This article by Southeast Asia Program Director Donald Emmerson originally appeared in East Asia Forum.

Joe Biden’s immediate priority following his inauguration on 20 January 2021 will be domestic, difficult and crisis-driven. His challenge will be to reduce the spread of COVID-19 without worsening unemployment, triggering a recession or yielding to obstruction by Donald Trump’s fans in Congress or by his right-wing judicial appointees. The new administration will be turned further inwards by the need to re-professionalise agencies that Trump has had four years to politicise and corrupt.

Biden will begin his foreign policy by re-entering the world. Trump pulled the United States out of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty, the Paris Agreement, the Iran nuclear deal, the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), the UN Human Rights Council, UNESCO and the World Health Organization. He threatened withdrawal from the World Trade Organization and criticised NATO and the G7.

The Biden administration may not be able or inclined to reverse all of these exits — reviving the Iran deal and joining the revised TPP are notably problematic. But all else being equal, ‘America First’ glossed as ‘America Alone’ will be jettisoned in favour of what might be called ‘America Together’ — institutionalised cooperation towards shared goals with like-minded partners around the world.In the course of excoriating ‘globalists’, Trump has embarrassed or alienated many foreign counterparts. European leaders have been especially angered by insulting disregard, so Biden will want to restore comity with them. They and heads of other developed countries such as Japan can also help him address key transnational challenges — global infection, global warming and global competition in trade and technology.

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Among Asian states, the one that will challenge Biden most is China — a semi-developed country, the origin of COVID-19, the world’s leading emitter of CO2 and a would-be global digital power. Not to mention military clout and repressive-cum-expansionary behaviour.

Biden’s approach to China and Asia will depend in part on advice he is given by the cadre of foreign-policy advisers he assembled over his 2009–2017 vice-presidency and his earlier chairmanship of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. Based on preliminary signs of what that advice would be and what Biden would himself prefer, his administration’s likely statements and steps can be summarised in one word: internationalisation. Biden would prioritise enlisting outside powers in efforts to achieve US objectives in the wider world.

Internationalisation warrants support on several grounds. Domestically, it responds to the concern shared by many, both in Trump’s base and on the Democratic left, that the United States is overcommitted abroad. Sharing burdens with partners can be portrayed as an optimal position between badgering them as in Trump and over-involving the United States in their affairs.

‘America Together’ will acknowledge the reality of stressed and stretched U.S. resources and the need to augment them with help from partnering countries in addressing shared concerns — the pandemic, the environment, poverty and security, for example. In East Asia, such a policy could encourage and help countries that are willing to work with China on fair terms but unwilling to be bullied or bought into a region remade in Beijing.

In this context a Biden administration can be expected to revalidate and elevate the non-partisan profession of diplomacy following egregious abuse under Trump. The centre-left Center for American Progress, for example, has recommended enlarging and empowering the State Department in ways that would, perhaps controversially, reduce the Department of Defense’s role.

Cognate are remarks regarding a Biden administration’s likely policy on the South China Sea made recently by Daniel Russel, a career foreign service officer and former Asia adviser to President Obama. Biden’s policy, he said, would include ‘not just sending warships’ — a reference to US Pacific Command Freedom of Navigation Operations (FONOPs) in the South China Sea — but ‘diplomacy, engagement and participation with ASEAN and regional forums’.

China’s behaviour in Xinjiang, Hong Kong, the South and East China seas and on Taiwan has prompted global pushback and led many US policy advisers to toughen their China positions.

Biden’s Asia team will not readily revert to the softer stance of the Obama years, but the team’s success in Asia will depend on its and Biden’s ability to do several divergent if not incompatible things simultaneously. They will need to work in tandem with other countries to oppose China’s predatory expansion, interference and repression, while selectively supporting China’s participation in multilateral efforts to defeat contagion, mitigate warming and improve human welfare.

