International Relations

FSI researchers strive to understand how countries relate to one another, and what policies are needed to achieve global stability and prosperity. International relations experts focus on the challenging U.S.-Russian relationship, the alliance between the U.S. and Japan and the limitations of America’s counterinsurgency strategy in Afghanistan.

Foreign aid is also examined by scholars trying to understand whether money earmarked for health improvements reaches those who need it most. And FSI’s Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center has published on the need for strong South Korean leadership in dealing with its northern neighbor.

FSI researchers also look at the citizens who drive international relations, studying the effects of migration and how borders shape people’s lives. Meanwhile FSI students are very much involved in this area, working with the United Nations in Ethiopia to rethink refugee communities.

Trade is also a key component of international relations, with FSI approaching the topic from a slew of angles and states. The economy of trade is rife for study, with an APARC event on the implications of more open trade policies in Japan, and FSI researchers making sense of who would benefit from a free trade zone between the European Union and the United States.

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Rose Gottemoeller
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Ten years ago, the United States and Russia signed the New START treaty—a nuclear arms control agreement that we, as the heads of our governments’ respective delegations, helped negotiate. Since then, New START has played a central role in keeping the peace and preventing a dangerous arms race between the two countries that together possess 90 percent of the world’s nuclear weapons.

Now, however, New START is in trouble: without action to extend it, the treaty will expire in February 2021. Its demise would have worrying implications for the security of the United States, of Russia, and of the world. It could bring a return to nuclear competition and spark mutual suspicion that would push the world to a level of nuclear risk unseen for decades.

Read full article at Foreign Affairs

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Why Washington and Moscow Must Extend the New START Treaty

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A panel discussion on the threat and potential solutions for the rise of global populism.

“Populism” has claimed enormous amounts of popular and press attention, with the Brexit vote of 2016, the election of President Donald J. Trump, and the rise of self-proclaimed populists in Europe and elsewhere. But what exactly is populism? And is populism in Poland the same phenomenon as in the United States? Does populism have the same set of universal causes, or are there many paths to populist resurgence?

This panel discussion will feature the four co-authors of the recent white paper “Global Populisms and Their Challenges,” which finds that established mainstream political parties are the key enablers of populist challenges—and the key solution.

Join the report's co-authors Anna Grzymala-Busse, Didi Kuo, Francis Fukuyama and Michael McFaul as they explain the nature of the threat and potential solutions for the rise of global populism. They will also present some of the findings from the Global Populisms project at Stanford University.

LEARN MORE AND DOWNLOAD A PDF OF THE GLOBAL POPULISMS REPORT HERE.

This event will take place on Zoom. Register here: https://stanford.zoom.us/webinar/register/WN_3lTFDgJCQ0yVQywbAV-oAg

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This event is available through livestream only. Please register in advance for the webinar by using the link below.

REGISTRATION LINK: https://bit.ly/2WSJxRx

 

As the complex and multi-layered US-China relationship has become increasingly strained with the global pandemic led by the US political leadership, Japan-China relations appears to have taken a different path. Despite continued security tensions in the East China Sea, Japan and China seem to have moved closer in crucial ways, according to some important popular opinion surveys and diplomatic cooperation. At the same time, the relationship is complex with Japanese manufacturers rushing to diversify production networks and supply chains to other parts of Asia and with security issues in the oceans surrounding China continuing. 

This panel brings together deep, balanced expertise on Japan-China relations and will examine an array of areas with a focus on moving forward constructively. Panelists will cover diplomatic, security, and public opinion dimensions as well as introducing China's advanced digital technology used for medical care, education, e-commence and the rapid recovery of Japanese companies supported by China's central and local governments.

PANELISTS

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Yves Tiberghien, Professor, Political Science and Co-Director, Center for Japanese Research, University of British Columbia

Yves Tiberghien (Ph.D. Stanford University, 2002 and Harvard Academy Scholar 2006) is a Professor of Political Science, Faculty Associate in the School of Public Policy and Global Affairs, Director Emeritus of the Institute of Asian Research, Co-Director of the Center for Japanese Research, and Executive Director of the China Council at the University of British Columbia (UBC). Yves is currently a visiting professor at Tokyo University and at Sciences Po Paris.

