In an era of increased transnational repression against dissidents, opposition groups need to become more effective in galvanizing support and avoiding suppression. These organizations are simultaneously losing critical institutional donors, as governments are becoming less inclined to donate to pro-democratic movements. This makes it more important than ever for such organizations to find out how to stimulate collective action among diasporic communities and uncover new outlets for donations. 

Therefore, CDDRL Postdoctoral Fellow Ivetta Sergeeva and her collaborator, Emil Kamalov (EUI), decided to start the OutRush project to survey Russians who have fled since the 2022 invasion of Ukraine. By understanding the conditions that drive Russian emigrants to donate to activist organizations, Sergeeva and Kamalov’s research, presented in a recent CDDRL seminar, could prove vital to more effectively mobilizing diaspora communities.

The Russian government has expanded its criminalization of oppositional organizations since the 2022 invasion, increasingly labeling groups as “undesirable.” This designation is for organizations that are allegedly a threat to Russian security, making any collaboration with them illegal. For example, Russian citizen Alexey Malyarevsky was recently sentenced to prison for donating to Alexey Navalny’s “undesirable” Anti-Corruption Fund (FBK). With 70% of Russian emigrants being afraid of repression since the invasion, Sergeeva predicted that this designation would discourage emigrants from donating.

To test their hypothesis, Sergeeva and Kamalov surveyed respondents annually through OutRush about their willingness to donate to theoretical organizations that fit various criteria. They utilized nonmonetary incentives, such as promising to send reports to respondents, which lowered the cost of the study.

Contrary to expectations, there was a positive correlation between the criminalization of an organization and the diaspora’s willingness to donate. The “undesirable” designation did not deter support as intended. Instead, it served as a marker that the organization was effective in its opposition, incentivizing donations. This effect was especially prominent among those residing in countries outside of Russia’s sphere of influence. At the same time, it diminished in host countries friendly to Russia, reflecting the continued fear of transnational repression. Furthermore, donor anonymity and organizational transparency further incentivized support. 

The very means through which authoritarian regimes attempt to suppress dissent — the criminalization of opposition groups — can actually be used to galvanize diasporic support. Sergeeva and Kamalov’s research serves as evidence that activist organizations have the opportunity to mobilize emigrants discontented with the regimes they fled, despite oppression. 

Democracies face the challenge of requiring competent yet representative leaders in order to effectively embody the will of the people. More than a hundred countries have electoral quotas for women and minorities to ensure representation; however, such efforts are being threatened globally under the guise of critiques alleging that quotas undermine meritocracy and candidate quality. 

To assess this assumption, Stanford Assistant Professor of Political Science Soledad Prillaman examined in a CDDRL research seminar the relationship between candidate quality and electoral affirmative action. Her co-authored study relies on data from India, where the largest of such policies is enacted, and local Gram Panchayat positions are proportionally reserved for women and lower caste individuals on a rotating basis. Using population, census, and survey data, Prillaman compared the quality of politicians by looking at their level of education and their relative education performance. 

Her findings reveal that politicians in general are positively selected, meaning that they are much better educated than the constituents they serve. While quota-elected politicians had lower average education levels than non-quota politicians, they were more positively selected — they were drawn from a higher tail of their group’s education distribution. This means that quota politicians are relatively better educated than non-quota politicians, suggesting that they are of no worse quality and maybe even higher quality.

To further bolster this claim — that quota politicians may be of higher quality than non-quota politicians — Prillaman shows that voters hold quota politicians to a higher education standard than non-quota politicians and that the lower levels of average education are largely due to inequality in access to education. 

The evidence provides little justification for the assumption that electoral quotas undermine meritocracy. Instead, inequality of opportunity underlies differences in levels of education, and overall quality can be higher because voters tend to hold minority candidates to higher standards. As affirmative action policies are under challenge across the globe, it is critical to remember that improving minority representation in our democratic systems does not require sacrificing candidate quality.

