Sylvie Ashford | Starting with Questions, Not Answers

I am a co-term student, and I’m finishing up my B.A. in International Relations and Arabic at Stanford, with Honors in Democracy, Development, and the Rule of Law. I’m originally from Washington, D.C, and before coming to MIP I worked as a Middle East policy research assistant and campaign field organizer. 

MIP was exactly what I hoped it would be. The program brings together fascinating people from different countries and life paths. I learned so much from them in and out of the classroom, which ended up being one of the most meaningful aspects of the program. Particularly after spending the first half of the program on Zoom, I loved every time we were able to come together as a cohort for classes and social events this year.

Being a part of this community has definitely changed how I think about the process of policymaking. What I've really come to understand is that policymaking should start with a question, not an answer, and with a rigorous effort to understand a specific social problem in its own context. After graduation, I'm moving to San Francisco to work at the Natural Resources Defense Council, and I know that keeping that perspective in mind will be a huge help to me as I’m doing policy analysis and advocacy work to support the NRDC's Climate and Clean Energy Program.

David Sprague | MIP Training, Military Service

When I first started as an MIP student, I didn’t realize how flexible the program would be or how many options there are to study in different fields. The program really emphasizes how to approach policy making through practical considerations, not just wishful thinking, whether that’s in computer programming and coding, international affairs, climate science, business, design thinking, or any of the other topics policy covers. There’s a lot of crossover with other programs on campus like the design school and the Graduate School of Business, I think this dynamic gives students a policy framework that's grounded in sound political strategies. 

It’s definitely been a busy two years. Beyond being a MIP student, I’m also an active duty officer in the U.S. army, and I have a family. I’ve been very appreciative of how I was able to work within the program to try and keep all of those different responsibilities in balance. This is the best location, hands down, to pursue a policy degree, and there are so many opportunities to get experience with things you truly value, whether that’s family, friends, researching a topic you have strong opinions about, coding, or surfing.

After graduation, I will be returning to the Army to be an operations officer, or a prime integrator, in organizations ranging from 700 to 10,000 soldiers. I know that what I’ve learned here at FSI in the master’s program — both about policy making and myself — is going to help me serve our men and women in uniform better.

Shirin Kashani | Moving Forward, but Not Away

I am graduating this June, but I’m not going far! The program helped me realize my dreams to continue my career in academia, and so I will be pursuing a PhD in political science here at Stanford.

Part of the MIP experience is the one-on-one advisor matching that the program organizes for students. I was paired with Dr. Jeremy Weinstein, and he was so genuinely helpful and keen on setting me up for success. He met with me every two weeks to help me plan and prepare to be a competitive, successful PhD candidate after MIP.

For any students coming into the program, I would strongly advise you take advantage of how flexible the program is. The four specializations — Cyber, Environment, Governance and Development, and International Security — are there to guide you, not to put you in a box. Take courses from departments in your interests and customize your electives to whatever you think will help you. Don’t be afraid to go beyond what’s expected of you in the program to explore and make the best out of your two years on the Stanford campus!

Mikk Raud | Coming Full Circle

Prior to starting this master’s program, I spent eight years studying and working in Beijing and Hong Kong, where I most recently worked for a global risk consultancy, assisting multinational companies with assessing cyber risk, threats, and regulations, as well as crisis management. One of my goals here at Stanford was to pivot away from Asia and refocus my studies in cyber security and cyber policy in the U.S.

Because it’s right in Silicon Valley and so close to the leading industries, the MIP program here at Stanford was my top choice of school, and it has not disappointed. Aside from being able to closely interact with top faculty members and professors such as Frank Fukuyama, I got to see guest speakers such as President Bill Clinton, President Barack Obama, and other high-level U.S. military officials that Stanford has brought to campus to speak to students. I’ve learned so much from classes like “INTLPOL 340: Technology, Innovation and Modern War,” taught by Steve Black and Joe Felter, and groups like the Hack Lab.

As my time at Stanford comes to an end, my academic experience and industry experience are making a full circle, and I will be going to work with the global financial technology firm where I interned over the summer. I will be working on technology and information security issues while I am in the U.S. by using the one year of optional practical training (OPT). Given the current events in Ukraine and their proximity to my native Estonia, at some point I would also like to be able to contribute my skills and experience back home.

Each of the students in the 2022 class of the Ford Dorsey Master's in International Policy has had the opportunity to practice policymaking and problem solving hands-on in the Policy Change Studio, the two-quarter capstone course of the MIP program. Each year, second-year students partner with NGOs, think tanks, and other groups around the world to get out of the classroom and into the world to bring their know-how to some of the world's most pressing issues.

To learn more about what the 2022 cohort has been working on, explore some of the capstone presentations below.

Every year, a few hundred idealistic, nerdy college students compete in the Intercollegiate Ethics Bowl. Teams representing universities across the United States are given 18 real-world issues, decide what they think about them from an ethical perspective, and then explain themselves. Issues have spanned from privacy and oppression in the Chinese Social Credit System to the moral status of rivers and aliens, the virtues of honesty in classrooms, and the ethics of fictional races like the Orcs from Lord of the Rings. It’s a friendly version of debate, rewarding the collegial and thoughtful more than the brash and eloquent.

Read the rest at the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 

On June 1, 1996, two trains arrived in Russia transporting the last nuclear warheads that had been deployed in Ukraine when the Soviet Union collapsed. That concluded the process in which Kyiv gave up what was then the world’s third-largest nuclear weapons arsenal—exceeding Britain, France, and China combined. The Ukrainian government did so in large part because of Russia’s assurances that it would respect Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity, and refrain from the use of force against Ukraine.

Twenty-six years later, Russia is more than three months into a massive invasion of Ukraine. This has understandably led Ukrainians to question the wisdom of giving up those nuclear arms, and Vladimir Putin’s war has dealt a blow to future efforts to arrest nuclear proliferation.

Read the rest at the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists

This essay originally appeared in Korean on May 20 in Sindonga (New East Asia), Korea’s oldest monthly magazine (established 1931), as the second in a monthly column, "Shin’s Reflections on Korea." Translated by Raymond Ha. A PDF version of this essay is also available to download.