Yves is also a Distinguished Fellow at the Asia-Pacific Foundation of Canada. He serves as the International Steering Committee Member representing Canada at Pacific Trade and Development Conference (PAFTAD). In November 2017, he was made a Chevalier de l’ordre national du mérite by the French President.

Yves' research specializes in East Asian comparative political economy, international political economy, and global economic and environmental governance, with an empirical focus on Japan, as well as China and Korea. His published books include Entrepreneurial States: Reforming Corporate Governance in France, Japan, and Korea. 2007. Cornell University Press in the Political Economy Series directed by Peter Katzenstein and Leadership in Global Institution-Building: Minerva’s Rule, edited volume, Palgrave McMillan, 2013. He is currently working on articles related to Japan’s role in the Liberal and International Order and a book, titled Up for Grabs: Disruption, Competition and the Remaking of the Global Economic Order."

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Kiyoyuki Seguchi, Research Director, Canon Institute for Global Studies
 
Kiyoyuki Seguchi is the Research Director at the Canon Institute for Global Studies. His research focuses on the Chinese economy and the U.S.-China-Japan trilateral relationship. Mr. Seguchi worked for the Bank of Japan from 1982 to 2009. During this time, he was Chief Representative of the Representative Office at BOJ in Beijing from 2006 to 2008. Mr. Seguchi was also the international visiting Fellow at RAND Corporation (Los Angeles, CA) from 2004 to 2005. Mr. Seguchi received his bachelor’s degree in economics from the University of Tokyo.

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Kenji Kushida, Research Scholar, Shorenstein APARC Japan Program (Moderator)

Kenji E. Kushida is a Japan Program Research Scholar at the Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center and an affiliated researcher at the Berkeley Roundtable on the International Economy. Kushida’s research interests are in the fields of comparative politics, political economy, and information technology. He has four streams of academic research and publication: political economy issues surrounding information technology such as Cloud Computing; institutional and governance structures of Japan’s Fukushima nuclear disaster; political strategies of foreign multinational corporations in Japan; and Japan’s political economic transformation since the 1990s. Kushida has written two general audience books in Japanese, entitled Biculturalism and the Japanese: Beyond English Linguistic Capabilities (Chuko Shinsho, 2006) and International Schools, an Introduction (Fusosha, 2008). Kushida holds a PhD in political science from the University of California, Berkeley. He received his MA in East Asian studies and BAs in economics and East Asian studies, all from Stanford University.

Virtually via Zoom.

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Yves Tiberghien, University of British Columbia
Kiyoyuki Seguchi, Canon Institute for Global Studies
Kenji Kushida, Stanford University
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Naomi Funahashi
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The following is Part 2 of a two-article series on facilitating cross-cultural online learning. For Part 1, please go here.


Last month, I shared my reflections on a March 20, 2020 virtual class (VC) session that SPICE facilitated for high school students in Japan and the United States to engage in a cross-cultural online exchange. This online discussion engaged my U.S.-based students of the 2020 Reischauer Scholars Program and Waka Brown’s Japan-based students of the Spring 2020 Stanford e-Japan Program in a Zoom session, during which they talked and learned with and from one another on a range of topics, including the impact of COVID-19 within their respective communities.

During the main portion of the session, the 45 students were divided into six small breakout rooms to engage in 40 minutes of discussion. Each group had a designated volunteer student moderator and a notetaker/reporter; the latter was asked to share the key points of discussion from his or her small group when we reconvened towards the end of the 90-minute VC. All discussions were conducted in English, with the exception of one group, which was designated as a bilingual space for students who felt comfortable conversing in both English and Japanese.

Since this was the 2020 students’ first opportunity to meet (another joint VC on comparative education took place on April 10), we felt it important to preface the session by setting a few ground rules for discussion. Communication styles and norms—particularly in group settings—tend to be quite different in Japan and the United States. We have found it helpful, for example, to address these differences up-front to alleviate potential cross-cultural misunderstandings.