Internationalisation is not a panacea. Multilateral diplomacy will fail if it becomes an end in itself, as in the caricature of ASEAN as an Asian NATO — ‘No Action, Talk Only’. Conducting international meetings virtually on screens will limit the exercise of personal empathy that Biden is known for. Unregenerate Trumpians will do what they can to delegitimise global outreach as kowtowing to outsiders.

Biden’s Republican opponents will enlarge their minority in the House of Representatives and seem likely to retain their majority in the Senate. Biden will need their cooperation if ‘America Together’ with other countries is to work.

Internationalisation will not restore lost trust in the United States unless the new administration manages to put the United States’ own house in order, showing the world that the years under Trump were anomalous — not a harbinger of worse to come.

Donald K Emmerson heads the Southeast Asia Program at the Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center, Stanford University. His latest publication is The Deer and the Dragon: Southeast Asia and China in the 21st Century (ed., 2020).

Valerie Wu, a student at the University of Southern California and an alum of SPICE’s Reischauer Scholars Program (RSP), Sejong Korea Scholars Program (SKSP), and China Scholars Program (CSP), recently interviewed Dr. Tanya Lee, instructor of CSP, for US-China Today, a publication of USC U.S.-China Institute.

In the September 26 interview, Lee shares insightful comments on her experiences teaching the CSP, including insights on the importance of studying China for everyone, regardless of their eventual career; and how she identifies topics for the course. In addition, Lee references SPICE’s newest course, Stanford e-China (SeC), which was developed for high school students in China and focuses on “Technologies Changing the World: Design Thinking into Action.” Lee and SeC instructor Carey Moncaster are engineering a collaboration between CSP and SeC students in November, in which they will work on a “green technology” project together, exploring practical solutions to sustainability issues they see in their own communities. The students will also be connecting informally over social media and are very eager to make contact with their counterparts overseas.

Looking back at her experience in the CSP, Wu commented, “The interdisciplinary, global thinking that I cultivated as a student at SPICE has become a fundamental aspect of my academic career. As a Narrative Studies and Law, History & Culture double major with an interest in China, the academic mentorship I received through the CSP highlighted the ways that intellectual study intersects with all these different ways of thinking about a certain topic. The way an issue is framed, specifically the way that we apply our own interpretation to it, reflects not only our understanding of culture, but also our place in it.” For Lee, witnessing students like Wu continue their study of China in college makes her feel more optimistic about future U.S.–China relations, despite the current tension between the two countries.

Wu’s interview of Lee can be accessed here.

The Stanford e-Japan Program provided me with the opportunity to take insightful lectures by front runners in various fields (for example, ambassadors, lawyers, and university professors), and to participate in absolutely riveting virtual classrooms, during which we could confer and raise questions about issues pertaining to the lectures.

It was my gateway to cross-cultural understanding and international studies, and it was the key to finding my passion, as I realized that law and business were my specific areas of interests. The program pushed me to seek further education in those fields and learn more intensively.

In high school, I conducted comparative research between India and Pakistan, analyzing honor killing court cases dating back to the late 19th century, judicial systems, etc. I realized how law can reinforce social norms by signaling approval and dissent through legal decisions, and how a revision of judicial systems can have massive social impact. I decided to major in Japanese law to gain knowledge and insight into these legal regimes domestically, and to pursue my dream of addressing social injustice.

Studying law at the University of Tokyo was both rewarding and invigorating. I had chances to engage in frank discussions with professors about civil procedures and criminal law, scrutinize documents, participate in seminars, and write a research paper about criminal prosecutions for defamation in Japan. Whilst taking classes, I also had internship opportunities to see how law was put into practice at a number of domestic and international law firms, and these experiences greatly assisted in developing my practical and theoretical expertise in law.

At the same time, having an interest in business, I launched a project with university peers to tackle food insecurity in Asia with the ultimate aim of reducing social injustice through social entrepreneurship. The idea was to produce an environmentally sustainable source of animal feed and provide a new source of income for the local population. We presented this plan and placed in the top six in the Asian Regional Hult Prize competition—one of the world’s largest international social entrepreneurship competitions for students—and took our project further.

