Paragraphs

In July 2015, General Qasem Soleimani, former commander of Iran’s elite Quds Force, secretly traveled to Moscow to discuss an emergency plan to rescue the Assad regime in Syria, which had lost control of roughly 80 percent of Syrian territory in four years of civil war. Russia had just helped broker the 2015 Iran nuclear deal, known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action. Soleimani’s trip, disclosed three months later, took place in defiance of UN travel sanctions tied to Iran’s nuclear program and threatened to undermine it. Yet the meeting would initiate a decadelong evolution of the Iranian-Russian relationship, from tactical cooperation in Syria to close partnership today, culminating in the signing of a strategic partnership agreement between the two countries in January 2025.

All Publications button
1
Publication Type
Journal Articles
Publication Date
Journal Publisher
Foreign Affairs
Authors
Or (Ori) Rabinowitz
Authors
Larry Diamond
News Type
Commentary
Date
Paragraphs

As we gather here to celebrate freedom and to recommit ourselves to the democratic cause, we face a powerful authoritarian tide. The remarkable third wave of global democratization ran out of steam two decades ago. Since then, many countries have fallen under the spell of illiberal and even authoritarian populism. Anti-establishment parties have swept into power promising to elevate “the people” over corrupt ruling elites and decrepit institutions, only to betray them more deeply through corruption and abuse of power. These include not just emerging-market democracies like Venezuela and Turkey but wealthier democracies in Europe and the United States, whose stability as liberal democracies we took for granted. 

In this global trend away from freedom, authoritarian populists have implemented a common playbook to polarize politics, punish independent media and civil society, undermine judicial independence, purge neutral watchdog institutions, politicize the civil service and security apparatus, and weaponize the state to persecute critics and opponents.

Once this authoritarian project settles into power, truth decays, the rule of law crumbles, fear sets in, and submission becomes the norm. Moreover, authoritarian populists draw from one another — and from powerful autocracies like Russia and China — the narrative arguments, political techniques, resource flows, and technological tools to accelerate their bids for hegemony.
 


The longer these authoritarian parties are in power, the more they eviscerate democratic institutions. But they are not invincible or irreversible.
Larry Diamond
Mosbacher Senior Fellow in Global Democracy, FSI


The longer these authoritarian parties are in power, the more they eviscerate democratic institutions. But they are not invincible or irreversible. Incipient authoritarianism has been turned back in countries as diverse as Brazil, Poland, Sri Lanka, and Senegal. The slide away from liberal democracy has been reversed recently in Botswana and Mauritius. An executive coup against democracy was defeated in South Korea. Young people in Bangladesh overthrew a dictator last year in a remarkable upsurge of protest. And the longstanding autocracies in Venezuela and Turkey are looking increasingly desperate and unpopular. These examples bear lessons we must learn and promote if we are to ignite — as we surely can — a new era of democratic progress.

First, we must study what it takes to defeat autocrats at the ballot box. Typically, electoral battles are not a straight contrast between democracy and autocracy. Voters weigh their circumstances of life as well. Fortunately, autocrats have other failings besides their corruption, lawlessness, and abuse of power: sooner or later, they fail to deliver on their material promises. Successful democratic campaigns target the populists’ hypocrisy and address not just people’s political rights but their economic and social needs. 

To defeat autocrats, democratic forces must offer specific, credible plans to meet the core policy challenges of economic growth and distribution, fairness and inclusion, education, health care, infrastructure, public safety, and national security. 

But people everywhere also need a vision of what constitutes a good and just form of government. Here, democracies have dropped the ball in making the case FOR democracy as the best form of government. Decades ago, as they fought dictatorships and then came to power, democracies taught their young people the values, ideas, and history of democracy. But as new democracies stabilized, the existence of a democratic culture came to be assumed, and countries forgot the terrible price they paid under dictatorship — the fear, falsehoods, powerlessness, and repression, the lack of accountability, voice, justice, and human dignity. We can make the practical case for democracy — it performs better over time. But we cannot pin the argument on performance, which may fail at specific points in time.
 


