Stanford University

As US-Russian Arms Control Faces Expiration, Sides Face Tough Choices

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The Trump administration’s proposal for trilateral arms control negotiations appears to be gaining little traction in Moscow and Beijing, and the era of traditional nuclear arms control may be coming to an end just as new challenges emerge. This is not to say that arms control should be an end in it itself. It provides a tool that, along with the right combination of deterrence and defense forces and proper doctrine, can enhance U.S. and allied security and promote stability.

Applying that tool will require overcoming a variety of challenges, not just regarding nuclear weapons but related issues, such as missile defense and conventional strike systems. Policymakers face some hard choices.

NUCLEAR ARMS

In August 2019, the United States withdrew from the 1987 Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty following Russia’s violation. (More broadly, Moscow’s selective compliance with arms control agreements poses a problem.) The 2010 New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START) remains as the sole agreement constraining U.S. and Russian nuclear weapons. New START expires in February 2021, but can be extended for up to five years.

For the United States, New START extension should be a no-brainer. Russia is in compliance with the treaty. Extension would continue limits on Russian strategic forces, as well as the flow of information on those forces provided by the treaty’s verification measures, until 2026. Extension would not require that the Pentagon change its strategic modernization plans, as those plans were designed to fit within New START’s limits.

Moscow has offered to extend New START, but the Trump administration has been reluctant. In 2017, U.S. officials said that, before considering the extension issue, they wanted to: 1) see if Russia met the New START limits, which took full effect in February 2018, and 2) complete the nuclear posture review, which was released the same month. Two years later, however, the administration still lacks a position on extension.

Instead, President Trump has set an unachievable objective — a trilateral negotiation with China and Russia covering all their nuclear arms. As I recently wrote in more detail, Chinese officials have repeatedly said no to such a negotiation, citing the large difference in nuclear weapons levels. The Trump administration thus far has offered nothing to entice Beijing to change its position.

Moreover, almost a year after the president set his goal, his administration has yet to offer a proposal — or even an outline — for what such a negotiation would seek to achieve. Neither Washington nor Moscow is ready to agree to have the same number of nuclear weapons as China, but it is unrealistic to think that Beijing would accept unequal limits.

Setting aside China, Russia is not ready to discuss all nuclear arms unless certain conditions are met (more on that below). The Obama administration sought a new negotiation after New START’s conclusion with the goal of including all U.S. and Russian nuclear weapons. That idea never gained traction in Moscow.

If New START expires in 2021, the United States and Russia likely would not launch major new build-ups, as both face real defense budget constraints. But their deployed strategic warhead levels could “creep up” above the number allowed by New START if the sides add warheads to intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) and/or submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) that currently carry fewer warheads than their capacity. With the demise of New START’s verification regime, the sides would have little visibility into the other’s actions regarding adding warheads or total warhead numbers.

Some appear to believe that holding back on agreeing to the extension of New START and/or starting from scratch in a new negotiation might increase U.S. leverage to include all nuclear arms, including non-strategic nuclear weapons. That does not appear to be the case. It is more likely that the end of New START’s constraints on deployed strategic weapons would make bringing non-strategic or non-deployed nuclear weapons under control more difficult.

MISSILE DEFENSE

Russian conditions for discussing a broader agreement focus first on missile defense. Differences over missile defense pose a challenge for arms control.

Current U.S. missile defenses hardly constitute a threat to Russian ICBM and SLBM warhead numbers. Moscow, however, has long seemed to fear the potential of U.S. technology and prospective missile defenses. The United States and Russia came close in spring 2011 to an arrangement on a cooperative missile defense for Europe, but they failed to reach agreement, after which the Russian position on limiting missile defenses hardened. Moscow showed no interest in a 2013 U.S. proposal for an executive agreement on missile defense transparency, under which the sides would have exchanged information each year on their current missile defense numbers and prospective numbers looking out each year for 10 years.

Moscow appears to want legally-binding limits on missile defenses. However, the Trump administration’s 2019 missile defense posture review stressed that there should be no negotiated limits on missile defense. Missile defense has a strong constituency in the U.S. Senate, impeding the chance that a treaty limiting missile defenses would get the necessary two-thirds approval.

The missile defense issue will become more complex in coming years. As part of its ground-based mid-course defense, the U.S. military maintains 44 ground-based interceptors in Alaska and California capable of intercepting strategic ballistic missile warheads, with another 20 interceptors planned. In a separate program, the Pentagon is now developing a new variant of the SM-3 missile interceptor. Whereas current variants (the SM-3 IA and SM-3 IB) can engage intermediate-range ballistic missile warheads, the Pentagon intends to test the new SM-3 IIA variant against an ICBM warhead.