To successfully chart a safe course for South Korea in its foreign relations, the Yoon Suk-Yeol government must be highly attuned to the twists and turns of today’s geopolitical undercurrents. A new international order defined by an ideological struggle between democracy and authoritarianism will leave no room for strategic ambiguity, Seoul’s hitherto strategy for balancing its relationships with the U.S. and China. Slogans such as “the United States for security and China for the economy” will be rendered obsolete. Policy visions of South Korea as a mediator for North Korea or Seoul being in the “driver’s seat” on the peninsula could become a fantasy. It is vital to consider South Korea’s economic interests with China and account for the unique characteristics of inter-Korean relations. However, South Korea should pursue a foreign policy rooted in international norms and based on values such as human rights, democracy, and sovereignty.

Russia’s War Crimes

As a responsible member of the international community, South Korea cannot remain a bystander to Russia’s imperialistic behavior. Through its own painful history, Korea knows what it means for the right to self-determination—recognized by the international community—to be trampled upon by a great power. In particular, South Korea must raise its voice in unequivocally condemning the widespread war crimes that are being committed in Ukraine.

War crimes refer to criminal acts that take place during armed conflict. This includes deliberate attacks against civilians or civilian structures such as homes and hospitals, rape and enforced prostitution, and the use of poisonous weapons, all of which constitute serious violations of human dignity. The horrific atrocities committed by the Russian military across Ukraine since its invasion on February 24 are profoundly disturbing. It has committed mass murder against civilians in Bucha, Borodyanka, Motyzhyn, and other locations; it has shelled humanitarian corridors intended to provide safe passage for refugees; and it has launched airstrikes against maternity hospitals and schools, taking the lives of Ukrainian children. The world has been taken aback by the unthinkable brutality of Russia’s military forces.

On April 7, U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken said “more and more credible reports of rape, killings, torture are emerging” every day.[2] He implied that the true scale of Russia’s atrocities may be much larger than currently understood.

This is certainly not the first time that the world has seen war crimes. After World War II, there were war crimes in Vietnam, Cambodia, the former Yugoslavia, Syria, and Myanmar. However, the brutality inflicted by Russian forces in Ukraine is incomparable in its severity and intensity. Unlike war crimes committed during a civil war, Russia has committed crimes against the citizens of another sovereign state. In an April interview with The Times, former White House advisor Fiona Hill noted that Putin “has switched from trying to capture the country to ‘annihilation.’”[3] President Biden has also labeled the Russian military’s actions as “genocide.”

It is not yet possible to determine whether Russia truly has genocidal aims against the Ukrainian people, but there are growing calls in the international community to bring Putin to justice for war crimes. The most direct way to achieve this would be for him to stand trial at the International Criminal Court (ICC). In March, the ICC announced that it had begun its investigation into alleged war crimes committed by the Russian military. However, Russia formally withdrew from the ICC in 2016. The ICC does not have the authority to act on its own, and it requires the cooperation of relevant states to arrest suspected war criminals. It seems highly unlikely that Putin will ever face trial at The Hague. Because the ICC does not hold trials in absentia, a trial cannot proceed unless Putin is arrested within Russian territory. After the wars in the former Yugoslavia, former President Slobodan Milošević stood trial before an international criminal tribunal on charges of genocide and war crimes. Unlike in the case of Milošević, prosecuting Putin does not appear to be a feasible option at this time. Even so, South Korea must actively join the international community in sanctioning Russia for its actions in Ukraine.

The Threat of Sharp Power

It is especially troubling to note that Russia’s invasion of Ukraine is taking place in the midst of a worldwide democratic recession. According to Freedom House’s latest annual report, for the past 16 years, more countries experienced a decline in freedom than countries that saw a growth in freedom.[4] The Third Wave of democratization, which began in the 1970s, has now given way to the “Third Reversal.”

There has been an authoritarian shift during the COVID-19 pandemic, in which governments claimed a public health rationale to infringe upon individual freedoms or delay elections. In Hungary, one of the most prominent examples of democratic decline in recent years, Prime Minister Viktor Orbán achieved a landslide victory in the April 3 parliamentary elections to secure a fifth term in office.

In particular, there are growing concerns about the consequences of “sharp power,” which China and Russia have deployed across the world. Unlike traditional “hard power” (military and economic) or “soft power” (cultural), sharp power refers to the use of covert means to exercise influence. Dark money, economic leverage, and intelligence operatives are used to coerce a target state into complying with particular demands. Authoritarian regimes have engaged in information and ideological warfare as part of this effort.

Larry Diamond, a professor at Stanford University and a renowned scholar of democracy, warns in his book Ill Winds that the future of democracy will be bleak if liberal democracies, including the United States, do not defend against China and Russia’s sharp power. In 2016, the Russian government interfered in the U.S. presidential election in a blatant display of its sharp power. If fascism from Germany on the right and Bolshevism from the Soviet Union on the left threatened to destroy the international order in the 20th century, it is now China and Russia’s sharp power that poses the most serious danger to democracies across the world. It is in this context that Russia launched its invasion of Ukraine.

The End of Globalization

Russia’s invasion may have sounded the death knell for globalization. Joining a growing chorus of observers, David Brooks declared in his New York Times column on April 8 that “globalization is over.”[5] After the end of the Cold War, it seemed that the United States would usher in a new era of globalization, with the whole world coming together as one. During the presidency of Kim Young-Sam (1993–98), South Korea also joined this rising tide by pursuing a policy of globalization. A seemingly unstoppable wave of neoliberal globalization swept across the entire world in the late 20th and early 21st centuries. While the September 11 attacks were truly devastating and were later followed by the Iraq War, these events did not fundamentally alter the international order.

Today, we face a much greater challenge. Democracy is in retreat across the world, and barriers to trade are on the rise. Anti-immigration sentiments are widespread across the West, including in the United States. Brexit and the rise of Trumpism embody these global trends. Moreover, the pandemic has disrupted global supply chains. Cross-border exchanges are being slowed by rising trade barriers, and many countries are suffering from high inflation as prices skyrocket. The South Korean economy, which relies heavily on international trade, is being pummeled by these economic shocks. If countries take steps to reduce their dependence on other countries, then globalization gradually unravels.