Ultimately, the case for democracy is that being able to speak truth to power, to hold it accountable, and to change those who exercise it is a core element of human dignity and a basic human right.
Larry Diamond
Mosbacher Senior Fellow in Global Democracy, FSI


Ultimately, the case for democracy is that being able to speak truth to power, to hold it accountable, and to change those who exercise it is a core element of human dignity and a basic human right. The freedoms to speak, publish, pray, organize, and assemble are inalienable human rights. As are the rights to a fair and impartial trial and to have all citizens be treated equally under the law. It is only democracy — never autocracy — that protects these rights and treats citizens with dignity by investing sovereignty in them, not some self-appointed minority. Liberty and democracy are intertwined.

We must make these points relentlessly, creatively, and convincingly, not just in the schools, at successively higher levels of instruction and deliberation, but through the social media platforms where people live their information lives. Russia, China, Iran, and other autocracies wage extensive propaganda campaigns to trash liberal values and institutions. They portray democracy as lacking in dynamism, capacity, and masculine strength. These arguments are false, offensive, and degrading to the human spirit. But they will not fail of their own accord. They need to be defeated by better, more inspiring arguments and narratives about why people need freedom to thrive, and why societies need democracy to have freedom.

Today, there are four arenas of struggle for the future of freedom, and democrats must prevail in all of them. The core battle is now in the countries that have been sliding back from democracy to autocracy. 


In almost every instance where authoritarian projects have been defeated, it has been through elections. Illiberal populists crave the legitimacy that comes from victory in multiparty elections. But corruption and misrule erode their electoral support. So, they need elections that are competitive enough to validate their claim to rule but rigged enough to minimize the risk of defeat. The pathway to restoring democracy is to seize the electoral opportunity, flood the zone with election workers and observers, and wage an effective campaign so that people who have grown weary of authoritarian abuse can defeat it at the ballot box.

To win, democrats must forge a unified coalition across factional and ideological divides. They must offer concrete policy ideas to improve people’s lives. They need a narrative about what has happened to justice and democracy, and why restoring these will help to make the country great again. A campaign is not a legal brief. It must inspire and excite. It requires strong, compelling leadership. It must engage diverse sections of society, including people who once supported the authoritarian populists but are now disillusioned. Democrats must also express patriotism and show that illiberal populists wave a false flag. Democrats are the truer patriots because they recognize democracy and liberty as pillars of national greatness.

These lessons can help to restore democracy where it has been lost and to secure it in a second arena, when it is under challenge from authoritarian populist parties. But there are two other arenas of struggle in which we must prevail. Globally, democrats cannot let the world’s powerful authoritarian states capture and hollow out the global institutions to defend freedom — the UN Human Rights Council, the international and regional instruments of electoral observation and assistance, and the rules that govern the flows of data and information. Neither can we shrink from the global battle to support democratic values and free flows of information, and to lend technical and financial support to peoples, parties, media, and movements around the world struggling for freedom. 

In the face of isolationist efforts to defund and withdraw from this cause, we must convince democratic publics that we can only secure our own freedom by supporting that of others. A more democratic world will be a safer, fairer, less corrupt, more peaceful, and prosperous world.
 


There is no more urgent priority than to give the Ukrainian people the weapons, resources, and economic sanctions to defeat Russian aggression. Similarly, we must ensure that Taiwan’s democracy does not suffer the same aggression from the People’s Republic of China.
Larry Diamond
Mosbacher Senior Fellow in Global Democracy, FSI


All of that has been under existential challenge in Ukraine since Russia’s brutal invasion in February of 2022. Resisting aggression is the fourth arena of struggle. There is no more urgent priority than to give the Ukrainian people the weapons, resources, and economic sanctions to defeat Russian aggression. Similarly, we must ensure that Taiwan’s democracy does not suffer the same aggression from the People’s Republic of China. Taiwan must have the weapons, trade, and international dignity it needs to survive. We must preserve the status quo across the strait by making clear that the US and other democracies stand behind the resolve of a free people to chart their own destiny in Taiwan — as we do in Ukraine.