If the SM-3 IIA proves capable of intercepting strategic ballistic missile warheads, that will raise concern in Moscow (and Beijing) about the proliferation of those interceptors on U.S. warships, at Aegis Ashore sites in Romania and Poland, and elsewhere. Russia’s interest in limits on missile defenses would only intensify as would Moscow’s linkage of future nuclear arms reduction negotiations to a negotiation on missile defense.

LONG-RANGE PRECISION-GUIDED CONVENTIONAL STRIKE

Sea-launched cruise missiles (SLCMs) and air-launched cruise missiles (ALCMs) carrying conventional warheads have never been constrained by arms control agreements. As their precision has increased, Russian officials and experts have expressed concern that they could destroy targets that previously would have required a nuclear weapon and that the United States might consider a “conventional strategic” attack on Russia. It is unclear how realistic this concern is; would, for example, a conventionally-armed U.S. SLCM warhead be powerful enough to disable a hardened Russian ICBM silo?

Russian officials in 2011 began linking long-range precision-guided conventional strike systems to the issue of further nuclear arms cuts. The Pentagon has shown little enthusiasm for limits on these conventional systems, which are a key component of U.S. power projection capabilities. Russia may be starting to catch up, having demonstrated conventionally-armed ALCMs and SLCMs in Syria, but the U.S. military holds a significant numerical advantage.

As with missile defense, the situation with conventional strike may become even more complex. With the demise of the INF Treaty, the Pentagon is now developing or planning several conventionally-armed ground-launched missiles that would have been prohibited by the treaty. Two missiles — the Precision Strike Missile with a possible range of 700 kilometers and a ground-launched cruise missile with a range of 1,000 kilometers — almost certainly are being developed with European contingencies in mind. The Pentagon’s planned ballistic missile with a range of 3,000-4,000 kilometers is intended for the Asia-Pacific region, primarily as a counter to the large number of Chinese intermediate-range missiles (most of which are believed to be conventionally-armed).

Developing and deploying these U.S. missiles — along with Russia’s continued deployment of the 9M729 intermediate-range ground-launched cruise missile plus other missiles that Russia may develop and deploy as “counters” to new U.S. missiles — would further complicate the long-range precision-guide conventional strike picture. That, if in turn linked to nuclear arms control, would impede negotiation of a new agreement reducing and limiting nuclear weapons.

HYPERSONIC, CYBER, AND SPACE

Hypersonic weapons pose another complex factor for arms controllers. Both the United States and Russia (as well as China) are developing hypersonic weapons, including hypersonic glide vehicles to mount on ballistic missiles and hypersonic cruise missiles. Russia has deployed a small number of Avangard hypersonic glide vehicles atop ICBMs to enhance their ability to overcome U.S. missile defenses. Those fall under New START’s limits, but future hypersonic weapons, such as Russia’s Kinzhal air-launched ballistic missile, do not.

A negotiation to limit nuclear arms or long-range precision-guided conventional strike systems would have to take account of hypersonic weapons. That could be difficult, as the United States, Russia, and China appear to be focusing on different types of hypersonic systems.

Cyber and space domains can also have important effects on the nuclear arms relationship. Cyber raises concern about the possibility that a side’s nuclear command, control, and communication systems might be compromised in ways that would allow an intruder either to disrupt communications, including an authorized launch order, or to spoof the system with an unauthorized instruction. The cyber domain does not lend itself readily to traditional arms control-type arrangements.

As for space, Moscow has long advanced proposals to ban the weaponization or militarization of space. Washington has resisted those proposals, in part out of concern that they might affect the ability of the U.S. military to operate space-based assets for command and control, early warning, and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance purposes. It is unclear whether more limited proposals, such as a ban on anti-satellite tests that generate orbital debris or a ban on deploying strike weapons in space, might be negotiable.

DIFFICULT TRADE-OFFS

Traditional nuclear arms control is in trouble. If the United States and Russia — and perhaps other countries in the future — wish to continue to use it as a tool to promote a more stable, secure, and transparent nuclear relationship, they will have to deal with challenges that did not arise or that they could agree to set aside during past negotiations.

Washington faces a fundamental choice: Is it prepared to countenance some constraints on missile defense and possibly long-range precision-guided conventional strike systems in order to get Russia to agree to further reduce and limit nuclear arms, including non-strategic nuclear weapons? Moscow faces something of the reverse choice: Will it hold to its insistence on limiting missile defenses and conventional strike systems even if that blocks a future nuclear arms agreement with the United States?

There remains the question of China, and Russia almost certainly would seek to include Britain and France. Would those third countries be willing to consider an approach other than a full negotiation with the United States and Russia, perhaps by offering a degree of transparency regarding their nuclear forces and committing unilaterally not to increase their nuclear weapons numbers so long as U.S. and Russian nuclear forces were reducing?

