So how did the meeting in Anchorage actually play out?

In commentary on social media, FSI Director and former U.S. Ambassador to Russia Michael McFaul summarized the talks in the context of the Yalta Conference, an agreement between the United States, the United Kingdom, and the Soviet Union made in the waning months of WWII that quickly fell apart when Joseph Stalin broke promises made to Western leaders to maintain and support democratic elections in Eastern Europe.

Speaking on NPR’s Morning Edition, McFaul elaborated on his concerns: 

“What I think the worst outcome would be is if President Trump starts negotiating on behalf of the Ukrainians without the Ukrainians in the room. Trump needs something tangible, and I hope that doesn't make him too anxious to start negotiating on behalf of the Ukrainians because that would be a disaster. If he jams President Zelenskyy with something he can't accept, that would be the worst of all outcomes.”

Pifer echoed his relief about the lack of discussion over particulars about Ukraine between the two leaders, but also pointed out that the broadest goal of the meeting also hadn’t been met.

“The good news is, President Trump didn’t give away the store. I was concerned he might get into bargaining on details about Ukraine without the Ukrainians there, which would be to their detriment. But it seems Mr. Trump failed in his stated goal to achieve a ceasefire between Russia and Ukraine,” said Pifer. 

But even without a concrete policy outcome, Pifer says the Alaska meeting was an optical victory for Russia: 

“The significance for Vladimir Putin is that the meeting happened in the first place. Since Russia launched its invasion of Ukraine back in 2022, there’s been a boycott by Western leaders of any kind of face-to-face meeting with Putin. And by hosting him in Alaska, Trump broke that boycott. That is being played up in Moscow as a huge victory that Putin has been legitimized again.”

On Monday, August 18, President Zelenskyy and a cadre of other European leaders met with President Trump at the White House to discuss the Friday meeting and reinforce Europe’s positions and redlines against capitulation to Russian demands.

In analysis for Foreign Policy, Pifer outlined the stakes of this follow-up meeting for the European delegation:

“Zelenskyy and his European colleagues face a tricky challenge. They have to diplomatically offer suggestions to walk Trump back from a position that he does not appear to understand would be bad for Ukraine, bad for Europe, and bad for American interests. And they have to do so without setting off an explosion that could disrupt U.S.-Ukrainian and U.S.-European relations.”

McFaul is also cautious about the tone and tack of the discussions moving forward:

“I think it’s a good thing [the Europeans and Trump] are talking about security guarantees,“ he told Alex Witt on MSNBC. “But the devil is in the details. We keep hearing something about ‘NATO-like security guarantees.’ Why not just NATO security guarantees?"

The argument for building a lasting ceasefire in Ukraine based on NATO membership is a proposal McFaul has long supported.

“This notion that these guarantees are going to be something like NATO but less than NATO . . . if I were the Ukrainians, that would make me nervous. They had guarantees like that in 1994 called the Budapest Memorandum, and it meant nothing. It didn’t stop Putin from invading in 2014, and it didn’t stop him from launching a full-scale war in 2022,” McFaul reminded viewers.

“To me,” he argues, “it has to be NATO, not NATO-lite. The only way to do real, credible security guarantees for Ukraine is membership in NATO.”

In assessing the White House meeting with President Zelenskyy and European leadership, Rose Gottemoeller, the William J. Perry lecturer at CISAC and former deputy secretary of NATO, is cautiously optimistic. 

“This was a major step along the road, and it was vital that the Europeans were there as well as Ukraine,” she told the CBC.

A seasoned negotiator with direct experience working on high-level diplomacy with Russia, Gottemoeller is no stranger to the long process of dealmaking with the Kremlin.

“There are many steps to get through. We are not there yet. As much as Trump would like to walk out of the Oval Office and say, ‘We got the deal done,’ I think there will be many more hoops to jump through before that is possible.”