We meet here today just a short distance from the grotesque wall that stood for decades as the dividing line between freedom and tyranny. 36 years ago — almost to this day — the wall was torn down. Few imagined it would happen when it did. But it did because of democratic conviction and resolve. Now, we are in a new cold war with global authoritarianism. The history of Berlin should constantly remind us that freedom is fragile, but it can also be resilient. We must never lose faith in the rightness of our cause and the obligation we bear once again to defend freedom in an hour of peril.

Professor Diamond delivered this speech at the Berlin Freedom Conference on November 10, 2025.

Read More

Sunset with overlaid American flag and Statue of Liberty
Q&As

Turbulent Times For Democracy

Hoover scholar Larry Diamond calls for respect, collaboration, and a crackdown on young people’s smartphones.
Turbulent Times For Democracy
Larry Diamond on World Class Podcast
Commentary

How Democracy Is Doing Around the World

On the World Class podcast, Larry Diamond and Michael McFaul compare how civic discourse and political institutions are holding up in the United States, South Korea, Taiwan, and other democracies.
How Democracy Is Doing Around the World
Larry Diamond and Francis Fukuyama speaking at a round table in front of a wall of books on a shelf.
Commentary

CDDRL Scholars Explore Impacts of Executive Orders and Policy Changes on Global Democracy

In a new video series, Francis Fukuyama and Larry Diamond discuss how democracy-promoting programs are being eroded under the new administration.
CDDRL Scholars Explore Impacts of Executive Orders and Policy Changes on Global Democracy
Hero Image
Larry Diamond delivered remarks to the Berlin Freedom Conference on November 10, 2025.
Larry Diamond delivered remarks to the Berlin Freedom Conference on November 10, 2025.
Courtesy of Democracy Without Borders
All News button
1
Subtitle

Professor Larry Diamond's remarks to the Berlin Freedom Conference, November 10, 2025.

Date Label
-
Mr. Nobody Against Putin film poster

Mr. Nobody Against Putin is a 2025 documentary film that premiered at the 2025 Sundance Film Festival, where it won the World Cinema Documentary Special Jury Award.

The film follows a rural Russian teacher who resists state propaganda in his school after the invasion of Ukraine. Filmed over two years by videographer Pavel “Pasha” Talankin at Karabash Primary School #1, it reveals how he secretly documented the growing pressure to promote patriotic education and his quiet defiance under an increasingly repressive system.

Co-sponsored by the Center on Democracy, Development and the Rule of Law (CDDRL) and the Center for Russian, East European and Eurasian Studies (CREEES).

Screening is open to the public. Seating is limited — please register in advance. The film is in Russian with English subtitles.

Encina Commons 123 (615 Crothers Way, Stanford)

Film Screenings
Date Label
Authors
Khushmita Dhabhai
News Type
Q&As
Date
Paragraphs

The "Meet Our Researchers" series showcases the incredible scholars at Stanford’s Center on Democracy, Development and the Rule of Law (CDDRL). Through engaging interviews conducted by our undergraduate research assistants, we explore the journeys, passions, and insights of CDDRL’s faculty and researchers.

On a busy Thursday afternoon at Stanford’s Center on Democracy, Development and the Rule of Law (CDDRL), I sat down with Professor Michael McFaul, Director of the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies (FSI) and Ken Olivier and Angela Nomellini Professor of International Studies in the Department of Political Science, for a wide-ranging conversation on great power competition, U.S.–China relations, Cold War legacies, and the role of ideology in shaping global politics.

