We are pleased to share the publication of a new volume, Cold War Refugees: Connected Histories of Displacement and Migration across Postcolonial Asia, edited by the Korea Program's Yumi Moon, associate professor in Stanford's Department of History.

The book, now available from Stanford University Press, revisits Cold War history by examining the identities, cultures, and agendas of the many refugees forced to flee their homes across East, Southeast, and South Asia due to the great power conflict between the US and the USSR. Moon's book draws on multilingual archival sources and presents these displaced peoples as historical actors in their own right, not mere subjects of government actions. Exploring the local, regional, and global contexts of displacement through five cases —Taiwan, Vietnam, Korea, Afghanistan, and Pakistan — this volume sheds new light on understudied aspects of Cold War history.

The book's chapters — written by Phi-Vân Nguyen, Dominic Meng-Hsuan Yang, Yumi Moon, Ijlal Muzaffar, Robert D. Crews, Sabauon Nasseri, and Aishwary Kumar — explore Vietnam's 1954 partition, refugees displaced from Zhejiang to Taiwan, North Korean refugees in South Korea from 1945–50, the Cold War legacy in Karachi, and Afghan refugees.

Purchase Cold War Refugees at www.sup.org and receive 20% off with the code MOON20.

About the Authors
 

Ruixue Jia is Professor of Economics at the School of Global Policy and Strategy, University of California, San Diego.

Hongbin Li is Co-director of Stanford Center on China's Economy and Institutions, and a Senior Fellow of Stanford Institute for Economic Policy Research (SIEPR) and the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies (FSI) at Stanford University.

Claire Cousineau is a writer and former researcher at the Stanford Center on China’s Economy and Institutions, she is currently pursuing her MBA at Duke University.

Availability

The Highest Exam: How the Gaokao Shapes China is available now for purchase from Amazon and elsewhere.  

Upcoming Book Event

Join us on Tuesday, October 21 at 4 PM (Pacific) for a fireside chat with co-authors Ruixue Jia and Hongbin Li. The fireside chat will be held in-person in the Bechtel Conference Center and livestreamed for virtual attendees. Learn More & Register
 

Motivation & Contribution

China has become a world leader in digital repression, including social media surveillance, internet shutdowns, website-blocking, and arrests of those posting content the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) deems threatening. These technologies have been deployed not only on Chinese citizens but have also been exported around the world, to both democracies and dictatorships. Huawei, the world’s largest — and partly state-owned — telecommunications provider, is at the center of this dynamic, having been exported to over 60 countries on every continent.

Despite the visibility of Huawei technology transfers outside of China, our understanding of how exactly this affects recipient countries is still in its infancy. Some observers see Huawei as a cornerstone of the CCP’s efforts to prop up foreign dictatorships. Others see Huawei as a source of economic growth in some of the world’s most populous and least developed countries, providing cost-effective telecommunications and infrastructure development. What is needed is systematic evidence to move beyond speculation and to better understand whether and how Huawei transfers affect repression.
 

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Erin B. Carter and Brett L. Carter help fill this crucial gap in our knowledge. Using data on all Huawei contracts across the world over a nearly twenty-year period, they find that Huawei transfers do, in fact, facilitate digital repression in the autocracies — but not the democracies — that receive them. Attempts at digital repression in democracies are more often checked by independent political institutions and legal frameworks. When these fail, civil society organizations, news media, and popular mobilization can step in. By contrast, autocrats tend to lack these constraints and can thus more readily use Huawei for digital repression. In short, the impact of Huawei transfers varies depending on regime type.

The article compellingly demonstrates the enduring role of political institutions — in this case, those enabling democratic resilience. In addition, it sheds light on one mechanism underlying the so-called global wave of autocratization, namely, Huawei transfers that enable dictators to more efficiently control their citizens. And from a methodological standpoint, the paper provides the “first cross-country, plausibly causal evidence” of the effects of Huawei on repression.

Data & Methods

The authors use data on Huawei contracts from 2000 to 2017, which comes from the AidData project. This includes 153 projects — almost entirely on communications technologies — in 64 countries worth over $1.5 billion. The vast majority of recipient countries are in Sub-Saharan Africa and Central, South, and Southeast Asia. Huawei is responsible for around 70% of all telecommunications in Africa alone. The single largest recipient of Huawei transfers is Indonesia (~$391 million of contracts), followed by Uzbekistan (~$150 million) and Cameroon (~$100 million). Notably, of the top 20 recipient countries, only one (Costa Rica) is considered “Free” by Freedom House, the rest being “Partly Free” or “Not Free.” Huawei transfers flow slightly more to democracies than to autocracies, but this is only if Indonesia is included; otherwise, transfers flow disproportionately to autocracies.
 