Populist leaders have seized this moment, marching under the banner of chauvinistic nationalism. Twenty-first-century populist leaders are defined by two traits: anti-elitism and anti-pluralism. By challenging the West and opposing a pluralistic world, China and Russia have emerged as “populist” powers on a global scale. Just as the Korean War marked the beginning of the Cold War in earnest, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine may prove to be the first test of resolve for democracies in their struggle against authoritarianism.

The powerful sanctions enacted by the United States and the European Union against Russia underscore this sense of urgency. With the UN Security Council in paralysis, Washington coordinated with Brussels to impose a series of sanctions against Moscow. Only two days into the invasion, Russia’s Central Bank was removed from SWIFT. These “shock and awe” sanctions, which President Biden called the most powerful and wide-ranging sanctions ever imposed in history, were rolled out with the speed and precision of a sophisticated military operation. The ruble tanked as over $1 trillion of Russian assets were frozen. The 11th-largest economy in the world was pushed to the edge of a sovereign default. More than 300 global companies, including Apple, Google, ExxonMobil, and Mcdonald's, have shuttered their operations in Russia. During a recent conversation, a senior Google executive told me in no uncertain terms that “it will be difficult to return to Russia, even after the end of the war.”

The international community’s support, as well as the devastating sanctions imposed against Russia, have shored up Ukrainian morale as its people rally around President Zelensky. International public opinion is firmly behind Kyiv as more and more people around the world seek to help Ukrainians in their struggle against the Russian dictator.

The Rebirth of Sinocentrism?

The crisis in Ukraine has had a decisive impact on U.S. foreign policy. The Biden administration’s flagship Indo-Pacific Strategy is centered on working with its partners in the Quad—Japan, Australia, and India—to check the rise of China. Until early this year, the prevailing concern in the United States had been the possibility that China would launch an invasion of Taiwan. Biden’s decision to withdraw from Afghanistan, in the face of heavy criticism from home and abroad, was motivated by a need to focus on the Indo-Pacific Strategy. While Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has vigorously revived the transatlantic relationship, the United States now has to contend with both Russia and China at once. India’s reluctance to fully participate in sanctions against Russia, despite its key role in the Quad, is also cause for concern in Washington.

While Putin envisions the re-establishment of the Soviet Empire, Xi dreams of a rebirth of Sinocentrism. Having forcibly imposed its will on Hong Kong, there are growing concerns that China could use military force to bring Taiwan under its thumb. Beijing’s ambitious Belt and Road Initiative evidently seeks to go beyond economic cooperation and form a new China-led bloc built on economic assistance. In addition to bilateral trade disputes, decoupling between the United States and China in the high-technology sector is accelerating. The Biden administration is taking steps to bolster economic security, with the so-called Indo-Pacific Economic Framework (IPEF) as its strategic centerpiece.[6]

While China is currently pursuing a relatively loose form of cooperation with Russia, Putin and Xi, both populist leaders on the global stage, could join forces in earnest to upend the international order. At the same time, Prime Minister Modi of India, another populist leader, is taking an ambiguous stance. He has kept his distance from Washington and Brussels in terms of imposing sanctions against Russia, and he has stepped in to expand India’s imports of cheaper Russian oil.[7]

Since Russia’s invasion, there has been a sense of crisis among European capitals about the dangers of excessive energy dependence on Moscow. There is also growing apprehension about a national security crisis emanating from China. Although Europe and China have clashed in recent years over the repression of Uyghurs in Xinjiang and bans on Chinese technology, there was an underlying consensus about maintaining friendly economic relations. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has significantly altered Europe’s calculus, however. In Germany and elsewhere, there are deepening fears that maintaining close economic ties with China, which remains friendly toward Russia, could become a critical weakness for Europe. Michael McFaul, a colleague at Stanford and a former U.S. ambassador to Russia, has stressed that the outcome of the war will have lasting implications for the future of the liberal international order. In other words, a Russian victory will further entice China to invade Taiwan, with profound global consequences.

South Korea cannot afford to remain an idle spectator to the conflict in Ukraine. There could be serious repercussions for Seoul, much sooner than expected. At a moment when the international order could rapidly change, it would be highly imprudent to sit on the sidelines or take a position of strategic ambiguity. Over the past five years, the Moon Jae-In administration adopted an ambiguous stance in its foreign policy, with a disproportionate focus on North Korea. The end result was diplomatic isolation. Moreover, Russia’s invasion reminds us once again of the importance of values and norms in international politics. The right to self-determination—the right of citizens of a given state to determine their own destiny—is a basic principle of the international community, enshrined in Article 1 of the UN Charter.

The Need for a Consensus on “Core Interests”

The once-popular paradigm of an-mi-gyeong-joong (“the United States for security, China for the economy”) is now obsolete. It is time for South Korea to seriously consider a foreign policy based on common values. While accounting for economic interests, it is critical to formulate a consensus on its “core interests”—that is, on fundamental political values. The rising tide of anti-China sentiment among South Korea’s youth is rooted in their rejection of China’s illiberal, authoritarian modus operandi.[8] They want to stand side-by-side with fellow liberal democracies, in opposition to authoritarian powers. This is part of a global trend. According to a 2021 poll of 17 advanced economies by the Pew Research Center, unfavorable views of China were near “historic highs.” 88% of respondents in Japan, 80% in Sweden, 78% in Australia, 76% in the United States, 63% in the United Kingdom, and 71% in Germany held unfavorable views of China. 77% of respondents in South Korea indicated the same—the highest ever recorded by Pew for Korea.[9]

In its policy toward North Korea, Seoul should avoid overemphasizing the “special” nature of inter-Korean relations on the basis of belonging to the same ethnic nation. It should also abandon the illusion that it can act as a mediator between Pyongyang and Washington. Seoul’s North Korea policy should be cognizant of the larger context of today’s international politics, which is defined by competition between authoritarian regimes (Russia, China, North Korea) and liberal democracies (United States, European Union, South Korea). As transatlantic cooperation on security issues intensifies, South Korea should also strengthen its ties with Europe. It was thus timely for Yoon Suk-Yeol, while he was president-elect, to send special envoys to the United States, Japan, and the European Union. The U.S.-South Korea alliance should also serve as a basis for Seoul to broadly solidify its relations with fellow democracies across the world.

