This op-ed by Oriana Skylar Mastro and Zack Cooper originally appeared in Australian Financial Review.

Australia’s trials are not the first time Beijing has used economic coercion against another country.

It has become so common that we are becoming desensitised to it. Some notable examples include Beijing’s limitations on rare earth exports to Japan in 2010, Norwegian fish exports in 2010, Philippine tropic fruit exports in 2012, Vietnam’s tourist industry in 2014, Mongolian commodities trade in 2016, and South Korean businesses in 2017. In each case, Beijing sought to achieve a political objective by imposing economic penalties.

This case is different. Beijing has typically been ambiguous about the purpose or nature of its coercive economic statecraft. Despite evidence otherwise, it blamed the Japanese ban on meeting a yearly quota, the Philippine ban on pesticide exposure, the tourism drop to Vietnam on changing Chinese preferences, and the closure of South Korean stores on fire code violations. In Australia’s case, though, Beijing is doing away with these pretenses.

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China has not been shy this time about connecting its punitive actions to its unhappiness with Australian policies. The Chinese foreign ministry has listed a “series of wrong moves” by Australia for the disruption in relations. Beijing’s embassy in Canberra then gave a list of 14 “mistakes” to the Australian press.

These grievances include Australia’s foreign interference legislation, foreign investment reviews, funding for Australian think tanks, and unfriendly media reporting. Some of these criticisms are particularly ironic coming from Beijing, which often objects to foreign interference in other countries’ domestic affairs.

A core component of China’s strategy is a disinformation and propaganda effort designed to paint its moves as merely defensive, a proportionate and legitimate response to actions taken by the other side.

Australia has done nothing ‘wrong’

Let’s be clear: Australia has done nothing “wrong” in promoting and protecting its democratic institutions at home. It should not censor its media, obstruct analysis by outside experts, or shy away from safeguarding its democratic processes.

This time, the current trade restrictions are about more than making an example of Australia or showing smaller powers that they’ll pay if they have something to say about how the Chinese Communist Party governs at home. Beijing’s aims have taken on new proportions. Party leaders are now willing to punish democracies simply for upholding basic democratic principles within their own countries.

The message is clear: curtail some of your democratic principles or pay the price.

The US needs to work with like-minded states around the world to address this new threat. Free countries need to speak out together in Australia’s defence. If democracies do not hang together, they will hang separately. We should articulate that China’s actions are more than a violation of international law; they threaten the health of our democracies at home. Such a reframing would show Beijing that economic coercion will no longer be treated as a low-stakes tactic.

But words are not enough. We need coordinated action. US alliances are designed primarily to deter and defend against military attacks. Chinese actions make clear, however, that there are alternative methods for undermining peace, prosperity and freedom that our alliances do not adequately address. New alliance consultations to protect against economic attack would enhance our deterrence against China.

Washington should also launch a series of discussions with its allies to determine what new institutional mechanisms, commitments, and structures are needed to defend against economic attacks, not just military ones.

We should ensure the ability to take joint reciprocal action against Beijing in the economic realm, particularly to defend smaller countries. China engages in economic coercion because it is effective and relatively risk-free. But if instead like-minded countries responded together when one was attacked economically, this would go a long way in discouraging Beijing from employing such tactics.

Using all the tools of power

A critical first step is mapping dependencies on China and investigating how to limit over-dependence that open democracies to unacceptable economic vulnerability. As in the military realm, we need to enhance our resiliency against attack by avoiding over-dependence on any single import, export, or supply chain decency. This is a task that the so-called D10 (G7 plus Australia, India, and South Korea) should take up early next year.

The good news is a collective response to Chinese economic coercion will be more feasible under a Biden administration. President-elect Joe Biden and his senior advisers have articulated a preference for multilateral responses to Chinese aggression.

And while President Donald Trump relied mainly on military moves to warn and punish Beijing, Biden’s team prefers to make use of all tools of power. For these reasons, there has even been talk of rejuvenating past efforts like TPP. US allies and partners are also likely to see Biden as more reliable, making them more willing to undertake the risky venture of joining forces against Beijing.

The United States, Australia, and other allies and partners tried to welcome China into the international community. This was the right move. It has been good economically for many advanced economies, including Australia and the United States. But there is a flip side to every coin.

Australia has become too vulnerable to the whims of Beijing. And the US has few options to protect against such economic pressure. The incoming Biden administration needs to fundamentally rethink the nature of alliances so that countries like Australia have a third option the next time Beijing forces a choice between freedom and prosperity.

This op-ed by Donald K. Emmerson originally appeared in The Diplomat.