As part of CDDRL’s weekly research seminar series, Francis Fukuyama, Olivier Nomellini Senior Fellow at Stanford’s Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies (FSI), delivered a talk on the challenge of bureaucratic authority and delegation. Fukuyama, known for his influential works on state-building and governance, used this talk to trace how scholars and policymakers have grappled with the tension between empowering bureaucracies to act effectively and ensuring they remain accountable to political leaders. The talk was not only a theoretical journey but also a response to current debates about the U.S. administrative state and what meaningful reform should look like.

Fukuyama began with the basics of organizational theory. He explained that hierarchies — systems where authority is ranked and flows from the top down — exist because they reduce "transaction costs," or the costs of coordinating and enforcing agreements between people. This insight, developed by economist Ronald Coase, shows why firms and governments prefer internal structures rather than always relying on markets. Oliver Williamson expanded this to explain how organizations manage uncertainty and complexity. Fukuyama then discussed libertarian ideas, which hoped that technology and open networks could flatten hierarchies. These visions, he noted, largely failed because real-world decisions still require clear lines of authority.

As organizations grew more complex, scholars turned to “principal-agent theory.” In this framework, a "principal" (such as an elected official) delegates tasks to an "agent" (like a bureaucrat), but must ensure the agent acts in their interest. Yet, as Herbert Simon and John DiIulio observed, bureaucrats are not simply self-interested — they are also shaped by professional norms, organizational culture, and personal values. Fukuyama stressed that delegation is unavoidable because lower-level agents often hold critical, local knowledge that distant leaders lack. As economist Friedrich Hayek argued, knowledge is dispersed in society, and central planners cannot predict every situation.

However, delegation creates a dilemma: how to give bureaucrats enough freedom to use their expertise, while still keeping them accountable. Formal mechanisms like audits and punishments help, but informal tools such as trust, shared values, and education are just as crucial. Fukuyama pointed to Japan’s "kanban" manufacturing system and military strategies like "mission orders," where frontline actors are trusted to make decisions based on shared goals.

A major paradox Fukuyama addressed is that while anti-corruption efforts seek to limit bureaucratic discretion, political science research shows that too much constraint stifles effectiveness. He proposed an "inverse-U curve," where both too little and too much autonomy harm performance. The right balance depends on the state’s overall capacity.

Applying this to the U.S., Fukuyama challenged claims that bureaucrats are "out of control." Instead, he argued that America’s federal bureaucracy is over-regulated, bogged down by rigid rules that prioritize compliance over results. His work with Katherine Bersch identifies five existing tools for political control, such as appointment and removal powers, showing that bureaucratic autonomy is already tightly managed.

Fukuyama concluded by advocating for genuine reform: deregulating the bureaucracy, empowering implementers to work alongside policymakers, and rebuilding internal state capacity. Inspired by agile management methods and Jennifer Pahlka’s Recoding America, he argued that a flexible, mission-driven public sector is essential to meet the complex challenges of modern governance.

A full recording of Professor Fukuyama's talk can be viewed below:

On March 6, 2025, Michael Albertus, Professor of Political Science at the University of Chicago, presented his research at CDDRL’s weekly seminar. His talk, based on his book Land Power: Who Has It, Who Doesn’t, and How That Determines the Fate of Societies, examined how land ownership shapes political and economic hierarchies across history and in contemporary societies. Tracing land’s role as a source of power, Albertus analyzed how its distribution affects governance, social stratification, and conflict.

The talk analyzed land’s historical trajectory as a determinant of power. Sedentary societies emerged around 10,000 BC, followed by the development of permanent agricultural towns and the plow around 5,000 BC. By 3,000 BC, conflicts over land were already shaping political landscapes, as seen in Mesopotamian disputes. By 70 BC, Roman law had formalized land transactions, establishing legal frameworks that would influence future ownership systems. Throughout history, land has not only provided economic sustenance but has also been a critical tool for political control, determining who wields power in society.

