Marcela Ibáñez, a visiting postdoctoral fellow at CDDRL, presented her research on how Chinese development finance influenced citizens' support for democracy in Latin America. The research challenged the conventional expectation that economic engagement with authoritarian powers facilitates the diffusion of authoritarian norms and weakens democratic commitments. Instead, Ibáñez presented evidence suggesting that Chinese financing could produce the opposite effect: increased support for democracy among citizens in recipient regions. A central contribution of the presentation was its examination of three mechanisms that might explain this democratic backlash.

The first, revealed appropriation, suggested that foreign financing alerted citizens to additional resources available to their government. Where leaders depended on narrow winning coalitions, citizens might anticipate that these resources would disproportionately benefit political insiders, thereby strengthening their preference for democracy.

The second mechanism, revealed priorities, proposed that completed foreign-funded projects exposed deficiencies in domestic public goods provision. By demonstrating what governments could have delivered but had failed to provide, such projects could generate dissatisfaction with existing political institutions.

The third mechanism, legibility of the incumbent, emphasized the informational significance of a government's relationship with an authoritarian patron. Chinese-financed projects could make the incumbent's authoritarian associations more visible, prompting citizens to reassess their own political institutions rather than China itself.

The empirical strategy combined geocoded development aid data with 19 waves of Latinobarómetro surveys conducted between 2000 and 2021. Using a staggered treatment design and a two-way fixed-effects counterfactual estimator, the analysis examined changes in democratic attitudes following the arrival of Chinese-financed projects. The findings indicated that support for democracy increases at the time of Chinese financing commitments. Importantly, similar effects were not observed for projects financed by other donors, suggesting that the response is driven by the type of committed project.

The empirical findings provided stronger support for the first and third mechanisms. Democratic support increased following financing commitments rather than project completion, consistent with revealed appropriation. The stronger effects under electoral autocracies, alongside declining confidence in state institutions, were consistent with the legibility mechanism.

Overall, the presentation offered an important reconsideration of authoritarian influence abroad. Rather than treating foreign engagement primarily as a vehicle for institutional or ideological diffusion, it demonstrated how external financing could reshape citizens' evaluations of domestic governance. Its broader implication was that authoritarian economic influence did not necessarily produce authoritarian political preferences, although whether increased democratic support translated into greater democratic accountability remained an open question.

Milada Anna Vachudova of the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill presented on “Europe in the Face of War and America’s Authoritarian Turn” during a Rethinking European Development and Security (REDS) seminar, co-sponsored by the Center on Democracy, Development and the Rule of Law (CDDRL) and The Europe Center (TEC). Drawing on research coauthored with Nadiia Koval of the European Policy Institute in Kyiv, Vachudova examined how Russia’s war in Ukraine, democratic backsliding within the European Union, and changing U.S. foreign policy are reshaping Europe’s geopolitical role.

Vachudova began by arguing that Ukraine’s resistance to Russia’s full-scale invasion is also a defense of European democracy, national sovereignty, and the security of EU and NATO members. She situated this claim within a broader account of the EU’s power. Historically, the EU has exerted influence through its democratic norms, economic integration, market access, and enlargement rather than military force. Yet she rejected the idea that Europe must choose between defending liberal values and pursuing geopolitical interests. Military capabilities, she suggested, can complement the EU’s normative and economic strengths.

The EU’s potential as a geopolitical power has long been undermined by political expediency. Vachudova pointed to Europe’s pre-2022 dependence on Russian energy and continued economic engagement with Moscow, as well as the challenge posed by authoritarian-minded political parties within the EU. These vulnerabilities illustrated the costs of prioritizing short-term economic interests over democratic commitments and long-term security.

Russia’s February 2022 invasion nevertheless prompted an unusually rapid European response. EU institutions, particularly the European Commission, moved to assist Ukrainian refugees, expand market access, impose sanctions, provide financial and military assistance, and revive enlargement. Vachudova emphasized that this early institutional leadership occurred amid an absence of traditional French-German leadership. It also coincided with the emergence of ad hoc coalitions and a shift in influence toward northern and eastern EU member states, whose governments have often taken a more urgent view of the Russian threat.