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Carter and Carter quantify the effect of Huawei transfers on repression by using the generalized synthetic control (GSC) method. The goal is to compare those countries receiving (the “treatment”) of Huawei transfers with those in the “control group” that do not. However, comparing the treated and controlled countries or “units” is difficult for several reasons. For one, the countries that receive Huawei transfers differ from those that do not, for example, in terms of their political institutions and economic development. In addition, there is a lag of several years between receipt of Huawei and its full implementation, and the effects of Huawei transfers may take several years before they are fully realized. Similarly, transfers are staggered over time; for example, the largest number of contracts was signed as China’s Belt and Road Initiative expanded between 2014 and 2015.

Comparing (such ostensibly different) treated and controlled units can be facilitated by constructing a “synthetic” control out of multiple control units. This will more closely match the treated unit’s characteristics prior to receiving Huawei. GSC extends (or generalizes) the synthetic control method by enabling comparison across multiple time periods (given the staggered rollout mentioned above), and across countries with different backgrounds prior to adopting Huawei technologies. Separate tests are then run for autocracies and democracies to capture how political institutions influence the effects of Huawei transfers.

Findings

In addition to the central finding about regime type, the authors also provide evidence that the countries most likely to contract with Huawei are more populous and poorer. These countries are, from China’s standpoint, attractive markets, and their governments appreciate the subsidies offered by China’s Export-Import Bank. As such, transfers are driven, in part, by demand in recipient countries. In addition, recipient countries are also more likely to have received Chinese aid and, therefore, recognize the One China policy. Meanwhile, autocracies, coup-prone countries, and those rich in natural resources are not more likely to receive Huawei transfers. All of these findings should be qualified by the secrecy surrounding Huawei contracts. Indeed, many such contracts include confidentiality clauses that prohibit recipient countries from divulging information.
 

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Correlates of Huawei technology transfers
 

Another set of findings relates to those democracies that do use Huawei to digitally repress, even if transfers do not systematically increase repression in democracies. India is an important case, as it is a world leader in periodically shutting down the internet. Unsurprisingly, democracies whose political institutions and civil society organizations have been weakened by elected leaders with authoritarian ambitions (such as Narendra Modi) seem more likely to impose shutdowns or monitor media. At the same time, weak democracies are unlikely to use Huawei to block websites or arrest their citizens for digital action. As Carter and Carter point out, this highlights the importance of disaggregating the concept of digital repression as well as the set of institutions that enable democratic resilience. Ultimately, “Exporting the Tools of Dictatorship” is exemplary in its use of systematic data to shed light on a complex and contested geopolitical issue.

*Research-in-Brief prepared by Adam Fefer.

As the U.S.-China competition unfolds in areas ranging from trade to technology to the military, the rival-making discourse surrounding this great power competition was the focus of the conference Beyond a New Cold War, organized and hosted by the Stanford Next Asia Policy Lab (SNAPL).

Held on August 14, 2025, the event showcased SNAPL research illuminating how U.S. political leaders and the media shape narratives concerning China and how citizens in young democracies perceive these narratives. Serving as discussants were experts from Columbia University, the University of California, Berkeley, the Hoover Institution (represented by a former National Security Affairs Fellow), and the U.S. Congressional-Executive Commission on China.

The studies presented and discussed at the conference are part of SNAPL’s U.S.-Asia Relations research track, one of four research streams the lab pursues. Housed at the Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center (APARC) and founded by sociologist Gi-Wook Shin, the lab aims to generate evidence-based policy recommendations and promote transnational collaboration with academic and policy institutions to advance the future prosperity of Asia and U.S.-Asia relations.

“This conference provided an excellent opportunity to engage the policy community with our research findings,” says Shin, the William J. Perry Professor of Contemporary Korea, a senior fellow at the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies (FSI), and the director of APARC and the Korea Program. “The lab will continue to foster ongoing dialogue between academic and policy circles.” 