It would make sense for U.S. and Russian officials to conduct regular, intense bilateral strategic stability talks on the full range of issues — nuclear arms, missile defense, conventional strike systems, hypersonic weapons, third-country nuclear forces, cyber, and space — and their various interactions. Such discussions, if they go beyond mere recital of talking points, might allay some concerns the sides hold about the other while helping U.S. and Russian officials to decide whether specific negotiations might make sense.

None of these questions will be easy, and sorting them out will take time. That bolsters the already strong argument for extending New START. Doing so would give Washington and Moscow five more years to figure out what role, if any, arms control should play in managing their nuclear relationship with one another and, perhaps, with third countries.

 

Originally for Brookings

 

 

 

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Crimea:  Six Years after Illegal Annexation

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March 18 marks the sixth anniversary of Russia’s illegal annexation of Crimea.  Attention now focuses on the Russian-Ukrainian conflict in Donbas, a conflict that has taken some 14,000 lives, but Moscow’s seizure of Crimea—the biggest land-grab in Europe since World War II—has arguably done as much or more damage to Europe’s post-Cold War security order.

 

Ukraine lacks the leverage to restore sovereignty over Crimea, at least for the foreseeable future.  But that does not mean the West should accept it.  Doing so might only encourage the Kremlin to believe that taking the territory of other countries is an action that it can get away with.

 

Crimea’s Illegal Annexation

 

Ukraine’s Maidan Revolution ended in late February 2014, when President Victor Yanukovych fled Kyiv—later to turn up in Russia—and the Rada (Ukraine’s parliament) appointed an acting president and acting prime minister to take charge.  They made clear their intention to draw Ukraine closer to Europe by signing an association agreement with the European Union.

 

Almost immediately thereafter, armed men began occupying key facilities and checkpoints on the Crimean peninsula.  Clearly professional soldiers by the way they handled themselves and their weapons, they wore Russian combat fatigues but with no identifying insignia.  Ukrainians called them “little green men.”  President Vladimir Putin at first flatly denied these were Russian soldiers, only to later admit that they were and award commendations to their commanders.

 

The sizeable Ukrainian military presence in Crimea stayed in garrison.  If shooting began, Kyiv wanted the world to see the Russians fire first.  Ukraine’s Western partners urged Kyiv not to take precipitate action.  Since many enlisted personnel in the Ukrainian ranks came from Crimea, Ukrainian commanders probably had less than full confidence in the reliability of their troops.

 

Things moved quickly.  By early March, Russian troops had secured the entire peninsula.  On March 6, the Crimean Supreme Council voted to ask to accede to Russia.  The council scheduled a referendum for March 16, which offered two choices:  join Russia or return to Crimea’s 1992 constitution, which gave the peninsula significant autonomy.  Those who favored Crimea remaining part of Ukraine under the current constitution had no box to check.

 

The conduct of the referendum proved chaotic and took place absent any credible international observers.  Local authorities reported a turnout of 83 percent, with 96.7 percent voting to join Russia.  The numbers seemed implausible, given that ethnic Ukrainians and Crimean Tatars accounted for almost 40 percent of the peninsula’s population.  (Two months later, a leaked report from the Russian president’s Human Rights Council put turnout at only 30 percent, with about half of those voting to join Russia.)

 

On March 18, Crimean and Russian officials signed the Treaty of Accession of the Republic of Crimea to Russia.  Putin ratified the treaty three days later.

 

Russian Claims

 

Moscow maintains a historical claim to Crimea.  The Russians colonized Crimea during the reign of Catherine the Great, and they founded Sevastopol—the peninsula’s main port and largest city—to be the homeport for the Russian Black Sea Fleet.  Following the establishment of the Soviet Union, Crimea was a part of the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic until 1954, when it was transferred administratively to the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic.

 

It is also true that Crimea in 2014 had an ethnic Russian majority of about 60 percent—the only part of Ukraine where ethnic Russians constituted the majority.  But it is equally true that, when the Soviet Union collapsed in December 1991, the resulting independent states recognized one another in their then-existing borders.  Russia’s seizure of Crimea from Ukraine violated, among other agreements, the UN Charter, the 1975 Helsinki Final Act, the 1994 Budapest Memorandum of Security Assurances for Ukraine and the 1997 Treaty on Friendship, Cooperation and Partnership between Ukraine and Russia.

 

Moscow expressed concern about the fate of ethnic Russians in Crimea, but no evidence showed any threat to them.  The Russian government justified the referendum and annexation as an act of self-determination, though it appears that well less than half of the Crimean population actually voted to join Russia.  In any case, the Kremlin applies the principle of self-determination selectively; Moscow responded to the desire of Chechens for independence from Russia after the Soviet collapse with two bloody conflicts.