A former U.S. Ambassador to Russia and one of the most prominent voices on American foreign policy, Professor McFaul’s new book Autocrats vs. Democrats: China, Russia, America, and the New Global Disorder examines the stakes of the current geopolitical moment. Over the course of nearly an hour, we spoke about the elasticity of the term “great power competition,” the dangers of isolationism, the importance of middle powers, and the enduring influence of ideas in world politics. He also shared advice for young people interested in foreign policy, as well as the two books that shaped his early intellectual journey.

The term “great power competition” has become such a potent buzzword in Washington. Everyone uses it all the time, and it feels like it can mean many different things depending on who’s talking. How do you define great power competition? And do you think there’s a way for Washington to stop treating it as a catch-all phrase and instead turn it into a strategy with clear ends, means, and metrics?


The original motivation for writing my book came in 2017 when the Trump administration came into power. They wrote a National Security Strategy that very explicitly stated that we were in a new era of great power competition. And that document, in my view, became one of the most famous national security strategies of recent decades because it was so clear about that shift. The Pentagon even came up with an acronym — GPC (great power competition) — and when they create an acronym, it usually means it’s here to stay.

Around that time, there was also a big debate about whether we had entered a new Cold War. It began first with Russia — books were being written about a “new Cold War” as early as 2009 — and then the conversation shifted to China. So my first motivation for writing the book was to ask: Is this actually true? Is the Cold War analogy useful or not? My answer is complicated. Some things are similar, some things are different. Some of what’s similar is dangerous; some isn’t. Some of what’s different makes things less dangerous, and some of what’s different is scarier than the Cold War. If we don’t get the diagnosis right, then we won’t have smart policies to sustain American national interests.

You’ve written and spoken about how the Cold War analogy can be misleading. What are the main lessons from that period that we should remember, both the mistakes and the successes?


Because we “won” the Cold War, a lot of the mistakes made during it are forgotten. I use the analogy of when I used to coach third-grade basketball. If we won the game, nobody remembered the mistakes made in the first quarter. But if we lost, they remembered every single one. Because the U.S. “won,” people forget the mistakes.

There were major errors: McCarthyism, the Vietnam War, and allying with autocratic regimes like apartheid South Africa when we didn’t have to. So, in the book, I dedicate one chapter to the mistakes we should avoid, one to the successes we should replicate, and one to the new issues the Cold War analogy doesn’t answer at all. It’s not about glorifying the past; it’s about learning from it in a clear-eyed way.

President Trump and former President Biden have had very different approaches to great power competition. President Biden’s vision is closer to a liberal international order, whereas President Trump talks about a concert of great powers — almost a 19th-century idea. How do you evaluate that model? Do you think it can work today?


The short answer is no. I don’t believe in the concert model or in spheres of influence. That’s the 19th century, and this is the 21st. Trump’s team itself was internally confused on China. Trump personally thinks in terms of great powers carving up the world into spheres, but the national security strategy he signed was written by his advisors, not necessarily by him.

In thinking about Trump, I find it useful to remember that U.S. foreign policy debates don’t fall neatly between Democrats and Republicans. They run along three axes: isolationism versus internationalism, unilateralism versus multilateralism, and realism versus liberalism. Trump is radical on all three fronts — he’s an isolationist, he prefers unilateralism, and he doesn’t care about regime type. I think that combination is dangerous for America’s long-term interests.
 


I find it useful to remember that U.S. foreign policy debates don’t fall neatly between Democrats and Republicans. They run along three axes: isolationism versus internationalism, unilateralism versus multilateralism, and realism versus liberalism.
Michael McFaul


What role do middle or “auxiliary” powers — like India, Brazil, or Turkey — play in this evolving landscape of great power competition?


This is one of the biggest differences between today and the Cold War. Back then, the system was much more binary. Today, the world is more fragmented. I think of it as a race: the U.S. is ahead, China is closing the gap, and everyone else is running behind. But they’re running. They have agency. They’re not just sitting on the sidelines.

Countries like India, South Africa, Turkey, and Brazil are swing states. They’re not going to line up neatly with Washington or Beijing. BRICS is a perfect example — democracies and autocracies working in the same grouping. The U.S. has to get used to living with that uncertainty. We need to engage, not withdraw.