However, translating this initial momentum into sustained military capacity has proven difficult. Increased defense spending, including in Germany and Poland, has not eliminated obstacles to coordination, implementation, and collective action. The EU must contend with powerful veto players even as uncertainty about the United States raises questions about Europe's ability to help defend Ukraine and eventually defend itself.
Vachudova characterized the current U.S. trajectory as an “authoritarian turn,” arguing that the Trump administration’s approach to Russia and Ukraine has eroded transatlantic trust. In her assessment, perceived American unreliability carries significant security, reputational, and economic costs, including growing doubts among allies about dependence on U.S.-made weapons systems.

Despite these challenges, Vachudova identified reasons for cautious optimism. Europeans will not stop mobilizing against authoritarian rule even as these forces continue to fight for power with the help of the Kremlin. External threats and shocks can catalyze European integration. Vachudova also described a pattern of “democratic bandwagoning,” exemplified by Canada moving closer to the EU. Ultimately, she suggested that Ukraine’s determination could help sustain enlargement and strengthen Europe’s identity as both a democratic community and a geopolitical actor. The central question is whether Europe can convert crisis-driven solidarity into lasting political unity and defense capabilities.

At a CDDRL research seminar held on October 15, 2026, Christopher Dann, a pre-doctoral fellow at the Stanford Center on Democracy, Development and the Rule of Law and a PhD candidate in Political Science at Stanford, presented his research on legitimacy and large-scale infrastructure in 21st-century autocracies.

His research centered on a puzzle: how have autocracies modernized so successfully in the 21st century while sustaining authoritarian rule? Dann argued that a sizable number of today’s autocracies cultivate reputations for delivery to build mass support for the regime. They do so by organizing development around large-scale infrastructure, which is unusually visible, durable, and difficult to reverse. These qualities make infrastructure a costly and lasting signal of a dictator’s developmental intent, and they give citizens credible reason to believe the regime is committed to the majority’s future welfare.

Dann began by noting that modernization theory expected economic development to bring democracy. Instead, the world has seen a democratic recession, and many regimes, including Vietnam, Rwanda, Serbia, and Türkiye, have modernized while remaining authoritarian. He explained that 20th-century dictatorships were relatively poor and fear-based, relying on repression, coercion, and ideology, and that they bought support cheaply through patronage and targeted transfers. Today, however, autocrats have moved from fear to competence. They favor a rhetoric of economic performance and public services, and the countries with the highest confidence in national government are fast-growing autocracies.

To test this, Dann used data, following a recently released World Bank report, on approximately 150,000 large-scale construction projects worldwide from 2005 to 2024, each costing at least $25 million. The data show that autocracies build more than democracies, spend roughly twice as much per year, and complete and cancel more projects. They also build more new infrastructure rather than maintain old stocks, and they concentrate on transport and energy while democracies put relatively more into education and healthcare. In addition, autocracies build at about a third of the cost per kilometer for transport projects. As Dann explained, these differences arguably stem from longer political time horizons, fewer institutional constraints such as veto points and regulatory hurdles, thus providing a comparative advantage for wealthy, stable autocracies.

To measure the political return, Dann combined nine existing survey datasets covering about 2.5 million respondents in more than 2,300 districts. He then compared districts within the same country that received infrastructure at different times. Using this approach, he found that in autocracies and backsliding regimes, about 40 additional completed projects in a district raised confidence in government by roughly one percentage point, about a quarter of the gap in confidence between Singapore and the neighboring Malaysian state of Johor. Democracies showed no significant effect. Infrastructure also raised leadership approval and lowered perceptions of corruption, and newly built transport projects with government funding drove most of the effect.

Ultimately, Dann’s research offers a new account of authoritarian resilience, one that explains how autocracies govern more educated, urban, and wealthier societies through broad-based, performative distribution. He closed by questioning whether the more well-to-do a nation is in the 21st century, the greater its chances of sustaining autocracy.