 

It appears that domestic politics provided one motive behind Putin’s decision to seize Crimea.  He returned to the presidency in 2012 with an economic situation much weaker than during his first two terms as president (2000-2008).  Instead of being able to cite economic growth and rising living standards, he based much of his reelection appeal on Russian nationalism.  Seizing Crimea in a quick and relatively bloodless operation proved very popular with the Russian public.  Putin’s approval rating climbed accordingly.

 

Crimea Today and Looking Forward

 

Crimea has undergone significant changes over the past six years.  A large number of ethnic Ukrainians and Crimean Tatars—some put the total at 140,000—have left the peninsula since 2014.  Crimean Tatars complain of intimidation and oppression as one reason for moving.  During the same period, some 250,000 people have moved from Russia to Crimea (Crimean Tatar leaders claim the influx is much larger).  The inflow has included troops and sailors, as the Kremlin has bolstered the Russian military presence on the peninsula, deploying new submarines, surface combatants and combat aircraft among other things.

 

The economic picture is mixed.  Trying to create a success story, Moscow has poured in more than $10 billion in direct subsidies as well as funding major construction and infrastructure projects, such as the highway and railroad bridges that now cross the Kerch Strait to link Crimea directly to Russia.  On the other hand, small business has suffered, particularly with the decline in tourism, which once accounted for about one quarter of Crimea’s economy.  Crimea also remains subject to a variety of Western economic and other sanctions.  It is probably fair to say that the reality of the economic situation today falls short of what many in Crimea expected, or hoped for, with Russia’s annexation.

 

The ongoing Russian-Ukrainian conflict in Donbas has pushed Crimea to the back pages, with Kyiv understandably focusing on trying to end that fighting, which claims the lives of Ukrainian soldiers on almost a weekly basis.  Still, while Donbas has meant far more dead than Crimea, Crimea’s seizure arguably has done as much, if not more, damage to the European security order.  A key premise of the 1975 Helsinki Final Act and subsequent documents was that state borders should be inviolable and not changed by force; Russia’s actions in 2014 shredded that principle.  That has caused unease among Russia’s other neighbors.

 

The Ukrainian government maintains that it will get Crimea back.  Analytically, it is difficult to see how Kyiv can muster the political, diplomatic, economic and military leverage needed to do so.  Perhaps the one possibility would be if Ukraine were to achieve dramatic success in growing its economy, both in absolute terms and relative to the Russian economy, to the point where Crimeans calculated that their living standards would be better off as part of Ukraine.  Moscow would likely fiercely resist that—just ask the Chechens—and, in any case, Ukraine’s economy has a long way to go.

 

Even if Crimea’s return appears implausible in the near term, the United States and Europe should continue to support Kyiv’s position, maintain Crimea-related sanctions on Russia, and hold to the policy of non-recognition of Crimea’s annexation.  Moscow should pay some price for its use of military force to seize the peninsula.  That’s the right thing to do for Ukraine, for the European security order, and for dissuading the Kremlin from trying land grabs elsewhere.

 

The West also should remember the case of the Baltic states.  For five decades, the United States and other European countries refused to recognize their incorporation into the Soviet Union.  For most of that time, the Baltics regaining independence seemed implausible…until it happened.

 

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CANCELED: Reorienting U.S. Policy toward Great Power Competition and Russia

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CISAC will be canceling all public events and seminars until at least April 5th due to the ongoing developments associated with COVID-19.

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About this Event: The Trump administration's National Security Strategy, released in December 2017, put the economic, military and political challenges posed by peer competitors--Russia and China--at the top of its list of national security concerns.  What was the process that led the Trump administration to this conclusion, particularly regarding Russia, and what policies did the National Security Strategy advocate that the United States accordingly pursue toward Russia?  Our speaker, Nadia Schadlow, served on the National Security Council from 2017 to 2018 and was the principal author of the National Security Strategy.

 

About the Speaker: Dr. Nadia Schadlow has served in leadership positions in government and the private sector for over 25 years. Dr. Schadlow’s U.S. government experience includes senior leadership positions at the National Security Council and the Department of Defense. She was the principal author of the Trump Administration’s National Security Strategy (NSS) which  identified the return of great power rivalry as a central feature of global geopolitics.

Prior to her most recent  government service,  Dr. Schadlow served as a Senior Program Officer at the Smith Richardson Foundation where she invested in  research and policy solutions to improve the security and strategic competitiveness of the United States. Dr. Schadlow has written frequently on national security matters.  Her 2017  book, War and the Art of Governance, addressed the problems of political and economic consolidation during and following war. Dr. Schadlow received a B.A. degree in Government and Soviet Studies from Cornell University, and M.A. and Ph.D. degrees from the John Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS).