And at the same time, while the U.S. seems to be retreating from some of its instruments of influence, China appears to be expanding. What worries you about this divergence?


It’s striking. We’re cutting back on USAID, pulling out of multilateral institutions, shutting down things like Voice of America, Radio Free Asia, Radio Free Europe, and cutting back on diplomats. Meanwhile, the Chinese are expanding their presence, their multilateral influence, their media footprint, and their diplomacy.

If the autocrats are organized, the democrats have to be organized too. We can’t just step back and assume things will turn out fine. That’s not how competition works.
 


If the autocrats are organized, the democrats have to be organized too. We can’t just step back and assume things will turn out fine. That’s not how competition works.
Michael McFaul


During the Cold War, despite intense rivalry, the U.S. and USSR cooperated on nuclear nonproliferation and arms control. How do you see cooperation taking shape in today’s U.S.–China rivalry?


That’s a really important point. Cooperation in the Cold War wasn’t just about deterring the Soviets — it was also about working with them when we had overlapping interests. The Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty of 1968 was a monumental achievement. It was signed at the height of the Vietnam War, while we were literally fighting proxy conflicts, and yet we found common ground on nuclear weapons.

I think something similar can and should happen now. Even if we’re competing with China, and even with Russia, there are areas where cooperation is in everyone’s interest: nuclear arms control, nonproliferation of dangerous technologies like AI and bioweapons, and climate change. These are existential issues. We cooperated with our adversaries in the past; we should be able to do it again.

One of the big debates in international relations is about the role of ideology. How much does ideology matter in this current geopolitical context?


It matters a lot. My book isn’t called Great Powers — it’s called Autocrats vs. Democrats for a reason. I believe ideas and regime type shape international politics.

Putinism and Xi Jinping Thought are exported differently. Putinism — illiberal nationalism — has ideological allies in Europe and here in the U.S. Xi’s model is more economically attractive to parts of the Global South. Power matters, of course, but it’s not the only thing.

You can see this clearly if you compare Obama and Trump. There was no big structural power shift between 2016 and 2017, but their worldviews were radically different. That’s evidence that ideas and individuals matter a great deal in shaping foreign policy.
 


My book isn’t called "Great Powers" — it’s called "Autocrats vs. Democrats" for a reason. I believe ideas and regime type shape international politics.
Michael McFaul


You’ve warned about the dangers of U.S. retrenchment. Are there historical moments that you see as parallels to today?


I worry about a repeat of the 1930s. When Italy invaded Ethiopia, Americans said, “Where’s Ethiopia?” When Japan invaded China, they said, “Why do we care?” Then came 1939. Stalin and Hitler invaded Poland, and we still said, “That’s not our problem.” Eventually, it became our problem.

If we disengage now, we may find ourselves facing similar consequences. That’s part of why I wrote this book — to push back against the idea that retrenchment is safe. It’s not.

To close, what advice would you give to students who want to build careers like yours? And, could you recommend a book or two for young people entering this field?


Be more intentional than I was. Focus on what you want to do, not just what you want to be. Develop your ideas first, then go into government or academia to act on them. Don’t go into public service just for a title. I saw too many people in government who were there just to “be” something, without a clear agenda. The “to do” should come first; the “to be” comes later.

As for books, my own book, Autocrats vs. Democrats: China, Russia, America, and the New Global Disorder, is coming out soon — you can pre-order it. But the two books that shaped me the most when I was young are Crane Brinton’s The Anatomy of Revolution and Guillermo O’Donnell and Philippe Schmitter’s Transitions from Authoritarian Rule.

