keynote addresses by Ban Ki-moon, former United Nations secretary-general, and Soo-Man Lee, founder and chief producer of SM Entertainment, and a presentation by SUHO, leader of K-pop group EXO.

They joined long-time Korea Program supporters and members of the general public and Stanford community, who came together to celebrate the accomplishments of the Korea Program in its first two decades and consider its future. The event drew robust audiences both in person and online, including a large number of enthusiastic Stanford students and tens of thousands of viewers who watched the event livestream

To understand contemporary Korea and further Korean studies, it is critical to couple the traditional focus on the Peninsula’s security dilemma with a broader examination of Korean society and culture.
Gi-Wook Shin

Expanding the Field of Korean Studies

As he welcomed conference attendees, Stanford sociologist Gi-Wook Shin, the William J. Perry Professor of Contemporary Korea and founding director of the Korea Program, explained that the goal in gathering participants and presenters who represent deep and varied interests in Korea is to highlight the importance of Korean studies programs and build bridges between the United States and Korea, creating a lasting impact well beyond campus.

Shin, who also serves as APARC director, reflected on the efforts made to build a thriving Stanford research hub on contemporary Korea. These include establishing a Korean collection at the East Asia Library, recruiting faculty with expertise in both the social sciences and the humanities, academic publishing, offering training and fellowship opportunities, and events programming.

The conference’s dual focus on North Korea’s geopolitics and South Korea’s Hallyu reflects Shin’s commitment to expanding the range of inquiry about Korea. “To understand contemporary Korea and further Korean studies, it is critical to couple the traditional focus on the Peninsula’s security dilemma with a broader examination of Korean society and culture,” he said.

Professor of International Studies Michael McFaul, director of the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies, the parent organization of APARC and the Korea Program, and Professor of Jewish Studies Gabriella Safran, the senior associate dean for humanities and arts, contributed additional welcome remarks, symbolizing the Korea Program’s bridging of both the social science and humanities fields. Safran observed that Korean studies instruction at Stanford has been designed to engage the university community broadly and highlighted the evolution of Stanford students’ understanding of popular culture, thanks in part to the rising popularity of the Korean Wave.

North Korea’s Geopolitics and Society

The morning session of the conference opened with a panel on North Korea. Attendees heard from Siegfried Hecker, professor emeritus in management science and engineering, about the prospects for a renewed diplomacy policy with North Korea; from Kim Sook, former ROK ambassador to the United Nations, about the status of inter-Korean relations and North Korea’s efforts to stave off a COVID-19 crisis; and from Joohee Cho, Seoul bureau chief at ABC News, about the challenges of reporting from and on North Korea and the need to better understand North Korean society beyond the trope of the diplomacy of denuclearization.

Reflecting Back, Looking Ahead

Ambassador Kim, who is also a former fellow with the Korea Program, is one of many Program alumni from the academic, policy, and industry sectors. Speakers on the following panel represented the scope of expertise of the Program’s alumni community and the wide-ranging training and fellowship opportunities the Program facilitates.

The panel brought together Paul Chang, associate professor of sociology at Harvard University, Joon-woo Park, former ROK ambassador to the EU and Singapore, Jong Chun Woo, former president of Stanford APARC-Seoul Forum, and Megan Faircloth, a Stanford Senior in the Department of East Asian Languages and Cultures, to consider the Korea Program’s past, present, and vision for the future.

Hard, Soft, and Smart Power

Delivering the keynote address on the first day of the conference, former UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon focused on the paradox of the two Koreas. On the one hand, the Republic of Korea has followed a remarkable national development trajectory to become a powerhouse of cultural and artistic creativity – “a global soft power pace-setter,” said Mr. Ban. On the other hand, North Korea, with its stunted development, is seen as a global pariah, and its fixation on hard power suffocates the creativity, innovation, and culture of its own people through systemic repression, state control, and censorship.