For assessment purposes, we also asked students to send feedback on their experiences in the session. Some of their comments are included below as we turn to the student perspectives on what they experienced in this joint online discussion. More specific points from our observations and students’ feedback fall into five areas.

First, the session provided a platform for students to talk openly about the COVID-19 pandemic and also to learn about perspectives from another country. Risako of Stanford e-Japan reflected, “I could … learn about the way American students perceive political issues and coronavirus through an absorbing discussion and was surprised to discover that their perspectives were much more similar to Japanese students than I had expected.” Alika of the RSP noted, “It was really interesting to me to see how different countries are coping with the virus. I was pretty surprised to hear that many Japanese people still use public transport/eat out at restaurants and go on with their daily lives in the face of the global pandemic.” She continued, “I think some of the e-Japan students were also surprised to hear that California has a ‘6 feet apart’ rule and that many restaurants have closed as a precaution.” Yasuyuki from Japan added, “It’s not difficult to look up the news to find out about what’s going on in America, but living in Japan, you hardly ever get the chance to talk with people in America and hear from the horse’s mouth.”

Second, the session underscored the importance of empathy at times like this. Kristie from the RSP commented, “I always enjoy finding commonalities between me and others, and I think our shared experiences with the coronavirus really allowed us to connect and understand one another. I think the most important thing I will take away from this experience is that youth in Japan and America are really no different—despite our varied experiences and interests we were able to communicate about issues facing our countries and relate to one another on a deeper level.” Similarly, Yuna of Stanford e-Japan noted, “Since I have had only [a] few opportunities to interact with American high schoolers, it was a precious time for me. It was wonderful especially because we both were interested in each other. Talking ... with them made me realize how [thin] the border between our minds actually are. We were, after all, just friends.”

Third, the session prompted students to reexamine their own culture. For example, Hiromu of Stanford e-Japan noted, “I feel very pleased to have such a wonderful opportunity to teach them [the RSP students about Japanese language] and, simultaneously, however, recognized how I lack information about Japanese culture. I think this integrated meeting is vital in that it provides us opportunities for looking back on our culture and broaden[ing] our narrow-minded thoughts.” Jin of the RSP added, “What’s more, they [the Stanford e-Japan students] all spoke fluent English. This made me reflect on the world languages education in the U.S. I think the U.S. should incorporate more global studies (both language and culture) in the education system. America-centric curriculum will cause the younger generation to lose a global vision, and become unaware of Japan as a major political and economic ally in East Asia.”

Fourth, the session shed light upon how diverse both countries are. Jin of the RSP noted, “I’ve always thought that Japan has a rather homogeneous population, but talking to e-Japan students has given me a new perspective on Japanese society. I encountered a student from Myanmar who is living in Japan currently, a Japanese student who used to live in NYC for four years, and a student from Singapore who has been studying abroad in Europe for a couple years.” Rinako of Stanford e-Japan reflected, “Up until now, even when I had the chance to communicate with people outside of Japan, it was usually done in English. However, this time, all three of the Reischauer Scholar students [in her small group] spoke fluent Japanese which made me very happy as we were able to use both English and Japanese.”

Fifth, we came to realize how invaluable international and cross-cultural dialog—especially during times of crisis—can be for students. Having a session during such an unprecedented time seemed to add special significance to the experience. Brandon of the RSP noted, “Overall, it was an extremely memorable discussion, and I hope that we can continue this kind of online cross-cultural connection throughout the rest of the program.” Many Stanford e-Japan students like Fuka also reflected upon the opportunity to discuss critical topics like the coronavirus at this time. She noted, “It gave me a chance to think about familiar issues not just with people of my own country but with people from all kinds of backgrounds.”

Students are among those most acutely experiencing the direct impact of this global pandemic. As they look into the future with confusion and uncertainty about their educational prospects and options, our students seemed to find comfort in this opportunity to connect with their like-minded peers across the Pacific. As they reflected upon their differences, they deepened their understanding of one another and forged what I hope become lasting friendships.