Read More

Meet Our Researchers: Alain Schläpfer
Q&As

Meet Our Researchers: Alain Schläpfer

Investigating how reputation, cultural norms, and conditional cooperation shape social harmony and conflict with CDDRL Research Scholar Alain Schläpfer.
Meet Our Researchers: Alain Schläpfer
Meet Our Researchers: Michael Bennon
Q&As

Meet Our Researchers: Michael Bennon

Investigating how infrastructure project financing has changed amidst global geopolitical competition and how democracies can more effectively build in the future with CDDRL research scholar Michael Bennon.
Meet Our Researchers: Michael Bennon
Hero Image
Meet Our Researchers: Prof. Michael McFaul
All News button
1
Subtitle

Exploring great power competition, Cold War lessons, and the future of U.S. foreign policy with FSI Director and former U.S. Ambassador Michael McFaul.

Date Label
Paragraphs

This study is a comparative analysis of literature education as a high school subject in the upper secondary education systems of the United States and Russia. The research aims to identify and analyze the key similarities and differences in the principles of structuring and functioning of the school literature curriculum in both countries. The document is divided into two main sections: analysis of literary policy, and a practical case study examination. In the theoretical section, based on an analysis of official educational documents from both federations, the authors analyze the influence of state policy on the school literature curriculum. This includes the study of how objectives are formulated, how thematic content is selected (including ideological components), and how reading lists are compiled. Special attention is given to the role of the state in the education discourse of each country, as well as the degree of autonomy in their curricula. The practical section focuses on the examination of specific case studies related to literary issues, particularly book bans and censorship, in both countries.

All Publications button
1
Publication Type
Conference Memos
Publication Date
Authors
Paragraphs

In the context of media consumption in Russia, being online usually means having more “liberal” views, opposed to those actively instilled by the government. One of the most popular news sources online have become the Telegram channels that provide the opportunity to read a plethora of different views on the same topic. The level of trust to the Telegram channels is above 30%, being even higher for the younger generation, which is unprecedented for any other independent source in modern Russia, apart from the state-owned TV.

However, as Sergey Guriev and Daniel Treisman have pointed out, mastery over media as the key point of modern authoritarian regimes. Therefore, since the start of the full-scale invasion in Ukraine in 2022, we have seen the rise of manifold propaganda channels on Telegram as an important part of ongoing fight for support in Russia and across the globe. They include many previously known speakers, but also a cohort of so-called war correspondents, who report and analyze the events on the front, providing first-hand information. They usually align with the pro-Russian narratives about the war, strengthening its propaganda network online. The methods they use to report on the war remain diverse and fluctuating. With the rising tension in the Russian society, we have begun to see criticism of the Russian government from “the other side,” the far-right ambassadors of the “Russian World.” They critique Putin from his right for not mobilizing further to win the war. The peace negotiations between Russia and Ukraine that started in 2025 at the initiative of Donald Trump have produced many postings and speculations among our target group, illustrating previously made guesses about the field and giving us fruitful ground for analysis.

As for the second part of our research, the rise of Twitter as a central hub for political discourse and content dissemination makes it a critical platform for analyzing the spread of foreign propaganda in the digital age. A striking example of this is the 2024 indictment of Tenet Media, a U.S.-based conservative media company covertly funded by Russia’s state-owned RT.  Through a complex network of foreign shell entities and fabricated personas, RT funneled millions of dollars into Tenet Media to covertly shape American political discourse. Influential commentators with millions of followers across platforms—including Twitter—were recruited under false pretenses, with generous compensation and vague direction to create content on divisive U.S. issues. While these influencers denied knowledge of the Russian connection, the DOJ highlighted how the content served Russia’s strategic interests by amplifying domestic U.S. tensions and weakening opposition to its war in Ukraine.10 This case underscores Twitter’s relevance as a tool through which propaganda can be subtly seeded and amplified to mass audiences.