Additional insights from our scholars on the Trump-Putin summit and White House meeting with Zelenskyy and other European leaders can be found at the following links:

Russia, Ukraine, and Trump on Katie Couric
Trump Meets with Putin: Experts React in the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists
There Are No Participation Trophies in High-Stakes Diplomacy on Substack

Motivation & Contribution

Vladimir Putin has ruled Russia for over a quarter century despite economic mismanagement, corruption, and a disastrous war in Ukraine. Prior to the invasion, Putin’s rule was often seen as exemplifying modern autocracy, maintaining one-man rule while employing less overt mechanisms of social control, such as propaganda and regularly held, albeit controlled, uncompetitive elections. Since the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February of 2022, however, Putin’s authoritarianism has intensified, especially as opponents of the war are imprisoned, terrorized, driven into exile, or worse. As such, Russia’s “modern” autocracy, which relies less on force than on presenting a message to society of an all-capable state and leader, has transformed into a highly personalized form of harsh authoritarianism. At the same time, many average Russians do genuinely support Putin — especially given his emphasis on order in society and restoring Russian greatness — and view the regime as legitimate and responsive. Often, however, analysts of contemporary Russia in the West tend to focus more on those Russians who oppose Putin’s autocracy than on those who support it and why they do. 

In her “Review Article: Why Does Putinism Endure? Dialoguing With the Dictator,” Kathryn Stoner tackles this question through a critical analysis mainly of Hannah Chapman’s Dialogue with the Dictator: Authoritarian Legitimation and Information Management in Putin’s Russia. The analysis is complemented by insights from four other recently published books on authoritarianism and Russia. For Stoner, Chapman’s central contribution lies in showing how a seemingly ridiculous exercise in state propaganda — the Direct Line with Vladimir Putin TV call-in show — is in fact an important way of legitimizing Putin’s rule, providing his regime with information about social preferences and sources of dissatisfaction while affording citizens with the feeling that their complaints are being heard and even resolved live and on TV. Gaining information about citizens would otherwise be difficult in such an unfree society, where individual preferences that may be critical of Putin’s rule are often concealed or deliberately falsified to avoid punishment by the regime. The reader learns that even hegemonic dictators must be perceived by citizens to be a good listener. 

The Functions of ‘Participatory Technologies’

The conceptual foundation of Chapman’s analysis lies in what she terms ‘participatory technologies’ (PTs), which allow citizens to interact with authoritarian regimes “directly and in a positive manner.” Observers tend to dismiss PTs, which are often low-technology formats like TV shows or radio programs, as ‘spin’ or mere propaganda. In Russia, however, Putin uses PTs not only to control what information reaches citizens, but also to enhance his legitimacy and appear more accountable. Although PTs are limited and highly individualized — for example, more often than not ignoring collective demands — they are direct.

Participatory technologies differ from autocrats’ sham, window-dressing elections, where the outcome is a foregone conclusion. Instead, they permit citizens to engage with and provide input to the autocrat on specific issues. They also provide information to the regime about the performance of lower-level agents, such as governors or regional politicians, given that citizens are often concerned with local, day-to-day problems. By involving these lower-level agents, autocrats can deflect responsibility for governance problems away from themselves. Finally, PTs provide value to those who participate in them, giving them a sense of political efficacy. At the same time, however, PTs may expose embarrassing governmental dysfunctions. Indeed, the resolution of local problems – like fixing potholes on a local road – should not require direct citizen engagement with powerful national-level leaders. Furthermore, PTs run the risk of being overused and being seen as performative and fake by citizens.
 

Tuning into Direct Line

Stoner’s review article discusses Chapman’s analysis of one PT in particular, namely the Direct Line with Vladimir Putin call-in show. Direct Line began in 2001, organized by the Kremlin and broadcast on state-owned and pro-regime media. The audience and the questions posed are selected in advance. During the broadcast — which is one of the most watched events in Russia, perhaps because of compulsion from employers — Putin conveys to the audience that Russia is doing well, but that he is not satisfied, is working tirelessly, and wants to hear citizens’ concerns. Putin does not merely listen but acts to solve their concerns, for example, keeping a folder of issues raised by ordinary Russians and bringing these issues to the attention of regional governors. He has even forwarded questions directly to regional governors on air, which also serves to deflect responsibility away from himself. 

Methodology

Stoner describes the multiple survey experiments and interviews Chapman conducted in exploring whether Direct Line matters to ordinary Russians. Some of the interviewees seem to know that Direct Line is staged; yet they nonetheless find it compelling that Putin is not afraid to answer their sometimes uncomfortable questions. The goal of the survey experiments is to try to ascertain how prompts that (do not) mention Direct Line affect respondents’ evaluations of Putin. In other words, Direct Line is the ‘treatment,’ which participants in the ‘control’ group do not receive. One experiment only varies whether or not Putin heard about a problem on Direct Line. Another varies this as well as whether or not Putin resolved the problem. In both experiments, respondents whose prompts included mention of Direct Line evaluated Putin more favorably, although Stoner notes that the statistical effects of this are small. In another experiment, the mention of Direct Line leads respondents to believe there are greater opportunities to express their opinions and demands. Finally, a fourth experiment finds that respondents who support (oppose) Putin gave him higher (lower) evaluations when Direct Line was mentioned, hinting at how Direct Line might serve as a source of polarization in Russia.
 

