The New START Treaty has come under fire in recent weeks. Marshall Billingslea, President Trump’s new special envoy for arms control, said the Obama administration negotiated a very weak verification regime, which is odd because Trump administration officials have repeatedly acknowledged the security benefits of New START.

Read full article at Bulletin of Atomic Scientists

Ending the moratorium would not advance U.S. security interests.  The United States has conducted about as many nuclear weapons tests as the rest of the world combined (and 30 percent more than the number conducted by the Soviet Union/Russia).  U.S. weapons scientists learned more from testing.  When I served as a diplomat at the American Embassy in Moscow in 1988, I accompanied a U.S. team to the Soviet nuclear test site at Semipalatinsk (in what is now Kazakhstan).  Our Soviet hosts showed us a vertical shaft for an upcoming underground test; it was about three feet in diameter.  A U.S. team member from the test site in Nevada, which the Soviets would visit the following month, commented that U.S.-drilled vertical shafts for nuclear tests typically were nine to eleven feet in diameter.  That maximized the area above the weapon for instruments that would gather a burst of data in the nanosecond before they vaporized.

The testing moratorium and the CTBT, if ratified and entered into force, would seem to lock in an area of U.S. advantage regarding nuclear weapons and nuclear effects.  Why would we want others to test and erode that advantage?

Up until the idea of gaining leverage with Beijing and Moscow arose, the primary possible reason for a return to testing was if it became necessary to confirm the reliability of a weapons type in the stockpile.  However, the National Nuclear Security Administration has overseen for 25 years the Stockpile Stewardship Program, intended to confirm that U.S. nuclear weapons are safe, secure and reliable without having to test them in a manner that produces a nuclear yield. To do so, the program uses supercomputers, modeling and tools such as the Dual Axis Radiographic Hydrodynamic Test Facility (think of the world’s most powerful X-ray device).

Each year, the commander of Strategic Command and the directors of the national nuclear laboratories at Los Alamos, Sandia and Lawrence Livermore certify the safety and reliability of the nuclear stockpile.  When I visited Los Alamos several years ago, the director told me that, as long as the Stockpile Stewardship Program was funded, he was confident that nuclear testing was not needed.  He added that, as a result of the program, weapons scientists had learned things about how nuclear weapons work that they did not and could not learn from testing nuclear weapons underground.

The smart thing for U.S. national interests is to continue the moratorium, ratify the CTBT, and press others to ratify so that the treaty can be brought into force.  The Senate failed to give consent to ratification in 1999, due to concerns about how to maintain the stockpile’s reliability without nuclear testing and about monitoring the treaty.  The Stockpile Stewardship Program, just in its beginning stage then, can now answer the first concern and has been doing so.

As for monitoring a test ban, U.S. national technical means have improved over the past two decades, and the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty Organization has established the International Monitoring System with some 300 stations around the world.  It can detect underground nuclear explosions down to below one kiloton (the weapon that destroyed Hiroshima had a yield of 15 kilotons) as well as detecting tests in the atmosphere or ocean, both of which are banned by the 1963 Limited Test Ban Treaty.  Once in force, the CTBT also provides for an inspection mechanism.

As former Secretary of State George Shultz said in 2013, senators might have been correct not to consent to ratification in 1999, but given the Stockpile Stewardship Program’s development and enhanced monitoring systems, they would be right to vote for ratification now.

Conducting a nuclear test to bring China and Russia to the negotiating table will not work.  It will instead open the door for others to resume testing and close a nuclear weapons knowledge gap that favors the United States.  That will not make us safer or more secure.  It is an unwise idea that hopefully will continue to meet resistance within the U.S. government.

President Trump’s newly named envoy for arms control, Marshall Billingslea, gave a lengthy interview last week on the administration’s approach to nuclear arms negotiations. He stressed bringing in China, struck a pessimistic note about the sole treaty constraining Russian and U.S. nuclear forces, and offered no ideas for getting Moscow to discuss non-strategic nuclear arms.

Unfortunately, the interview reinforces the view that the Trump administration is unlikely to achieve a nuclear deal…or even develop a serious proposal.

Read full article at Defense One

Ten years ago, the United States and Russia signed the New START treaty—a nuclear arms control agreement that we, as the heads of our governments’ respective delegations, helped negotiate. Since then, New START has played a central role in keeping the peace and preventing a dangerous arms race between the two countries that together possess 90 percent of the world’s nuclear weapons.