This does not imply that South Korea must proclaim an “anti-China” policy stance. It is also unnecessary to needlessly provoke North Korea. Nonetheless, South Korea should clearly declare to the world its resolve to honor and defend universal values, including democracy, human rights, sovereignty, and core international norms. It will face difficult decisions in its relations with Beijing, especially due to economic considerations, and it will be impossible to treat North Korea just like any other country. As will be the case with every other democracy, South Korea will have to confront vexing challenges as it seeks to pursue its interests while upholding its values.

Since 1945, South Korea has been the largest beneficiary of the post-WWII liberal international order. It is time for South Korea to defend democratic norms and help uphold the rule-based international order. There is no free ride. As the tenth-largest economy in the world, South Korea’s economic heft alone entails certain responsibilities. If democracy is defeated by authoritarianism, there will be no future for South Korea. Intellectuals and policymakers in the United States are keeping a close eye on how South Korea responds to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. They are hoping that Seoul will join hands with its fellow democracies in their arduous struggle against authoritarian powers.

The Lessons of Korea’s History

Watching Russia’s invasion of Ukraine brings to mind the painful and bitter history of Korea’s recent past, which was marked by the First Sino-Japanese War (1894–95), the Russo-Japanese War (1904–05), and the Korean War (1950–53). South Korea did not succumb to adversity, however. It overcame formidable obstacles to become the economic and cultural powerhouse that it is today. As a result of its failure to appropriately respond to trends in international politics in the late 19th century, Korea lost its sovereignty. Amidst the chaos of division in 1945, the foundations for South Korea’s remarkable development were laid when it aligned with the United States instead of the Soviet Union. In 1991, at the end of the Cold War, South Korea pursued peace on the Korean Peninsula through its “Northern Policy,” also known as Nordpolitik.[10] It is especially interesting to note that at key junctures in the history of the modern international order, conservative leaders (Syngman Rhee in 1945 and Roh Tae-Woo in the 1990s) played a decisive role in steering South Korea in the right direction.

Faced with the relentless march of imperialism across the world, Korea’s leaders and intellectuals in the late 19th century responded in one of three ways. The first group advocated for Western-oriented reform, calling for the adoption of Western institutions and practices to achieve modernization. Seo Jae-Pil and Syngman Rhee were prominent figures in this camp. Second, there were those who called for Asian solidarity. Under this view, Korea would join hands with China and Japan to resist Western imperialism. An Jung-Geun’s vision of “Peace in East Asia” is a famous example. Lastly, some responded with a focus on Korean nationalism. Sin Chae-Ho and Park Eun-Sik made significant contributions to this strain of thought.

In the end, Korea was unable to coalesce around a unifying vision for the country. The Joseon Dynasty failed to achieve modernizing reforms, and Korea became a colony of Japan. Seo Jae-Pil and Syngman Rhee left for the United States. Furious at Japan’s betrayal, An Jung-Geun assassinated Itō Hirobumi, a leading advocate of Asian solidarity, at Harbin in October 1909. Korean nationalism evolved in controversial directions under colonial rule, as reflected by Yi Kwang-Su’s theory of national reconstruction.[11] Sin Chae-Ho, who wrote influential works of nationalist historiography, eventually turned to anarchism in his later years. This is the tragic portrait of a country, and of national leaders, who failed to gauge and adjust to shifting geopolitical winds.

With Japan’s defeat in 1945, the Korean Peninsula was once again thrown into a political vortex. Liberated from colonial rule, Korea was divided due to the strategic calculations of great powers. There was a tremendous loss of life not only during the Korean War, but also in the political instability that followed liberation. As the Cold War order began to take shape, North Korea stood with the Soviet Union. Fortunately, South Korea sided with the free world. Syngman Rhee played a critical role in this regard. Rhee was not well acquainted with Korea’s domestic politics, but he was perhaps the most perceptive Korean leader when it came to international politics. It is terrifying to imagine what may have transpired if South Korea had joined the communist bloc. Although Rhee’s legacy has been stained by his authoritarian rule, it is important to acknowledge his prescience in international affairs.

Storms on Both Fronts

As the Cold War order collapsed in the 1990s, South Korea once again stood at a geopolitical crossroads. The Berlin Wall unexpectedly fell in 1989, and the Soviet Union was dissolved in 1991. Amidst this sea change in international affairs, the Roh Tae-Woo administration seized a historic opportunity. South Korea established diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union in 1990, entered the United Nations at the same time as North Korea in 1991, and normalized ties with the People’s Republic of China in 1992. By pursuing this audacious “Northern Policy” in the face of staunch opposition from some conservatives, the Roh Tae-Woo administration laid the foundations for sustainable development and peace on the Korean Peninsula. Perhaps the present moment, in which China and Russia are disrupting the international order, calls for a new Northern Policy that redefines Seoul’s relationship with Moscow and Beijing. The core of this new Northern Policy, of course, must be rooted in solidarity with fellow democracies against authoritarianism.

It is difficult to anticipate how the geopolitical storm set off by Russia’s invasion of Ukraine may develop. For the time being, it appears quite likely that this storm will grow into a major typhoon instead of fizzling out, but it is hard to tell how powerful it will be or what direction it will take. What is certain is that the international order will not be the same, and this change will have significant repercussions for South Korea.

In fact, South Korea may already be at the center of this storm. There is momentary calm in the eye of a typhoon, but the full force of its impact will be felt in due course. When South Koreans finally experience the damage from this storm in a few years, it may be too late.

The Yoon administration has barely sailed out of the harbor, but it is already being battered on two fronts. As noted in last month’s essay, which focused on domestic issues, South Korea’s democracy is heading into troubled waters. This essay has examined an external shock: the geopolitical storm raging across the world since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Both present formidable challenges for South Korea.