A central argument of Albertus’s talk was the concept of the “Great Reshuffle,” a period of significant transformation in land ownership patterns over the past two centuries. Driven by population growth, state-building, and social conflict, this process has reshaped the global distribution of land, often exacerbating existing inequalities. Albertus identified four primary consequences of this upheaval: the reinforcement of racial hierarchies, gender disparities in land rights, economic underdevelopment, and environmental degradation.

To illustrate these dynamics, Albertus presented several case studies. He examined land dispossession in the United States, focusing on the Agua Caliente Indian Reservation in Palm Springs, California, where a checkerboard pattern of land ownership — rooted in U.S. federal policies — has marginalized Indigenous communities for over a century. He then turned to gender disparities in Canada’s settlement policies, referencing Georgia Binnie-Clark’s Wheat and Woman, which highlighted how women could buy and work land but were systematically excluded from government land grants, reinforcing gendered economic inequalities.

Albertus next analyzed Hugo Chávez’s 2001 Land Law in Venezuela as an example of state-led land redistribution. While intended to address historical inequalities, such policies often face resistance from entrenched elites and implementation challenges that limit their effectiveness. In contrast, South Africa’s post-apartheid land restitution programs have been politically significant but uneven in economic impact, as many beneficiaries struggle to secure long-term gains from reclaimed land. Finally, he discussed land conservation as a form of redistribution, using Chile’s Patagonia National Park as an example of land repurposed for ecological preservation rather than economic exploitation.

Albertus concluded by looking to the future, warning of a “Coming Global Reshuffle” driven by climate change and population growth. He presented projections suggesting that rising global temperatures will render some lands uninhabitable while making others newly viable for agriculture. These changes are likely to fuel new disputes over land, intensify migration pressures, and reshape geopolitical dynamics. Maps and population models from recent studies illustrated how shifting environmental conditions will impact territorial competition in the coming decades.

McGill University Professor of Political Science Juliet Johnson unpacked how central banks use their own museums to support the ‘stability narrative’ and promote confidence in financial institutions. She discussed her research in a recent REDS seminar co-sponsored by CDDRL and The Europe Center.

Central banks may be unique among government bureaucracies because of their investment in their own museums. Central banks focus on public outreach because monetary systems depend on collective belief in the value of money, as it is one of the most essential social contracts upon which modern society is built.

Museums can be effective instruments for improving faith in money and financial institutions. Visitors are unusually receptive to learning from museums because museums are often viewed as neutral, trusted guides. The number of central bank museums has increased significantly over the last two decades, and some get many visitors yearly. The Museum Bank Indonesia has an impressive 10,781 Google reviews and a 4.7-star rating.

The nearly 60 central bank museums that focus on economic education (in addition to numismatics and/or art) promote what Johnson calls the stability narrative, which is that central banks can maintain the value and security of money, represent the nation, and have become progressively more effective over time.

Through interactive exhibits and games, these museums aim to teach visitors that the central bank is needed to fight the evils of inflation. For example, the Bank of Finland museum has a display that features a green inflation monster to convey this sentiment. They use the exhibits to emphasize how people can be personally affected by inflation and, in many cases, to explain why maintaining a 2% inflation rate is ideal for protecting the value of money.

Central banks convey a sense of security to visitors through exhibits about detecting counterfeit money, regulating banks, and displaying their wealth, such as with gold bars. They tie their work to national pride through art displays about national heroes depicted on currency and by relating their work to prominent historical events. Through visual timelines, they convey how central bankers have learned from past mistakes and solved problems, making them more equipped to continue ensuring the stability of our financial system.

The rise of central bank museums exhibits the importance of improving public confidence in money and the financial institutions that control it, legitimizing an essential aspect of our society. 

In a CDDRL Research Seminar Series talk, Julia Azari, Professor of Political Science at Marquette University, explored the link between race, presidential transformation, and impeachment crises. She argued that presidents who significantly alter the racial status quo often face backlash, leading to populist successors who undermine democratic norms and ultimately face impeachment. She examined three cases — Andrew Johnson following Abraham Lincoln, Richard Nixon following Lyndon Johnson, and Donald Trump following Barack Obama — highlighting how racial politics shaped their presidencies and impeachment crises.