For more information about the Reischauer Scholars Program or the Stanford e-Japan Program, please visit our programs’ webpages at reischauerscholars.org and stanfordejapan.org. SPICE also offers other online courses to U.S. high school students on China (China Scholars Program) and Korea (Sejong Korea Scholars Program), and an online course to Chinese high school students on the United States (Stanford e-China Program).

To stay informed of SPICE news, join our email list and follow us on Facebook, Twitter, and Instagram.


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Sakura (cherry blossoms) at Stanford University | Yosuke Hatano, Visiting Scholar, Stanford University
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To celebrate its May release, contributors Karen Eggleston, Barry Naughton, and Andrew Walder will join editors Thomas Fingar and Jean Oi for a panel discussion of their volume Fateful Decisions: Choices That Will Shape China’s Future (Stanford University Press).  China has enjoyed an extraordinary run of rapid growth and development over the last 40 years.  Yet, as Fingar and Oi point out, China’s future is hardly set in stone.  Sustained economic growth, social welfare and stability will depend upon tough policy decisions confronting Beijing’s leaders today in what is a watershed moment.  Casting doubt on Beijing’s aversion to major reforms and its return to certain Mao-era policy tools, Oi and Fingar argue that China’s challenges are not only complex, but high-stakes – challenges that have become even more daunting in the aftermath of COVID-19.  As China battles the difficulties caused by an aging population, the loss of comparative economic advantage, a politically entrenched elite, and a population with rising expectations, today’s policy decisions will weigh heavily on its future. Topics explored in the volume include China's healthcare challenges in a slowing economy, its global ambitions and track record, economic aims and realities, the country’s mounting governance pressures, and more. 

 

Fateful Decisions is available for purchase here.

 

Fore more information on Fateful Decisions, check out these articles:

Karen Eggleston Examines China’s Looming Demographic Crisis, in Fateful Decisions

Now It Gets Much Harder: Thomas Fingar and Jean Oi Discuss China’s Challenges in The Washington Quarterly

China’s Challenges: Now It Gets Much Harder

 

Portrait of Karen EgglestonKaren Eggleston is a senior fellow at the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies (FSI) at Stanford University, director of the Stanford Asia Health Policy Program, and deputy director of the Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center at FSI. She is also a fellow with the Stanford Center for Innovation in Global Health and a faculty research fellow of the National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER). Eggleston earned her PhD in public policy from Harvard University, studied in China for two years, and was a Fulbright scholar in South Korea. Her research focuses on comparative health systems and health reform in Asia, especially China; government and market roles in the health sector; supply-side incentives; healthcare productivity; and economic aspects of demographic change.

 

Portrait of Thomas FingarThomas Fingar is a Shorenstein Distinguished Fellow in the Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center at Stanford University. From May 2005 through December 2008, he served as the first deputy director of national intelligence for analysis and, concurrently, as chairman of the National Intelligence Council. Previous positions include assistant secretary of state for Intelligence and Research (2000-2001, 2004–2005), principal deputy assistant secretary (2001–2003), deputy assistant secretary for analysis (1994–2000), director of the Office of Analysis for East Asia and the Pacific, and chief of the China Division. Fingar is a graduate of Cornell University (AB in government and history) and Stanford University (MA and PhD, both in political science). His most recent books are Uneasy Partnerships: China’s Engagement with Japan, the Koreas, and Russia in the Era of Reform (editor) (Stanford University Press, 2017); The New Great Game: China’s Relations with South and Central Asia in the Era of Reform (editor) (Stanford University Press, 2016); and Reducing Uncertainty: Intelligence Analysis and National Security (Stanford University Press, 2011).

 

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Barry Naughton is the So Kwanlok Professor at the School of Global Policy and Strategy, University of California–San Diego. Naughton’s work on the Chinese economy focuses on market transition; industry and technology; foreign trade; and political economy. His first book, Growing Out of the Plan, won the Ohira Prize in 1996, and a new edition of his popular survey and textbook, The Chinese Economy: Adaptation and Growth, appeared in 2018. Naughton did his dissertation research in China in 1982 and received his PhD in economics from Yale University.