On October 8, 2026, Aleksandar Matovski presented at a Rethinking European Development and Security (REDS) seminar, co-sponsored by the Center on Democracy, Development and the Rule of Law (CDDRL) and The Europe Center (TEC), on Russia’s nuclear escalation and restraint during the war in Ukraine. The central puzzle he sought to explain was why the severity of an external shock does not necessarily correspond to the timing or intensity of Russia’s response. Moscow has repeatedly resorted to nuclear threats and provocative signaling. Yet, at other times, it has absorbed substantial military setbacks without responding with comparable ferocity. The question, therefore, is what explains this variation in restraint and escalation.

Matovski identified three broad explanations in the existing literature. The first concerns external constraints, including backlash from Russia’s remaining partners, the limited battlefield utility of nuclear weapons, and the danger of confrontation with NATO. However, these factors primarily explain restraint rather than escalation. The second concerns credibility decay, whereby repeated threats without follow-through undermine credibility and encourage riskier behavior to restore it. The third concerns domestic political influences, including hardliner pressure, regime survival threats, and risk-averse elites and citizens. Interestingly, domestic politics can generate both escalation and restraint. The question is which pressures matter, when, and how they interact with external constraints.

Matovski consequently proposed his pressure cooker framework, based on three premises. First, Putin needs a “forever war” to maintain political control. Continued confrontation allows the regime to mobilize nationalism, justify repression, and redirect dissatisfaction toward foreign adversaries. Second, military failure does not necessarily imply domestic political failure. Much depends on how the Kremlin frames setbacks and manages their political consequences. Third, nuclear coercion is essential to sustaining the war. It discourages Western intervention and reinforces the domestic narrative that Russia cannot ultimately be defeated.

The mechanism begins with an external shock, followed by initial restraint and the gradual accumulation of political pressure. Initially, restraint may be advantageous because escalation can publicly acknowledge military failure, alarm risk-averse citizens, and create further external risks. The Kremlin can also temporarily defer the political costs of inaction by controlling the narrative. However, as setbacks accumulate, hardliners increasingly interpret restraint as weakness. Meanwhile, the wider public may question the war’s sustainability. Repeated unenforced threats also undermine Russia’s credibility and may encourage adversaries to test its limits. Eventually, the political costs of restraint may outweigh those of escalation, prompting more dramatic action.

Matovski illustrated this through the 2022 mobilization and nuclear scare. Despite the failure of Russia’s initial invasion, Putin initially avoided large-scale mobilization. However, following further setbacks, particularly Ukraine’s Kharkiv counteroffensive in September, domestic pressures arguably intensified. Putin subsequently announced partial mobilization and the purported annexation of four Ukrainian regions. Russia also intensified nuclear threats. In October, Moscow made allegations concerning a potential Ukrainian “dirty bomb,” amid heightened fears of nuclear escalation. Yet Russia subsequently withdrew from Kherson in November without nuclear retaliation. Matovski interpreted this sequence as consistent with his argument that escalation follows accumulated pressures rather than necessarily responding immediately to individual setbacks.

The central implication is that Russian restraint and escalation may represent different phases of the same political process. Apparent restraint may therefore be unstable, making subsequent escalation difficult to anticipate.

At a CDDRL research seminar held on October 1, 2026, Frances Cayton, the Einstein-Moos Postdoctoral Fellow at the Stanford Center on Democracy, Development and the Rule of Law, presented research from her book project on civil society in backsliding democracies.

Her presentation centered on the democratic potential of informal, apolitical civil society groups in resisting democratic erosion. She argued that autocrats devote little attention to these groups, leaving them with greater autonomy and the ability to decide when and whether to engage with the government. At the outset, these groups often have low civic consciousness, meaning they do not recognize the social capital and civic resources they hold. However, as autocratization threatens their independence, they become more aware of those resources and more committed to defending them, which makes them more likely to mobilize democratically and across partisan divides. 

