Unity, Division, and the Grassroots Architecture of Authoritarian Rule
Unity, Division, and the Grassroots Architecture of Authoritarian Rule
Dr. Natalia Forrat, a comparative political sociologist and lecturer at the University of Michigan’s Center for Russian, East European, and Eurasian Studies, explores how authoritarian regimes are maintained not only through top-down coercion but also through everyday social dynamics at the grassroots level.

On May 29, 2025, Dr. Natalia Forrat, a comparative political sociologist and lecturer at the University of Michigan’s Center for Russian, East European, and Eurasian Studies, presented findings from her recently published book The Social Roots of Authoritarianism. Part of CDDRL’s research seminar series, the talk explored how authoritarian regimes are maintained not only through top-down coercion but also through everyday social dynamics at the grassroots level. Using fieldwork from four Russian regions, Forrat developed a framework that links citizens’ perceptions of the state to the type of authoritarian institutions that emerge, with implications for how different societies experience and resist autocratic rule.
At the core of Forrat’s theory is the insight that authoritarian power at the grassroots level is shaped by how ordinary people perceive the state. Do they view it as a “team leader” worthy of cooperation, or as an “outsider” that must be bargained with or avoided? These contrasting perceptions form the foundation of two distinct models of authoritarianism: unity-based and division-based.
In unity-based regimes, found in statist societies, the state is embedded in everyday life. Citizens engage with state officials as collaborators, and civic life is deeply intertwined with state-led institutions. This creates top-down political machines that recruit activists, channel discontent, and generate electoral support through community structures such as residential councils and cultural centers. Kemerovo, a highly statist region, exemplifies this model. Its dense network of community institutions performs both civic and political functions — organizing holidays and cleanup drives, while also mobilizing voters and monitoring dissent.
In contrast, division-based regimes operate in anti-statist societies, where the state is distrusted and seen as an alien force. Here, political life is mediated through informal, bottom-up networks of brokers — non-state leaders who command local authority. Rostov offers a vivid illustration. A former official described how community initiatives failed until informal leaders intervened. While state officials are ignored, trusted local figures can instantly galvanize action. This form of authoritarianism relies on clientelism and strategic distribution of perks and punishments.
Forrat’s comparative analysis — spanning the Kemerovo region, the Republic of Altai, the Republic of Tatarstan, and the Rostov region — reveals how different grassroots visions of the state produce divergent regime dynamics. Importantly, she argues that these regime types are not interchangeable: an autocrat ruling over an anti-statist society cannot adopt statist tools without risking backlash, and vice versa. Each regime requires a distinct toolkit to maintain legitimacy and control.
This distinction has powerful implications for democratization. According to Forrat, unity-based authoritarianism lacks institutions that ensure accountability of the executive branch — like independent media, party competition, and pluralist civil society — while division-based regimes lack institutions that cultivate collective unity — such as inclusive state-building or civic trust. Democracy, then, is not merely a midpoint between authoritarian extremes, but a system that must deliberately cultivate the institutions its authoritarian predecessor lacked.