On November 20, 8,300 people in 83 countries attended a virtual Global Town Hall to watch and hear 66 speakers in multiple countries discuss “Rebuilding from the Covid-19 World.” Organized in Jakarta by the Foreign Policy Community of Indonesia (FPCI), the event ran 15 consecutive hours.

Few would choose virtual diplomacy over the in-person kind, other things being equal. When speakers are confined to flat boxes on small screens watched by strangers, the disincentives to candor and creativity are too high—not to mention the necessarily disadvantageous clashing of time zones. Gone are the clues and nuances of physical proximity, the creative chats in coffee breaks, the security from digitally prying eyes and ears afforded by a conversational stroll outdoors. But the technology of virtual discourse is here to stay, at least until such time as direct brain-to-brain or bot-to-bot communication is innovated and programmed on a planetary scale.

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Viewed in this cautionary light, the November town hall was distinctive and promising. It was organized not in the world of industrialized democracies where the ubiquity of electronic gatherings has already prompted webinar fatigue.  Nor was it sponsored by the United Front Department of the Communist Party of China or by Russia’s Internet Research Agency to propagandize for Beijing or Moscow. Indonesia’s virtual Global Town Hall was the brainchild of Dr. Dino Patti Djalal, a public figure well known in and outside his country for having founded and led the FPCI. (Although I know him, I played no role in the event or its preparation.)

The Community’s mission is to encourage “healthy internationalism” in Indonesia; “resist xenophobia”; “bring foreign policy to the grassroots”; and serve as “a dynamic meeting point” where Indonesians can interact on foreign affairs with each other and with foreigners “as equals.”

The Global Town Hall lived up to these promises in the size of its audience, the length and scope of its program, and the diversity of its many panels and speakers. Topics discussed during the marathon ranged from narrow to vast—from vaccines against Covid-19 to broad concepts and challenges such as the Indo-Pacific and climate change; development and democracy; nationalism and populism; emerging leaders and world order.

The conference was designed to call for new beginnings in a post-pandemic world.  One session debated the need for a “great social reset.” Another considered the contours of a no less urgent “geo-political reset.”  A third looked for “the light at the end of [a] tunnel” of global contagion and conflict, while a fourth pictured “the worst economic recession of our time” as “the edge of a cliff.” Just as Djalal and his team had intended, the sense of a global turning point calling for creative responses was palpable throughout.

The pandemic is not only planet-wide.  It is an all-of-society problem that cannot be reduced to adjustments in foreign policy. Accordingly, the town hall’s speakers were not only from different countries but from different walks of life as well.  Impressively, they included, alongside the foreign ministers of Australia, China, the European Union, India, Indonesia, Russia, and South Africa, influencers and analysts from think tanks, international organizations, and universities around the world.

The absence of someone from the Trump administration did not create a vacuum filled by China. On the contrary, the five speakers from the PRC were outnumbered three-to-one by the 15 Americans who spoke.  Yet the program was not stacked against Beijing.  Brainstorming in public is not China’s forte. In any conference that invites originality, creativity, and diversity, China is structurally disadvantaged by its authoritarian system, which limits what people are willing to say. Why invite speakers who are limited to thinking and speaking inside the box traced by a one-party line?

Only one Chinese think tank was among the town hall’s 44 sponsors and partners—the China Institute of International Studies (CIIS), an adjunct of China’s foreign ministry. Beijing actively promotes Chinese centers of research and opinion as no less deserving of praise and influence than their counterparts in democratic countries. But that campaign for global legitimacy is not helped by the oxymoronic status of free thinking and speaking in an unfree society.

A case in point is the Pangoal Institution, an ostensibly non-governmental think tank in Beijing. On its website, it upholds “objectiveness, openness, inclusiveness,”  and “innovation.” Yet in 2018, its president warned China’s think tanks to shun “the Western model” of what a think tank should be; eschew “so-called ‘independence’”; and adhere instead “to the leadership of the [Chinese Communist Party] and socialism with Chinese characteristics.” The risk of not channeling the groupthink required by the CPC was implied, as was the need to think “Xi Jinping Thought,” a guideline added to the CPC’s constitution in 2017.

China’s handicap in free speech and candor was also implicitly displayed at the very end of the conference, in its 12th and final panel. Harvard’s Joseph Nye and a balanced set of Washington-based analysts freely and critically discussed a range of sensitive issues in foreign and domestic policy including the jeopardized transition to a Joe Biden presidency. The event was coordinated with the Center for Strategic and International Studies, one of three American think tanks chosen by FPCI to partner in holding the town hall.