Limitations

Stoner highlights an important puzzle about whether participatory technologies like Direct Line can, in fact, provide credible information to Putin’s regime. For example, questions are pre-screened to exclude subjects that could threaten the regime. Additionally, those who call in are already likely to be more supportive of or sympathetic to the regime. It would thus seem that Putin has better mechanisms for gathering credible information, such as through the Kremlin’s surveillance system, than through a PT like Direct Line, as Chapman claims. As such, Direct Line’s value appears primarily rhetorical, as opposed to informational — the regime is merely performing an exercise in responding to easy problems that can be resolved quickly by Putin, or inane questions about things like Putin’s favorite books.

Stoner’s review article notes her concerns regarding the generalizability of Chapman’s findings. First of all, it would be challenging to draw conclusions from the survey experiments, given that they concern a single group of people who were surveyed a decade ago (2015-2016). Relatedly, and in light of the war in Ukraine, Chapman’s analysis of PTs seems dated, as Putin has resorted far more often to severely punishing opposition (real and imagined) to his regime, rather than cajoling and coercing society with participatory technologies like his call-in show. Indeed, the show was cancelled in 2022 without explanation, but presumably to avoid difficult questions about the devastation wrought that autumn on the Russian armed forces in Ukraine. Nonetheless, Stoner notes that there is now a burgeoning literature that helps us better understand how, in normal times, autocrats effectively utilize the media and other technologies to build support and legitimate their rule, while providing citizens with a sense that they can influence politics, when in reality, they cannot.

The escalation between India and Pakistan over the terrorist attack in Pahalgam, Kashmir is revealing important insights into India's evolving defense posture and military capabilities. Arzan Tarapore joins Michael McFaul to discuss what happened between April 22 and May 10, what the clash says about the security landscape of the Indo-Pacific region, and why it matters in global politics.

Arzan Tarapore is a research scholar at the Center in International Security and Cooperation at the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies at Stanford University. His work focuses on Indian military strategy and regional security issues in the Indo-Pacific. Prior to his scholarly career, he served for 13 years in the Australian Defence Department in various analytic, management, and liaison positions, including operational deployments and a diplomatic posting to the Australian Embassy in Washington, D.C.

Watch the video version of their conversation above, or listen to the audio below, on Apple Podcasts, Spotify, and other major podcast platforms. 

TRANSCRIPT:

McFaul: You're listening to World Class from the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies at Stanford University. I'm your host, Michael McFaul, the director of FSI.

Today I'm talking to Arzan Tarapore, a research scholar at the Center on International Security and Cooperation, which is part of the Freeman Spogli Institute here at Stanford. His work focuses on India's military strategy and regional security issues in the Indo-Pacific, which is why he is the perfect person to talk with us today about the escalation earlier this year between India and Pakistan in the Kashmir region. And India's evolving military strategy more generally, as it relates to players like the United States, China, and Russia.

Arzan, welcome to World Class.

Tarapore: Thanks very much, Mike. It's good to be on.

McFaul: So, I want to start with a chat group I was on several weeks ago with a bunch of former U.S. government officials. And at one point, somebody interjected, “We are about to see the biggest military war in the world since Russia invaded Ukraine.”

And I have to tell you, I was taken aback. I don't follow issues between Pakistan and India as closely as I should, and I look forward to learning more about that now that my book is done and I have more time.

But that really startled me. Take us back to that moment. Help us understand what occurred that made people so alarmist, and then why that didn't turn out to be the case.

Tarapore: Yeah, okay, that's a very big question. Let me see if I can hit all the high spots. Look, the trigger for that comment, probably, was a terrorist attack that happened in India at a place called Pahalgam on the 22nd of April. And it was an attack that was conducted, as far as we can judge, by a Pakistan-based terrorist group that attacked innocent civilians.