But hard power and soft power are not the only two paths, Mr. Ban stated. He went on to explain that a truly advanced country should embrace a forward-thinking national identity of smart power, combining and ultimately transcending hard power- and soft power-related attributes and characteristics. “In an uncertain future, I am certain that Korea’s ascension into a smart power can advance a common destiny for all, one rooted in peace, sustainability, and prosperity,” said Mr. Ban. The best way to achieve this vision, he concluded, is to educate new generations to embody the principles of global citizenship and help them live in harmony and peace with other human beings, irrespective of their nationality.

The soft and hard power strategies of the two Koreas are also the focus of two new documentaries commissioned by the Korea Program. Focused on K-pop and the North Korean human rights crisis, the films are intended to help scholars in teaching students about these two topics. The conference included the unveiling of the documentaries’ trailers and a discussion with film director Hark Joon Lee. The complete documentaries will be released later this year.

Hallyu Has No Borders

There is no doubt that the speaker who most charmed conference attendees and the multitudes of global viewers who watched the event livestream was SUHO, leader of K-pop group EXO. “Today, I am here as the guardian of EXO and K-pop,” SUHO said at the start of his speech, referring to the meaning of his stage name.

He went on to talk about his decade-long experience as a K-pop artist and the hard work and level of detail that go into the complex choreography of the K-pop dances, emphasizing the special, social media-driven emotional bond K-pop artists share with their global fanbase and noting how many fans take a deeper interest in Korean culture because they follow EXO.

Hallyu has no borders and no longer stops at one specific art form, concluded SUHO. “We are witnessing its expansion into our society from every angle: music, dramas, movies, food, education, and more. K-culture is more than a passing trend. It’s a global phenomenon that will continue to grow and evolve,” he said.

Joining SUHO for a discussion of the Korean Wave were Stanford’s Marci Kwon, assistant professor of art and art history, and Angela Killoren, CEO of CJ ENM America, Inc., who oversees U.S. operations for the South Korean entertainment conglomerate that is known for its multiple Academy Award-winning movie “Parasite” and popular K-dramas such as “Crash Landing on You.”

Killoren described the evolution of the global adoption of K-dramas, largely made possible by their distribution through Netflix, and offered insights into the drivers and shapers of the rise of Korean entertainment. According to Killoren, unlike the predominantly male gaze-driven entertainment forms in other cultures, Korean entertainment content caters to the female gaze, as befitting the consumer side of the Korean economy that has been driven by the purchasing power of women

From Immediate Interest to Long-Term Commitment

The second day of the conference convened leading academics to examine how to translate the wide interest in North Korea and K-pop into Korean studies. Panelists included Michelle Cho, assistant professor of East Asian studies at the University of Toronto, David Kang, professor of international relations and business at USC, and Stanford’s own Yumi Moon, associate professor of history, and Dafna Zur, associate professor of East Asian languages and cultures and director of the Center for East Asian Studies.

The panelists agreed on the importance of funding and supporting the study of Korean language in higher education, providing students with tools to articulate their knowledge and experience and help them arrive at insights that are personal, meaningful, and constructive; and fostering and supporting junior faculty. The discussion was followed by a lively Q&A session that engaged many student attendees.

Future Visions of K-pop

The conference concluded with a keynote speech by Soo-Man Lee, founder and chief producer of SM Entertainment. SM is one of South Korea's largest entertainment companies and is famous for fostering and popularizing the careers of a myriad of K-pop groups and stars — including the likes of aespa, NCT, Red Velvet, SUPER JUNIOR, and EXO — and for leading the worldwide K-pop phenomenon and the musical side of Hallyu

Lee recounted his roots as “K-pop’s first mover,” explaining how K-pop music expanded globally and how it demonstrates the power of content amid exponential technological revolution. “It connects the hearts of people around the world beyond generations and ideologies,” he said.

Lee described SM’s systematic production and management system, which he coined “Culture Technology (CT)” and which includes casting, training, content production, and marketing. This so-called CT system is the “growth engine of K-pop,” he noted.

He elaborated on his vision for a future of K-pop that centers on the “Play2Create” (P2C) ecosystem and combines metaverse technology. Within this blockchain-based ecosystem, which Lee says forms part of a new creator economy, fans, or “prosumers” can proactively use the original SM intellectual property to enjoy and create new content through recreation. The ultimate vision of K-pop and Hallyu is to contribute to human creativity, concluded Lee.