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Even more telling than the remarks the Americans made at that final panel, however, was its title, chosen by Djalal and the FPCI, which amounted to a collective sigh of relief after Donald Trump: “Welcome Back, America!”  The welcome suggested that the challenge of “Rebuilding from the Covid-19 World” posed by the Global Town Hall could not be met without the United States fully on board, as if, once on board, Joe Biden would do the right thing.

In November 2019, by a two-to-one margin, elite respondents in Southeast Asia named China over the U.S. as the outside power with the most “political and strategic influence” in their region. But of those who picked China, merely 15 percent welcomed Chinese influence, a fraction of the 53 percent of U.S.-choosers who welcomed American influence.

Soft power is perishable. Goodwill can be transient. But the pop-up Global Town Hall put together so creatively by Djalal and his colleagues in Indonesia, apart from its value as an experiment in worldwide policy discourse, delivered an encouraging reminder: America is welcome. The anti-multilateral jingoism of Donald Trump has failed to destroy the willingness of Djalal, his colleagues, and policy influentials elsewhere in Southeast Asia to work with a United States that can once again, openly and self-critically, interact with others to achieve common goals.

This op-ed by Kiyoteru Tsutsui and Charles Crabtree
was originally published in The Hill.

President-elect Joe Biden had a pleasant surprise for Japanese Prime Minister Yoshihide Suga during their first phone conversation after the U.S. presidential election. In what was expected to be a cordial congratulatory call without policy discussion, Biden explicitly stated America’s commitment to protect the Senkaku Islands, citing Article 5 of the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty.

At the time, Americans were preoccupied with the political aftermath of the still-contested election, but Japanese observers paid close attention to the first contact between the two new leaders, especially since the first encounter between their predecessors shaped U.S.-Japan relations for the past several years.

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Four years ago, Prime Minister Shinzō Abe became the first foreign leader to meet with President Trump, soon after his election victory in November 2016. This fact was never lost on Trump; throughout his presidential administration, the relationship between the two men was strong, which benefited the alliance as the two countries worked to create a united front against China’s increasing international aggression.

In 2016, policymakers on the Japanese side were concerned about the U.S. conceding much of its interest in the Pacific to China, as part of “a grand bargain” that would diminish U.S. commitment to Japan and other allies in the region. Trump’s successful campaign made this scenario less likely, but the Japanese understood that their country relies more on American support in constraining China’s expansive regional ambitions than vice versa. 

Fast-forward to 2020, and we see a new political reality in the bilateral relationship — the U.S. needs Japan as much as Japan needs the U.S. in facing the challenges of China’s rise to a global superpower. The fact that Biden mentioned his commitment to Senkakus — largely unsolicited, although the Japanese side allegedly dropped some hints — suggests an American desire to shore up support from Japan.

With China now viewed as a shared rival — if not outright enemy — how will the two leaders shape regional dynamics in coming years? On security, tensions around the Senkakus almost certainly will rise, and a credible threat of U.S. military action is likely the most effective deterrent of China’s provocations that could escalate the conflict over territorial claims there. Biden surely will work hard to rebuild the trust of other allies in the region, with the hope of containing China through multilateral alliances. South Korea is a particularly important partner in this effort, and Suga would be wise to rehabilitate Japan-ROK relations that have been marred by complicated historical issues. The U.S. can help mediate the process.

Similarly, on economy and trade, multilateral frameworks such as the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP) and the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) will become more important, and Japan will continue to encourage the U.S. to participate in these agreements. However, this might not be realistic given the domestic political environment in the U.S. The best-case scenario in the short term is probably the U.S. valuing the World Trade Organization (WTO) again. In this vein, the U.S. regaining the trust and respect of Europe is important, because China continues to lure European countries with its attractive economic and trade packages. 

On environmentalism, both Suga and Biden have declared that their countries will work toward zero emissions by 2050. On this issue, China’s cooperation is critical. While China also has committed to working toward zero -emissions by 2060, it likely will use this issue to gain other concessions from the U.S. Biden may face a difficult political decision at some point on whether to a) compromise on environmentalism and incur the wrath of the left wing of the Democratic party or b) sacrifice U.S. national interest in other areas for an agreement on environmentalism and risk losing support from independents and moderate Republicans. Japan would worry about the latter scenario.