And in particular, it was designed, it seems, to be as inflammatory, as provocative as possible, right? Because the terrorists were at a tourist spot, and they rounded up people and got those people to identify themselves — whether they were Hindu or Muslim — and they executed the Hindu men.

McFaul: Wow. Oh my God.

Tarapore: So it was designed to be as communal and as provocative as possible. And in that sense, it worked because the Indian government almost immediately was assumed to be poised to retaliate.

And this is interesting. This is notable, because about as recently as a decade ago, it was always an open question whether India would retaliate militarily against these types of terrorist attacks. And the situation has changed so much in the past decade that this time around it was almost assumed from the get-go that India would retaliate. And indeed they did retaliate.

McFaul: And they did.

Tarapore: And they did. And probably the reason that that member of your group chat said what they said is because India and Pakistan have, for decades, been poised with their militaries pointed at each other. These are very large militaries, very capable militaries. And nuclear armed militaries.

McFaul: Yes. Let's not leave out that small fact.

Tarapore: Exactly, right? Which is always overriding concern in Washington. So, it was President Clinton who, back in the 90s, called South Asia the most dangerous place in the world. He identified India Pakistan as the sort of scenario that if any scenario in the world was going to lead to a nuclear exchange, since the 90s there's been a strong case to be made that it would be India Pakistan. And that's always colored American thinking whenever there's a crisis between India and Pakistan and this time around was no different.

McFaul: And tell us how it played out, and how it ended.

Tarapore: So, the inevitable—that is, an Indian military attack—happened on the night of 6-7 May. So, in the very early hours of the 7th of May, local time. At about 1 a.m., India launched standoff attacks, meaning attacks launched by aircraft that did not cross into Pakistani airspace.

So the Indian aircraft stayed on the Indian side of the border and launched long-range munitions plus probably some loitering munitions, so sort of what some people call suicide drones. So, drones that are designed to go to the target and destroy the target and themselves.

S,o India launched these standoff attacks against nine terrorist targets, terrorist sites.

McFaul: And they were terrorist sites, right?

Tarapore: Yes. So there's a line of Pakistani information operations that suggests that civilians were killed. That may or may not be true. But certainly the Indian position is that they were terrorist targets and that the Indian claim is that the strike was designed to minimize civilian casualties as far as possible. Hence they attacked, for example, at 1 a.m., right, when places were probably not occupied.

McFaul: Got it.

Tarapore: So, a bunch of these sites were sort of in the countryside. And we know that because they showed the full motion video of the sites being destroyed by the missiles and they are just for some of them were just a building in the middle of the countryside or a couple of others that were terrorist headquarter complexes in the middle of cities and these are big sort of campuses that include living quarters and operation centers and mosques all on the same campus. And a couple of those sites were struck as well.

But again, at 1am and in a very targeted fashion to minimize civilian casualties. And by and large, they did a pretty good job of minimizing civilian casualties.

McFaul: So they could have done more and they chose this kind of response, right?

Tarapore: Exactly. And not only that, but they also in the subsequent press briefings, they were very clear in saying, “Listen, our quarrel is with the terrorists. We do not intend to start a war with Pakistan. We will respond if Pakistan responds to us. But we very deliberately have not struck Pakistan military targets or targets of the Pakistan state. We've only struck terrorists. And so as far as we are concerned, we have done what we needed to do. Now it's up to Pakistan to stand down and not retaliate.”

Of course, there was no chance of that happening. Pakistan did retaliate. And so then we entered a period of about three or three and a half days of tit for tat attacks between India and Pakistan. Again, all of them largely targeting each other's particular military sites; everything from sort of air defence sites to air bases on each side.

McFaul: On each side, right?

Tarapore: On each side.

McFaul: And did planes cross the line, or was it was the same kind of thing that you just described?

Tarapore: Planes never crossed the line, as far as we know. So, even though there were claims that some aircraft were shot down on the Indian side, and the Indian military leadership has subsequently conceded that, admitted that.

McFaul: So there were? That has been confirmed? I didn’t know that.

Tarapore: They have confirmed that they suffered some losses. They have not confirmed how many or what type. But it seems to be somewhere in the order of two to five Indian aircraft were shot down.

A bunch of Pakistani air bases were struck by Indian Air Force strikes. And this time around, unlike in the last crisis in 2019, the Indians were very assiduous in releasing battle damage assessment—photography and video—to prove they did actually hit these targets.