Cayton began by noting that current scholarship often focuses on two ways autocratic regimes interact with civil society. First, they work alongside and reward groups that share their views as a source of support, and second, they crack down on opponents through repression and bureaucratic pressure. What this picture overlooks, Cayton argues, are the apolitical and informal groups that make up much of civic life, such as biking clubs and mushroom hunters, who often do not consider themselves part of civil society at all. 

To account for these groups, Cayton organizes civic life into a two-by-two framework of formal and informal organizations with political and apolitical missions. Formal groups have internal structures such as membership and dues, making them easy for the state to see. Informal groups have looser arrangements, such as friends who help stray dogs in their neighborhood. Political groups have an explicit political mission, such as human rights, labor, religious, or left-and right-wing causes, while apolitical groups focus on areas like sports, education, and the arts. 

Her argument therefore suggests that the less visible nature of these informal, apolitical groups makes them an almost blind spot in the autocrat's agenda, allowing them to maintain their autonomy. Cayton hypothesizes that, relative to formal pro-regime civil society, aspiring autocrats will target formal apolitical and opposition groups more often, but will not treat informal civil society differently. 

She then tests this through the case of Poland, drawing on a panel dataset covering the universe of Polish civil society, a survey of civic organizations, and interviews. Her analysis of public funding shows that after the Law and Justice party (PiS) took power in 2015, formal apolitical and formal opposition groups lost public funding relative to formal pro-regime groups, while informal groups saw no significant change. Informal and apolitical groups also became less likely to file optional financial disclosures, which she reads as a choice to remain less visible to the state. 

In her survey experiment, Cayton reminded civic groups of government threats to civil society. Informal and apolitical groups became more open to meeting groups with different political views and hosting cross-partisan events, while showing no greater willingness to work with PiS. Together, these results suggest that the regime's pressure largely bypassed informal and apolitical groups, and that the threat to civil society strengthened their commitment to independence and pluralism. 

Ultimately, Cayton's research shows that informal, apolitical civil society is a powerful tool for democratic resilience. As one interviewee put it, these groups often "become political in order to maintain apoliticality," which leads them to defend their independence by mobilizing in support of democracy.

During the Center on Democracy, Development and the Rule of Law's (CDDRL) first Fall 2026 Research Seminar, Emily Russell, the 2026-27 Gerhard Casper Postdoctoral Fellow in Rule of Law at CDDRL, presented her research on why police selectively target certain minorities within particular regions of India. She began by situating her work within the literature on common explanations of police repression. These explanations often include crime and political dissent that the police seek to curtail, or racial and ethnic biases within policing institutions. Russell, however, argues that police may also target vulnerable groups in order to enforce an economic order and maintain and enable conditions of extraction that sustain production and hierarchy. 

Russell contextualizes this through the broader literature on coercion, taxation, extraction, and labor control. Existing work already shows how coercion can be used to restrict workers’ outside options and prevent laborers from leaving. Acemoglu and Wolitzky’s 2011 paper, for example, models coercion as force or the threat of force that employers use to influence workers’ participation decisions. Russell adds another layer to this literature by focusing on how coercion can be exercised through the state, rather than only directly by employers. 

Russell situates this argument in the context of Assam’s tea plantation economy. Plantation owners have incentives to control labor, prevent dissent, and discourage laborers from leaving. Within the plantation, they can engage in private coercion directly. Beyond the plantation, however, private coercion becomes more difficult. At that point, landowners may rely on the state, particularly the police, to exercise coercion on their behalf. This produces a clear testable implication: where plantation owners retain incentives to control labor but private coercion can no longer easily reach workers, policing should increase, particularly against the relevant labor population. This is where Assam’s plantation geography becomes useful.

Russell distinguishes between plantations themselves, plantation catchments, and more distant rural areas. Catchment areas are the residential zones surrounding plantations where laborers can still live within commuting distance while remaining beyond employers’ direct control. She then uses a spatial regression discontinuity design across plantation boundaries and catchments to estimate whether policing increases in these areas.