 

Jean C. OiJean C. Oi is the William Haas Professor of Chinese Politics in the Department of Political Science and a senior fellow in the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies at Stanford University. She directs the China Program at the Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center and is the Lee Shau Kee Director of the Stanford Center at Peking University. Oi has published extensively on China’s reforms. Recent books include Zouping Revisited: Adaptive Governance in a Chinese County, coedited with Steven Goldstein (Stanford University Press, 2018), and Challenges in the Process of China’s Urbanization, coedited with Karen Eggleston and Yiming Wang (2017). Current research is on fiscal reform and local government debt, continuing SOE reforms, and the Belt and Road Initiative.

 

Portrait of Andrew WalderAndrew G. Walder is the Denise O’Leary and Kent Thiry Professor of Sociology in the School of Humanities and Sciences, and a senior fellow in the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies at Stanford University. A political sociologist, Walder has long specialized in the study of contemporary Chinese society and political economy. After receiving his PhD at the University of Michigan, he taught at Columbia, Harvard, and the Hong Kong University of Science and Technology. At Stanford he has served as chair of the Department of Sociology, director of the Asia-Pacific Research Center, and director of the Division of International, Comparative, and Area Studies in the School of Humanities and Sciences. His most recent books are Fractured Rebellion: The Beijing Red Guard Movement (2009), China under Mao: A Revolution Derailed (2015), and Agents of Disorder: Inside China’s Cultural Revolution (2019).

Via Zoom Webinar.
Register at: https://bit.ly/2WiwPvm

Karen Eggleston <br> Senior Fellow at FSI; Director of the Asia Health Policy Program, Shorenstein APARC, Stanford University <br><br>
Thomas Fingar <br> Shorenstein APARC Fellow, Stanford University <br><br>
Barry Naughton <br> Sokwanlok Chair of Chinese International Affairs, School of Global Policy and Strategy, UC San Diego <br><br>
Jean C. Oi <br> Director, Stanford China Program; William Haas Professor of Chinese Politics, Stanford University <br><br>
Andrew Walder <br> Senior Fellow at FSI; Denise O'Leary and Kent Thiry Professor, Stanford University <br><br>
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COVID-19 is having a profound impact on our online systems - exposing both the essential role they can and do play in our modern society, and the risks and vulnerabilities they represent. Substantial research is emerging on this topic, and the implications of that research  will have important consequences for both medium (e.g., 2020 elections) and long-term cyber policies. 

Welcome Remarks: Mike McFaul

  • Introduction to CPC and the center’s work on COVID from moderator Kelly Born
  • Alex Stamos of the Internet Observatory will discuss their work examining shifting narratives about coronavirus from Chinese and Russian State Media, early insights into covid misinformation in other countries (e.g., Nigeria), and how tech companies are responding; as well as how Zoom and other platforms have been working to adapt policies and practices to meet growing demands, and risks.
  • Nate Persily at PDI will discuss the challenges of running the elections in the current environment, including implications for state necessary changes to state policies and practices.
  • Eileen Donahoe at GDPI will discuss geopolitical threats to the international human rights law framework due to ineffective response to COVID by democratic govs; cite risks to 5 specific substantive civil/political rights; and recommend that democratic govs apply international human rights process principles in COVID-19 context.  [I will use ~2 slides  -only  if others use slides]
  • Marietje Schaake will discuss human-rights challenges (to privacy, freedom of association, and freedom of expression) that have arisen with various applications of AI in COVID-19 context - e.g.,contact tracking and content moderation; as well as emerging criteria for policymakers to consider when deploying tracing and related technologies. 
  • Andy Grotto from GTG will discuss recent work on How to Report Responsibly on Hacks and Disinformation, and the implications for mainstream media’s coverage of COVID.
  • 30 min for Q&A
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APARC's China Program recently hosted Center Fellow Thomas Fingar for the webinar "Was America’s China Policy a Foolish Failure? The Logic and Achievements of Engagement." In this talk, Fingar examines the longtime U.S. strategy of engagement with China as well as the potential shift toward a strategy of decoupling. "Much recent commentary on U.S. relations with China claims that the policy of 'Engagement' was a foolish and failed attempt to transform the People’s Republic into an American style democracy that instead created an authoritarian rival," he says. "This narrative mocks the policies of eight U.S. administrations to justify calls for 'Decoupling' and 'Containment 2.0.'” Fingar argues that the policy of Engagement has been fruitful and that Decoupling is not only inadvisable but also unattainable. Watch:

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APARC Fellow Thomas Fingar on the U.S. Intelligence Report that Warned of a Coronavirus Pandemic

In our online conversation, Fingar discusses the 2008 National Intelligence Council report he oversaw and that urged action on coronavirus pandemic preparedness, explains the U.S. initial failed response to the COVID-19 outbreak, and considers the implications of the current crisis for U.S.-China relations.
APARC Fellow Thomas Fingar on the U.S. Intelligence Report that Warned of a Coronavirus Pandemic
Quote from Thomas Fingar and Jean Oi from, "China's Challeges: Now It Gets Much Harder"
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Now It Gets Much Harder: Thomas Fingar and Jean Oi Discuss China’s Challenges in The Washington Quarterly

Now It Gets Much Harder: Thomas Fingar and Jean Oi Discuss China’s Challenges in The Washington Quarterly
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Decoupling, according to Fingar, is not only inadvisable but also unattainable. 

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Livestream: Please click here to join the livestream webinar via Zoom or log-in with webinar ID 944 5730 9104.

 

About this Event: Why do some governments give foreign militants missiles that can destroy aircraft while giving others only bullets and AK-47s? Why do some governments deploy special operations forces to carry out joint attacks with some insurgent groups, while only giving others basic training on weapons handling? Despite the fact that governments often provide costly - and controversial - forms of support to foreign militant groups, we know little about why some groups receive advanced weapons technology and boots on the ground while others do not. In this presentation, I unpack trends in third-party provision of support through an in-depth examination of the CIA's provision of anti-tank missiles and the Pentagon's deployment of Special Operations Forces to support specific militant groups in the recent Syrian conflict. Drawing from an original dataset of the over 150 Syrian militant brigades that received some form of US support and over 60 interviews with Syrian militants and US and Jordanian government officials, I find that, when militant groups have similar organizational characteristics as the armed forces of their government partners, they are more likely to receive and accept costly forms of support. 

 

About the Speaker: Melissa Carlson is a PhD candidate in the Department of Political Science at U.C. Berkeley, specializing in international relations, comparative politics, and methodology. She will join CISAC in 2019-2020 as a Middle East Initiative Pre-doctoral Fellow. Broadly, her research examines the dynamics of military partnerships between state governments and foreign militant groups. Melissa's dissertation develops an organizational theory of third-party provision of support: when foreign militant groups and state armed forces share similar organizational characteristics, they are more likely to form joint commands, carry out joint attacks, and provide each other with advanced weapons systems.  Melissa's other research interests focus on factors that influence informal cooperation between states, and on how refugee perceptions of host communities, host governments, and aid organizations influence refugee decision-making. Prior to beginning her PhD at U.C. Berkeley, Melissa worked as Public Information consultant for the International Organization for Migration, Iraq Mission in Jordan and Iraqi Kurdistan. Melissa has a M.A. in Political Science from U.C. Berkeley, and a B.A. in International Relations and Politics, Philosophy, and Economics from Claremont McKenna College.

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Melissa Carlson Predoctoral Fellow at CISAC
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This event is via Zoom Webinar. Please register in advance for the webinar by using the link below.