 

 

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Countering Russian Cyber Operations: At the Boundaries of Conflict

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This event is co-sponsored with the Project on Russian Power and Purpose in the 21st Century

 

Seminar Recording:   https://youtu.be/5gWmnsTD0MA

 

About this Event: Russia has deployed cyber operations to interfere in foreign elections, launch disinformation campaigns, and cripple neighboring states—yet the regime has also maintained a thin veneer of deniability and avoided strikes that cross the line into acts of war. How should a targeted nation respond? The international effort to counter Russian cyber operations by imposing sanctions and indictments, in combination with a new defend forward approach, has done little to alter Moscow’s behavior.  Therefore, in his new book on Russian Cyber Operations, Scott Jasper takes a deep dive into the legal and technical maneuvers that are used to avoid consequences, proposing that nations develop robust solutions for resilience to withstand future attacks.

 

About the Speaker: Scott Jasper, CAPT, USN (ret) is a Lecturer at the National Security Affairs Department and the Institute for Security Government at the Naval Postgraduate School, specializing in defense strategy, hybrid warfare, and cyber policy. Scott has published chapters in various handbooks related to cybersecurity and articles in Strategic Studies Quarterly, the International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence, United States Cybersecurity Magazine, The National Interest, Small Wars Journal, and The Diplomat. He is the author of Russian Cyber Operations: Coding the Boundaries of Conflict, Strategic Cyber Deterrence: The Active Cyber Defense Option and editor of Conflict and Cooperation in the Global Commons, Security Freedom in the Global Commons, and Transforming Defense Capabilities: New Approaches for International Security. He received his Ph.D. from the University of Reading, U.K. 

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Scott Jasper Naval Postgraduate School
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Russian Power and Purpose in the 21st Century Seminars

Germany, Europe and Russia

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Seminar Recording: https://youtu.be/BGjRsO0fKds

 

About this Event: Germany plays a key role in shaping European and Western policy toward Russia.  Berlin is a leading voice within the European Union on Russian issues, and Chancellor Angela Merkel co-chairs with the French president the "Normandy" effort that seeks to broker a setttlement between Ukraine and Russia to the conflict in Donbas.  Emily Haber, the German ambassador to the United States, will join us for a conversation on how Berlin sees the Russian challenge and how the West should respond.

 

About the Speaker: Emily Margarethe Haber has been German Ambassador to the United States since June 2018. 

Immediately prior to this, Haber, a career foreign service officer, was deployed to the Federal Ministry of the Interior, serving as State Secretary overseeing security and migration at the height of the refugee crisis in Europe. In this capacity, she worked closely with the US administration on topics ranging from the fight against international terrorism to global cyberattacks and cybersecurity. In 2009, she was appointed Political Director and, in 2011, State Secretary at the Foreign Office, the first woman to hold either post. 

Emily Haber is married to Hansjörg Haber. The couple has two sons. 

Emily Margarethe Haber German Ambassador to the United States
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Putin vs. The Internet

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This event is co-sponsored with the Center on Democracy, Development, and the Rule of Law

 

Seminar Recording: https://youtu.be/cPaeCJiRWuM

 

About this Event: In 2011, the impact of the Arab Spring and the emergence of YouTube videos evidencing ballot stuffing during Russian parliamentary elections, which nearly led to a revolution in Russia, forced Kremlin strategists to suddenly realize that the Internet had become a major media — and a major power. This was the case not only in Russia, but everywhere on the planet. The Kremlin spent years and billions of dollars [or rubles?] to subdue this power, and  to learn how to make use of it. Was this crusade successful? Is it true that Putin is now capable of influencing elections everywhere in the world? Will he be able to cut Russia off from the global internet? And what are the troll farms trying to achieve? Leonid Volkov, an internet expert and the founder of the Internet Protection Society, the leading Russian digital rights NGO—and, simultaneously, Chief of Staff for Alexey Navalny, the leader of Russian opposition—is known for his optimistic view on these issues. While Putin is far from possessing almighty internet warfare, the situation has complex implications for Russian society and democracy.

 

About the Speaker: Leonid Volkov is a Russian politician and IT-expert. He oversees regional political operations, IT and electoral campaigns for the leader of Russian opposition Alexey Navalny. Previously Volkov served as campaign manager and chief of staff for Alexei Navalny’s 2013 mayoral campaign for Moscow, as well as for Navalny’s attempt to get registered for the 2018 presidential election. Leonid Volkov is a former deputy of the Yekaterinburg City Duma. He has over 20 years of experience as an IT professional, running and consulting several of Russia’s largest software firms. Since 2016 Leonid is active also as founder and chairman of the Internet Protection Society, a NGO focused on internet freedom and digital rights in Russia.

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Leonid Volkov Russian Politician and IT-Expert
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Don't Let New START Die

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The 2010 New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START) expires in one year. Unfortunately, President Trump’s attitude seems to reflect disinterest, if not antipathy. Last April he asked for a proposal to involve Russia and China and cover all nuclear arms, but it has yet to emerge. Neither Moscow nor Beijing has shown any real interest in the concept.