The conference made headlines in Korean media and elsewhere. Explore selected media coverage, the event press release, conference agenda, and YouTube playlist including the full livestream recordings via the links below

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From left to right: Soo-Man Lee, SUHO, and Ban Ki-moon.
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The Korea Program at Stanford’s Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center marked its 20-year anniversary with a two-day conference that gathered eminent leaders from academia, government, and the K-pop industry, including former United Nations Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon and global star SUHO, leader of K-pop group EXO.

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image of Julie Owono and Phumzile Van Damme on blue background

Join us on Tuesday, May 31st from 12 PM - 1 PM PT for "A Former South African Politician’s Effort to Combat Misinformation in Elections" featuring Phumzile Van Damme, former Member of Parliament in South Africa, in conversation with Julie Owono of the Content Policy & Society Lab (CPSL). This weekly seminar series is jointly organized by the Cyber Policy Center’s Program on Democracy and the Internet and the Hewlett Foundation’s Cyber Initiative.

About the Seminar: 

Misinformation during elections is a serious concern for democratic systems around the world. This is particularly true in various African countries, cases of electoral violence have been linked to disruptions in the informational realm. Yet, the underinvestment by technology companies in initiatives to limit the existence and impact of disinformation in Africa remains a reality.

Local initiatives have attempted to mitigate this inequality. This week’s webinar will focus on the work of Former South African MP Phumzile Van Damme, who launched a project to tackle the spread of misinformation on social media platforms before and during the local government elections in November 2021. She will share on the methodology used, and results observed. The webinar will also discuss the challenges faced in ensuring that South African users and citizens have access to reliable information.
 

About the Speakers:

Phumzile Van Damme is an independent consultant on disinformation and digital rights. She is a member of the Real Facebook Oversight Board, the International Grand Committee on Disinformation, and an advisory council member of #ShePersisted. Van Damme’s work on misinformation was the subject of a documentary that premiered at Sundance Film Festival in 2020, “Influence.” 
 
A former Member of Parliament in South Africa, Van Damme served on the Communications and Digital Technologies committee as Shadow Minister. She played a pivotal role in holding social media platforms accountable for misinformation on their platforms and spearheaded the summoning of Facebook and other tech giants to Parliament. 
 
In September 2021, she helped found and coordinate South Africa’s first electoral disinformation monitoring project, the ‘Local Government Anti-Disinformation Project’. She has spoken on various platforms on the subject of disinformation including at the UNDP and the UN Commission on the Status of Women.

Julie Owono is the Executive Director of the Content Policy & Society Lab (CPSL) and a fellow of the Program on Democracy and the Internet (PDI) at Stanford University. She is also the Executive Director of digital rights organization Internet Sans Frontières, one of the inaugural members of the Facebook Oversight Board, and an affiliate at the Berkman Klein Center at Harvard University. She holds a Master’s degree in International Law from la Sorbonne University in Paris, and practiced as a lawyer at the Paris Bar. 

With a fluency in five languages, a childhood spent in various countries, and an educational background at the Lyçée Français Alexandre Dumas in Moscow, Julie has a unique perspective to understand the challenges and opportunities of a global Internet. This background has shaped her belief that global and multi stakeholder collaborations can be instrumental in the emergence of rights-based content policies and regulations.

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Siegfried S. Hecker
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How has Vladimir Putin’s invasion of Ukraine upended the world nuclear order? 

Longtime Carnegie Corporation of New York grantee Siegfried Hecker, one of the world’s foremost nuclear security and policy experts, offers his perspective on how Putin’s invasion of Ukraine is as momentous for nuclear affairs as the dissolution of the Soviet Union in a recent interview with John Mecklin, editor-in-chief of Corporation grantee the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists.