Finally, Biden is expected to be more involved than Trump regarding China’s human rights issues. He’s likely to call out situations in Xinjiang and Hong Kong, among others. Japan will join the chorus, and mix in the North Korean abduction issue, which largely has been silenced internationally as a consequence of Trump’s bromance with Kim Jong Un. China will counter these criticisms by pointing to racism in the U.S. as evidence of American hypocrisy. This might embarrass the U.S. but can be a net positive, if China’s naming and shaming leads to more efforts by the U.S. government to address racism. This dynamic is reminiscent of the Cold War era, when the Soviet Union countered America’s criticisms of civil and political rights violations by pointing to racism in the U.S., facilitating advancements during the civil rights movement.

Overall, on hard issues such as security and trade, a drastic change is unlikely; rehabilitating relations with allies, and revaluing multilateral frameworks, will be the most likely changes under a Biden administration. On more values-oriented issues such as environmentalism and human rights, domestic politics in the U.S. plays a significant role in shaping Biden foreign policy. Assuming that Democrats don’t win both of the Senate seats in Georgia’s runoff elections, Biden will face a Republican Senate that can block appointments for key cabinet positions and some of his foreign policy priorities.

For Japan, Biden’s remark about the Senkaku Islands was an excellent start. With such a commitment secured, Suga can play the diplomatic game from a position of strength and mediate between the U.S. and China. This is a role that Japan can thrive in, as its shrewd management of relationships with both the U.S. and China in the past few years indicates. Japan’s success in playing this role could define international relations in the Asia-Pacific for the next decade or two.

On November 10th, the APARC China Program convened an expert panel focused on the Decision of the fifth plenary session of the 19th Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party, which took place on October 26-29.  The Fifth Plenum Decision outlines not only China’s 14th Five Year Plan (2021-2025), but also Beijing’s economic blueprint through 2035 and the “goal of fully building a modern socialist country."  The CCP leadership recently articulated its “dual circulation” policy – viz., a drastic reduction in China’s dependence on U.S. technologies and increased reliance on domestic consumption while maintaining exports and attracting foreign direct investments.  At this critical juncture when the coronavirus pandemic has shrunk global trade and tensions between the U.S. and China continue to intensify, panel members were asked to examine what the Fifth Plenum Decision might signify.  Does it mark a significant shift in Beijing’s strategic economic orientation?  What are the short- and long-term implications of the Decision for China’s economic development strategy, U.S.-China relations, as well as the world’s economic and technology ecosystems?  

Guests heard from experts James Green, Damien Ma, and Xiaomeng Lu.  James Green, Senior Research Fellow at Georgeton University's Initiative for U.S.-China Dialogue on Global Issues, has worked for over two decades on U.S.-Asia relations.  He has held several positions in government, including Minister Counselor for Trade Affairs at the U.S. Embassy in Beijing and China Director of the White House’s National Security Council.  Damien Ma is the Director and co-founder of MacroPolo, the Think Tank of the Paulson Institute, which focuses on China's economics, technology, and politics.  He is also adjunct faculty at the Kellogg School of Management at Northwestern University.  Finally, Xiaomeng Lu is a senior analyst in Eurasia Group's geo-technology practice.  She focuses on many of the most important issues related to China right now, including cybersecurity, data protection, artificial intelligence, internet governance, 5G, and trade.  The panel concluded with a discussion of audience questions. Watch:

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Using a unique entrepreneurship-focused survey of Stanford alumni, Lee and Eesley investigated how the Stanford Center for Entrepreneurial Studies (CES) at the Business School and the Stanford Technology Ventures Program (STVP) at the Engineering School affect entrepreneurial activity. They administered the survey to a well-defined population of comparable individuals from multiple industries, in total generating 27,783 responses. Respondents reported information on their entrepreneurial status, participation in angel investing and venture capital, and on the founding, duration, and success of start-up ventures. Respondents also indicated to what degree, if any, they had participated in the CES or STVP programs.

The survey results reveal that overall participation in the Stanford Business School CES had a negative to zero impact on entrepreneurship rates and participation in the Engineering School STVP had no impact on entrepreneurship rates. However, the data suggests that participation in the Business School initiative decreased startup failure and increased firm revenue in the long-term. “University entrepreneurship programs may not increase entrepreneurship rates,” Lee and Eesley conclude, “but help students better identify their potential as entrepreneurs and improve the quality of entrepreneurship.”

These findings provide important context to broader questions about entrepreneurship development and incubation, such as whether entrepreneurship is an intrinsic or acquired trait, and as such, whether firms should seek to develop entrepreneurial capabilities internally or acquire them from external sources. This question equally concerns universities and the strategies institutions of higher education employ to foster entrepreneurial talent.

Lee and Eesley note that it is important to take into account variation in entrepreneurship training programs in course content, emphasis, and other dimensions. Their research suggests that general entrepreneurship education that targets a broader spectrum of startups, rather than one that solely focuses on technology startups, may be more effective in reducing the uncertainty in entrepreneurial ability or improving startup performance.