Azari’s framework situates race at the heart of presidential politics. Presidents usually maintain political stability, but transformative leaders disrupt racial hierarchies through legislation, executive action, and symbolism. This disruption sparks resistance, exploited by successors who reject transformation and undermine opposition. These backlash presidents often overreach institutionally, leading to impeachment. However, Azari argued impeachment rarely halts reactionary movements, which outlast individual leaders and shape long-term politics.

Her first case examined Lincoln’s presidency, which ended decades of compromise over slavery through the Civil War, emancipation, and constitutional amendments. His successor, Andrew Johnson, sought to reverse these changes through “presidential reconstruction,” allowing Southern states to reinstate white supremacist governance. His impeachment stemmed from both political imperatives — opposing Radical Reconstruction — and institutional overreach, violating the Tenure of Office Act. Though he survived removal, Reconstruction ultimately failed, and white supremacy prevailed.

The second case analyzed Nixon’s presidency following Lyndon Johnson’s civil rights transformation. Johnson’s passage of landmark legislation triggered a white backlash, which Nixon capitalized on with “law and order” rhetoric and the Southern Strategy. His impeachment crisis resulted from abuses of executive power, including spying on opponents and obstructing justice in the Watergate scandal. Though Nixon resigned, his realignment of the Republican Party and weakening of civil rights enforcement persisted.

The final case examined Obama’s presidency, which symbolically challenged the whiteness of the office, intensifying racial polarization. Conspiracies about his identity and accusations of favoritism toward minorities fueled Trump’s rise. Trump embraced racially charged policies, from the Muslim travel ban to attacking the 1619 Project. His two impeachments reflected this broader racialized political crisis — first for withholding Ukraine aid to pressure an investigation into Biden, and second for inciting the January 6 insurrection to overturn the 2020 election.

Azari concluded that racial transformation triggers backlash, leading to populist leaders who challenge institutional norms and face impeachment. However, impeachment alone is ineffective in stopping these movements, as they continue shaping U.S. politics. With Trump’s continued influence and the 2024 election looming, this pattern of transformation, backlash, and institutional crisis is likely to persist.

India’s once-robust democracy is in decline, with the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) being the only party with effective political organizing and a clear national message. FSI Mosbacher Senior Fellow in Global Democracy Larry Diamond, Hoover Senior Fellow Šumit Ganguly, and Hoover Research Fellow Dinsha Mistree reflected on this reality in a CDDRL seminar series talk. The discussion built on findings from their recently released book, The Troubling State of India's Democracy (University of Michigan Press, 2024).

The absence of a coordinated opposition in India has continued to threaten the functioning of its democracy. The challenges confronting the Indian National Congress Party (INC) are at the heart of the problem.

In the first half of the twentieth century, the INC emerged as a healthy political party. It enjoyed a unified national vision that championed secularism and independence from the British Empire. By being inclusive towards various political and religious identities, it unified a vast coalition across India’s broad geography, utilizing effective grassroots organizing mechanisms.

Today, however, the INC is hampered by extreme personalism due to the domineering role of the Gandhi family. The party lacks the organization or national vision to compete with the BJP. This decline began under the populist prime minister Indira Gandhi, who rose to power in the late 1960s. She replaced party leaders with loyalists and sycophants, weakening critical party mechanisms. The party began to set aside ideologically-driven political priorities in favor of more personalistic sinecures.

As subsequent members of the Gandhi family continued to lead the party, the INC failed to pose as an effective alternative to the BJP. The lack of political options results in a harmful feedback loop where citizens are discouraged from engaging with the opposition at all because they perceive no other candidates as having a chance at gaining power.