To measure policing and police abuse, Russell draws on GDELT-type media data to capture visible policing events, and legal and human-rights records help capture forms of abuse that may be less visible in media reporting. The broader project also incorporates qualitative evidence from more than 60 interviews.

What she finds is that policing increases sharply in plantation catchment areas relative both to plantations themselves and to more remote rural areas. This increase is especially important in areas with larger populations descended from indentured laborers (Adivasis). Measuring this population is difficult using conventional demographic data, so Russell constructs a surname-based measure based on fieldwork with interviews of elders from indentured communities and geocoded voter records. This allows her to estimate where populations historically connected to plantation labor are concentrated.

The heterogeneity result is particularly important. Policing increases with the concentration of Adivasi populations within plantation catchment areas, but not beyond that geographic zone. This matters because it helps distinguish her argument from a purely ethnic-bias explanation. If repression were driven only by generalized discrimination against Adivasis, one might expect policing to increase wherever these populations are concentrated. Instead, the increase appears specifically where these communities remain economically connected to plantation production but are beyond employers’ direct private control.

The broader point is therefore that the state can use coercion to maintain inequalities that sustain production. Police repression may not only reflect attempts to control crime, political dissent, or ethnic minorities. It can also function as a state-supplied mechanism of labor control, particularly where private coercive authority becomes insufficient.

In a CDDRL research seminar held on May 21, 2026, Alice Evans, a Senior Lecturer at the Stanford King Center for Global Development, presented her research exploring the causes of the global Islamic revival. To understand this transformation, she conducted qualitative research across nearly every world region, living with families and communities in countries including Indonesia, Morocco, Turkey, Uzbekistan, India, and across West Africa. 

Evans explores several competing theories for the global Islamic revival, beginning with past religious authoritarianism and Arab prestige bias. Past religious authoritarianism is the belief that historical Islamic empires consolidated political authority by empowering clerics and religious institutions, creating systems in which rulers derived legitimacy through religion. Similarly, Arab prestige bias argues that the religious prestige of places like Mecca and Medina drew Muslims across the world to follow religious practices associated with the Arab Islamic heartland.  However, Evans argues that these explanations alone cannot fully explain the global Islamic revival, as both Arab religious prestige and religious authoritarian traditions existed long before the revival began in the 1970s. 

The second major explanation discussed by scholars is historical contingencies, including geopolitical conflict and Saudi-funded Wahhabism. Geopolitical conflicts such as the 1967 Arab-Israeli War, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, and the post-9/11 War on Terror intensified a sense of global Muslim solidarity and reinforced an “us versus them” worldview. Similarly, Saudi-funded Wahhabism explains the revival through Saudi Arabia’s oil wealth, which allowed the kingdom to fund mosques, madrasas, scholarships, and religious education programs across the Muslim world. However, Evans argues that these explanations still cannot fully account for the revival because geopolitical conflict does not explain why the shift manifested specifically through religiosity, veiling, and gender segregation, while reformist Islamic movements also emerged independently outside of Saudi influence in places such as Egypt, India, and West Africa. 

Consequently, Evans argues that modernization played the most important role in the global spread of the Islamic revival. As highlighted throughout the seminar, technological advances such as steamships, print media, radio, television, and the internet enabled Muslims around the world to gain greater access to religious knowledge, leading to deeper engagement with Islamic scholarship and religious networks. This process was further strengthened through expanded mass schooling and increased state spending on religious education. 

This ultimately leads to Evans’ central theory, the “Prestige-Piety Feedback Loop,” which argues that modernization amplifies whichever moral systems command prestige within a society. In Muslim-majority societies, greater access to religious education and communication technologies leads to greater trust in religious authorities and increased social importance of visible piety, including practices such as veiling and gender segregation. Evans emphasizes that these practices are reinforced through community social pressure, particularly in large religious communities where individuals are constantly evaluated based on visible signs of piety. Consequently, modernization strengthened transnational Islamic identity and reinforced religious norms across the Muslim community. 