Read the rest at Carnegie Corporation of New York

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Longtime Corporation grantee Siegfried Hecker, one of the world’s foremost nuclear security and policy experts, offers his perspective on how Russia’s invasion of Ukraine is as momentous for nuclear affairs as the dissolution of the Soviet Union

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Siegfried S. Hecker
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North Korean officials, including Kim Jong Un, have made several statements in recent months that begin to bring clarity to the country’s evolving nuclear doctrine. Within those statements, there has been a notable emphasis on the role of tactical nuclear weapons (TNWs) in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea’s (or, North Korea’s) larger nuclear strategy and the potential for early nuclear use should conflict break out on the Korean Peninsula.

38 North Director Jenny Town recently met with Dr. Siegfried Hecker, Senior Fellow (emeritus) at the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies at Stanford University, to discuss these developments and what they could mean for future North Korean nuclear activities, and potential new security challenges.

Read the rest at 38 North

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North Korea's flags Micha Brändli via Unsplash
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North Korean officials, including Kim Jong Un, have made several statements in recent months that begin to bring clarity to the country’s evolving nuclear doctrine. Within those statements, there has been a notable emphasis on the role of tactical nuclear weapons (TNWs) in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea’s (or, North Korea’s) larger nuclear strategy and the potential for early nuclear use should conflict break out on the Korean Peninsula.

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Rose Gottemoeller
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Eight years ago, I traveled as undersecretary of state for arms control and international security to the Marshall Islands, a remote place in the central Pacific. I was there to commemorate the 60th anniversary of Castle Bravo, the largest and most catastrophic of the 67 nuclear weapons tests that the United States conducted in the Marshalls during the Cold War. Because of a design error that led to a larger-than-expected blast, radioactive fallout from the test—at Bikini Atoll, which had been evacuated—spread over more than 4,000 square miles of the Pacific Ocean and contaminated nearby populated atolls.

Read the rest at the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists

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'Castle Bravo' on March 1, 1954 on Bikini Atoll.
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Rose Gottemoeller, former undersecretary of state for arms control and international security, remembers the painful history of Castle Bravo—the largest and most catastrophic US nuclear weapons test conducted in the Marshall Islands during the Cold War—and urges the United States to finish the compact extension with the three island nations to contain China’s growing influence in the Pacific.

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Three months after Russia’s large-scale invasion of Ukraine began, the Russians have failed to achieve their objectives. U.S. officials now expect a war of attrition, with neither side capable of a decisive military breakthrough. How the war will conclude remains unclear.

A FAILING INVASION

On February 24, Russian forces invaded Ukraine from the north, including from Belarus, from the south out of Crimea, and from the east. The multiple axes of attack suggested that the Russian military aimed to quickly capture the capital of Kyiv, depose the democratically-elected government, and occupy perhaps as much as the eastern two-thirds of Ukraine.

The Russians failed. Their forces reached the outskirts of Kyiv but retreated at the end of March. The Russian army’s thrust toward Odesa bogged down around Mykolaiv after three weeks. In May, Russian forces attacking Kharkiv, Ukraine’s second largest city and located just 25 miles from the Russian border, were pushed back, having entered only the city’s outskirts.

The Russian military finally secured control over Mariupol in mid-May, when the last Ukrainian forces surrendered after a valiant resistance. Weeks of indiscriminate Russian shelling and bombing have left Mariupol, a predominately Russian-speaking city where almost half of population was ethnic Russian, absolutely devastated.

Following their retreat from Kyiv and northern Ukraine, Russian forces have concentrated on the Donbas region in eastern Ukraine. After six weeks, they have made some progress but at considerable cost against determined Ukrainian defenses.

Military analysts ponder whether the Russian army will soon become a spent force — exhausted by heavy casualties, high equipment losses, poor morale, and weak logistics, and incapable of mounting another major offensive operation. The Kremlin’s decision not to declare a full mobilization makes it difficult for the Russian military to replace combat losses. U.S. officials see Russian President Vladimir Putin stubbornly digging in, discern no negotiating path in the near term, and expect a war of attrition, with the sides slugging it out but neither able to score a convincing victory.

LOOKING FORWARD

Ukraine appears to have already won in one sense: virtually no one believes the Russian military capable of taking Kyiv and occupying one-half to two-thirds of the country. Ukrainians are returning to the capital, and life there has begun to take on an air of normalcy. However the war concludes, an independent and sovereign Ukrainian state will remain on the map of Europe.