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Since March, a series of escalations have heightened tensions in the South China Sea. From the sinking of a Vietnamese fishing boat to an ongoing standoff with the Malaysian navy, China has been accused of taking advantage of the COVID-19 pandemic to further its control of the South China Sea. Beijing’s actions on the water are not all that different than what it was doing just a few months ago. But having them continue amid a global health crisis has sparked a new level of outrage. And the nationalistic response from Chinese authorities has only added fuel to the fire. These developments highlight the new normal in the South China Sea, which will continue long after COVID-19 fades.

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Gregory B. Poling is Senior Fellow for Southeast Asia and Director of the Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative at CSIS. His research interests include the South China Sea disputes, democratization in Southeast Asia, and Asian multilateralism. Mr. Poling’s writings have been featured in Foreign Affairs, the Wall Street Journal, Nikkei Asian Review, and Foreign Policy, among others. He has authored or coauthored multiple works including The Thickening Web of Asian Security Cooperation (RAND Corporation, 2019), Building a More Robust U.S.-Philippines Alliance (CSIS, August 2015), and A New Era in U.S.-Vietnam Relations (CSIS, June 2014). Mr. Poling received an M.A. in international affairs from American University and a B.A. in history and philosophy from St. Mary’s College of Maryland.

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Gregory B. Poling Senior Fellow for Southeast Asia and Director, Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative, Center for Strategic and International Studies
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Early this year, Vladimir Putin had big plans for an excellent spring:  first, constitutional amendments approved by the legislative branch and public allowing him the opportunity to remain in power until 2036, followed by a huge patriotic celebration of the 75th anniversary of the defeat of Nazi Germany.  Well, stuff happens—specifically, COVID-19.  Putin’s spring has turned out quite differently from what he had hoped.

Big Plans for the Spring

The president surprised Russians on January 15 in his annual speech to the Federal Assembly (the lower house of the Russian legislative branch).  He proposed amending the constitution to reduce the authority of the presidency, increase the power of the Federal Assembly, and provide a legal basis for a State Council.

The amendments prompted speculation that Putin, who likes to have options, sought to create ways to hold on to power after 2024, when term limits would require him to step down from the presidency.  He might become an empowered prime minister or head the State Council.

Then, on March 10, another surprise.  A Federal Assembly deputy proposed an additional amendment that would, in effect, allow Putin to run for president twice more, opening the possibility that he could remain in office until 2036.  He had consistently argued in the past against ending term limits.  However, according to the Kremlin spokesperson, Putin was so taken with the deputy’s justification that he changed his mind on the spot.

Things can move fast in Russia—especially when Putin wants them.  On March 11, the Federal Assembly approved the constitutional amendments by a vote of 383-0, and the Federal Council (Russia’s senate) gave its approval 160-1.  (Nothing like having a rubber-stamp legislative branch.)  Within two days, all 85 regional parliaments had approved the amendments.  The Constitutional Court worked over a weekend and, on March 16, unsurprisingly found the amendments consistent with the constitution.

All told, it took just six days to check the legal requirements for amending the constitution.  Putin, however, desired more.  He called in January for a nationwide referendum on April 22 to approve the package of amendments.  The constitution provides no requirement for such a vote.  Putin wanted it to further legitimize the changes to the constitution.  Popular endorsement would undercut any future challenge should he decide to run for reelection in 2024.

Topping off the spring would be the May 9 celebration of the 75th anniversary of VE Day.  Putin has built this holiday up to rival New Year’s Day, traditionally the biggest holiday for Russians.  The celebration of World War II veterans and a large military parade on Red Square not only remind Russians of their country’s part in defeating Hitler, but they also play well to the themes of nationalism and Russia’s place as a great power on the world stage that Putin has embraced and perpetuated, particularly over the past eight years.

COVID-19 Intrudes

Alas for Putin, reality intruded.  The number of COVID-19 cases began to grow in mid-March.  As of April 21, the country reported over 52,000 cases, with more than half of those just in Moscow.  The number undoubtedly is understated—as in many countries—if for no other reason than some are asymptomatic or suffer mild symptoms.  There are also indications that local health authorities are underreporting cases.

