Nuclear policy
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The United States has a growing inventory of spent nuclear fuel from commercial power plants that continues to accumulate at reactor sites around the country.

In addition, the legacy waste from U.S. defense programs remains at Department of Energy sites around the country, mainly at Hanford, WA, Savannah River, SC, and at Idaho National Laboratory.

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But now the U.S. nuclear waste storage program is “frozen in place”, according to Rod Ewing, Frank Stanton professor in nuclear security at Stanford’s Center for International Security and Cooperation.

“The processing and handling of waste is slow to stopped and in this environment the pressure has become very great to do something.”

Currently, more than seventy thousand metric tons of spent nuclear fuel from civilian reactors is sitting in temporary aboveground storage facilities spread across 35 states, with many of the reactors that produced it shut down.  And U.S. taxpayers are paying the utilities billions of dollars to keep it there.

Meanwhile, the deep geologic repository where all that waste was supposed to go, in Yucca Mountain Nevada, is now permanently on hold, after strong resistance from Nevada residents and politicians led by U.S. Senator Harry Reid.

The Waste Isolation Pilot Plant in Carlsbad New Mexico, the world’s first geologic repository for transuranic waste, has been closed for over a year due to a release of radioactivity.

And other parts of the system, such as the vitrification plant at Hanford and the mixed oxide fuel plant at Savannah River , SC, are way behind schedule and over budget.

It’s a growing problem that’s unlikely to change this political season.

“The chances of dealing with it in the current Congress are pretty much nil, in my view,” said former U.S. Senator Jeff Bingaman (D-NM).

“We’re not going to see a solution to this problem this year or next year.”

The issue in Congress is generally divided along political lines, with Republicans wanting to move forward with the original plan to build a repository at Yucca Mountain, while Democrats support the recommendations of the Blue Ribbon Commission on America’s Nuclear Future to create a new organization to manage nuclear waste in the U.S. and start looking for a new repository location using an inclusive, consent-based process.

“One of the big worries that I have with momentum loss is loss of nuclear competency,” said David Clark, a Fellow at the Los Alamos National Laboratory.

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“So we have a whole set of workers who have been trained, and have been working on these programs for a number of years. When you put a program on hold, people go find something else to do.”

Meanwhile, other countries are moving ahead with plans for their own repositories, with Finland and Sweden leading the pack, leaving the U.S. lagging behind.

So Ewing decided to convene a series of high-level conferences, where leading academics and nuclear experts from around the world can discuss the issues in a respectful environment with a diverse range of stakeholders – including former politicians and policy makers, scientists and representatives of Indian tribes and other effected communities.

“For many of these people and many of these constituencies, I’ve seen them argue at length, and it’s usually in a situation where a lot seems to be at stake and it’s very adversarial,” said Ewing.

“So by having the meeting at Stanford, we’ve all taken a deep breath, the program is frozen in place, nothing’s going to go anywhere tomorrow, we have the opportunity to sit and discuss things. And I think that may help.”

Former Senator Bingaman said he hoped the multidisciplinary meetings, known at the “Reset of Nuclear Waste Management Strategy and Policy Series”, would help spur progress on this pressing problem.

“There is a high level of frustration by people who are trying to find a solution to this problem of nuclear waste, and there’s no question that the actions that we’ve taken thus far have not gotten us very far,” Bingaman said.

“I think that’s why this conference that is occurring is a good thing, trying to think through what are the problems that got us into the mess we’re in, and how do we avoid them in the future.”

The latest conference, held earlier this month, considered the question of how to structure a new nuclear waste management organization in the U.S.

Speakers from Sweden, Canada and France brought an international perspective and provided lessons learned from their countries nuclear waste storage programs.

“The other…major programs, France, Switzerland, United Kingdom, Canada, they all reached a crisis point, not too different from our own,” said Ewing.

“And at this crisis point they had to reevaluate how they would go forward. They each chose a slightly different path, but having thought about it, and having selected a new path, one can also observe that their programs are moving forward.”

France has chosen to adopt a closed nuclear cycle to recycle spent fuel and reuse it to generate more electricity.

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“It means that the amount of waste that we have to dispose of is only four percent of the total volume of spent nuclear fuel which comes out of the reactor,” said Christophe Poinssot of the French Atomic and Alternative Energy Commission.

“We also reduce the toxicity because…we are removing the plutonium. And finally, we are conditioning the final waste under the form of nuclear glass, the lifetime of which is very long, in the range of a million years in repository conditions.”

Clark said that Stanford was the perfect place to convene a multidisciplinary group of thought leaders in the field who could have a real impact on the future of nuclear waste storage policy.

“The beauty of a conference like this, and holding it at a place like Stanford University and CISAC, is that all the right people are here,” he said.

“All the people who are here have the ability to influence, through some level of authority and scholarship, and they’ll be able to take the ideas that they’ve heard back to their different offices and different organizations.  I think it will make a difference, and I’m really happy to be part of it.”

Ewing said it was also important to include students in the conversation.

“There’s a next generation of researchers coming online, and I want to save them the time that it took me to realize what the problems are,” Ewing said.

“By mixing students into this meeting, letting them interact with all the parties, including the distinguished scientists and engineers, I’m hoping it speeds up the process.”

Professor Ewing is already planning his next conference, next March, which will focus on the consent-based process that will be used to identify a new location within the U.S. for a repository.