Beyond that, things become more difficult to predict. The Kremlin has now focused on taking full control of the Donbas, a substantially downsized goal from its original invasion aims. Moscow may have to further reduce its Donbas objective to full control of Luhansk oblast but not all of Donetsk oblast. Russian forces in southern Ukraine have begun preparing defensive positions.

Ukrainian forces, bolstered by a growing flow of weapons from the West, have carried out successful counterattacks as well as conducting a stout mobile defense. However, transition from defense to a full-scale counteroffensive aimed at driving the Russians out of the territory they have occupied since February 24 would pose a tough challenge. In that case, some of the advantages that favor the defense would accrue to the Russian military.

A military stalemate that could perhaps drag on for many months more thus appears the most likely scenario.

A REAL NEGOTIATION?

A negotiated settlement offers one path to end a war. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy appeared ready for compromise on key questions in March, for example, offering to set aside Kyiv’s ambitions of joining the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and accept neutrality. But his Russian counterpart did not take up the possibility to secure a neutral Ukraine and perhaps other gains.

In retrospect, that may turn out to be a missed opportunity for Moscow. Ukrainian attitudes toward negotiation have hardened since March. That reflects growing confidence in the abilities of the Ukrainian military and outrage at Russian war crimes, such as the wanton destruction of Mariupol, and atrocities in places such as Bucha and Borodianka. Public anger almost certainly limits the freedom of maneuver that Zelenskyy might have in considering possible concessions.

While Kyiv in March offered a proposal that suggested a readiness to compromise on Crimea, illegally seized and annexed by Russia in March 2014, Ukrainian officials now insist on full restoration of Ukraine’s borders as of 1991. The West should support that position and reject the Kremlin’s attempt to redraw international borders by force of arms.

Whether Kyiv would sustain that position if the war drags on is unknown. Barring a total collapse of the Russian military (not to be excluded, but unlikely), it is difficult to see how Ukraine can muster the necessary leverage to regain Crimea. A senior Ukrainian official privately said in September 2014 that perhaps Kyiv should let the then-occupied part of Donbas go — “they don’t think like we do” — but he quickly added that no serious Ukrainian official could say that publicly and expect to survive. In a recent private discussion, a Ukrainian politician did not argue for giving up Crimea and Donbas but noted that regaining those territories would bring a liability: the return of three or four million pro-Russian voters, which would prove disruptive for Ukraine’s politics.

How Ukraine resolves this dilemma is a question for the Ukrainian government to decide. Zelenskyy has left the door open for diplomacy. If Moscow changes its approach and moves to a serious negotiation, Zelenskyy will have to weigh the balance of his desire to end the killing of Ukrainians, the imperative of protecting Kyiv’s positions of principle vs. the possible need for compromise, and the potential political blowback if Ukrainians believe a compromise concedes too much to Russia.

Only Zelenskyy and his government can weigh the trade-offs and make that delicate decision. The West should follow Kyiv’s lead in any negotiation, not pressing Ukraine to accept a settlement it does not want and not objecting to a settlement that Kyiv favors and believes meets Ukraine’s interests. Western countries will have to decide what to do about sanctions on Russia; some may wish to maintain sanctions even after a settlement, though the West should be sensitive to sanctions-easing if Kyiv says that is necessary to secure an otherwise acceptable deal.

Of course, this is an academic discussion as long as the Kremlin remains uninterested in serious negotiation.

A TRAGEDY AND A DISASTER

Ukraine did nothing to provoke or justify this war of choice, a choice made by Putin. It is a tragedy for the country, one that has resulted in the death of thousands of Ukrainian soldiers and civilians and enormous material damage to infrastructure, homes and apartments, and commercial and industrial facilities. (This could also become a tragedy for countries around the world that depend on Ukrainian food exports that are now blockaded.)