Little suggests grounds for optimism about nuclear arms control as long as Mr. Trump remains president. Change will require that the Democratic candidate win in November. His or her administration would then have to move immediately to extend New START before exploring additional measures that could usefully regulate an ever more complex arms competition with Russia and others.

 

Disinterest or Antipathy:

President Trump seems to understand little about nuclear arms or how agreements negotiated to constrain them enhance America’s security. During his January 2017 call with Russian President Vladimir Putin, he reportedly was unfamiliar with New START.

In February 2019, the Trump administration gave six months’ notice of its intention to withdraw from the 1987 Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty. That treaty, signed by Ronald Reagan and Mikhail Gorbachev, banned all U.S. and Soviet land-based missiles with ranges between 500 and 5,500 kilometers.

Russia violated the INF Treaty by testing and deploying the 9M729 land-based, intermediate-range cruise missile.  While asserting that it wanted to bring Moscow back into compliance, the Trump administration showed little strategy for doing so.  It eschewed military and political measures that would have raised the costs to the Kremlin of its violation and might have affected Moscow’s calculation.

The demise of the INF Treaty last August leaves New START as the only treaty constraining U.S. and Russian nuclear forces. New START limits each country to no more than 1,550 deployed strategic warheads on no more than 700 deployed strategic missiles and bombers.  In contrast to the INF Treaty, Russia has complied with New START’s limits.  The compliance concerns expressed to date come from Russian officials, who challenge the adequacy of processes used to convert some U.S. strategic missile launchers and bombers so that they no longer count under New START.

New START expires by its terms on February 5, 2021. It can, however, be extended by up to five years by agreement between the countries’ presidents. Mr. Putin has stated that Russia is ready to extend without preconditions. Instead, Mr. Trump wants a negotiation to limit all U.S. and Russian nuclear weapons as well as bring China into the equation. Both are desirable—but highly unrealistic—goals.

Moscow has long declined to discuss limits on non-strategic nuclear weapons unless the United States discusses issues such as limits on missile defense, but the Trump administration’s 2018 missile defense review stressed no constraints on missile defenses. Absent a readiness to address issues of concern to Moscow, Mr. Trump will not succeed in negotiating limits covering all U.S. and Russian nuclear arms.

China has repeatedly made clear that it will not negotiate until the gap between U.S. and Russian nuclear weapons numbers, on the one hand, and Chinese nuclear weapons numbers, on the other, narrows. Currently, the United States and Russia each have well more than ten times as many nuclear weapons as does China.

In mid-January, U.S. and Russia officials held strategic security talks covering a range of issues.  They agreed to further meetings—which is good news—but nothing suggests progress toward a negotiation that would include all nuclear arms and bring in China.

Nine months after Mr. Trump expressed interest in going big on arms control, his administration has offered no concrete ideas as to what limits it wants or how it would persuade Moscow and Beijing to join its desired trilateral negotiation. That could mean internal disagreement within the U.S. government. It fuels suspicion that the proposal seeks to divert attention from the administration’s failure to extend New START.

Extending New START to 2026 should be a no-brainer. Doing so would maintain the treaty’s limits on Russian strategic forces when Moscow has hot production lines running (U.S. production of new strategic bombers, submarines and missiles will begin in earnest only in the mid-2020s). Extension would continue the flow of information about Russian forces provided by the treaty’s data exchanges, notifications and inspections, which helps the Pentagon avoid costly worst-case assumptions. It would offer a mechanism for addressing exotic new kinds of Russian strategic weapons. Extending New START would achieve all this without forcing the U.S. military to alter any part of its strategic modernization program, as that program was designed to fit within New START’s limits.

Unfortunately, the administration’s attitude toward the INF Treaty and New START give little reason to think anything positive will happen on the arms control agenda under Mr. Trump’s watch. Change will require the Democratic candidate wins in November.

 

Looking Forward

If the Democrats were to win, New START extension would demand urgent attention from the incoming president. He or she would take the oath of office on January 20, 2021—just 15 days before the treaty’s expiration date. The new president should immediately agree to Mr. Putin’s offer on extending the treaty.

If extension were decided, U.S. and Russian officials could use the treaty’s Bilateral Consultative Commission to take a more serious look at Russian concerns about conversion of U.S. strategic systems and the new kinds of strategic arms under development in Russia, such as the Poseidon nuclear-armed, nuclear-powered torpedo.

New START extension would provide a solid foundation for discussions with Russian officials on the full range of issues affecting the U.S.-Russian strategic relationship:  strategic nuclear weapons, non-strategic nuclear arms, precision-guided long-range conventional strike systems, missile defense, third-country nuclear forces, cyber and space issues, as well as how to maintain strategic stability in a rapidly changing world.