History unfolds in mysterious ways. Just as in 1945 and 1991, a conservative leader is once again in the wheelhouse as South Korea heads into a geopolitical storm. The Yoon Suk-Yeol administration must keep its eyes wide open and firmly grasp the helm as it navigates these troubled waters. Syngman Rhee and Roh Tae-Woo turned geopolitical crises into opportunities for South Korea. I sincerely hope that Yoon Suk-Yeol will also be able to chart a safe course for South Korea through the coming storm

“It’s a great honor, for the second time, to have a chance to address your community, the community of Stanford University, to students, to professors, to all the Americans who feel support, who are feeling nervous because of our fight for freedom,” Zelenskyy said, speaking through an interpreter. “I’m grateful for your interest and for so many sincere good viewpoints and expressions that I can see.”

While much has changed since September, much has remained the same, Zelenskyy said. “Ukraine is the country where everything is possible … Ukraine is the country who destroyed the myth about the enormous capabilities of the Russian forces.”

During his speech, the Ukrainian president drew a parallel between the deadly mass shooting this week in Uvalde, Texas, where an 18-year-old gunman fatally shot 19 schoolchildren and two adults, and the incomprehensible violence inflicted by 18-year-old Russian troops in Ukraine.

“We are living in terrible times when American people express their condolences because of the death of [Ukrainians] at war and we express our condolences because of death” during peacetime in America, he said. “Accept my condolences, please.”

'We Remain Free'

Zelenskyy was introduced by Michael McFaul, director of FSI and former U.S. ambassador to Russia. McFaul thanked Zelenskyy for honoring the Stanford community with his presence and said that Stanford has a long history of engagement with Ukraine, including more than 200 Ukrainians participating in various training programs mostly run through FSI. He noted that many Stanford alumni now work for Zelenskyy.

“I want to thank you, your warriors, and all Ukrainians for leading the fight for democracy, freedom, and sovereignty, and against tyranny, repression, and imperialism, not only in Ukraine but for the entire free world in the fight between democracy and dictatorship, colonialism and independence, and good and evil,” McFaul said. “No nation in the world is sacrificing more than Ukrainians. … In these dark times in Ukraine, around the world, and even here, yes, in my own country, we need heroes. You are a hero, Mr. President, not just for Ukraine, not just for Europe, but for the entire world.”
 

Several audience members brought Ukrainian flags or wore outfits of bright blue and yellow – the country’s national colors. Gazing out across the audience, Zelenskyy noted people were not wearing armored vests or helmets, nor were they cowering in bomb shelters or wounded by enemy shelling. “Unfortunately, this is not the case for Ukraine,” he said.

Answering the question he first posed to the Stanford audience, Zelenskyy said that what matters most for him is to give his country everything necessary to defend its freedom, such as “the weapons that can help us overcome the might of the Russian army, the sanctions that will stop the flow of money used for the Russian terror finance,” war tribunals, and more.

Zelenskyy said he was inspired after visiting Stanford last September as he considered what the U.S. and Ukraine could accomplish together.

“I believe that many of you will indeed visit Ukraine, help Ukraine in the reconstruction after the war, because this is the biggest project for freedom, and your generation will take its crucial part in it,” Zelenskyy said. “Our citizens’ towns are devastated, our seas are blocked, but we remain free.”

'See the Truth'

More than two dozen people stood in line to ask Zelenskyy a question during the event, oftentimes addressing the Ukrainian president in his own language. Zelenskyy’s responses were often lighthearted, prompting laughter from the energetic early morning crowd. He jokingly told one student that she looked Ukrainian – though she was German – and said she should thank her parents for that. He teased another student for speaking about his youth in the past tense.

Other times, the back-and-forth between Zelenskyy and the audience was more somber. First-year MBA student Olga Chyumanskaya said she is “a young Russian person who shares democratic values [of] freedom, and would like to see my home country develop in a different direction.” The Russian community abroad is working to support Russian independent journalism and Ukrainian refugees, she said, but every day, she asks herself if she did enough. On Friday, she asked Zelenskyy what more she should do.

Zelenskyy told Chyumanskaya that she and other Russians could help pierce the state-sponsored bubble of disinformation that envelops their home country. “You see the truth,” he said. “You get the knowledge in the United States. You can demonstrate to the world which is bigger than Russia, which is bigger than Ukraine, [or] any country, for that matter. The world is big. And we have to remove the frontiers, open the borders, and bring the truth in with our knowledge, with conviction, so much with persuasion.”

School of Medicine student Solomiia Savchuk and computer sciences graduate student Zoe Von Gerlach are co-founders of TeleHelp Ukraine, a telehealth resource initiated by Stanford students to connect Ukrainians in need of medical assistance to U.S.- and Ukraine-based physicians. On Friday, they asked Zelenskyy about how Stanford students can further assist, as well as why activism abroad is important.

Zelenskyy said there’s a need not only for blood and oxygen but also for psychological rehabilitative support now and after the war, in which telehealth resources could greatly help. He encouraged the students to contact McFaul to discuss ways they might connect with Ukraine’s Ministry of Health. He added that students’ activism is “extremely important” in reminding world leaders of the need to support Ukraine, as this war “recognizes no distances.”

In closing the event, Zelenskyy reminded the audience that around the world, some are studying at universities while others are drafted into war and won’t live to write a college thesis.

“That is a terrible story. That’s why I would like to wish to all the students, I would like to wish you a long and interesting life in what you’re doing – in science, in journalism, in art, in whatever [you do],” he said. “I would sincerely like to wish you peace.”

A Ukrainian-language transcript of President Zelenskyy's prepared remarks at Stanford is also available.

When David Relman learned in April that he was elected to the American Academy of Arts and Sciences, he was humbled – and a bit surprised. 

Relman is a senior fellow at the Center for International Security and Cooperation and the Thomas C. and Joan M. Merigan Professor and a professor of medicine and of microbiology & immunology. AAA&S honors exceptional scholars, leaders, artists, and innovators engaged in advancing the public good. 

When he received notification, Relman went to the organization’s web site to check on the discipline area and specialty with which he was affiliated. 