These findings may generalize to other samples of selective-admission college-educated alumni, although there is certainly need for future work that explores the effects of entrepreneurship education in different institutional environments.

Just over ten years after becoming the first U.S. ambassador to Japan to participate in the Hiroshima Peace Memorial Ceremony in 2010, Ambassador John Roos spoke about his experiences with 26 high school students in Stanford e-Japan from throughout Japan. In his October 16, 2020 online talk, Ambassador John Roos noted that his tenure in Japan—2009 to 2013—was defined by three major issues: (1) the 2011 Great East Japan Earthquake or 3/11; (2) Operation Tomodachi (“friend” in Japanese) during which the U.S. Armed Forces helped in disaster relief following the 3/11 crisis; and (3) the Hiroshima Peace Memorial Ceremony on August 6, 2010.

Regarding the first and second issues, Ambassador Roos recalled, “I was proud that the United States was there to help the people in Japan who obviously faced one of the biggest crises in your history… Vice President Biden came to Japan and the two of us traveled up to the Tohoku region because he wanted to see firsthand how he could help and how the United States could help, and I saw him interacting with not only the leaders but the people of the Tohoku region.” In addition to Operation Tomodachi, the youth-focused Tomodachi Initiative—a public-private partnership between the U.S.-Japan Council and the U.S. Embassy in Tokyo, with support from the Government of Japan—was born out of support for Japan’s recovery from the 2011 Great East Japan Earthquake. Regarding the third issue, Ambassador Roos shared, “I was the first United States ambassador to go to the Hiroshima commemoration ceremony. And I did that because I felt it was important to show respect for all of the victims of World War II and particularly obviously the victims of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. I did it because I felt that it was helping to promote President Obama’s agenda of the elimination of all nuclear weapons.”

During his talk, Ambassador Roos coupled his sharing of specific personal recollections with general insights on being the U.S. ambassador to Japan. For example, he explained that the role of the U.S. ambassador to Japan is twofold. First, the U.S. ambassador’s responsibility is to protect and look after the health and safety of the Americans that live in Japan—about 150,000 of them—including another 50,000 U.S. military personnel and their dependents. Second, nurturing and looking after the relationship between Japan and the United States, of course, is critical. He not only touched upon economic, political, and security relations but also emphasized the importance of student-to-student exchange. Concerning the latter, he is concerned that students from the United States are not spending enough time in Japan, and students in Japan are not spending enough time in the United States.

His insights profoundly connected to a student from Kyoto who commented, “When I am older, I hope to become a diplomat and maybe even an ambassador, so I’m really excited to get to talk to you today.” She continued, “What do you think makes a successful ambassador?” Ambassador Roos replied, “I hope you become the ambassador to the United States… Obviously, an ambassador needs to deal with all of the different policy issues and many difficult issues, but I think the most important thing is—and you may not expect this—but it is to listen… and to learn and to hear all sides of the equation… to show empathy.”

The current fall 2020 session of Stanford e-Japan is the 12th offering of the course since 2015. Stanford e-Japan is made possible by Mr. Tadashi Yanai, Chairman, President, and CEO of Fast Retailing Co., Ltd. Mr. Yanai and Ambassador Roos share a mutual concern for the need for students in Japan and the United States to spend more time in each other’s countries.

As a closing question, Stanford e-Japan Instructor Meiko Kotani asked Ambassador Roos what he expects from Japanese high school students and what role he thinks they should play to foster the U.S.–Japan relationship. Roos responded, “Well, first of all, let me tell you how impressed I am by this group of students. The reason I am doing this session at 9:00pm on a Friday night is because I think you are the future of the relationship. So I encourage you to find ways to connect with the younger generation of [the United States] because in the end, we need you. We need the best and brightest minds, not only in the United States but in Japan and the rest of the world to confront some pretty big challenges we have in the world right now… When I listen to you, it gives me a tremendous amount of hope, and so I’m just honored to have had the opportunity to talk with you.”

After Ambassador Roos signed off, the students shared some points that especially resonated with them. Among these were the deep respect that Ambassador Roos has for Japan and his visit to all 47 prefectures; the importance he placed upon the need for high school students in Japan to communicate with high school students in the United States; the importance he placed upon the leadership of the United States to be humble despite its power; and the importance of empathy. And since 2020 marks the 75th anniversary of the end of World War II, the following words that Roos stated seemed to especially resonate with the students: “President Obama said that we may not eliminate nuclear weapons in his lifetime or my lifetime. I hope in your lifetime.”