During the Cold War period, strategic stability—a situation in which neither Washington nor Moscow had an incentive to strike first with nuclear weapons, even in an intense crisis—required a relatively straightforward calculation.  It focused on the strategic nuclear weapons of each side.  As long as each had survivable strategic forces capable of devastating the other, even after absorbing a first strike, stability could be maintained.

Today’s stability model is far more complex. It is multi-domain, including missile defense, conventional strike, cyber and space operations in addition to nuclear arms. It is multi-player, as third-country actions have to be factored into stability calculations.

U.S. and Russian security officials should discuss the challenges posed by this new era. The talks might not spin off specific negotiating agendas, at least not immediately. To get negotiations started, both sides would have to weigh trade-offs. Realistically, if Washington wants Moscow to negotiate non-strategic nuclear weapons, it would have to consider addressing Russia’s concerns on missile defense. However, even absent new negotiations, a structured discussion venue would allow U.S. and Russian experts to exchange views and better understand, and perhaps alleviate, the other side’s concerns.

A new administration should seek a parallel set of discussions with China. Seeking negotiated limits on Chinese nuclear forces would pose a wildly impractical goal, at least in the near term.  The dialogue might instead usefully begin with an exchange of views on concerns about the other’s force structures and doctrines. It might later seek to move China toward some transparency on its total nuclear weapons number and a unilateral commitment not to increase that number if the United States and Russia continue to limit and reduce their nuclear arms.

As for the INF Treaty, the Russian military wants the 9M729, and the Pentagon has four different land-based missiles under development or planned with ranges that the treaty would have prohibited. While the 9M729 reportedly can carry nuclear or conventional warheads, the Russian military appears interested primarily in its conventional capability. All four of the Pentagon’s planned intermediate-range missiles are intended to be conventionally armed. This opens the possibility of a negotiation to ban land-based, intermediate-range missiles armed with nuclear warheads. That would pose verification challenges, but they should not prove insurmountable.

The U.S. military has expressed the greatest interest in having land-based intermediate-range missiles in the western Pacific to counter China’s large number of intermediate-range missiles, most of which are conventionally armed. The Pentagon’s development of intermediate-range missiles might open the possibility—admittedly, a long shot—for a separate U.S.-Chinese discussion, or a trilateral U.S.-Chinese-Russian discussion, on prohibiting nuclear-armed, land-based, intermediate-range missiles.

Extending New START, strategic discussions with Russia and China, and the possible negotiation of an agreement to ban land-based, intermediate-range missiles armed with nuclear warheads comprise a more modest agenda for nuclear arms control than many would like. These measures nonetheless would provide useful guardrails for the nuclear competition between the United States and its two peer military rivals. They would provide time to consider further steps to reduce nuclear risks and enhance strategic stability in the modern era.  Unfortunately, little suggests that Mr. Trump is prepared to take such steps. They will have to await his successor.

 

Original Source: The National Interest

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From Fake News to Hybrid Warfare: The Militarization of Disinformation Debate in the Czech Republic

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Seminar Recording: https://youtu.be/liv27EFoFWA

 

About this Event: The phenomenon of “fake news” has become a highly political issue not only in the United States but also in other parts of the world. In this talk, we focus on the politics of fighting disinformation in post-communist Central Europe, specifically in the Czech Republic. In the Czech public debate, the problem of disinformation started to be treated by many politicians, journalists, and analysts as an existential threat, as they see the spread of “fake news” as a part of Russia-led hybrid warfare waged against the West, aiming at undermining the trust in the current political system and its elites. We explain the emergence and wide-spread popularity of this military narrative around disinformation and suggest that using the language of war in this context is a highly political move, which changes our way of thinking about the problem of disinformation, gives room for repressive solutions rather than civilian ones, and by itself threatens the fundamental values of a democratic society more than paid Russian “trolls”. We argue instead for understanding the problem of disinformation as a part of a broader condition of “information chaos”, characterized by sociotechnical transformations of news production and consumption, occasional malign interference by state- as well as non-state actors, all this taking place in the context of growing inequalities and cultural backlash against traditional elites in Western societies.

 

About the Speaker:

Dagmar Rychnovská is Marie Sklodowska-Curie Fellow at the Techno-science and societal transformation group at the Institute for Advanced Studies in Vienna. She holds a PhD in International Relations (Charles University in Prague), an MA in Comparative and International Studies (ETH Zurich and University of Zurich), and an LLM in Law and Politics of International Security (VU University Amsterdam). Her research interests lie at the intersection of international relations, security studies, and science and technology studies. Her current research explores security controversies in research and innovation governance, with a focus on bioweapons, biotechnologies, and biobanks.