Stanford e-Japan was much more than a virtual classroom, as it introduced me to so many caring and enthusiastic educators who encouraged me to go beyond my limits, and it equipped me with the skills that are essential for learning, such as problem-solving, research, and communication skills. With these skills and personal ties, I intend to keep challenging myself and carrying on my lifelong journey of learning.

The New Europe Center, a Ukraine-based think tank, asked six American experts to comment on the implications of the U.S. presidential election for Ukraine.  The following is Steven Pifer's contribution.

For Americans, the November 3 presidential election will be the most significant vote in many decades.  The election also will have consequences for Ukraine:  Whether Donald Trump or Joe Biden sits in the White House at the end of the day on January 20, 2021 will matter greatly for U.S. policy toward Ukraine and Europe.

Since Ukraine regained its independence in 1991, the United States has proven a strong and supportive partner.  Presidents Clinton, Bush and Obama each saw a stable, independent, democratic Ukrainian state with a robust market economy as in the U.S. interest, including in contributing to a more stable and secure Europe.  Washington thus has provided substantial political, economic and—particularly since 2014—military support to Kyiv.  It has sanctioned Russia for its aggression in Crimea and Donbas and sought to bolster NATO in the face of a growing Kremlin challenge to Western security.

The Trump administration has largely continued these policies.  It has provided Kyiv reform and military aid, including lethal military assistance.  It has applied additional sanctions on Russia, albeit under pressure from Congress.  And it has taken steps to strengthen the U.S. military presence in NATO, at least until recently.

However, it has never been clear that Mr. Trump himself supports these policies.  His principal engagement on Ukraine was his attempted extortion of Kyiv to advance his personal political prospects, an effort that led to his impeachment.  While his administration has taken a tough line on Russia, Mr. Trump seems incapable of criticizing Vladimir Putin or Russian misdeeds.  He apparently thinks that Ukraine, not Russia, interfered in the 2016 U.S. presidential election, ignoring the conclusions of the U.S. intelligence community, the Mueller investigation and the Republican-led Senate Intelligence Committee.

Mr. Trump’s disdain for NATO has long been clear, going back to the 1980s.  In June, he decided to withdraw 10,000 U.S. troops from Germany, apparently out of pique at Chancellor Merkel’s refusal to attend a G7 summit at Camp David.  Senior Pentagon officials scrambled for weeks to offer military justifications for the drawdown, but those that they provided did not survive serious scrutiny.

If Mr. Trump is re-elected, he will not have to worry about facing the voters in another election campaign.  He will cement his control of the Republican Party, leaving Republicans in the Senate and House of Representatives less able to block his bad instincts.  What accommodations would he make with Mr. Putin?  Would he be inclined, as he suggested in 2016, to recognize Russia’s illegal annexation of Crimea and lift economic sanctions?   Would he withdraw the United States from NATO, as many former U.S. officials fear?  The Alliance’s collapse would be a huge gift to Mr. Putin and leave Ukraine in a precarious geopolitical position.

It will be different if Mr. Biden is elected (full transparency:  the author fervently hopes for this).  The United States would have a president who understands the U.S. interest in a successful Ukraine and who knows the country well from his time as vice president.  He would be the kind of friend that Ukraine needs, supportive but also ready to press the Ukrainian leadership to take necessary reform steps.  He recognizes the security challenge that Russia presents to Ukraine and the West, and he realizes the importance of a strong trans-Atlantic relationship with a robust NATO at its core.  And Mr. Biden might prove a president who could bind some of the differences that so badly divide Americans today.  An America more unified at home would be a stronger international actor.

Whether Mr. Trump or Mr. Biden wins the elections will mean very different things for U.S. policies affecting Ukraine.  That said, the American electorate will decide the next president largely on domestic issues, such as the Trump administration’s handling of COVID19 and the economy.  Ukraine has no role to play in this, and Ukrainian officials should continue to do all that they can to avoid their country becoming a political football in the U.S. campaign.

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Steven Pifer is a William Perry Research Fellow at Stanford University’s Center for International Security and Cooperation and a former U.S. ambassador to Ukraine.