And through this whole process of about three and half days of tit for tat strikes, where the Indians scored a few big strikes against the Pakistan military and the Pakistan military did not really score any big hits against the Indian military. There were a few rounds that went astray and did sort of hit civilian targets, but by all accounts unintentionally. Through this all, the two militaries tried to keep things relatively proportionate. Neither one took big steps. They did not cross big thresholds to escalate.

But then on the last day, there were some concerns that Pakistan was in fact preparing for a bigger escalation. That's when the U.S., which had hitherto sort of tried to stay hands off, that's when the U.S. started making some phone calls to both capitals.

And then as probably prompted by that, prodded by U.S. pressure, Pakistan made a phone call to India—the Director General of Military Operations made a phone call to his opposite number in India—suggesting a ceasefire, which India agreed to. And that was the end.

So it was about a three and a half day stoush, little conflict, mostly run by missiles and loitering munitions. So no one crossed into the other country’s territory. It was a very sort of modern conflict in that sense.

McFaul: So, I want to get back to the Americans in a minute, but before that: what did you learn about Pakistani military capabilities and Indian military capabilities as a result of this?

Tarapore: So it was pretty interesting. It was very interesting, actually. Because for decades, basically throughout the 21st century, we have been worried about the prospect of a conventional war between India and Pakistan as a result of a terrorist attack.

And the mental model that we've always had is a large, combined arms, ground-centric invasion by India against Pakistan, right? Basically a war.

And for years, India has been trying to find options short of that in a way that would not prompt a Pakistan nuclear escalation. And it seems, after a couple of crises, that India has found a way to hit back at Pakistan militarily using these standoff capabilities that are relatively new in the Indian arsenal.

So, India has recently acquired a lot of these capabilities that have given it the strategic option to hit Pakistan without starting a war, So, when you ask, what did we learn about their capabilities, we learned that India has the capability to conduct these standoff attacks. And interestingly, from my point of view, the real star for the Indian military was air defense.

Whereas India managed to score a few good hits against the Pakistan Air Force and the terrorist infrastructure on day one, the really interesting thing was that despite Pakistan launching a bunch of mostly drone attacks against India, they did not score any significant hits. And this was a result of a layered air defense system that India has built up, which I was surprised by. The effectiveness was surprising.

McFaul: And where do their missile defenses come from? Are they Russian? Are they mixed?

Tarapore: I'm glad you asked Mike. They come from all over. A lot of it is indigenous.

McFaul: Indigenous! Okay, I didn't know that.

Tarapore: Some of it is indigenous, the shorter range. There's a surface-to-air missile called Akash, which is an indigenous system. There are some old legacy guns that the army operates that prove very effective.

But the really interesting thing that think that you would find in particular interesting is that the most sophisticated—which is to say, the most recently acquired and longest range system that provides the biggest bubble—was the S-400, which India acquired from Russia, much to the chagrin of the United States.

McFaul: Yes, the United States. It was a huge fight, right?

Tarapore: Yup! The U.S. threatened CAATSA sanctions against India for it.

McFaul: Tell everybody what CAATSA sanctions are. It’s a specific category of sanctions passed in the Trump administration, wasn’t it?

Tarapore: Yep, which is designed to deter countries from acquiring Russian equipment. So, the Indian deal to acquire S-400s was happening contemporaneously and the U.S. was always on the horns of a dilemma whether they should enforce CAATSA sanctions against India or issue a waiver.

As far as I recall, the U.S. decided to not make a decision. They never imposed the CAATSA sanctions, but nor did they issue an indefinite waiver. So it was always something that years ago was sort of hanging over the head of the relationship that the U.S. did not go through with sanctioning India. And the Indians now, after Op Sindoor, after this clash, now feel vindicated that in fact they acquired S-400s and you know what? They they proved to be extremely effective in protecting India.

McFaul: Super interesting. So they were right. I remember when we were trying to prevent the Russians from selling the S-400s to the Iranians during our negotiations over the Iran nuclear deal long ago. On paper, this was a significant capability. It sounds like in reality it is as well.

Tarapore: It absolutely is.

McFaul: Let's talk about the geopolitics. Let's just talk about the reaction. Walk us through U.S., China, Russia. How did they react to this conflict? And what are your takeaways in terms of the geopolitics of a very complicated set of bilateral relationships, especially with India, it seems to me, but with Pakistan as well.

How did the great powers react? And what do we learn about great power competition from this conflict?