“I looked at the areas and specialties that pertained to my background and expertise (medical sciences, microbiology and immunology, other aspects of the biological sciences), but I could not find my name,” he said. “I thought that maybe the notification was in error.” Then he looked more closely at AAA&S’s letter, and found that his nominators had proposed the “public affairs and public policy section.” 

Arguably that distinction truly reflects Relman’s wide-ranging and serious policy impact in biosecurity, as well as his groundbreaking career work on the nature of the human indigenous microbiota (microbiome). AAA&S’ section of 220 policy luminaries includes former President Barack Obama, former Secretary of Labor Robert Reich, and former Secretary of State Madeleine Albright. Indeed, Relman’s extensive knowledge in microbiology and immunology has played key roles on several critical U.S. and international policy fronts – most recently, the pandemic. 

 Boundless curiosity 

“When you consider the history of the academy and its origins in 1780 during the American Revolution by John Adams and John Hancock, it’s really quite awe-inspiring. You’re joining those who follow in that history,” said Relman, who received an S.B. (Biology) from MIT, M.D. from Harvard Medical School, and joined the faculty at Stanford in 1994. 

Relman’s scholarship is characterized by boundless curiosity – he asks the deeper questions about the pandemic, about human-microbial relationships – both beneficial and harmful, and what they portend for humanity and the future of life on Earth. With grace and diligence, he’s explored the assembly, diversity, stability, and resilience of human microbial communities, while collaborating with other scholars and policy makers on issues paramount to humanity. 

“When I step back and think about the pandemic, it’s clear that it is about much more than just the virus, but also about the social, political, and environmental factors that contribute to the emergence and impact of such pathogens,” said Relman, currently director of a Biosecurity and Global Health initiative at FSI. 

Why do pandemics and more localized outbreaks arise, and how do they uniquely manifest themselves, he ponders. 

“What are the factors that underlie these events, and can we anticipate them better? We much consider three categories of factors: One, is the microbes themselves – and microbes evolve and find ways to do new things. The second category is the hosts – humans, plants, and animals. And humans are undertaking new activities as individuals and as populations that tend to make us more vulnerable, such as immune suppressing ourselves to treat cancer and autoimmune disorders and crowding ourselves into megacities. The third is environmental, and that relates to climate change, and our changing use of land, such as deforestation, intrusion into previously isolated habitats, and other factors,” Relman said. 

Intrusion into new habitats, making contact with animal hosts such as bats that harbor potential disease-causing microbes and viruses, and then bringing these potential pathogens into a lab where we manipulate and alter these agents can lead to human error and accidents, not without grave consequence. “The choices we make in an effort to understand the world around us all come with risk,” he said. 

As far as the microbes and viruses go, “transmissibility is the key,” Relman said. The COVID pandemic reinforced this view for him. 

“When you see what happens when a virus can travel around the globe so quickly, transmissibility has to be viewed as the critical attribute. Viruses evolve and can outrun anything that we might throw in their way, even when we’re already prepared. So, we have to be agile, quick, and shrewd, and we desperately need a far better public health system across the globe that can respond and implement needed measures much more quickly.” 

It’s not just drugs and vaccines and science when it comes to tackling a pandemic. “It’s the social factors, the political factors, and the willingness of humans to work together, and trust, respect and believing in each other. We’ve learned the hard way that this is a tall order. Sometimes we really don’t work together very well,” he said. 

Long-view perspectives 

Relman quotes Joshua Lederberg, a Nobel Prize-winning geneticist and Stanford professor on this age-old war between humanity and viruses: 

“The future of humanity and microbes likely will unfold as episodes of a suspense thriller that could be titled, ‘Our Wits Versus Their Genes,’” Lederberg wrote in an essay, “Infectious History,” in 2000. 

That perspective inspires Relman, who considers this suspense thriller with open eyes and an open mind – digging deeply into complex scientific challenges while understanding long-view perspectives. 

“If you step back in time and consider the history of this planet,” he said, “realize the Earth is about 4.6 billion years old. The earliest life forms we know of were microscopic organisms (microbes) that left signs of their presence in rocks at least 3.7 billion years ago. They have had literally billions of years to diversify, adapt, and secure niches – including on and in animals.” 

On the other hand, modern humans (homo sapiens) have been around for only 200,000 years. “So, we’ve basically been here for the last 3 or 4 seconds of a 24-hour period that started with the formation of Earth. Compare this to microbial life, which has been here for more than 19 hours of this 24-hour period, and will be continue to persist and evolve on this planet for far longer than humanity,” Relman said. 

Relman contemplates and studies the intricacies of the human-microbe relationship, and delves into the issue of how do “favorable” relationships become established, whose interests do they serve, and how can they be supported or restored? 

“This is fundamental to my laboratory work. And why do those relationships sometimes go off the rails? What causes an unusual turn of events such as pandemics? And in what ways and for what reasons do humans mess with these storylines and relationships with these microbes? Those are the puzzles and mysteries that intrigue me,” he said. 

Health equity is a major concern for Relman. Pandemics and public health crises invariably result in harsher consequences for underserved populations than more privileged ones. Many of these communities lack ready access to vaccines, treatments and safeguards, and suffer more disproportionate economic and social turmoil. This is true regardless of how a pandemic arises, including and especially those that might arise because of irresponsible or deliberately malevolent human activities. 

“Subsequent generations are going to be looking at how we’ve handled this pandemic across society, especially for the underserved,” Relman said. “We need to, and can do, much better on this front.” 

Relman was a long-time volunteer for the Rock Medicine program organized by the Haight Ashbury Free Clinics, a free health care service provider serving more than 34,000 people who need access to quality medical care. He served as the chief medical officer for the program for more than a decade. In the 1990s he was featured on MTV for his work providing free medical care at concerts through the program. “Don’t get me started on the dangers of mosh pits,” he once said. 