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Three CISAC scientists have joined 26 of the nation’s top nuclear experts to send an open letter to President Obama in support of the Iran deal struck in July.

“The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) the United States and its partners negotiated with Iran will advance the cause of peace and security in the Middle East and can serve as a guidepost for future non-proliferation agreements,” the group of renowned scientists, academics and former government officials wrote in the letter dated August 8, 2015.

“This is an innovative agreement, with much more stringent constraints than any previously negotiated non-proliferation framework.”

CISAC senior fellow and former Los Alamos National Laboratory director Sig Hecker is a signatory to the letter, along with CISAC co-founder Sid Drell, and cybersecurity expert and CISAC affiliate Martin Hellman.

Six Nobel laureates also signed, including FSI senior fellow by courtesy and former Stanford Linear Accelerator director Burton Richter.

The letter arrives at a crucial time for the Obama administration as it rallies public opinion and lobbies Congress to support the Iran agreement.

You can read the full letter along with analysis from the New York Times at this link.

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ABSTRACT

The archival record makes clear that killing large numbers of civilians was the primary purpose of the atomic bombing of Hiroshima; destruction of military targets and war industry was a secondary goal and one that “legitimized” the intentional destruction of a city in the minds of some participants. The atomic bomb was detonated over the center of Hiroshima. More than 70,000 men, women, and children were killed immediately; the munitions factories on the periphery of the city were left largely unscathed. Such a nuclear attack would be illegal today. It would violate three major requirements of the law of armed conflict codified in Additional Protocol I of the Geneva Conventions: the principles of distinction, proportionality, and precaution. There could be great pressure to use nuclear weapons in future scenarios in which many American soldiers’ lives are at risk and there is no guarantee that a future US president would follow the law of armed conflict. That is why the United States needs senior military officers who fully understand the law and demand compliance and presidents who care about law and justice in war.

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Scott D. Sagan
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In 2013, the U.S. government announced that its nuclear war plans would be “consistent with the fundamental principles of the Law of Armed Conflict” and would “apply the principles of distinction and proportionality and seek to minimize collateral damage to civilian populations and civilian objects.” If properly applied, these legal principles can have a profound impact on U.S. nuclear doctrine. The prohibition against targeting civilians means that “countervalue” targeting and “minimum deterrence” strategies are illegal. The principle of distinction and the impermissibility of reprisal against civilians make it illegal for the United States, contrary to what is implied in the 2018 Nuclear Posture Review, to intentionally target civilians even in reprisal for a strike against U.S. or allied civilians. The principle of proportionality permits some, but not all, potential U.S. counterforce nuclear attacks against military targets. The precautionary principle means that the United States must use conventional weapons or the lowest-yield nuclear weapons that would be effective against legitimate military targets. The law of armed conflict also restricts targeting of an enemy's leadership to officials in the military chain of command or directly participating in hostilities, meaning that broad targeting to destroy an enemy's entire political leadership is unlawful.

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Scott D. Sagan
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In late August 2021, United States President Joseph Biden hosted the newly elected Israeli Prime Minister, Naftali Bennet, at the White House for an official meeting. Shortly after, Israeli journalist Barak Ravid reported that Biden and Bennet ‘reaffirmed the strategic understandings’ between the two allies on Israel’s ‘alleged undeclared military nuclear program’, noting that this reaffirmation of policy has been repeated by every US President since Richard Nixon.1 As shall be explored below, this statement is mostly accurate, with the seemingly glaring exception of President George H.W. Bush. Upon its publication, Ravid’s story became the most recent in a long line of reports detailing this repeated commitment by US presidents to their Israeli counterparts.2

What role does this commitment play in Israel’s long history with the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT)? The primary aim of this article is to answer this question by charting Israel’s relationship with the NPT and its decades-long fear of American coercion to join it. A secondary aim of this article is to provide a concise primer, or introduction, to this nuanced question for scholars and students alike, by reviewing the existing literature and adding insights from new archival sources to this growing body of work.

The paper proceeds in three parts. The first charts the emergence of Israel’s NPT policy and the technical-diplomatic road which led to the emergence of the policy in the late 1960s and the early 1970s. The second charts how this policy impacted Israel’s nuclear energy policy in the following decades, ultimately preventing it from pursuing its plan of launching a massive civilian nuclear infrastructure program, specifically nuclear power plants for electricity production. The third concludes with charting Israel’s NPT policy at the end of the Cold War. Research for this study was conducted in archives in the US, United Kingdom, Canada, and Israel, and taps both primary and secondary sources; Hebrew translations are by the author, unless otherwise noted.3

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Cold War History
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In July 2015, General Qasem Soleimani, former commander of Iran’s elite Quds Force, secretly traveled to Moscow to discuss an emergency plan to rescue the Assad regime in Syria, which had lost control of roughly 80 percent of Syrian territory in four years of civil war. Russia had just helped broker the 2015 Iran nuclear deal, known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action. Soleimani’s trip, disclosed three months later, took place in defiance of UN travel sanctions tied to Iran’s nuclear program and threatened to undermine it. Yet the meeting would initiate a decadelong evolution of the Iranian-Russian relationship, from tactical cooperation in Syria to close partnership today, culminating in the signing of a strategic partnership agreement between the two countries in January 2025.

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Foreign Affairs
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Or (Ori) Rabinowitz
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