Now, however, New START is in trouble: without action to extend it, the treaty will expire in February 2021. Its demise would have worrying implications for the security of the United States, of Russia, and of the world. It could bring a return to nuclear competition and spark mutual suspicion that would push the world to a level of nuclear risk unseen for decades.

Read full article at Foreign Affairs

In my line of work, you have to have a long memory. Periods of success in negotiations are followed by droughts, because of politics, military upheaval, arms buildups—yes, sometimes the weapons have to be built before they can be reduced—or a sense of complacency: “We have arms control treaties in place; let’s just focus on implementing them.” In those cases, new thinking and new negotiations may slow or even stop. Yet, the national security interest of the United States continues to drive the necessity for nuclear arms control.

Read full article at The Foreign Service Journal 

Early this year, Vladimir Putin had big plans for an excellent spring:  first, constitutional amendments approved by the legislative branch and public allowing him the opportunity to remain in power until 2036, followed by a huge patriotic celebration of the 75^th anniversary of the defeat of Nazi Germany.  Well, stuff happens—specifically, COVID-19.  Putin’s spring has turned out quite differently from what he had hoped.

Big Plans for the Spring

The president surprised Russians on January 15 in his annual speech to the Federal Assembly (the lower house of the Russian legislative branch).  He proposed amending the constitution to reduce the authority of the presidency, increase the power of the Federal Assembly, and provide a legal basis for a State Council.

The amendments prompted speculation that Putin, who likes to have options, sought to create ways to hold on to power after 2024, when term limits would require him to step down from the presidency.  He might become an empowered prime minister or head the State Council.

Then, on March 10, another surprise.  A Federal Assembly deputy proposed an additional amendment that would, in effect, allow Putin to run for president twice more, opening the possibility that he could remain in office until 2036.  He had consistently argued in the past against ending term limits.  However, according to the Kremlin spokesperson, Putin was so taken with the deputy’s justification that he changed his mind on the spot.

Things can move fast in Russia—especially when Putin wants them.  On March 11, the Federal Assembly approved the constitutional amendments by a vote of 383-0, and the Federal Council (Russia’s senate) gave its approval 160-1.  (Nothing like having a rubber-stamp legislative branch.)  Within two days, all 85 regional parliaments had approved the amendments.  The Constitutional Court worked over a weekend and, on March 16, unsurprisingly found the amendments consistent with the constitution.

All told, it took just six days to check the legal requirements for amending the constitution.  Putin, however, desired more.  He called in January for a nationwide referendum on April 22 to approve the package of amendments.  The constitution provides no requirement for such a vote.  Putin wanted it to further legitimize the changes to the constitution.  Popular endorsement would undercut any future challenge should he decide to run for reelection in 2024.

Topping off the spring would be the May 9 celebration of the 75^th anniversary of VE Day.  Putin has built this holiday up to rival New Year’s Day, traditionally the biggest holiday for Russians.  The celebration of World War II veterans and a large military parade on Red Square not only remind Russians of their country’s part in defeating Hitler, but they also play well to the themes of nationalism and Russia’s place as a great power on the world stage that Putin has embraced and perpetuated, particularly over the past eight years.

COVID-19 Intrudes

Alas for Putin, reality intruded.  The number of COVID-19 cases began to grow in mid-March.  As of April 21, the country reported over 52,000 cases, with more than half of those just in Moscow.  The number undoubtedly is understated—as in many countries—if for no other reason than some are asymptomatic or suffer mild symptoms.  There are also indications that local health authorities are underreporting cases.

Moscow’s mayor adopted a shelter-at-home policy, but with lots of exceptions.  While the mayor asserted that the city’s hospitals had sufficient capacity, medical staff described more difficult situations, and videos showed ambulances in line to wait hours to admit patients.  The health infrastructure outside of Moscow and other large cities is weaker, raising concern about the virus’s impact in rural areas.

Much like his American counterpart, Putin responded slowly to the mushrooming health crisis, leaving it to mayors and regional authorities to manage.  Sounding a lot like Donald Trump in February, Putin told Russians on April 19 (Orthodox Easter) “the situation is under full control.”  He has raised his public profile the past ten days, conducting videoconferences from his residence outside Moscow.  Russia, however, may be just beginning its COVID-19 trial.