Scientific truth-telling 

A pioneer in his field, Relman’s research paper on bacillary angiomatosis and a method for the discovery of new pathogens was selected as “one of the 50 most important publications of the 

past century” by the American Society for Microbiology. In other research, ecological theory and predictions are tested in clinical studies with multiple approaches for characterizing the human microbiome. His work has led to the development of molecular methods for identifying novel microbial pathogens, and the subsequent identification of several historically important microbial disease agents. He was one of the first to characterize microbial diversity in the human body using modern molecular methods. Relman is also the Chief of Infectious Diseases at the Veterans Affairs Palo Alto Health Care System in Palo Alto, California, and served as science co-director at CISAC from 2013-2017. 

During the pandemic, scientific knowledge has been expressed in many ways – but political polarization in the U.S. has sometimes worked against crafting sound policy. 

Relman said, “All good scientists know what they’re good at. You need to be very mindful about what you know and what you don’t know. While people are pretty quick to say what they know, they’re not terribly quick to admit what they don’t know. This goes to the issue of ‘lanes’ and the roles of scientists in policy formulation.” 

Many scientists, he added, may think that scientific information alone determines the ultimate public policy. “But it’s only a piece of it. Lots of other factors go into policy, such as social, cultural, political, and economic considerations,” he said. 

National security policy 

Relman served as vice-chair of the National Academy of Sciences Committee that reviewed the science performed as part of the FBI investigation of the 2001 “Anthrax Letters.” He’s also been a member of the National Science Advisory Board on Biosecurity, and was president of the Infectious Diseases Society of America. He is currently a member of the Intelligence Community Studies Board and the Committee on Emerging Infectious Diseases and 21st Century Health Threats, both at the National Academies of Science, as well as the Science and Security Board of the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists and the Defense Science Board at the Pentagon. He received an NIH Pioneer Award, an NIH Transformative Research Award, and was elected a member of the National Academy of Medicine in 2011. 

He also chaired and led the work on the National Academies of Science 2020 report on “Havana syndrome,” cases of unexplained health disorders – aka, “anomalous health incidents” – among U.S. government personnel and their families at overseas embassies. Their findings pointed to a “plausible role of directed, pulsed radiofrequency energy,” though “no hypothesis has been proven, and the circumstances remain unclear.” 

Relman said, “I think that we’re going to be facing challenges like this one, that is, complex poorly-explained health problems at the interface of emerging science and national security, more frequently, and that’s what I’ve told our national leadership.” In the report, the scientists wrote, “We as a nation need to address these specific cases as well as the possibility of future cases with a concerted, coordinated, and comprehensive approach.” 

Megan Palmer, the executive director of the Bio Policy & Leadership Initiatives and Relman’s longtime colleague, said, “David is an exceptional scientist, mentor, colleague and friend. He is deeply thoughtful, especially about the role of science and scientists in society, and he is committed to work with integrity for the service of others. He is compelled to tackle the most difficult problems with great care, and he inspires others to follow suit. I am so grateful for his mentorship; he believes in and brings out the best in people.” 

This interview with Scot Marciel was originally published by The Irrawaddy. Marciel, who served as U.S. ambassador to Myanmar from March 2016 through May 2020, is a visiting practitioner fellow on Southeast Asia at APARC. His forthcoming book, Imperfect Partners: The United States and Southeast Asia, which interprets the region and its relations with the United States historically and at present, will be published by APARC later this year.

Since it seized power in February 2021, Myanmar’s military regime has ignored international calls to end its use of violence, release political prisoners and negotiate with its opponents. Some Western nations have applied sanctions, while powerful neighbors India and China have largely sought to protect their own interests. Regional bloc ASEAN has been split, with some members seeking to engage the junta and others calling for contact with the shadow National Unity Government. The Irrawaddy spoke to Scot Marciel, former United States ambassador to Myanmar (2016-20) and currently a Visiting Scholar at Stanford University’s Walter Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center, about the current state of regional and international efforts to tackle the Myanmar crisis.

The Irrawaddy: There have been many tragic stories in Myanmar since the coup. It is not enough to just pressure the regime to change its behavior or to make concessions. Can you talk about how the international community and regional groupings such as the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) should assist the Myanmar people?

Marciel: I would offer two thoughts. First, I don’t think you can expect ASEAN to solve this problem, certainly not by itself. The ASEAN Five-Point Consensus, while it’s done with very good intentions, not only are the points not being implemented, they are actually not appropriate for the situation in Myanmar in my view. So it is a mistake to dwell on the Five-Point Consensus. I don’t really blame ASEAN too much for that because the junta is refusing to be reasonable at all and make any kind of concessions. Second, as Malaysia’s foreign minister has suggested publicly, more engagement with the National Unity Government (NUG) and other figures opposed to the junta is really important. I am pleased to see that [US] Deputy Secretary of State Wendy Sherman met with Zin Mar Aung [the NUG foreign minister, on Aug. 12] in Washington. I think there needs to be more engagement with the NUG and other actors, recognizing that trying to convince the generals to hold talks with those who oppose them is not really a very useful way of going about things.

The Irrawaddy: Do you think the NUG is the best option, aside from Ethnic Armed Organizations (EAOs) and other stakeholders, in terms of whom the US and ASEAN should be engaging with?

Marciel: I know some people have not been fully satisfied with the NUG. I understand that, but it’s certainly one important factor that has a lot more legitimacy than the junta for sure. I think it is useful to engage with the NUG, but also with actors who are seeking to return the country to a democratic and peaceful path.

The Irrawaddy: When we talk about ASEAN there are some criticisms because so far the Five-Point Consensus as you said is going nowhere, but people keep talking about it. We, ourselves, have become the hostages of the consensus. Beyond ASEAN, there has also been some criticism that the US and other Western countries are outsourcing the Myanmar crisis to ASEAN. We know that ASEAN is toothless and powerless, and so far has achieved little on Myanmar. Why has the West outsourced the problem to ASEAN?

Marciel: To be fair, at least for the United States, I don’t think the United States is necessarily expecting ASEAN by itself to solve the problem. The truth is I don’t know any outside player that can solve the problem. ASEAN can help. This goes back to, among other things, the Five-Point Consensus. It’s not just that the points aren’t being implemented, they really aren’t appropriate for the situation. A ceasefire… OK If the military stops all violence and allows peaceful protests, that would be useful. But does anyone really think that is going to happen? Second, dialogue, my sense is, again I can’t speak for the Myanmar people, but it seems people aren’t interested in negotiating and compromising with the military junta. They want them out of power. And I think the international community should be supporting those efforts, rather than proposing and calling for some kind of dialogue that is completely unrealistic, at least at this time.