Moscow’s mayor adopted a shelter-at-home policy, but with lots of exceptions.  While the mayor asserted that the city’s hospitals had sufficient capacity, medical staff described more difficult situations, and videos showed ambulances in line to wait hours to admit patients.  The health infrastructure outside of Moscow and other large cities is weaker, raising concern about the virus’s impact in rural areas.

Much like his American counterpart, Putin responded slowly to the mushrooming health crisis, leaving it to mayors and regional authorities to manage.  Sounding a lot like Donald Trump in February, Putin told Russians on April 19 (Orthodox Easter) “the situation is under full control.”  He has raised his public profile the past ten days, conducting videoconferences from his residence outside Moscow.  Russia, however, may be just beginning its COVID-19 trial.

As the number of cases grew in March, questions arose about the feasibility of the April 22 referendum.  Putin apparently very much desired it, and the Kremlin wanted a large turnout to bolster the referendum’s legitimacy.  Some suggested the referendum could be conducted over several days, allowing voters to space out visits to polling stations.  But the Kremlin bowed to reality and announced on March 25 that the referendum would be postponed.

Likewise, the Kremlin hoped that the May 9 commemoration could go forward, and troops began practicing for the military parade (one video showed thousands of soldiers in close formation with no masks).  However, the day’s heroes—World War II veterans now in their 90s—constitute an age-group very vulnerable to COVID-19.  Going forward with a celebration that could devastate their ranks hardly made sense.  On April 16, Putin announced a postponement.

The Economic Prognosis Looks Grim

Instead of a big public endorsement of his constitutional amendments and a patriotic gala on May 9, Putin faces a daunting challenge:  the combination of COVID-19 and an economy in trouble.  Under the virus’s impact, Russia’s already anemic economy is headed for recession.  The International Monetary Fund expects it to contract by 5.5 percent in 2020.

Complicating the economic picture for the Kremlin is continued application of Western sanctions due to Russia’s seizure of Crimea and its conflict with Ukraine in Donbas.  Economists estimate they cost Russia 1-1.5 percent of its gross domestic product.  While Russian officials downplay the effect, they miss few opportunities to ask for their removal.  For example, Putin used his intervention in the March 26 videoconference of G20 leaders to call for an end to all international sanctions.

COVID-19 has another negative impact on the Russian economy.  It has crashed global demand for oil, by far Russia’s most important export.  Perhaps not expecting the economic consequences of the virus, Russia on March 6 did not agree to an OPEC proposal to reduce production.  Igor Sechin, head of the Rosneft Oil Company and a close associate of Putin, reportedly wanted to drive the price down to push U.S. shale oil producers out of the market (their production has boosted the United States to supplant Russia and Saudi Arabia as the world’s largest oil producer).

The price dropped, more than Sechin might have anticipated.  Saudi Arabia responded to Russia’s refusal to cut production by boosting its own output and cutting the price.  On March 8, the price of oil fell 30 percent.  The resulting havoc hurt both sides.  On April 9, Russia and OPEC agreed to cut production by about 10 million barrels per day.

Whether that will suffice is uncertain.  The global economic slowdown has caused demand for oil to drop by 20-25 millions barrels per day.  On April 21, the price of a barrel of Brent oil fell below $20, a price not seen since 2002.  That was down from $74 one year earlier (the Russian government budget was designed to balance at a price of $42 per barrel).  The per barrel export duty collected by the Russian government fell to below $1, also the lowest since 2002.  Russia has to cut 2.5 million of barrels per day of production to meet its part of the April 9 agreement.  With oil storage facilities nearing capacity, there may well be further price drops before things turn around.

None of this is good news for the Russian economy, but how hard a hit it will take remains to be seen.  Thus far, the Kremlin has adopted a stimulus package to counter the COVID-19 economic consequences that is relatively modest, especially compared to programs being implemented by the United States, Germany, Britain and other industrial countries.

Managing the health crisis and its economic consequences, which could affect Putin’s approval rating—something to which the Kremlin pays extraordinarily close attention—is now the Russian president’s top preoccupation.  This is not anything like he anticipated three months ago.

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