Tarapore: So as you would know, as listeners would know, China is Pakistan's primary patron, great power patron. It provides Pakistan the bulk of its military capability. And in fact, this India-Pakistan clash was seen by some in some quarters as a test of Chinese military capability . . .

McFaul: Yes.

Tarapore: . . .  because the Pakistanis operate so much Chinese equipment.

Well, I think it's not a very good test of Chinese capability for many reasons. One, because the equipment itself that Pakistan operates is lower grade export variants of what China’s is. It's not integrated into a system in Pakistan in the same way as it is in China. And it's not used with the same what we would call “multi-domain doctrine” as the Chinese use.

So it's not a very good test of the Chinese equipment.

McFaul: Okay, well that's an important point, a very important point. They don't have the best stuff.

Tarapore: Yeah, that's right. They don't have the best stuff and they don't use it “properly,” quote unquote, in the same way that the Chinese do.

So, from the Indian point of view, this is a country, India, that has always been concerned about what they call the collusive two front threat: Pakistan and China ganging up on India, where if there was a crisis or a conflict with one, then India was always concerned that the other rival would opportunistically take advantage of it and open a second front.

I've always been skeptical of that. And I think what this conflict showed was what India considers to be no longer a two front dilemma, but one reinforced front. Because in this view, Pakistan was essentially, if not an appendage of China, it was nevertheless underwritten by China.

It may, according to some accounts, have benefited from real-time Chinese support during the conflict. For example, intelligence support, electronic warfare support by China, perhaps even Chinese personnel helping to advise Pakistan on how to use its weapons and how to plan and operate them. We don't know if that's true, but that's a possibility.

McFaul: Speculation, interesting That's a big step.

Tarapore: It is a big step. And so if you ask about China's approach to this, then clearly China is not neutral in this, right? China is underwriting Pakistan in this. But openly, diplomatically, it's not going to take a position and it's not going to take advantage of this sort of conflict to cause trouble on the India-China border. It's not that sort of exploitation.

Similarly, as with the U..S, there were Russian comments throughout this conflict that either proponents of an India-Russia relationship or critics of an India-Russia relationship could use instrumentally.

Some people, sometimes some Russian officials said something about India and Pakistan sort of creating this sense of equivalence that in fact they're not on our side, that they're being ambivalent. Others would say that no, in fact, Russia was more solidly behind us than any other country was.

And the same occurred with the U.S. There were U.S. officials who commented that either India is a victim of terrorism and that Pakistan is a perpetrator of terrorism, which pleased Indians, or that this conflict is none of our business, that it's something for India to handle, which they could live with.

Or, when President Trump started talking about India and Pakistan having been at war for a thousand years or whatever he said . . .

McFaul: Thousand years, he said. Yes.

Tarapore: . . . Indians rolled their eyes and were frustrated because for decades Indian officials have been trying to get Americans to internalize this idea that India is an important partner of the U.S. and that this hyphenation between India and Pakistan is an outdated idea that no longer applies.

And now here we have a President of the United States, again talking about India and Pakistan in the same breath, talking about having mediated between them, talking about having coerced both sides using the cudgel of trade deals, and promising to get the two sides to sit down and talk about Kashmir.

All of these things to anyone who doesn't follow South Asia, prima facie sound reasonable. To anyone who follows South Asia, these are all red lines and big alarm bells, especially in India, because they go against decades of American policy.

And so it was a sense of, in the extreme, a sense of betrayal. Or at a minimum, was a sense of rolling your eyes at a president who has not been well briefed.

McFaul: Who doesn't know the details. So what do you think? Was it was he just winging it, or was this really a policy change that was scripted?

Tarapore: No. So the interesting thing is, I mean, if you look at what the United States, quote unquote, deep state did—that is, the State Department, the U.S. State Department and the Secretary of State Marco Rubio—their comments were very consistent with U.S. policy over the last couple of decades. The concern is strategic stability, that these are two nuclear armed countries, we don't want conflict escalating carelessly, and that India is in fact a victim of terrorism and that, you know, there's no role for the United States to mediate a Kashmir issue.

There was none of that sort of sense, right? The State Department and the Secretary of State played a very straight bat and were consistent. It was President Trump who spoke extemporaneously about a conflict he seems to be not well-versed in, which has raised heckles.

But also, on the one hand, we can say that this is just a president speaking extemporaneously. On the other hand, he is the commander in chief of the United States.