The war has also proven a disaster for Russia: tens of thousands of soldiers killed and wounded, major equipment losses, international isolation, sanctions that are inflicting real economic pain, and a galvanized, reinvigorated, rearming NATO that will soon welcome Finland and Sweden into its ranks. Moreover, NATO could well decide to make the presence of alliance forces on its eastern flank (e.g., in the Baltic states and Poland) permanent rather than rotating. Putin’s war will not succeed in bringing Ukraine closer to Moscow’s orbit; it is instead imbuing a hatred towards Russia in Ukraine that will take decades to overcome.

The war has a clear victim and a clear aggressor. It is in the West’s interest that the Kremlin fail in its attempt to subjugate Ukraine and deny Ukrainians the right to determine their own course. That means continuing to provide the Ukrainians the means to defend their country and drive back the invading Russian army. That also means ratcheting up sanctions to accelerate the havoc coming to the Russian economy due to Putin’s disastrous decisions.

In the end, the desired outcome to this war would see the Ukrainians forcing a Russian withdrawal or, at a minimum, getting Moscow to agree to a negotiated settlement on terms acceptable to Kyiv. Ensuring that Russia’s aggression fails and that Ukraine achieves one of these outcomes should be primary goals for the West.

Originally for Brookings Order from Chaos blog

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Three months after Russia’s large-scale invasion of Ukraine began, the Russians have failed to achieve their objectives. U.S. officials now expect a war of attrition, with neither side capable of a decisive military breakthrough. How the war will conclude remains unclear.

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David Holloway
Scott Sagan
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The Russia-Ukraine war is entering its fourth month, with no end in sight.  The Kremlin seems intent on achieving a victory on the battlefield, while relations between the West and Russia plummet to new lows.  One casualty:  U.S.-Russian arms control negotiations.

Negotiated limits on U.S. and Russian nuclear forces seem far more important today than in 2010, when the two countries concluded the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START) and enjoyed warmer overall relations.  Keeping those limits in place, to say nothing of achieving new constraints, could prove difficult.

Prospects appeared brighter in 2021.  Immediately on taking office, President Biden agreed to extend New START until February 2026.  U.S. officials indicated a desire to engage Russia in a negotiation to limit all U.S. and Russian nuclear warheads, a logical next step after New START.

Following the June 2021 Biden-Putin summit in Geneva, U.S. and Russian officials met in the strategic stability dialogue to discuss nuclear arms and related issues, such as missile defense.  Although the dialogue by the end of the year had not produced a mandate for negotiations, both sides characterized the discussions as constructive.

Then, on February 24, 2022, the Russia launched its brutal and unjustified invasion of Ukraine.  Washington wound down “business as usual” and suspended the strategic stability dialogue.

Resumption of those discussions almost certainly will have to wait until an end to the war, and likely for some time after that.  Arms control skeptics will seize on Russia’s attack to intensify their opposition to any attempt to negotiate with Moscow.

If U.S.-Russian discussions resume at some point, the delay will have an impact.  Persuading Moscow to negotiate limits on non-strategic nuclear weapons, which would bring in a host of complex questions, would have been difficult in any case.  Now, however, the sides would have little time to conclude a treaty, let alone for the Senate to discuss ratification, before the U.S. political season cranks up in 2024.

Setting aside the time factor, the Russia-Ukraine war almost certainly will make it harder to persuade Russian negotiators to put non-strategic nuclear weapons on the table.  The Russian military attaches great importance to such weapons, seeing them as one means to make up for U.S. and NATO conventional force advantages (to say nothing about China).

Given the abysmal performance by its military against a smaller and out-gunned foe, the Russian General Staff is likely to regard its non-strategic nuclear arsenal as more necessary than ever.

Of particular note, the Russian military has devoted significant efforts in recent years to adding to its arsenal precision-guided conventional weapons, including long-range strike systems such as the Kalibr cruise missile.  They demonstrated some of those weapons in Syria.

However, the war against Ukraine has revealed significant shortcomings.  First, the Russian weapons appear to have a high fail rate.  U.S. officials estimated that some Russian “smart” weapons miss targets as much as 60 percent of the time.  Second, the large number of Russian air sorties delivering dumb bombs (which require that aircraft fly lower, making them more vulnerable to Ukrainian surface-to-air missiles) suggests that the Russian stockpile of smart weapons may not be large.  Third, Western bans on the export of hi-tech products to Russia could hinder Russian production of new precision-guided conventional weapons.