The future of India’s democratic competition requires the revival of opposition parties. Local parties at the state level are unlikely to grow to match the BJP, as they are often focused on specific ethnic and regional concerns, as well as lacking the infrastructure to take on the BJP nationally. The INC, once a leading national party, is unlikely to reinvent itself effectively unless it is released from the personalist grasp of the Gandhi family. The history of coalition building among the diversity of parties at the state and regional levels may provide a potential model for democratic checks or even electoral alternation. In any case, vigorous opposition must emerge from within India's political party system if backsliding is to be countered in the world's largest democracy.

A full recording of the seminar can be viewed below:

At a CDDRL weekly seminar, American University Political Scientist Keith Darden examined how the Russian-Ukrainian war is reshaping European institutions. The talk was part of the REDS seminar series, organized in partnership with The Europe Center and the Hoover Institution. While some expected that heightened military threats would drive greater European Union (EU) unity and integration, Darden argued that the war is instead reinforcing national institutions and re-nationalizing Europe.

First, the war has shifted power dynamics within the EU, strengthening newer member states, particularly those from post-enlargement waves in Eastern Europe. Unlike older Western European members, these states do not share the post-WWII commitment to anti-nationalism that has underpinned European integration. Countries such as Poland and Hungary have adopted nationalist policies that challenge the EU’s foundational ideals, treating European regulations as discretionary rather than binding. This shift has weakened the EU’s ability to act as a unified political entity.

Second, while the war has spurred European military rearmament, this has occurred along national rather than EU-wide lines. Defense spending has surged across the continent, yet procurement remains fragmented, with countries prioritizing domestic industries and bilateral agreements over collective EU initiatives. Military aid to Ukraine, rather than being coordinated by European institutions, has largely been managed through U.S.-led bilateral mechanisms. This reflects the EU’s limited role in security policy. Historically, existential threats have led to fiscal centralization—the concentration of taxation and spending powers at a higher level of government to fund collective defense. However, the EU is restricted by its treaties from directly allocating budgeted funds for military expenditures, limiting its ability to centralize security coordination or build stronger institutional frameworks in response to the war.

Third, the war has heightened national identity politics across Europe, further undermining European integration. Instead of fostering a shared European identity, the conflict has reinforced national distinctions. In Ukraine, the war has fueled policies emphasizing language, media control, and historical narratives rooted in nationalism. Within the EU, it has led to unilateral trade restrictions, violations of Schengen rules, and disputes over migration policies. These trends have strengthened sovereignty-based decision-making at the national level rather than pushing Europe toward deeper federalism.

Darden situated these findings within broader theories of state-building. Drawing from bellicist theories, he explained that war has historically driven state-building by centralizing fiscal capacity and consolidating power. However, unlike past cases where war led to greater political integration, the EU remains structurally constrained by its reliance on voluntary market-based cooperation rather than centralized security imperatives. Kelemen and McNamara (2022) argue that the EU’s fragmented institutional development results from the absence of war-induced fiscal consolidation. Even with the return of war to Europe, integration has not accelerated; instead, security responses have remained decentralized, with national governments taking the lead.

Darden concluded that the war is reinforcing the dominance of the nation-state rather than strengthening the EU as a collective entity. Despite increased military spending, European defense remains disjointed, and the war’s institutional impact is shaped by national identities, security alternatives, and EU governance constraints. Far from unifying Europe, the war may ultimately weaken the post-WWII European project.

Alice Siu, the Associate Director of CDDRL’s Deliberative Democracy Lab (DDL), presented her work at a CDDRL research seminar on the effect of deliberation on how people think about political issues, particularly in the current polarized context.

DDL and its partners organized discussions on contentious issues, ranging from climate change to institutional democratic reforms, among hundreds of participants from wide-ranging demographic and political backgrounds. For a total of 12 hours, participants discussed topics through an AI-assisted deliberation platform. They were polled before and after deliberation and compared to a control group who did not engage in the discussions. 

The results showed a consistent and significant opinion change among participants following deliberation, with movement towards consensus across party affiliations. Satisfaction with democracy dramatically improved, especially among Republicans, who shifted from 18.9% to 50.1% satisfaction. Evidence showed an increase in participants’ trust and empathy toward individuals with opposing opinions.