CDDRL Visiting Scholar Michael Albertus’s Research Seminar presentation, “Winning Under Electoral Authoritarianism: Turning Out the ‘Right’ Votes in Venezuela,” examined how electoral infrastructure can become a subtle but powerful tool of authoritarian political control. The presentation, based on joint work with Felipe Baritto and Dany Jaimovich, focused on Venezuela and asked whether the expansion of polling centers under Chávez and Maduro was simply a response to demographic demand or whether it was politically targeted to benefit the ruling coalition.

The central puzzle of the presentation was that Venezuela substantially expanded its electoral infrastructure between 2000 and 2024, with the number of polling centers increasing by about 70 percent, even though population growth was much smaller. Albertus situated this puzzle within the broader literature on competitive authoritarianism, where regimes often maintain formally competitive elections but tilt the playing field through institutional design, state resources, media control, opposition harassment, and selective manipulation. His key contribution was to show that the organization of voting infrastructure itself may belong on this “menu of manipulation.”

The empirical strategy was built around a geocoded dataset of voting centers across Venezuelan election periods. The authors identified “new” polling centers and used stable polling centers to construct electoral Voronoi polygons, which served as local catchment areas. This allowed them to ask whether areas with higher prior support for Chavismo were more likely to receive new voting centers in later periods. Their baseline models used polygon and election-period fixed effects, with controls such as population, and clustered standard errors by municipality.

The main result was that lagged regime support predicted the creation of new polling centers. A 10-percentage-point increase in regime support was associated with roughly a 10-percentage-point increase in the probability of receiving a new polling center relative to the sample mean. Areas in the top quartile of regime support were about 30 percent more likely to receive a new center. These effects were strongest in urban areas and became larger as elections tightened and regime support weakened.

Albertus also presented evidence that new polling centers were not politically neutral spaces. Many carried regime-aligned names and ideological language, including terms associated with Bolivarianism, Chávez, communes, popular power, and revolutionary programs. This suggested that polling centers were not only administrative sites but also spaces of political embedding.

The presentation then turned to consequences. New polling centers were associated with higher turnout, especially in areas already supportive of the regime. They were also linked to smaller polling centers and more single-table centers, which may have made voter monitoring easier. In the 2024 election, the opposition's collection of actas (vote tabulations) was less likely in polygons where new polling stations had previously been established, suggesting that infrastructure expansion may have weakened the opposition's monitoring capacity.

Overall, the presentation argued that authoritarian regimes do not always need to rely on blatant fraud or overt suppression. They can instead selectively expand access, making voting easier for supporters while improving their own capacity for mobilization and monitoring. The project’s broader significance lies in showing how seemingly technical decisions about election administration can have deeply political effects.

Katherine Casey, professor of political economy at Stanford Graduate School of Business and the faculty director of the King Center on Global Development, presented her team’s work in a CDDRL Research Seminar on Thursday, May 7. Casey opened her talk establishing that citizen esteem for politicians is on the decline. In the U.S., only 16 percent trust the federal government. Across 30 African countries, while 75 percent believe elections are the best way to choose leaders, only 37 percent are satisfied with how their democracies are working. Casey asserts that the root of this dissatisfaction runs deep, ultimately posing the question: how can high-human-capital, representative individuals be identified, screened, encouraged to run for office, and brought into consideration by political parties? 

Casey’s team examined local governance in Sierra Leone to answer this question, partnering with government and civil society to test an intervention designed to induce candidate entry. The field experiment was a nationwide, randomized controlled trial covering all fourteen local district councils in Sierra Leone. The team chose to focus on local councils because the barriers to entry are low, the work requires competence but is not particularly specialized, and its part-time nature allows candidates to run without quitting their day jobs. The experiment included two rounds of random assignment and implementation. 