This will make it harder to get non-strategic nuclear weapons in the negotiation.  At a minimum, the price that Russian negotiators will demand, such as limits on missile defense, will increase.

The Biden administration thus has no chance to get an ambitious agreement in its first term.  As for a second term, who knows what the American electorate will decide in November 2024?

A less ambitious approach would look at extending the limits that now apply to U.S. and Russian strategic offensive forces.  That could offer a sensible fallback.  The U.S. military values New START’s verification and transparency measures.  The Russians, like the Soviets before them, traditionally have sought constraints on U.S. strategic forces.

New START’s terms, however, do not permit extension beyond 2026.  If U.S. and Russian negotiators concluded a new treaty merely extending New START’s constraints, securing the two-thirds vote needed in the Senate for consent to ratification could prove difficult.  Among other things, opponents would point out that, when consenting to ratify New START in 2010, the Senate called on the administration to negotiate limits on non-strategic nuclear weapons.

The administration could seek to extend New START’s limits in an agreement that it would submit to both houses of Congress for approval by simple majorities.  (The Nixon administration handled the 1972 Interim Offensive Arms Agreement that way.)  Doing so, however, would require majorities in both the House and Senate—and no doubt would generate complaints about end-running the Senate.

Another approach would center on politically-binding agreements (not submitted to Capitol Hill) or parallel unilateral declarations.  These could extend the New START limits, but they likely would not continue the treaty’s verification measures.  The Russians have taken the position in the past that they cannot share information that their system regards as classified without a legally-binding agreement.  Washington would have little enthusiasm for continuing New START limits unaccompanied by verification measures.

Arms control offers a useful national security tool that can put guardrails on the adversarial aspects of the U.S.-Russian relationship.  As Washington and Moscow find themselves at the most contentious point in their relations since the early 1980s and perhaps since the 1962 Cuban missile crisis, keeping such guardrails in place is more important than ever.  Unfortunately, the Russia-Ukraine war will make doing that more difficult than ever.

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ballistic missile submarine USS Nebraska
The Ohio-class ballistic missile submarine USS Nebraska (SSBN 739)
Photo credit: U.S. Department of Defense, accessed via Wikimedia Commons
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The Russia-Ukraine war is entering its fourth month, with no end in sight.  The Kremlin seems intent on achieving a victory on the battlefield, while relations between the West and Russia plummet to new lows.  One casualty:  U.S.-Russian arms control negotiations.

When the European Peace Project started – 72 years ago – WWII had just ended. It took the great vision and foresight of the “European founding fathers“ – Konrad Adenauer, Robert Schuman, Jean Monnet, and Alcide De Gasperi and others – to bring about the most important change the European continent has ever seen. From a closer economic cooperation (coal and steel) to the founding of the European Communities (treaties of Rome 1957) to the creation of the European Union with its Single Market and the Schengen Area, Europe has experienced an era of peace, stability and prosperity like never before. Preserving these epochal achievements within European borders and extending to Europe’s immediate neighbors lies at the very heart of the Foreign and Security policy of the EU.

Now a brutal war has started, putting at risk lives and livelihoods of many, putting our economies under strain and  demanding quick and resolute political answers. The attacks in Ukraine mark a turning point (in the words of Chancellor Olaf Scholz: “Zeitenwende”) for the German, French and Common Foreign and Security Policy(CFSP). As highlighted by French President Emmanuel Macron at the EU summit in Versailles in March 2022, “As a force of peace, we cannot rely on others to defend ourselves, be it on land, sea, air, space or cyberspace […]. Our European defense must take a new step.” This panel will discuss what a realigned CFSP could possibly look like, what role NATO could play in that context, and how Germany and France could contribute to this new order.

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Christophe Crombez

Online via Zoom

Gisela Müller-Brandeck-Bocquet, University of Würzburg
Pierre Haroche, Institute for Strategic Research (IRSEM, Paris)
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