The conference builds on previous SNAPL forums and meetings with policy and academic communities in Washington, D.C., held in September 2024. These policy engagement activities are made possible thanks to a grant from FSI. 

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Dynamics of American Elite Discourse on China

At the first conference panel, Research Fellow Xinru Ma shared a study that unravels who leads elite discourse on U.S.-China relations – whether Congress, the White House, or the media. While prior research suggests that each of these actors could have distinct agenda-setting capacities, their relative influence and its directionality in foreign policy discourse remain empirically underexamined.

The study addresses this question by investigating China-focused discourse and framing by the U.S. legislative and executive branches as well as the media. Using computational and causal inference methods, the study analyzes social media data from the legislative and executive branches alongside major U.S. media outlets across two periods: the 116th Congress (January 3, 2019 – January 3, 2021) and the 118th Congress (January 3, 2023 – January 3, 2025).

The analysis reveals that, both in terms of issue attention and framing, the media tends to follow the lead of Congress and the President. The findings also indicate that Republican lawmakers exert greater influence on setting the China agenda in the media. In contrast, Democratic lawmakers are stronger predictors of how the media frames the issues at stake. Moreover, the findings suggest that presidential influence on China discourse weakened sharply in the 118th Congress, and that there is an overall shift toward party-driven, rather than institutionally mediated, communication among elites. 

Policy Implications
 

• Media Weakness: The reliance of media outlets on partisan cues from political elites on foreign policy issues increases the risk of incomplete or skewed public understanding of China and U.S.-China relations. The risk is especially disconcerting as U.S. reporters face limited access to China.
• Partisan Echo Chambers: Communication flows primarily within partisan networks rather than across institutions, with the separation of powers becoming less effective as a system of checks and balances. The splintering of political discourse into parallel echo chambers risks eroding opportunities for cross-party dialogue and democratic deliberation on complex foreign policy issues.
• Fragmented Messaging: Divergent partisan messaging on China signals inconsistency to both domestic and international audiences who might draw contradictory conclusions about U.S. intentions. This dynamic gives rise to strategic miscalculations abroad and a fragmented public understanding of China policy at home.
• Declining  Institutional Voices: The decline of institutional power over shaping U.S. discourse on China has created a growing vulnerability. As individual political figures gain sway, personalized narratives often prioritize short-term visibility over a coherent, long-term strategy.

Democracy vs. Autocracy: A View from Young Democracies

Despite their deep divisions on most issues, there is one topic Republicans and Democrats converge on: China. Both parties increasingly frame the intensifying U.S.-China tensions as a strategic competition between democracy and autocracy. But is the value diplomacy this approach begets effective in promoting liberal values in young democracies?

At the second conference panel, Visiting Scholar Gidong Kim presented a study that addresses this question. “This study challenges the effectiveness of the value-laden U.S. diplomacy in young democracies and presents a more nuanced explanation of democracy's role in forming public opinion on foreign policy,” says Kim, formerly a postdoctoral fellow with SNAPL and currently an assistant professor of political science at Hankuk University of Foreign Studies (HUFS).

The study hypothesizes that in young democracies, where democratic histories are relatively short and legacies of authoritarian rule endure, citizens tend to understand democracy in terms of electoral institutions rather than liberal values. Similarly, in the context of the U.S.-China competition, citizens in these countries tend to perceive China’s threats to electoral institutions more seriously than its threats to liberal values.

To test this proposition, the study uses a country-level, cross-national analysis and an original survey experiment in South Korea. The findings support the hypothesis.

Policy Implications
 

• Context Matters: U.S. policymakers must acknowledge the limits of value-driven diplomacy. Washington should diversify its foreign policy toolkit and adapt it to regional contexts: in Western Europe, liberal values rhetoric can reinforce alliances, but in young democracies, the design and strength of electoral institutions carry greater weight.
• A Crisis of Credibility: For China, there is an equally clear lesson about the need to rethink its approach to diplomacy. Without addressing suspicions of election interference in democratic countries, Beijing will struggle to gain traction with the publics in young Asian democracies and dissipate anti-China sentiments in those countries, even if it increases its soft power through liberalization policies.

SNAPL’s studies presented at the conference underscore the crucial role that narratives and public perceptions play in international relations. They suggest that great power competition is not just about power. Rather, it is also about persuasion, which, in turn, depends on how different audiences — at home and abroad — perceive the story.