The experiment focused on three headline factors: representation, quality, and gatekeeping. During the representation phase, the field team visited villages and spoke with residents to better understand who they would want to represent them. These nominees were then screened for quality using metrics for human capital, work experience, local experience, managerial capital, and conscientiousness. After this screening, candidates' profiles were sent to political parties. Of those nominated at the representation level, 85 percent were willing to share their profiles, and 89 percent said they were interested in running for office. 

When conducting analysis, Casey’s team found that top nominees from the representation stage score higher than both status quo applicants and incumbents on quality metrics, differences that are large in magnitude and highly statistically significant. Many top nominees came from traditional authority lineages, and many work in education, positioning them as alternative elites. Among lower-ranked nominees, only 16 percent ultimately entered electoral races, but this rate rose to 25 percent among top-ranked nominees.  Their entry enhanced the maximum observed quality of applicants in the potential candidate pool.

Analysis was then conducted to determine whether the parties selected any nominees from the profiles, which found that nearly all wards had at least one candidate selected and that nominations increased the likelihood that a local woman would make the candidate list.  Incumbents were highly favored in this election, leaving little space for new entrants to win elected seats.

Casey ended her talk with a few conclusions. Firstly, the intervention successfully identified popular, high-quality, new entrants to politics, drawn from a different set of elites. The nominees self-selected into the entry on quality, boasting the highest observed quality among applicants and selected candidates, which also showed that representation need not trade off quality. Casey’s team also found a challenge in translating willingness to run into formal applications, a challenge she believes could be honed in on with more recruitment efforts. Ultimately, the collaboration between research and policymakers crafted a unique model to empower dissatisfied voters to nominate leaders they want to see in office. 

In a CDDRL research seminar held on April 30, 2026, Anna Grzymala-Busse, the Michelle and Kevin Douglas Professor of International Studies in the Department of Political Science, senior fellow at the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies, and the director of The Europe Center, explored historic state development and fragmentation in Europe, focusing on how conceptualizations shape conclusions about state formation. She examined how scholars define both “Europe” and “the state,” comparing how different coding and measurement choices lead to different patterns of fragmentation over time. 

Grzymala-Busse first defines what counts as Europe, noting that while some scholars define Europe through Western Christianity, others rely on geographic cutoffs like west of the Don River or west of the Ural Mountains. This is significant, as including large cases like Russia or the Ottoman Empire creates the impression of growing state size over time, while excluding them makes Europe appear more fragmented. She also points out the risk of circularity, in which Europe is defined by certain institutions, and then that same group is used to explain why those institutions developed. In that sense, excluding places like Russia or the Ottoman Empire based on cultural or institutional reasons can lead to conclusions about European distinctiveness that are already built into how Europe was defined in the first place.

The second big question is how a state is defined, since historical Europe included a wide range of political units like empires, kingdoms, duchies, city-states, and trading leagues, making it hard to rely on a single clear definition based on sovereignty or centralization. This ties directly to how fragmentation is measured, since it depends on methodological choices such as which units are included and how they are counted. One of the most important choices is whether to include city-states. When excluded, the data show fewer and larger states over time, which supports the bellicist idea of consolidation. When included, Europe appears more fragmented, aligning more with revisionist arguments. Overall, this illustrates how a few key classification choices can shape broader conclusions about state development.

This issue becomes even more apparent when looking at fragmentation itself, which both bellicists and revisionists treat as central to their arguments. For bellicists, fragmentation is a starting point that declines over time, while for revisionists, it is more durable and persists across periods. The Holy Roman Empire serves as a key example: it was one of the largest political entities in Europe, yet remained highly fragmented, with overlapping authorities and no clear centralization. This highlights the importance of measurement and coding decisions, as choices such as which polities to include, whether to count borders or use concentration measures, and even the size of geographic grid cells all shape the results. 

Ultimately, Grzymala-Busse concludes that rules and definitions fundamentally shape how fragmentation appears in the data. Once these methodological choices are made clear, there is less clear evidence for the bellicist claim that states were consistently consolidated, but this does not fully confirm the revisionist argument either. Consequently, if the debate is a matter of coding rather than evidence, transparency in concepts and measures becomes even more important.