McFaul: Exactly, yeah, right, exactly.

Tarapore: So you can't quite ignore what he says.

McFaul: Right. And just two seconds on the Russians. You gave us a little bit of it, but did they seem pleased? Obviously, they seem pleased with how their S-400s performed. Is this another – because obviously Modi has a pretty special relationship with Putin, I would say, compared to other leaders of democracies. Is this seen as a sign of closer relations between India and Russia, or is that too far?

Tarapore: I think that's going too far. I think the broader trend of India trying to wean itself off Russia remains, but it may have been set back a little bit by this. And what I mean by that is, for example, even if you take just the S-400s themselves, India bought five regiments of them and only has taken delivery of three of them.

COVID interrupted the deal, right? COVID interrupted the deliveries and then the Ukraine war interrupted the deliveries.

McFaul: Okay, I didn't know that.

Tarapore: And so the Indians are still waiting to take delivery of two regiments. And now, again, as we've said, this conflict seems to have vindicated the Indian decision to acquire S-400s. And that in fact, you know, there may be niche military capabilities that the Russians can offer India that proved to be operationally useful. So this relationship is far from a relic, right? This relationship is very much a live relationship that yields dividends for India.

McFaul: Great point. And tragically, the Russians have learned a lot about how to use drones in Ukraine. I just talking to some officials who work on European security, and they are way far ahead of where we expected them to be in terms of that. That could be an exportable technology in the future for other countries, for sure.

Tarapore: Absolutely.

McFaul: So to close out: give us your sense of what's next. What do you think happens here? Is this just a one-off or are you worried about other escalatory events?

Tarapore: An India-Pakistan crisis is never a one-off.

McFaul: That's a good point! I shouldn't laugh, but it's been there for a long long time.

Tarapore: It's been there for a long, long time. So, the sub-conventional campaign of terrorism based in Pakistan against India will continue. And as I said at the outset, what used to be hard to think of and then became a question of uncertainty has now become a certainty that India will retaliate.

Modi, after this conflict, gave a speech where he basically pledged that any future attack against India will be met with retaliation, Indian military retaliation. So it is now a matter of policy that India will retaliate against Pakistan.

McFaul: Before go on: we have not—the United States and obviously not China—we do not have enough influence vis-a-vis Pakistan to shut those terrorist camps down, right?

Tarapore: No way. This is foundational to the Pakistan army, foundational to the most powerful political actors in Pakistan.

McFaul: Got it.

Tarapore: And I think what this latest conflict shows is that India also recognizes that it is futile to try and dissuade the Pakistani military-jihadi complex from attacking India.

That used to be what they tried to do: to dissuade them, to deter them. What we've seen in 2025 is India recognizing it cannot dissuade Pakistan. It must instead impose costs upon these terrorists, and now the Pakistan army as well, so that it just makes it harder for them to attack India, so that attacks become less frequent and less provocative.

That seems to be where India is leaning. It is expecting future attacks from Pakistan And it's correct. And it will retaliate next time. That is a highly probable eventuality.

The question for me is, okay, so we now expect this sort of conflict to recur. The question is, what does it mean for India's overall defense posture, including what lessons does India learn for deterring conflict with China on the land border. And what does it mean for India's ability to project power into the Indian Ocean region? This is a country that faces challenges, security challenges on all sides.

And every time one of these fronts becomes active and it seizes the attention of decision makers in Delhi, the concern is that India will react to it and it will over learn the lessons of the last crisis and it will come at the expense of other priorities elsewhere.

So that'll be the thing that I watch. To what extent does this cast a shadow over Indian security planning for the months and years ahead?

McFaul: Wow, it sounds super scary. It sounds like Clinton was right, what he said back then. And when you add, as you did, we're talking about two nuclear powers. Obviously, China is a nuclear power.

Tarapore: Three!

McFaul: Three. This is frightening part of the world. That's why we're grateful, Arzan, to have you on World Class! We're grateful to have you at FSI and at Stanford, because we’ve got to be following this issue. So thanks for joining World Class today.

Tarapore: Absolutely my pleasure. Thanks Mike, for bringing some attention to this issue.

McFaul: You've been listening to World Class from the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies at Stanford University. If you like what you're hearing, please leave us a review and be sure to subscribe on Apple, Spotify, or wherever you get your podcasts to stay up to date on what's happening in the world, and why.