The Irrawaddy: In the past, the US has played a major role in promoting democracy, freedom and federal union in Myanmar. You know in 2008-09, we had Kurt Campbell, one of the key architects of the pivot to Asia and of course specific Myanmar policies of principled engagement, and the carrot-and-stick approach, where sanctions were imposed but also with the incentive that if reforms took place, the sanctions would be eased. There was very consistent and intense communication with the-then regime and the opposition in Myanmar. Do you think that, in coordination with ASEAN, the US can work on Myanmar issues with the same vigor and energy as it did in the late 2000s?

Marciel: It’s a good question. It’s very clear that the US and the Biden administration remain very supportive of efforts to help the country go back to democracy and peace and federal union. But my sense is that it’s hard to figure out what they can actually do to make that happen. There’s not a lot of easy choices, whether it’s the United States or ASEAN, because the generals do not seem interested in doing anything positive, they are just holding onto power. We’ve seen what they are willing to do to their own people for the sake of holding power. And it narrows the space for diplomacy, certainly. I would have a very hard time if I were still in the government saying we should engage with the junta and try to create incentives for them because I think there is no chance, absent them feeling much more pressure, that they are willing to seriously consider changing their approach.

The Irrawaddy: Do you think there should be more sanctions, more pressure, including maybe an arms embargo? What about ASEAN and other countries like China, Thailand, and India?

Marciel: There is no great option right now. I don’t believe there is, at this point at least, any opportunity for dialogue that will return the country to a democratic path or democratic federalism. I don’t think the military can restore stability and govern the country effectively. So the best possible scenario is for the military to face so much pressure, that they then begin to look for a way out. So yes, I think maximum pressure, both internally and externally, on the military whether it’s by sanctions or other means is the best chance of achieving progress, though it won’t be easy.

The Irrawaddy: We have a powerful neighbor, China, which shares a long border with Myanmar. We also have our neighbor Thailand, which is absorbing refugees, migrant workers, and asylum seekers. Because of the crisis, they are also sharing the burden. Obviously, China is always supportive of those in power, whether it is the regime or a democratic government. If China and Thailand don’t make any moves, don’t apply any external pressure, it is hard to see any policy of maximizing pressure on the regime working. Do you agree?

Marciel: I agree that there are limits in terms of external pressure. That’s why there is no easy answer. It seems that China is willing to support the junta even though nearly the entire population of Myanmar opposes that. I don’t think that is likely to change. On Thailand, I hope that the Thai authorities will see that the longer the military is in power, the more problems there are going to be across the border, including refugees and instability. And the Thais, I think, will have an interest in pressing in their own way, pressing the military to look for a way out, because otherwise this crisis is going to continue and Thailand’s going to suffer from some of these cross-border challenges, including very serious humanitarian issues.

The Irrawaddy: We have heard that the regime is not happy with the idea of—the wording is quite sensitive—a humanitarian corridor. But Thailand will have to play a key role if cross-border assistance and humanitarian assistance are to reach a large number of Myanmar people. What are your thoughts on that, as the US has made at least four high-ranking official visits to Thailand since the coup? Should the Biden administration engage and cooperate with the Thai government to provide assistance?

Marciel: There is a lot of discussion between the US and Thai officials on this. I don’t know the substance of those discussions. I am not sure what exactly has been said. But to me the United States and Thailand, even if we may have somewhat different views on the coup and the junta, we should try to find a way to work together at a minimum to address the serious humanitarian need right along the Thai border and just across the border. You know it is not easy for Thailand as a neighbor of Myanmar having to deal with the junta. But I think there are ways that this could be done carefully and I assume that these discussions are happening between the United States and Thailand. I hope that they lead to greater and more successful efforts to get humanitarian assistance to the border and across the border on behalf of Myanmar people.

The Irrawaddy: Not only Thailand but, since 1988, the US has also been one of the more generous countries in taking Myanmar refugees and asylum seekers from the Thailand-Myanmar border. This time, again, we see the educated people, the middle class, technicians, professionals, artists, media, and IT people leaving Myanmar. It is a brain drain for Myanmar, but a brain gain for the countries they go to. Do you agree that those people are hugely beneficial to those societies?

Marciel: Yes, I agree. I think, the US processing of…I hate to sound bureaucratic, but you know working to welcome refugees is not a fast process, because there are so many refugees around the world who are seeking asylum in the United States and other places. The US does, as you said, have a long record of accepting and welcoming refugees from Burma/Myanmar. I expect that will continue. I mean, it serves one aspect. A lot of people want to go back to the country and contribute, but right now the conditions aren’t right. For those who definitely want to leave, I think the United States will continue to welcome them. But there is a process because there are so many refugees around the world now.

The Irrawaddy: In Myanmar, as in any country, the people need a professional military, but not the one we have right now. That’s why people have taken up arms against it and the regime. You wrote an article about the Myanmar military last year. Can you talk about reform in the military and security sector?

Marciel: It is too bad that the situation has reached the point that people feel like they have no choice but to take up arms. I don’t judge them for that. It is unfortunate. But the military took away the peaceful option for people to protest or express their views against the junta. It is understandable why a number of people have taken up arms. I wrote the article because I was hearing from some people in the region and around the world saying well, the Myanmar military is an essential institution and one of the country’s few unifying institutions. I disagree. In theory, it should be a unifying institution, but it hasn’t been one. It’s been one that has been a source of so much division and so much conflict. I am sure that there are individuals in the military who would like to work in a professional military but, at least at the leadership level, the culture of brutality and impunity is so deeply ingrained that I don’t think you can reason with these generals. I think Myanmar does need a military, but a dramatically reformed military that will be answerable to the civilian government and that, over many years, will adopt a very different culture and will respect human rights instead of waging war on the people.