 

Michal Smetana is currently a Visiting Scholar at the Center for International Security and Cooperation (CISAC), Stanford University, as well as Research Associate and Assistant Professor at the Faculty of Social Sciences, Charles University, and Coordinator of the newly established Peace Research Center Prague. He holds a PhD in International Relations from Charles University in Prague, and he was previously a Visiting Research Fellow at the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) and Peace Research Institute Frankfurt (PRIF). His main research interests lie at the intersection of security studies, international relations, and political psychology, with a specific focus on issues related to nuclear weapons in world politics, arms control and disarmament, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, deterrence theory, and norms and deviance in international affairs. His most recent articles have been published in International Affairs, The Washington Quarterly, Journal of International Relations and Development, International Relations, Asia Europe Journal, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Cambridge Review of International Affairs, The Nonproliferation Review, and other academic and policy journals. He is the author of Nuclear Deviance: Stigma Politics and the Rules of the Nonproliferation Game (Palgrave Macmillan) and co-editor of Global Nuclear Disarmament: Strategic, Political, and Regional Perspectives (Routledge) and Indirect Coercion: Triangular Strategies and International Conflict (Charles University Press). 

Dagmar Rychnovská & Michal Smetana
Seminars
European Security Initiative

The Wagner Group: Untangling the Purpose behind a Russian Power Tool

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This event is co-sponsored by the European Security Initiative

* Please note all CISAC events are scheduled using the Pacific Time Zone

 

Seminar Recording: https://youtu.be/1rkTwxnf2Fg

 

About this Event: Russia has employed the semi-state Wagner Group security company in Ukraine, Syria, the Central African Republic, Libya, Mozambique, and Mali (so far). Wagner is tightly connected to Russia's military intelligence organization (the GRU), and partially funded by one of Vladimir Putin's cronies, Evgeny Prigozhin, who also uses it for private duties. So why is Wagner technically illegal (and even unconstitutional) in Russia? Its use is less costly in budgetary and political terms than using the uniformed military, and it provides (limited) plausible deniability for Russian actions. But it is also unclear what Russia wants from impoverished sub-Saharan Africa. Using the best available evidence, this presentation explores these mysteries.

 

About the Speaker: Kimberly Marten is a professor of political science (and the department chair) at Barnard College, Columbia University, and a faculty member of Columbia’s Harriman Institute and Saltzman Institute. She has written four books, including Warlords: Strong-Arm Brokers in Weak States (Cornell, 2012), and Engaging the Enemy: Organization Theory and Soviet Military Innovation (Princeton, 1993) which received the Marshall Shulman Prize. The Council on Foreign Relations (where she is a member) published her special report, Reducing Tensions between Russia and NATO (2017). She is a frequent media commentator, and appeared on “The Daily Show” with Jon Stewart. She earned her A.B. at Harvard and Ph.D. at Stanford, and was a CISAC post-doc.

Virtual Seminar

Kimberly Marten Professor of Political Science (and the department chair) at Barnard College, Columbia University Barnard College, Columbia University
Seminars
Russian Power and Purpose in the 21st Century Seminars
European Security Initiative

Do Morals Matter?

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Seminar Recording: https://youtu.be/qanfBvhmTQM

 

About this Event: In Do Morals Matter?, Joseph S. Nye, Jr., one of the world's leading scholars of international relations, provides a concise yet penetrating analysis of the role of ethics in US foreign policy during the post-1945 era.

Working through each presidency from Truman to Trump, Nye scores their foreign policy on three ethical dimensions: their intentions, the means they used, and the consequences of their decisions. Alongside this, he evaluates their leadership qualities, elaborating on which approaches work and which ones do not.

Since we so often apply moral reasoning to foreign policy, Nye suggests how to do it better. Crucially, presidents must factor in both the political context and the availability of resources when deciding how to implement an ethical policy--especially in a future international system that presents not only great power competition from China and Russia, but transnational threats as borders become porous to everything from drugs to infectious diseases to terrorism to cyber criminals and climate change.

 

About the Speaker: Joseph S. Nye, Jr. is University Distinguished Service Professor Emeritus and former Dean of Harvard’s Kennedy School of Government. He received his bachelor's degree summa cum laude from Princeton University, won a Rhodes Scholarship to Oxford, and earned a Ph.D. in political science from Harvard. He has served as Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, Chair of the National Intelligence Council, and a Deputy Under Secretary of State, and won distinguished service awards from all three agencies. His books include The Future of Power,  The Power Game: A Washington Novel, and (forthcoming) Do Morals Matter? He is a fellow of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences, the British Academy, and the American Academy of Diplomacy. In a recent survey of international relations scholars, he was ranked as the most influential scholar on American foreign policy, and in 2011, Foreign Policy named him one of the top 100 Global Thinkers. In 2014, Japan awarded him the Order of the Rising Sun.

Joseph S. Nye, Jr. University Distinguished Service Professor Emeritus Harvard’s Kennedy School
Seminars
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