The strategic use of social media for information warfare is not accidental but rooted in longstanding Russian military doctrine. Russian military theorist Valery Gerasimov emphasized the importance of the “information space” as a battlefield, recognizing social media as both a threat and an opportunity for asymmetrical warfare. Since the Western response to Russia’s 2014 actions in Ukraine, the Kremlin has intensified its efforts to influence global audiences through online disinformation. The Tenet Media operation exemplifies the evolution of these strategies—moving from overt messaging by registered foreign agents to covert infiltration of domestic media outlets. Twitter’s role in this ecosystem is central, given its fast-paced, viral nature and its prominence among political commentators. As such, Twitter is not just a platform for public discourse but also a potent battleground where narratives are shaped, contested, and often manipulated by foreign actors.

Another dimension of our research lies in analyzing content in the context of different platforms. Different affordances from the nominatively-independent and privately owned platforms (with or without algorithms) foster varying styles of posting and formulating narratives. The government’s mastery of the online platforms that were previously seen as “liberating technologies” shrinks people’s access to free, uncensored and truthful information.

Our research therefore concentrates on collecting, understanding and analyzing these peace narratives, as well as the speakers producing them, in order to understand the heterogenous and fluctuating landscape of the Russian propaganda on Telegram. Additionally, we are aiming to compare these narratives to those produced by English-speaking influencers on X (former Twitter) of various political views to see how the pro-Russian political agenda manifests differently across borders and between sources.

All Publications button
1
Publication Type
Conference Memos
Publication Date
Authors
Paragraphs

As the global order becomes increasingly multipolar, Russia is not only reacting to Western sanctions but also advancing a distinct vision of global governance. This study investigates the ideological, political, and economic narratives Russia uses to shape an 'alternative world order' in the Global South and examines how these narratives contribute to its strategic ambitions amidst rising geopolitical tensions. Through systematic analysis of diplomatic statements, media content, and bilateral relationships across three regional case studies — Africa, India, and Latin America — this research reveals that Russia's Global South engagement, while ideologically coherent on the surface, suffers from significant structural contradictions that undermine its strategic effectiveness.

All Publications button
1
Publication Type
Conference Memos
Publication Date
Authors
Paragraphs

This article explores the influence of the war in Ukraine on rural schools in Russia, particularly focusing on the Republic of Bashkortostan. This research analyzes social media content and official school documents to answer the following question: How has the ideological content in rural schools evolved since the start of the full-scale war in Ukraine?

The analysis reveals not just an intensification of existing patriotic messaging but a significant qualitative shift towards militarization and the centralization of ideological control. Applying the “power vertical” theory and frameworks of authoritarian education, I argue that the education system is being actively used to promote the state's war-centric narrative and “traditional values.” Understanding this transformation in rural schools helps illuminate the war's broader ideological effects within Russian society.

All Publications button
1
Publication Type
Conference Memos
Publication Date
Authors
Paragraphs

This paper investigates contemporary forms of Russian colonialism as manifested in three distinct regions: Ukraine’s Donbas, Georgia’s Abkhazia, and Russia’s Chechnya. Through a comparative case study approach, the analysis applies the concepts of internal colonization and selected elements of settler colonialism, drawing on postcolonial theory to explore practices such as identity erasure, militarization, and legal assimilation. The study argues that Russian imperial strategies have not disappeared but adapted into dynamic tools of governance—combining symbolic integration, coercive loyalty, and discursive control. By situating these developments within both Soviet legacies and post-Soviet transformations, the paper contributes to a growing body of literature that reconsiders Russia’s imperial role in the 21st century.

All Publications button
1
Publication Type
Conference Memos
Publication Date
Authors
Paragraphs

The Russo-Ukrainian War has exacerbated several of the country’s existing public health crises. Specifically, this paper identifies 3 areas of public health concern that are inflamed by the conflict in Ukraine that will likely have an outsized effect on the economic success and political legitimacy of the country in the coming years. These are, namely, alcohol
addiction, an aging population, and attrition from war. This publication explores the complex causes, the extent of their economic and political ramifications, and an evaluation of the future success of current attempts to address them.

All Publications button
1
Publication Type
Conference Memos
Publication Date
Authors
Subscribe to Russia