As the number of cases grew in March, questions arose about the feasibility of the April 22 referendum.  Putin apparently very much desired it, and the Kremlin wanted a large turnout to bolster the referendum’s legitimacy.  Some suggested the referendum could be conducted over several days, allowing voters to space out visits to polling stations.  But the Kremlin bowed to reality and announced on March 25 that the referendum would be postponed.

Likewise, the Kremlin hoped that the May 9 commemoration could go forward, and troops began practicing for the military parade (one video showed thousands of soldiers in close formation with no masks).  However, the day’s heroes—World War II veterans now in their 90s—constitute an age-group very vulnerable to COVID-19.  Going forward with a celebration that could devastate their ranks hardly made sense.  On April 16, Putin announced a postponement.

The Economic Prognosis Looks Grim

Instead of a big public endorsement of his constitutional amendments and a patriotic gala on May 9, Putin faces a daunting challenge:  the combination of COVID-19 and an economy in trouble.  Under the virus’s impact, Russia’s already anemic economy is headed for recession.  The International Monetary Fund expects it to contract by 5.5 percent in 2020.

Complicating the economic picture for the Kremlin is continued application of Western sanctions due to Russia’s seizure of Crimea and its conflict with Ukraine in Donbas.  Economists estimate they cost Russia 1-1.5 percent of its gross domestic product.  While Russian officials downplay the effect, they miss few opportunities to ask for their removal.  For example, Putin used his intervention in the March 26 videoconference of G20 leaders to call for an end to all international sanctions.

COVID-19 has another negative impact on the Russian economy.  It has crashed global demand for oil, by far Russia’s most important export.  Perhaps not expecting the economic consequences of the virus, Russia on March 6 did not agree to an OPEC proposal to reduce production.  Igor Sechin, head of the Rosneft Oil Company and a close associate of Putin, reportedly wanted to drive the price down to push U.S. shale oil producers out of the market (their production has boosted the United States to supplant Russia and Saudi Arabia as the world’s largest oil producer).

The price dropped, more than Sechin might have anticipated.  Saudi Arabia responded to Russia’s refusal to cut production by boosting its own output and cutting the price.  On March 8, the price of oil fell 30 percent.  The resulting havoc hurt both sides.  On April 9, Russia and OPEC agreed to cut production by about 10 million barrels per day.

Whether that will suffice is uncertain.  The global economic slowdown has caused demand for oil to drop by 20-25 millions barrels per day.  On April 21, the price of a barrel of Brent oil fell below $20, a price not seen since 2002.  That was down from $74 one year earlier (the Russian government budget was designed to balance at a price of $42 per barrel).  The per barrel export duty collected by the Russian government fell to below $1, also the lowest since 2002.  Russia has to cut 2.5 million of barrels per day of production to meet its part of the April 9 agreement.  With oil storage facilities nearing capacity, there may well be further price drops before things turn around.

None of this is good news for the Russian economy, but how hard a hit it will take remains to be seen.  Thus far, the Kremlin has adopted a stimulus package to counter the COVID-19 economic consequences that is relatively modest, especially compared to programs being implemented by the United States, Germany, Britain and other industrial countries.

Managing the health crisis and its economic consequences, which could affect Putin’s approval rating—something to which the Kremlin pays extraordinarily close attention—is now the Russian president’s top preoccupation.  This is not anything like he anticipated three months ago.

Former Russian President Dmitry Medvedev, who signed the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START) with Barack Obama on April 8, 2010, called last week for the United States to agree to extend the treaty. On Friday, a Department of State spokesperson told the Russian news agency TASS in response:  “The President has directed us to think more broadly than New START…  We stand ready to engage with both Russia and China on arms control negotiations that meet our criteria.”

Unfortunately, nothing suggests President Trump will achieve anything on nuclear arms control.

Read full article at The Hill.

In the midst of the damage to public health and the global economy, the COVID-19 crisis could present an unexpected opportunity both to resolve the only hot war in Europe and to address Russian President Vladimir Putin's assault on international norms of behavior.

As the spreading coronavirus and collapsing oil prices weigh increasingly on the Kremlin, the United States and its allies should offer to lift international sanctions against Russia if Putin will end his military incursions into Ukraine. President Trump and Congress can advance America's interests, and the world's, with a bold step to encourage an end to this war. The Trump administration and Congress should seize this opening.

Read the rest at NPR.org.