The effects of these conversations persisted after the intervention. Three months after deliberation, participants continued to feel more positively about those they disagreed with. Results show that 41.7% agreed that those with opposing viewpoints “have good reasons; there are just better ones on the other side,” compared to 31% before deliberation and 33% immediately after. These long-term effects manifested in the participants’ political participation as well. One year after a climate-focused deliberation, participation in discussions was correlated with stronger support for a Democratic-controlled congress before the 2022 midterm elections.

These results demonstrate that democracy can be strengthened through deliberation. However, for a substantial, long-lasting impact, deliberation must be scaled significantly. To do so, technology must be leveraged. For example, using an AI instead of a human moderator may improve affordable access to deliberation platforms. Furthermore, deliberation should occur in educational settings from the middle school to the graduate level. Investing in youth’s communication skills and civic engagement affords them tools to uphold our democracy for generations. Challenging but empathic conversations with those from differing viewpoints must be encouraged. While this research offers reasons for optimism, a more scalable model must be developed to ensure large-scale participation in robust discourse; at DDL, Siu is leading this effort to bring deliberation to entire societies through the AI-assisted Stanford Online Deliberation Platform.

Ali Çarkoğlu, a political scientist specializing in elections, voting behavior, and Turkish politics, presented an analysis of Turkey's electoral dynamics from 1990 to 2023 at a CDDRL research seminar. His study focused on the interplay between social cleavages, democratic backsliding, and their impact on political competition and voter behavior. Using data from the World Values Survey and Turkish Election Studies, Çarkoğlu explored the rise of the Justice and Development Party (AKP) and the enduring influence of cultural divides on Turkey’s political landscape.

Central to his analysis was the "alla Turca kulturkampf," a concept describing the deep-rooted center-periphery divide in Turkish politics. This cleavage reflects a cultural conflict between two contrasting societal visions: the Kemalist ideal of secularism, gender equality, and scientific rationalism versus the pro-Islamist focus on tradition, religion, and family values. Despite the AKP’s success in bringing peripheral groups into the state’s institutional core, these cultural divides persist as a primary source of polarization. Çarkoğlu argued that this polarization has entrenched partisan loyalty and overshadowed other factors in shaping voter behavior.

A key theme of the presentation was Turkey's democratic backsliding, characterized by the erosion of democratic institutions, curtailment of civil liberties, and electoral manipulation. Çarkoğlu noted that Turkey ranks 148th on the liberal democracy index, illustrating its significant democratic decline. He linked these trends to heightened polarization, which weakens opposition forces and reduces the influence of traditional electoral cleavages. Instead of fostering competitive elections, the political landscape is increasingly dominated by entrenched party loyalties and identity-driven politics.

The presentation also highlighted the significant social and economic changes Turkey has undergone since 1990. Urbanization surged from 61% in 1992 to 78% in 2024, while agriculture’s share of employment dropped from 45% to 17%. Economic growth has raised per capita income from $2,000 to $10,000, but inequality remains pervasive, and safety nets are inadequate. Women’s labor force participation remains low at 35%, and educational disparities persist. Household sizes have decreased, and the dependency ratio has dropped from 65 to 47 over 30 years. However, these societal shifts have had limited political consequences, as electoral dynamics remain anchored in longstanding cultural cleavages.

Çarkoğlu’s findings indicated that Turkey’s party system has remained "frozen" for the past three decades. While socio-demographic factors play a declining role in explaining voter behavior, attitudinal variables such as group identity and cultural values have gained prominence. This shift reflects how polarization has solidified, with partisan loyalty reinforcing competitive authoritarianism.

Çarkoğlu emphasized that the weakening of electoral cleavages has facilitated democratic backsliding by reducing opposition effectiveness and enabling strategic manipulation. Despite rapid social change, entrenched cultural divides and polarization have prevented political transformation. His research underscores the importance of addressing institutional decline, polarization, and social inequality to combat democratic erosion. Turkey’s experience offers critical lessons for other unconsolidated democracies facing similar challenges.